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HISTORY   OF   THE   GREAT   WAR 
BASED  ON  OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS 

BY  DIRECTION  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  SECTION  OF 
THE  COMMITTEE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  AIR 


Being  the  Story  of 

The  part  played  in  the  Great  War 
by  the  Royal  Air  Force 

VOL.  IV 

BY 

H.  A.  JONES 


OXFORD 
AT  THE  CLARENDON  PRESS 

1934 


^ 


OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

AMEN    HOUSE    E.C.    4 
London   Edinburgh   Glasgow 

Leipzig  New  York  Toronto 
Melbourne  Capetown  Bombay- 
Calcutta  Madras  Shanghai 
HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

PUBLISHER    TO    THE 
UNIVERSITY 


D 


PRINTED  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


PREFACE 

This  volume  covers  naval  air  developments  and  opera- 
tions in  home  waters  throughout  191 7  and  for  the  first 
quarter  of  191 8.  It  includes  a  narrative  of  the  anti-sub- 
marine work  of  the  various  types  of  aircraft  during  the 
period  of  unrestricted  U-boat  warfare,  and  of  the  diverse 
operations  undertaken  by  naval  aircraft  based  at  or  near 
Dunkirk.  The  remainder  of  the  volume  deals  with  air 
warfare  on  the  Western  front,  beginning  with  the  battle 
of  Messines  in  June  191 7  and  ending  with  the  German 
offensives  on  the  Somme  and  on  the  Lys  in  March  and 
April  191 8. 

A  feature  of  the  period  dealt  with  was  the  development 
of  air  attacks  against  troops,  transport,  and  similar  targets 
on  the  ground.  These  attacks  reached  the  peak  of  their 
intensity  during  the  German  advance  on  the  Somme. 
When  the  situation  on  the  Third  Army  front  was  most 
critical,  on  the  26th  of  March  19 18,  thirty-seven  squadrons, 
out  of  a  total  of  sixty  working  with  the  British  armies  in 
France,  operated  over  the  Third  Army  front,  and  twenty- 
seven  of  them  were  specifically  engaged  on  low-flying 
attacks,  with  bomb  and  machine-gun,  against  ground 
targets. 

A  point  of  interest,  which  a  study  of  the  air  reports  has 
revealed  for  the  first  time,  is  that  when  the  German 
offensive  opened  on  the  21st  of  March  19 18,  the  fog  on 
the  front  of  the  Third  Army  was  not  so  dense  as  along  that 
of  the  Fifth  Army  on  its  right.  While  the  happenings  on 
the  Fifth  Army  front  were  almost  entirely  obscured  from 
the  air  in  the  morning,  some  of  the  observers  who  flew 
over  the  Third  Army  front  saw  and  reported  a  fair  amount. 
In  other  words,  ground  visibility,  on  which  the  defence 
schemes  so  largely  depended,  varied,  and  this  must  be 
taken  into  account  when  the  varying  fortunes  of  the 
defending  troops  are  under  consideration. 

Throughout  this  volume  the  air  story  is  told  of  necessity 


vi  PREFACE 

against  a  background  of  naval  and  military  operations. 
The  reader,  however,  will  remember  that,  although  the 
air  work  is  thus  thrown  into  sharp  relief,  he  is  looking  at 
only  one  aspect  of  the  various  battles  here  narrated.  The 
background  has  been  kept  as  colourless  as  possible,  but 
the  author  has  judged  it  necessary  to  make  an  occasional 
comment  on  the  military  operations.  If  a  corrective  is 
necessary  it  will  be  supplied  by  the  military  historian 
who  will  deal  with  the  battles  in  France,  covered  by  this 
volume,  in  subsequent  volumes  of  the  Military  Opera- 
tions. In  these  volumes  only  can  material  be  supplied  for 
an  adequate  judgement  of  the  campaign  on  the  Western 
front. 

The  author  has  again  received  much  assistance  from  the 
President  of  the  Reichsarchiv,  General  Hans  von  Haeften, 
as  from  his  predecessor,  General  Freiherr  Mertz  von 
Quirheim,  who,  in  particular,  supplied  the  material  from 
which  the  German  air  concentrations  for  the  various 
battles  have  been  set  out.  He  records  his  grateful  thanks 
to  these  officers  and,  through  them,  to  Archivrat  Major 
Arndt.  Apart  from  the  matter  supplied  by  the  Reich  s- 
archiv,  published  German  works,  wherever  they  show 
results  of  the  British  air  operations,  have  been  widely  con- 
sulted. Such  sources  are  acknowledged  in  the  text.  The 
author  hoped,  however,  to  visit  Potsdam  to  consult  the 
relevant  German  records  so  that  he  might  add  official 
evidence  concerning  the  effect  of  the  bombing  and  of  the 
low-flying  operations.  He  was  informed  that  the  German 
war  records  were  not  yet  sufficiently  collated  and  that  an 
appreciable  time  must  elapse  before  it  would  be  possible 
to  extract  the  required  documents.  If  the  information 
becomes  available  before  the  work  is  completed,  it  will  be 
appended  to  the  final  volume. 

The  author  has  received  much  help  from  those  officers, 
naval,  military,  and  air,  who  played  a  part  in  the  operations 
here  described,  and  a  great  number  of  private  documents 
have  been  freely  placed  at  his  disposal.    For  this  help, 


PREFACE  vii 

which  has  added  truth  and  colour  to  the  story,  he  acknow- 
ledges his  indebtedness.  He  expresses  his  thanks,  also,  to 
the  Military  Branch  of  the  Historical  Section,  for  com- 
ments and  advice  on  the  military  operations,  and  to 
Professor  D.  Nichol  Smith,  who  read  the  volume  in  proof 
and  made  valuable  suggestions.  Finally  he  pays  tribute 
to  the  assistance  he  has  received,  as  before,  from  the  staff 
of  the  Air  Historical  Branch. 

H.  A.  JONES. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I.    Aircraft  with  the  Fleet,   1917- 

March  1918.  ....  pp.  1-44 

Influence  of  the  German  U-boat  campaign.  A  change  of  Government. 
Reorganization  at  the  Admiralty. 

The  Grand  Fleet  Aircraft  Committee        .  .         p.  5 

Admiral  Beatty  dissatisfied  with  the  naval  air  situation.  A  Grand 
Fleet  Committee  appointed.  Its  recommendations.  Aircraft-carriers. 
The  Furious. 

Aircraft  Carrier  Operations  .  .  .  .       p.  14 

The  Manxman  and  mine-laying  operations 

Flying-boat  Successes     .  .  .  .  .       p.  16 

The  development  of  the  flying-boat.  Commander  J.  C.  Porte.  Large 
and  Small  Americas.  H.M.S.  Baby.  Hunting  Zeppelins  over  the  North 
Sea.  The  L.  22  and  L.  43  destroyed.  Flying-boat  and  aeroplane — a 
combined  adventure. 

Catapult  Experiments   .  .  .  .  p.  22 

Catapults — hydraulic,  electric,  and  compressed  air.  Experiments  at 
Hendon  and  in  the  hopper  Slinger. 

Fighter  Aeroplanes  in  Light  Cruisers         .  .       p.  23 

Flying-off  platforms  in  light  cruisers.  Harwich  Force  experiments  in 
1915.  A  platform  fitted  in  the  Yarmouth,  1917.  A  Sopwith  'Pup' 
flown  off.  The  Zeppelin  L.  23  destroyed  by  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant 
B.  A.  Smart  in  the  Yarmouth's  Sopwith  'Pup'. 

Deck  Landings     .  .  .  .  .  p.  26 

Squadron  Commander  E.  H.  Dunning  lands  on  the  forward  deck  of 
the  Furious.  Proposal  to  build  a  flying-on  deck  aft.  Opinion  divided. 
Admiralty  air  policy.   Flying  from  gun-turret  platforms. 

New  Proposals  for  Fleet  Aircraft     .  .  .       p.  30 

Admiralty  plans  for  Fleet  aircraft  revised.  Decisions  of  October  1917. 
And  of  January  191 8. 

A  proposed  air  offensive  against  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet.  The 
torpedo-carrying  Sopwith  'Cuckoo'. 

The  appointment  of  a  Rear- Admiral  for  Air. 

The  Furious,  fitted  with  a  landing-deck,  rejoins  the  Grand  Fleet. 
Landing  difficulties.  The  demand  for  a  clear  deck.  The  design  of  the 
Argus  modified. 

The  Eagle,  Glorious,  Courageous,  and  Hermes.  Flying  two-seaters 
off  turret  platforms. 


x  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Kite  Balloons  with  the  Fleet  .  .  .  p.  38 

The  balloon,  an  advantage  or  disadvantage?    A  lively  controversy. 
Admiralty  policy. 

Airships      .  .  .  .  .  .  p.  40 

Non-rigids.    Trouble  with,  the  'North  Sea'  type.    Reasons.    Rigids 
and  their  poor  performance.   Towing  'Coastals'  from  light  cruisers. 
Real  value  of  the  non-rigids. 
Grand  Fleet  Aircraft — a  general  summary. 

CHAPTER  II.  Unrestricted  U-boat  Warfare   pp.  45-77 

An  Anti-submarine  Division  formed  at  the  Admiralty,  December 
1916.  Additional  air  patrols.  The  South-Western  Group  of  air 
stations.  The  detective  work  of  the  Naval  Intelligence  Division. 
Difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  hostile  and  friendly  submarines. 
The  critical  period  of  April  1917.   The  convoy  system  adopted. 

Felixstowe  Flying-boats  .  .  .  p.  53 

The  Spider-web  patrol.  Successful  attacks  on  U-boats. 

Attacks  by  German  7 'orpedo- carrying  Aircraft  .       p.  55 

Surprise  of  a  new  form  of  attack,  April  191 7.  The  sinking  of  the 
S.S.  Gena,  1st  May.  All  aircraft  under  suspicion.  Admiralty  action. 
Further  attacks,  May,  June,  and  July.  Germans  abandon  this  form 
of  attack. 

Ocean  Convoys     .  .  .  .  .  •       P-  59 

Organization  of  the  convoy  system.  Aircraft  patrols.  The  Mullion 
Airship  Station.  Difficulties  of  airship  patrol  in  the  southern  part  of 
the  North  Sea.  Loss  of  the  C.iy  and  C.  27.  Airship  patrols  abandoned 
south  of  the  Norfolk  coast. 

Kite  Balloons       .  .  .  .  .  •      P«  63 

Controversy  about  the  value  of  kite  balloons. 
The  Kite  Balloon  Destroyer  Force. 
Stalking  U-boats.  The  U.  6g  destroyed. 
Additional  balloon  bases. 

Flying-boats  and  U-boats        .  .  .  .       p.  64 

More  Felixstowe  flying-boat  successes.  Probable  end  of  the  U.B.  36. 
Felixstowe  bombed.  The  U.C.  1  and  U.B.  20  destroyed. 

Handley-Page  patrols  off  the  Tees. 

End  of  the  U.C.  6. 

A  Porte  flying-boat  adventure. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xi 

The  North  Sea  Barrage  .  .  .  .       p.  67 

Minefield  to  close  north-about  route  to  U-boats. 
Aircraft  patrols. 

The  French  Coast  .  .  .  .  p.  68 

The  Cherbourg  station.  A  seaplane  destroys  the  U.B.  32. 

Anti-Submarine    operations    from    Dunkirk.     German    seaplane 
stations  on  the  Belgian  Coast. 

Flanders  I  and  //. 

Dunkirk  seaplanes  replaced  by  aeroplanes. 

A  Large  America  flying-boat  from  Dunkirk  destroys  the  U.C.  72. 
Anti-submarine  operations  summarized. 

CHAPTER    III.     Naval   Air   Operations    from 

Dunkirk,  1917-March  1918     .  .      pp.  78-108 

Bombing  operations.  The  Handley  Page  and  the  D.H.  4. 

The  Bombardments  of  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend      .       p.  82 

Attack  on  the  lock-gates  at  Zeebrugge  12th  May  191 7,  and  on  the 
dockyard  at  Ostend  5th  June  1917.   Aircraft  co-operation. 

The  Belgian  Coast  Barrage    .  .  .  p.  86 

The  barrage  reinstituted,  July   1917.    Aircraft  patrols.    German 
bombing  attacks  on  the  ships.  The  Fernlenkboot. 

Bombardments  of  Ostend         .  .  .  p.  89 

Attacks  on  Ostend  by  monitors  of  the  barrage  patrol,  September- 
December  1917.  Work  of  the  naval  aircraft.   German  smoke-screens. 

A  projected  Landing      .  .  .  .  p.  90 

Landing  operations  dependent  on  progress  of  the  battles  of  Ypres, 
1917.  Air  photographic  survey  of  the  landing  beaches. 

Naval  Air  Co-operation  in  the  Flanders  offensive      p.  92 

Patrols  by  naval  fighting  aircraft.   Day  and  night  bombing. 

The  German  Bombing  Squadrons      .  .  .       p.  98 

Daylight  bombing  attacks  on  England.  Effect  on  the  Dunkirk  air 
squadrons.  Concentrated  bombing  attacks  on  the  naval  aircraft  depot, 
St.  Pol.  The  depot  goes  out  of  action.  Bombing  by  the  Handley 
Pages  and  D.H.  4s. 
Importance  of  the  photographic  work  of  the  Dunkirk  squadrons.  A 
general  summary.  War  development  of  Bruges  as  an  Imperial  Dockyard. 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Duel  between  the  bomb  and  ferro-concrete.  Standard  thickness  of  roof 
and  walls  of  protected  buildings.  The  submarine  shelters  in  the  North 
Darse. 

Bruges,  Zeebrugge,  and  Ostend,  as  important  naval  targets. 

Bombing  operations  of  Dunkirk  air  squadrons  analysed.  Dissipation 
of  effort. 

Flights  in  British  aircraft  by  H.M.  the  King  of  the  Belgians. 

CHAPTER  IV.  The  Battle  of  Messines,  7th-i4th 

June  1917 pp.  109-137 

General  plan  subsequent  to  failure  of  Nivelle  offensive.  Clearing  the 
Belgian  coast.  Importance  of  the  Messines- Wytschaete  ridge.  The 
British  and  German  formations  in  the  area.  Air  concentration  for  the 
preliminary  battle.  Importance  of  artillery  operations.  Main  duties 
of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps.  The  scheme  for  the  air  offensive.  The 
wireless  interception  organization.  The  German  system  of  wireless 
warnings. 

The  opening  bombardment.  'Bombardment  Flights.'  Air  observa- 
tion for  the  artillery.  Air  fighting.  Death  of  Lieutenant  Schaefer. 
Air  reconnaissances.  Bombing  operations.  Rehearsals  of  the  artillery 
barrage. 

The  Attack p.  125 

The  explosion  of  mines.  Contact  patrol  reports.  Failure  of  infantry 
to  light  flares.  Progress  of  the  battle. 

Attacks  by  low-flying  aircraft.  Feat  of  Captain  W.  A.  Bishop.  Low- 
flying  attacks  of  a  sporadic  kind. 

Air  observation  for  the  artillery  during  the  attack.  Bombing.  Air 
fighting. 

Consolidation.  Air  work  curtailed. 

Freiherr  von  Richthofen  returns  from  leave.  German  pilots  become 
more  active.    Influence  of  German  air  raids  on  England.    Fighting 
squadrons  withdrawn  from  France.   Effect  on  the  air  position  on  the 
Western  front. 
Lessons  of  the  battle. 

CHAPTER  V.  The  Battles  of  Ypres,  31st  July- 

10th  November  1917      .  .  .    pp.  138-226 

The  plan  of  operations.  British  take  over  the  Nieuport  sector  from 
the  French.  The  Fifth  Army  re-formed  in  Ypres  area.  The  Fourth 
Army  move  north  to  the  coast. 

Air  Concentration  for  the  Offensive  .  .     p.  140 

The  head-quarters  of  the  V  Brigade  move  north  with  the  staff  of  the 
Fifth  Army.  Composition  of  the  Brigade.  The  IV  Brigade  with  the 
Fourth  Army. 

The  air  concentration,  Allied  and  German,  summarized. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xiii 

Employment  of  Aircraft  .  .  .  .    p.  143 

Major-General  Trenchard  issues  general  instructions  for  the  employ- 
ment of  Allied  aircraft  in  the  battle.   The  air  offensive  ordered  to 
begin  on  the  8th  July. 
The  Aerial  Activity  Office  of  the  V  Brigade. 

The  German  Attack  at  Lombartzyde         .  .     p.  146 

The  Germans  deliver  a  surprise  attack.  Why  the  air  observers  failed 
to  report  German  preparations.  Success  of  the  German  attack. 
Counter-battery  work  of  No.  52  Squadron.  Development  of  co-opera- 
tion between  aeroplanes  and  balloons.  Also  between  aeroplanes  and 
sound-ranging  sections. 

The  Influence  of  Air  Raids  on  England     .  .     p.  152 

London  bombed  for  second  time  by  daylight,  7th  July.  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  asked  for  two  righting  squadrons  and  to  make  a  raid  on  Mann- 
heim. His  protest.  One  squadron  sent.  Fighting  aeroplanes  diverted 
to  Home  Defence  Squadrons.  Sir  Douglas  Haig  protests  again.  A 
comment. 

The  Preliminary  Air  Offensive        .  .  .    p.  155 

Bombing  German  aerodromes. 
Large-scale  clashes  in  the  air. 

The  Battle  Opens p.  160 

Progress  of  the  fighting,  31st  July.  Weather  affects  flying  programme. 
Single-seater  fighters  used  for  low  bombing.  Explaining  the  air  arm 
to  the  infantry.  Bad  weather  delays  renewal  of  the  offensive. 

The  Attack  on  Hill  yo  [Loos'].  .  .  .p.  169 

A  diversion  near  Lens.   Hill  70  captured.  Aircraft  co-operation. 

The  Battle  of  Langemarck,  16 th-i 8th  August  .  p.  172 
The  Ypres  attacks  resumed.  A  serious  failure.  The  German  'pill- 
boxes'. Weather  conditions  prevent  air  observers  reporting  counter- 
attack concentrations.  Work  of  the  squadrons. 

Minor  Operations  .  .  .  .  .    p.  179 

Ypres  area  a  morass.  Minor  operations  on  other  parts  of  the  front. 
Low-flying  attacks  in  co-ordination  with  infantry.  Gillemont  Farm 
and  Cologne  Hill  Farm. 

The  Battle  of  the  Menin  Road  Ridge,  20th-2$th 

September  .  .  .  .  .    p.  180 

The  weather  improves  and  ground  recovers  at  Ypres.  Offensive 
resumed.  Scheme  of  employment  of  squadrons.  Success  of  the  battle. 


xiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Examples  of  low-flying  attacks.  Many  warnings  of  concentrations  for 
counter-attacks  sent  from  the  air.  Enemy  formations  broken  up  by 
artillery  fire.  Bombing  operations.  Air  Fighting.  Death  of  Werner 
Voss. 

The  Battle  of  Polygon  Wood,  26  th  September-jrd 

October p.  190 

A  successful  advance.  Counter-attack  warnings  from  the  air.  Heavy 
German  losses. 

Low-flying  attacks.   Bombing  and  fighting. 

Development  of  Night  Flying.  .  .  .     p.  196 

Night  bombing  by  the  Corps  squadrons.  First  night  flights  in  'Camels' 
and  Bristol  Fighters.  German  night-bombing  squadron.  Attacks  on 
the  German  aerodromes.   Night  bombing  by  single-seater  fighters. 

No.  56  Squadron.  The  Services  and  publicity.  The  views  of  Sir 
Douglas  Haig.  Air  Statistics  of  the  Ypres  battles. 

Broodseinde  and  Poelcappelle,  4th  and  9 th  October    p.  202 

The  Broodseinde  attack,  4th  October.  Rain.  Restricted  air  work. 
General  effect  of  bad  weather  on  the  operations.  Major  objectives 
impossible  of  attainment.  Why  the  offensive  was  continued. 

The  attack  of  9th  October.  Contact  patrols  and  counter-attack 
patrols. 

Continuous  rain.  The  attack  of  12th  October. 

Air  reports  of  German  movements. 

The  bombing  attack  on  Rumbeke  aerodrome. 

20th  October.  Further  infantry  attacks.  Aircraft  co-operation. 

Death  of  Lieutenant  A.  P.  F.  Rhys-Davids. 

Passchendaele       .  .  .  .  .  .     p.  21 1 

The  capture  of  Passchendaele. 

Developments  in  Artillery  Co-operation,  191 7     .     p.  213 

Increase  in  artillery  and  problems  of  co-operation.  New  battery  com- 
manders arrive  in  France  without  knowledge  of  latest  methods  of 
co-operation  between  aeroplanes  and  artillery.  One  reason  is  diversity 
of  methods  in  use.  A  memorandum  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ludlow- 
Hewitt.  The  need  for  standardization. 

Propaganda  by  air         .  .  .  .  .     p.  219 

Dropping  propaganda  pamphlets  from  aeroplanes.  Illegal  according 
to  German  view.  The  Death  Penalty.  Royal  Flying  Corps  officers 
sentenced  to  penal  servitude.  British  Government  protests.  Protests 
effective.  Propaganda  by  air  a  legitimate  act  of  war.  Special  balloons. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xv 

CHAPTER  VI.    The  Battle  of  Cambrai,  20th 

November-7th  December  191 7        .    pp.  227-259 

The  interest  of  the  battle  of  Cambrai.  Reasons  for  the  battle.  Plan 
of  operations.  Overwhelming  air  concentration.  No  preliminary 
bombardment.  Special  air  arrangements.  Discreet  air  patrols.  Bad 
flying  weather  helps  surprise.  The  experience  of  a  German  flying 
officer.  The  opening  of  the  battle.  Mist.  Low-flying  attacks  by 
single-seater  fighters. 

The  check  at  Flesquieres.  Personal  accounts  of  flying  pilots.  Heavy 
casualties  to  low-flying  aeroplanes. 

Corps  aeroplanes  in  the  mist.  Nothing  seen  of  the  Flesquieres  check. 

Bombing  operations. 

The  importance  of  Bourlon  Wood.  The  advance  resumed,  21st 
November.  Rain  and  low  clouds.  The  position  on  the  evening  of  the 
2 1  st.  Disquiet.  The  case  for  withdrawal.  Sir  Douglas  Haig  decides 
to  go  on.  Air  reports  of  German  reinforcements.  The  attack  of 
23rd  November.  Part  played  by  German  anti-aircraft  guns  used  as 
anti-tank  weapons.  Richthofen's  'Circus'  arrives  from  Flanders.  All 
J agdstaffeln  placed  under  Richthofen.  Intense  low-flying  attacks, 
German  and  British,  on  the  23rd.  Royal  Flying  Corps  low-flying 
casualties,  30  per  cent. 

The  struggle  for  Bourlon  village. 

Influence  of  the  Richthofen  'Circus'.   Provision  of  fighter  escorts. 

Warnings  of  a  German  counter-stroke.  Confidence  at  General 
Head-quarters.  Some  of  the  bombing  activity  diverted  to  other  fronts. 
The  German  counter-offensive,  30th  November.  Mist.  A  tactical 
surprise  in  the  south.  Reasons  for  the  surprise.  Part  played  by  German 
low-flying  aircraft.  The  attack  at  Bourlon.  Concentration  of  aero- 
planes in  the  area.  German  low-flying  attacks.  Some  of  the  results. 
Attack  and  counter-attack.  The  Bourlon  positions  abandoned. 

General  comments.  Low-flying  attacks  the  feature  of  the  battle. 
German  staff  views  on  their  value. 

CHAPTER  VII.  The  German  Offensive,  1918. 
The  First  Battles  of  the  Somme,  21st 
March~5th  April  .  .  .  .    pp.  260-365 

Lessons  of  the  Cambrai  battle.  Schemes  for  defence.  Employment  of 
Royal  Flying  Corps  when  army  is  on  defensive.  Importance  of  recon- 
naissance. Extension  of  British  line.  The  German  plans.  Apprecia- 
tion of  German  intentions  by  Fifth  Army  commander.  Views  of 
G.H.Q.  Influence  of  air  reports.  Value  of  air  photographs.  Infantry 
warned,  20th  March,  attack  would  be  made  next  morning. 

Air  Concentrations  for  the  battle      .  .  .     p.  271 

Particulars  of  British  and  German  concentrations.  German  air  service 
outnumbers  British  in  battle  area.  German  air  reorganization  and 
expansion  1917-18  reviewed.  Kriegspiele. 


xvi  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Air  Operations  before  the  battle       .  .  .p.  ^77 

Guiding  policy,  'interference  with  enemy  preparations'.  Co-operation 
with  the  artillery.  A  word  about  the  Corps  Squadrons.  Bombing 
programmes  and  operations.  Attacks  on  German  aerodromes. 

The  air  offensive.  Discussion  about  size  of  fighting  formations. 
Schemes  of  air  patrol. 

Air  combats. 

The  Offensive  begins     .  .  .  .  .p.  290 

Schemes  for  employment  of  squadrons  once  the  German  attack  had 
begun.  4.45  a.m.  on  21st  March.   Fog. 

Morning  visibility  better  on  Third  than  on  Fifth  Army  front.  Air 
reconnaissances  of  Third  Army  front.  Fog  lifts  about  1  p.m. 
Subsequent  air  work.  Widespread  German  movements  reported. 
German  low-flying  activities.  Intense  air  fighting.  Evidence  from 
German  side  of  effect  of  British  air  attacks.  Extent  of  German  ad- 
vance. Air  squadrons  move  back. 

Fog  again,  22nd  March.  German  advance  renewed.  A  critical 
situation.  Low-flying  attacks.  Strategic  bombing.  Air  offensive 
patrols.  Night  bombers  give  information  of  German  reinforcements. 
Fifth  Army  withdraw  further.  23rd  March,  a  gap  in  the  line.  Con- 
tact-patrol reports  mirror  the  battle.  Low-flying  attacks,  bombing, 
and  air  fighting.  Germans  exploit  the  gap,  24th  March.  Air  reports 
show  threat  developing.  British  low-flying  attacks  intensified.  Air 
fighting  increases  and  at  lower  heights. 

25th  March,  day  of  crisis.  A  wedge  between  French  and  British. 
Exploiting  gaps  on  Third  Army  front.  Air  messages  report  German 
masses,  but  British  guns  mostly  silent. 

All  available  squadrons  diverted  to  Third  Army  front  to  attack 
enemy.   'Very  low  flying  is  essential.  All  risks  to  be  taken.' 

Night  bombing  in  hail  and  snow. 

Low-flying  attacks  begin  at  dawn,  26th  March.  A  day  of  bitter 
fighting.  Third  Army  crisis  ends. 

Desperate  plight  of  Fifth  Army.  Air  reports  of  the  threat  to  Roye. 
British  and  French  diverging.  Low-flying  attacks  to  stem  advance  on 
Roye.  Enemy  air  activity  falls  away. 

The  appointment  of  General  Foch. 

Night  bombing  operations. 

Amiens  as  the  German  objective.  Air  operations  on  Third  Army 
front,  27th  March.  V.C.  award  to  Lieutenant  A.  A.  McLeod.  Con- 
centration of  low-flying  attacks  south  of  the  Somme.  Night  bombing 
to  help  Fifth  Army. 

Attack  at  Arras,  28th  March,  and  fight  for  Amiens  continued. 
Remnants  of  Fifth  Army  absorbed  by  Fourth  Army.  An  appreciation 
of  the  Fifth  Army.  Low-flying  attacks  continued  mainly  south  of  the 
Somme. 

Air  fighters  begin  to  return  to  the  upper  air. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xvii 

Bombing  railway  junctions. 

General  Foch's  air  instructions.  A  comment.  Change  in  air  tactics. 
Air  fighting  formations  concentrated. 

German  attacks  on  5th  April  end  in  failure.  The  line  settles  down. 

Aerodrome  and  Supply  Organization         .  .     p.  353 

Difficulties  of  aerodrome  accommodation  and  of  maintenance  during 
the  retreat.  How  aerodromes  were  chosen.  Emergency  supply  schemes 
of  Brigadier-General  Brooke-Popham.  Removal  of  the  depots  from 
Candas  and  Fienvillers.  A  tribute  to  the  air  mechanics. 

Work  of  the  air  squadrons  in  the  March  retreat.  Service  contro- 
versy. Breakdown  of  co-operation  with  the  artillery.  Reasons. 
General  comments.  Opportunties  missed  by  the  German  air  service. 
Breakdown  in  German  air  supply  and  in  communications.  Comments 
of  General  von  Hoeppner. 

CHAPTER  VIII.   The  Battles  of  the  Lys,  9th- 

29th  April  191 8     .  .  .  .    pp.  366-404 

Air  reports  of  an  enemy  concentration  north  of  La  Bassee.  Views  of 
G.H.Q. 

British  and  German  dispositions. 

The  Battle  of  ens .  .....     p.  374 

The  attack  made  in  fog,  9th  April.  Portuguese  overwhelmed.  No 
flying  until  2  p.m.  No.  208  Squadron  burn  their  aeroplanes.  Contact 
patrols  in  the  afternoon  plot  the  German  advance.  Low-flying  at- 
tacks. Squadrons  go  on  the  move.  The  battle  area  extends,  loth 
April.  Ground  mist  and  low  clouds.  Low-flying  attacks  in  the  mist. 
Casualties. 

Contact  patrols  from  low  heights. 

Gaps  in  the  line,  nth  April.  Fighter  squadrons  concentrated  on 
low-bombing  attacks. 

Bombing  railway  junctions. 

A  critical  day,  12th  April.  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  'backs  to  the  wall' 
order.  Fine  weather  leads  to  great  air  activity.  The  progress  of  the 
battle  clearly  reported  by  the  contact-patrol  observers.  Low-flying 
attacks  concentrated  to  stem  advance  on  Hazebrouck. 

Bombing  the  German  lines  of  communication.  Attacks  on  German 
observation  balloons.  Traffic  to  the  battle  area  bombed  by  night. 
The  German  advance  slackens. 

The  attack  on  Filler s-Bretonneux    .  .  .     p.  387 

Indications  of  a  renewal  of  the  offensive  on  the  Somme.  Air  reports 
of  night  activity  at  Chaulnes  railway  junction.  The  junction  bombed. 
Germans  attack  with  tanks,  24th  April.  Poor  visibility.  Contact 
patrols  from  a  low  height. 

Death  of  Freiherr  Manfred  von  Richthofen.  His  career  and  an 
estimate. 


xviii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

The  Loss  of  Kemmel  Hill       .         .  .  •     P-  397 

The  Lys  attack  resumed,  25  th  April.  Germans  take  Kemmel.  Air 
reports  of  traffic  congestion.  Long-range  gun-fire  and  bombing 
attacks.  Low  bombing  in  the  battle  area.  German  aeroplanes  very 
active. 

Arrangements  in  being  to  divert  all  head-quarters  fighter  squadrons 
to  low  bombing.   The  battle  dies  down  in  bad  weather. 

Supply  and  repair  difficulties  during  the  battle.  How  they  were 
overcome.  The  emergency  depot  at  Guines.  Subsidiary  depots  at 
Desvres  and  Motteville. 

Wastage  in  British  aircraft  during  the  German  March-April  offen- 
sive.  Losses  in  equipment  and  stores. 

Difficulties  of  the  German  air  service  during  the  Lys  battles.  Air 
superiority  passes  to  the  Allies  after  second  day.  Complaints  from  the 
German  infantry.  German  communications  again  break  down. 
General  von  Hoeppner's  comments. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xix 

APPENDICES 

PAGE 

I.  Admiralty  Memorandum  on  Naval  Air  Policy  (August  191 7)     407 
II.  Anti-Submarine  Results.  By  Various  Types  of  Aircraft,  191 7    408 

III.  Order    of   Battle,  Royal    Flying    Corps,  7th    June    1917 

(Messines)  ........     409 

IV.  Daily  Artillery  Results  by  the  Second  (Corps)  Wing — 15th 

May  to  9th  June  1917 413 

V.  Order    of   Battle,    Royal    Flying    Corps,  31st    July  191 7 

(Ypres) 414 

VI.  Battles  of  Ypres,  1917.   R.F.C.,  H.Q.  Orders  for  bombing 

and  machine-gun  attacks    .  .  .  .  .  .418 

VII.  V  Brigade  R.F.C.  Order,  31st  July  1917  .  .  .  .421 

VIII.  9th  Wing,  R.F.C.  Order,  31st  July  1917.  .  .  .     422 

IX.  The  Battle  of  Cambrai  1917.   R.F.C.  H.Q.  Instructions  to 

I  Brigade  and  Ninth  Wing.  .....     424 

X.  Order  of  Battle,  Royal  Flying  Corps,  20th  November  191 7 

(Cambrai)        ........     426 

XI.  Battle  of  Cambrai.   Ill  Brigade,  R.F.C.   Special  Operation 

Order 431 

XII.  Employment  of  Battle  Flights.    German  Memorandum  of 

February  1918 433 

XIII.  Extract  from  German  Manual  'The  attack  in  Position  War- 
fare', dated  1st  January  191 8.  VL  Air  Forces        .  .     439 

XIV.  The  Employment  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  in  Defence. 

(Memorandum  issued  by  G.H.Q.  January  191 8)     .  .     444 

XV.  Order  of  Battle,  Royal   Flying   Corps,  21st  March  1918 

(German  Offensive)    .......     446 

XVI.  Comparative  Table  of  Changes  in  Strength  of  British  and 
German  Air  Services  during  the  German  Somme 
Offensive  191 8 

Table  A.  British  and  opposing  German     . 

Table  B.  German  Air  Strength  opposing  the  French  . 

XVII.  Development  of  Aerial  Fighting.  (H.Q.,  R.F.C.  Memoran- 
dum of  December  191 7)     453 

XVIII.  Orders  of  General  Foch  (translated),  1st  April  1918  .     456 

XIX.  Brigade  Strength  in  Squadrons,  9th  April  1918.  (Battles!   after 
of  the  Lys) J      458 

INDEX 459 


after 
451 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

1.  Sphere  of  Naval  Air  Operations  in  Home  Waters  191 7- 

1918  .  •       .  To  face  p.     1 

2.  Seaplane    and    Flying-Boat    Patrols.     South-Western 

Group  of  Air  Stations,  July  1917  ....  48 

3.  North  Hinder  Flying-Boat  Patrol  (Spider- Web),  April 

1917 53 

4.  Battle  of  Messines,  7th  June  1917.  Disposition  of  R.F.C. 

Corps  Squadrons  ......  109 

5.  Battles  of  Ypres,  1917 137 

6.  Battles  of  Ypres,  1917.  Disposition  of  Royal  Naval  Air 

Service  and  Royal  Flying  Corps  Squadrons,  31st  July 

1917 212 

7.  Battle  of  Cambrai,  20th  November-7th  December  191 7  227 

8.  Battle  of  Cambrai.    Scheme  of  Employment  of  the 

Royal  Flying  Corps,  20th  November  191 7        .  .  244 

9.  German  Offensive  on  the  Somme,  March  1918    .  .  267 

10.  German  Offensive  on  the  Somme,  March  191 8.    Dis- 

position of  British  and  German  Aircraft  Units,  21st 

March  1918 364 

11.  German  Offensive  on  the  Lys,  April  1 91 8  .  .  404 


SPHERE  OF  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS 

IN   HOME  WATERS,   1917-1918. 


CHAPTER  I 
AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET 

igiy-March  igi8 

Developments  and  Operations 
[Map  facing.] 

In  191 7  there  were  important  developments  in  all 
branches  of  naval  air  work.  Some  were  made  possible  by 
the  trials  and  patient  organization  of  the  earlier  years  of 
warfare.  One,  the  introduction  of  the  aeroplane,  or  land 
aircraft,  for  fleet  work,  was  revolutionary.  Another,  the 
development  of  the  large  flying-boat  for  reconnaissance, 
and  as  an  offensive  weapon,  with  the  southern  part  of  the 
North  Sea  for  its  field  of  operations,  was  due  in  great 
measure  to  the  faith  and  persistence  of  one  flying  officer. 

The  direction  of  the  naval  air  expansion  was  greatly 
influenced  by  the  German  U-boat  campaign.  The  battle 
of  Jutland  left  Admiral  Scheer  with  no  illusions.  He  knew, 
as  he  says  in  his  book,  Germany'' s  High  Sea  Fleet  in  the 
World  War  (p.  169),  that  no  possible  action  by  the  German 
fleet  could  overcome  the  British  naval  blockade  and,  in  a 
report  to  the  Emperor  wherein  he  summarized  his  final 
impressions  of  the  battle,  said :  'A  victorious  end  to  the 
'war  at  not  too  distant  a  date  can  only  be  looked  for  by 
'the  crushing  of  English  economic  life  through  U-boat 
'action  against  English  commerce.' 

Before  any  decision  was  reached  for  an  extension  of  U- 
boat  warfare,  Scheer  had  made  his  August  191 6  sortie  into 
the  North  Sea.  He  did  not,  on  that  occasion,  risk  contact 
with  Admiral  Jellicoe's  forces,  but  successful  action  by  his 
U-boats  had  led  to  a  revision  of  the  policy  of  the  employ- 
ment of  the  Grand  Fleet.  The  light  cruisers  Nottingham  and 
Falmouth  had  been  torpedoed  in  the  swept  areas  off  the 
East  Coast,  and,  in  consequence,  Admiral  Jellicoe  had 
urged  that  the  Grand  Fleet  should  not  again  be  taken 
south  of  the  Dogger  Bank  or  east  of  longitude  40  E.  unless 
every  class  of  vessel  was  protected  by  anti-submarine 
screens ;  with  this  view  the  Admiralty  agreed. 

In  October  1916  a  new,  but  restricted,  U-boat  campaign 

2504»4  t. 


2  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

began,  and  Admiral  Scheer  no  longer  had  the  Ems  and 
Flanders  submarine  flotillas  at  his  disposal  for  operations 
with  the  High  Sea  Fleet.  He  tried  a  sortie  without  their 
help  in  this  month,  but  nothing  came  of  it,  and  the  Ger- 
man Fleet  went  back  to  its  harbours.  There  ensued  a  posi- 
tion of  deadlock  between  the  opposing  fleets  which 
endured  until  191 8. 

Meanwhile  controversy  on  the  subject  of  U-boat  war- 
fare was  having  political  and  service  reactions  in  Germany 
and  in  England.  In  Germany  the  naval  chiefs,  led  by 
Admiral  von  HoltzendorfT,  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff, 
conducted  an  intensive  propaganda  for  the  abolition  of 
all  restrictions  against  the  employment  of  the  U-boats. 
Holtzendorff  knew  that  lawless  submarine  warfare  might 
bring  America  into  the  war  alongside  the  Allies,  but  he 
argued  that  America  was  not  to  be  feared  as  she  could  do 
nothing  effective.  Dr.  von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  the 
Imperial  Chancellor,  and  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  opposed  the  naval  staff,  on  grounds  of 
expediency  rather  than  morality,  but  when  the  military 
chiefs,  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff,  ranged  themselves 
with  their  naval  colleagues,  it  was  obvious  that  a  decision 
for  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  was  merely  a  matter  of 
time.  The  new  policy,  in  fact,  was  put  into  operation  on 
the  1st  of  February  1917.  To  the  student  of  psychology, 
the  shifts  and  manoeuvres  by  which  Germany  came  to  the 
final  announcement  of  her  intentions  are  of  interest.  The 
events  which  led  to  the  decision  are  revealed  in  published 
German  official  documents  and  in  the  memoirs  of  the  pro- 
tagonists: they  are  also  well  summarized  in  the  British 
official  naval  history  (Naval  Operations,  vol.  iv,  ch.  vii). 

In  England  those  who  were  in  the  best  position  to  judge 
foresaw  that  Germany  would  stake  everything  on  the  sub- 
marine. Admiral  Jellicoe  had  continuously  urged  the 
adoption  of  more  energetic  measures  to  combat  the  U- 
boats.  Tt  seemed  to  me',  he  says,  'questionable  whether 
'our  organization  at  the  Admiralty  included  a  sufficiently 
'numerous  and  important  staff,  having  as  its  sole  business 
'the  work  of  dealing,  rapidly  and  effectively,  with  the  pro- 
'blem  which  was  assuming  such  very  serious  proportions. 


i9i6]         A  CHANGE  OF  GOVERNMENT  3 

'It  did  not  appear  that  new  proposals  and  inventions 
'for  dealing  with  the  submarine  campaign  were  being 
'pushed  forward  with  the  necessary  rapidity,  possibly  be- 
'cause  of  the  absence  of  such  an  organization,  and  of  the 
'difficulties  connected  with  labour  and  materiel ';  and 
'generally  it  seemed  doubtful  whether  the  dangers  con- 
'fronting  us  would  be  successfully  combated.'1 

In  a  letter  to  the  Admiralty,  written  in  October  191 6, 
Admiral  Jellicoe  had  defined  these  dangers.  'Our  losses  in 
'merchant  ships,'  he  said,  'combined  with  the  losses  in 
'neutral  merchant  ships,  may,  by  the  early  summer  of  191 7, 
'have  such  a  serious  effect  upon  the  import  of  food  and 
'other  necessaries  into  the  Allied  countries  as  to  force  us 
'into  accepting  peace  terms  which  the  military  position  on 
'the  Continent  would  not  justify,  and  which  would  fall 
'short  of  our  desires.' 

It  was,  indeed,  clear  that  there  must  be  a  wide  revision 
of  our  existing  methods  of  conducting  the  war.  On  the 
22nd  of  November  1916  Admiral  Jellicoe,  who  had  pre- 
viously been  invited  to  London  to  confer  with  the  Govern- 
ment, was  offered  the  post  of  First  Sea  Lord.  A  week  later 
he  left  the  Iron  Duke  for  Whitehall  and  was  succeeded  as 
Commander-in-Chief  by  Admiral  Sir  David  Beatty.  On 
the  4th  of  December  Mr.  Asquith,  the  leader  of  the 
Coalition  Government,  resigned,  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
formed  his  Coalition  Government  three  days  later.  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  created  the  War  Cabinet  of  four  or  five 
members,  freed  from  departmental  duties,  whose  decisions 
on  all  matters  affecting  the  conduct  of  the  war  were  to  be 
absolute. 

At  the  Admiralty  Mr.  Balfour  was  succeeded  as 
First  Lord  by  Sir  Edward  Carson,  and  a  new  Board  of 
Admiralty  was  formed.2  On  the  18th  of  December  1916 
a  special  division  for  the  co-ordination  and  control  of  all 
anti-submarine  operations  was  set  up  at  the  Admiralty 

1  The  Grand  Fleet  igi 4-1916,  by  Viscount  Jellicoe  of  Scapa,  pp.  456-7. 

2  Sir  Edward  Carson,  First  Lord;  Admiral  Sir  John  R.  Jellicoe,  First 
Sea  Lord ;  Admiral  Sir  Cecil  Burney,  Second  Sea  Lord;  Rear- Admiral  F.  C. 
Tudor  Tudor,  Third  Sea  Lord;  and  Commodore  Lionel  Halsey,  Fourth 
Sea  Lord. 


4  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

under  Rear-Admiral  A.  L.  Duff,  previously  Second-in- 
Command  of  the  1st  Battle  Squadron. 

It  was  not  long  before  the  Board  of  Admiralty  was  itself 
expanded.  The  War  Cabinet,  soon  after  its  formation, 
approved  proposals  for  a  reorganization  of  the  production 
and  employment  of  aircraft  which  had  been  formulated  by 
its  predecessor,  the  War  Committee,  in  November  1916. 
One  of  these  proposals  was  for  the  addition  to  the  Board 
of  Admiralty  of  a  Fifth  Sea  Lord,  who  would  be  able  to 
speak,  as  the  naval  representative  on  the  Air  Board,  with 
an  authority  similar  to  that  of  the  War  Office  representa- 
tive, who  was  a  member  of  the  Army  Council.  Rear- 
Admiral  C.  L.  Vaughan-Lee,  who  held  the  existing 
Admiralty  appointment  of  Director  of  Air  Services,  was 
succeeded  by  Commodore  G.  M.  Paine,  who  became  Fifth 
Sea  Lord  on  the  31st  of  January  1917.1 

These  political  and  service  changes  were  destined  to 
exert  a  powerful  influence  on  naval  air  policy  and  expan- 
sion. With  Admiral  Jellicoe  at  the  Admiralty,  where  he 
could  give  practical  expression  to  his  views,  and  with 
Admiral  Beatty,  a  firm  believer  in  the  value  of  the  air 
weapon,  as  Commander-in-Chief,  progress  in  the  develop- 
ment of  aircraft  co-operation  with  the  Grand  Fleet  was 
rapid.  The  establishment  of  the  special  anti-submarine 
division  at  the  Admiralty  led  also  to  a  great  increase  in 
the  activities  of  all  types  of  anti-submarine  aircraft. 
There  was  little  in  common  between  these  two  lines 
of  progress.  The  expanded  use  of  aircraft  in  anti- 
submarine warfare  was  chiefly  a  matter  of  training, 
reorganization,  and  systematized  co-ordination  with 
other  U-boat  counter-measures.  But  the  development  of 
aircraft  co-operation  with  the  Fleet  at  sea  involved  pro- 
blems of  design  and  practice  which  necessitated  much  re- 
search work  and  pioneer  experiments  which  called  for  a  high 
degree  of  skill  and  cold  courage.    As  shall  be  told,  such 

1  Commodore  Godfrey  Paine  was  an  officer  of  great  air  experience.  He 
had  qualified  as  a  pilot  in  May  191 2,  and  had  thereupon  been  appointed 
first  Commandant  of  the  Central  Flying  School.  He  had  held  this  appoint- 
ment until  191 5,  when  he  took  command  of  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service 
Training  Establishment  at  Cranwell. 


1917]         A  GRAND  FLEET  COMMITTEE  5 

progress  was  made  towards  the  solution  of  these  problems 
as  laid  the  foundations  for  much  of  the  immediate  post- 
war organization  of  this  branch  of  naval  air  work. 

So  long  as  the  High  Sea  Fleet  was  in  being,  Admiral 
Scheer  might  decide  at  any  moment  to  resume  his  sorties, 
and  the  Grand  Fleet  had,  at  all  times,  to  be  in  a  state  of 
readiness.  Operations,  indeed,  to  attract  Scheer  to  sea 
were  planned  from  time  to  time,  but  the  German  Fleet, 
although  it  continued  to  be  a  menace,  became,  in  effect,  a 
coast  defence  force  whose  duty  was  to  keep  the  Bight  of 
Heligoland  secure  for  the  passage  of  the  incoming  and 
outgoing  U-boats. 

The  major  activities  of  the  Grand  Fleet  were  therefore 
directed  to  the  covering  of  mine-laying  operations  in 
German  waters  to  limit  and  define  the  passage  of  the 
U-boats.  In  January  191 7  Admiral  Beatty  urged  that 
shallow  and  deep  mines  should  be  laid  in  a  semicircle 
across  the  Heligoland  Bight,  and  that  the  line,  when 
complete,  should  be  watched  by  light  cruiser  and 
destroyer  sweeps,  at  varying  intervals,  and  by  sub- 
marines. This  project  could  not  be  sanctioned  because 
there  were  not  sufficient  mines  to  be  had,  and,  instead,  it 
was  decided  that  independent  minefields  should  be  laid 
along  a  semicircle  between  Ameland  and  the  Schleswig 
coast.  The  main  air  work  with  the  fleet  was  associated  with 
this  mining  policy.  It  was  directed  against  the  German 
airships  and  seaplanes  which  patrolled  extensively,  recon- 
noitred the  minefields,  assisted  the  German  mine-sweep- 
ing flotillas,  helped  to  guide  the  U-boats  through  the 
swept  channels,  and,  at  times,  watched  the  British  mine- 
layers at  their  work. 

The  Grand  Fleet  Aircraft  Committee 

On  the  21st  of  January  1917  Admiral -Beatty,  dissatisfied 
with  the  naval  air  situation,  wrote  to  the  Admiralty  asking 
what  policy  their  Lordships  intended  to  pursue  in  regard 
to  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service.  Five  days  later,  before  he 
received  a  reply,  he  set  up  a  special  committee  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  under  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Hugh  Evan-Thomas 


6  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

to  report  on  the  Fleet's  air  requirements.  On  the  5th  of 
February  191 7  the  Committee  presented  a  comprehensive 
report.1 

The  members  of  the  Committee,  it  was  stated,  had,  in 
accordance  with  their  terms  of  reference,  considered  the 
air  requirements  of  the  Grand  Fleet  as  follows : 

(i)  Reconnaissance  over  the  North  Sea. 
(ii)  Screening  of  the  Fleet  by  aircraft  while  on  passage, 
(iii)  Heavier-than-air  craft  for  duty  with  the  Fleet, 
(iv)   Seaplane  Carriers, 
(v)  Use  of  seaplanes  and  balloons  as  aids  to  gunnery. 

They  recommended  that  systematic  reconnaissance  of  the 
North  Sea  should  be  a  duty  of  large  flying-boats  supple- 
mented by  non-rigid  airships.  Airships,  also,  of  the 
'Coastal'  or  'North  Sea'  type,  should  provide  a  screen  when 
the  Fleet  left  its  bases  by  daylight.2 

The  duties  of  the  heavier-than-air  craft  were  defined  as 
close  reconnaissance,  and  attacks  on  German  airships.  For 
the  latter  duty  it  was  recommended  that  Sopwith  Tup' 
aeroplanes  should  replace  the  Sopwith  'Baby'  seaplanes  in 
the  Campania,  as  it  had  already  been  decided  they  should 
do  in  the  Manxman. 

This  recommendation  is  of  importance.  The  Manx- 
man, a  former  passenger  steamer  on  the  Isle  of  Man 
service,  had  been  commissioned  in  December  1916  to 
carry  seaplanes  aft  for  reconnaissance  and  Sopwith  'Baby' 
seaplanes  forward  to  fight  Zeppelins.  Flight  Com- 
mander F.  J.  Rutland  had  been  appointed  to  the  new 

1  The  Report  was  signed  by  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Hugh  Evan-Thomas, 
Captain  C.  M.  de  Bartolome,  and  Flag  Commander  Wilfred  A.  Egerton. 

2  In  Grand  Fleet  Battle  Orders  dated  24th  of  January  1917  this  duty 
had  been  provided  for.  All  available  airships  from  Kirkwall,  Longside,  and 
East  Fortune,  were,  by  order  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  to  rendezvous 
with  the  Fleet  if  the  Fleet  concentration  was  west  of  longitude  2°  E.  The 
airships  were  to  be  informed  of  the  course  and  speed  of  the  Fleet  and  were 
then  to  scout  ahead  and  to  the  flanks  of  the  light  cruiser  screen.  If  U-boats 
were  sighted,  their  positions  were  to  be  reported,  and  the  airships  were  to 
attack  with  bombs.  If  enemy  airships  were  sighted,  the  British  airships 
were  to  fall  back  on  the  light  cruiser  line.  These  were  the  first  naval  orders 
of  their  kind  to  British  airships. 


1917]  AEROPLANES  IN  CARRIERS  7 

carrier  before  she  was  commissioned,  and  he  was  soon 
advocating  that  aeroplanes  should  be  carried  instead  of  the 
'Baby'  seaplanes.  He  argued  that  the  Tup'  aeroplane  was 
the  only  craft  capable  of  getting  to  the  'ceiling'  of  a 
Zeppelin,  that,  fitted  with  airbags,  the  Tups'  were  safer  on 
the  water  than  the  'Baby'  seaplanes,  that  they  were  a  better 
match  for  other  aeroplanes  which  might  be  encountered  at 
sea  and,  finally,  that  the  adoption  of  a  fighter  which  was 
being  manufactured  for  the  Western  Front  would  ensure 
supplies  being  available  and  would  also  enable  the  Naval 
Air  Service  to  take  advantage  of  improvements  embodied 
in  the  type  from  time  to  time  as  a  result  of  fighting 
experience  in  France.  This  officer  had  made  the  first 
of  two  flights  off  the  deck  of  the  Manxman  in  January 
1 91 7  in  one  of  the  'Baby'  seaplanes  and  he  had  found  that 
the  run  given  by  the  deck  of  the  ship  necessitated  a  good 
wind  before  the  seaplane  could  get  away.  The  adoption 
of  aeroplanes,  which  could  be  flown  off  the  deck  under 
less  exacting  conditions,  would  increase  the  number  of 
occasions  when  aircraft  could  be  used.  Largely  as  a  result 
of  his  advocacy  and  of  the  trials  with  the  'Baby'  seaplanes, 
Sopwith  Tup'  aeroplanes  had  been  allotted  to  the  Manx- 
man. 

As  fighters  could  be  flown  from  the  deck  when  the 
weather  conditions  were  against  the  heavier  two-seater 
seaplanes,  the  Committee  recommended  that  the  fighters 
should  be  fitted  with  a  small  wireless  transmitting  set  of  a 
range  of  about  five  miles.  The  fighting  pilots  would  then 
be  able,  when  the  occasion  arose,  to  communicate  to  the 
ships  in  the  extended  cruiser  line  important  information 
about  enemy  vessels. 

The  estimate  of  the  Committee  was  that  the  Grand 
Fleet  would  require  twenty  anti-Zeppelin  aircraft  and  a 
similar  number  of  reconnaissance  aircraft.  The  latter, 
it  was  calculated,  would  provide  for  two  aircraft  in  the 
air  during  the  time  the  opposing  fleets  were  gaining 
touch,  and  one  in  the  air  throughout  the  subsequent 
action. 

It  will  be  of  interest  to  consider  the  resources,  in  air- 
craft, of  the  Grand  Fleet  at  the  time  the  Committee  made 


8  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

their  report.     They  were   carried  in  the  three  aircraft 
carriers  as  follows: 


Speed  in 
knots. 

Reconnaissance 
[two-seater)  Aircraft. 

Anti-Zeppelin  {single- 
seater)  Aircraft. 

18  to  21 

18 

16  to  18 

No. 

How  sent  up. 

No. 

How  sent  up. 

Campania 

Engadine 

Manxman 

6  seaplanes 
2  seaplanes 
4  seaplanes 

From  deck 
Off  the  sea 
Off  the  sea 

6  seaplanes 
2  seaplanes 
4  aeroplanes 

From  deck. 
Off  the  sea. 
From  deck. 

The  Grand  Fleet  was  thus  considerably  below  the  estab- 
lishment considered  by  the  Committee  as  the  minimum, 
and  what  made  matters  worse  was  the  low  speed  of  the 
Manxman  which,  in  moderately  rough  weather  in  the  open 
sea,  had  proved  to  be  much  under  the  estimate  (21  knots) 
given  for  her  before  she  was  commissioned :  there  was  small 
chance  that  she  would  ever  be  able  to  take  part  in  a  fleet 
action.  Furthermore,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the 
Campania,  in  which  most  of  the  fleet  aircraft  and  balloon 
reconnaissance  and  spotting  work  had  been  developed,  had 
been  on  the  sea  for  nearly  twenty-four  years.  She  had  been 
drastically  reconditioned,  and  those  who  knew  her  best 
considered  that  she  was  still  splendidly  sound  for  work 
in  the  open  sea,  but,  whether  she  was  or  not,  it  seemed 
obvious  that  her  future  employment  must  chiefly  be  for 
training  and  experimental  work. 

There  must  be  new  carriers,  but  where  were  they  to 
come  from  ?  So  that  the  Committee's  further  recom- 
mendations may  be  appreciated,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
consider  briefly  the  general  position  with  regard  to  new 
carrier  construction.  As  early  as  August  1 91 5  outline  plans 
for  a  special  seaplane-carrying  cruiser  had  been  prepared 
by  Lieutenant  Gerard  R.  A.  Holmes,  R.N.V.R.,  in  co- 
operation with  Sir  John  H.  Biles,  the  naval  architect. 
Lieutenant  Holmes,  a  former  assistant  naval  architect  to 
the  Cunard  Company,  had  been  serving  in  the  Riviera 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war.  His  design  embodied  many 
fine  features  and  was,  in  some  respects,  ahead  of  its  time. 
The  suggested  method  of  re-shipping  the  seaplanes,  while 
the  vessel  was  under  way,  was  by  means  of  a  slip,  or  slope, 
extending  into  the  sea  from  the  tail  end  of  the  ship.   The 


i9i6]       PROPOSALS  FOR  NEW  CARRIERS  9 

Director  of  the  Air  Department  had  recommended  the 
scheme  to  the  Board  but,  after  much  discussion  and 
delay,  it  had  been  rejected,  and,  instead,  the  Manxman 
had  been  taken  over  for  conversion.  The  reason  for  reject- 
ing the  proposed  new  carrier  was  stated  to  be  the  existing 
congestion  in  the  ship-building  yards,  but  it  may  also  be 
inferred  that  the  Admiralty  was  unwilling,  at  that  time,  to 
devote  resources  to  a  highly  experimental  proposition, 
more  especially  as  it  seemed  unlikely  that  the  ship  could  be 
completed  and  made  efficient  during  the  progress  of  the 
war.  Furthermore,  it  was  considered  that  an  *  essential 
feature  of  the  design  submitted  by  Lieutenant  Holmes  was 
the  slip  method  of  re-shipping  the  seaplanes,  and  expert 
opinion  was  doubtful  whether  this  could  be  made  a 
practical  proposition.1  Sir  John  Biles,  unwilling  to  let  the 
matter  rest,  had  sent  the  fully  developed  plans  to  Admiral 
Jellicoe,  then  Commander-in-Chief,  who  had  urged  the 
Admiralty,  in  May  191 6,  to  lay  down  a  vessel  of  the  type 
as  soon  as  possible.  Alternatively,  if  this  was  judged  im- 
possible, he  had  suggested  that  some  of  the  features  in  the 
designs  sent  him  might  be  embodied  in  the  Glorious  class 
of  large  light  cruisers  then  building.2 

Thereupon  the  Board  had  again  considered  the  ques- 
tion. While  the  matter  was  being  debated,  successful 
flights,  by  two-seater  seaplanes,  from  the  deck  of  the  Cam- 
fania,  and  the  seaplane  reconnaissance  flight  made  from 
the  Engadine  during  the  battle  of  Jutland,  had  created  an 
atmosphere  at  the  Admiralty  more  favourable  to  the  con- 
sideration of  new  carrier  construction.  As,  however,  there 
was  little  prospect  of  building  a  large  new  vessel  in  less 
time  than  fifteen  to  eighteen  months,  the  Admiralty  de- 
cided to  acquire  two  Italian  liners,  in  frame  in  shipyards, 

1  When  the  Hermes  came  to  be  planned,  the  scheme  of  landing  on  a  slip 
at  the  tail  end  of  the  ship  was  embodied  as  part  of  the  original  design. 
Mr.  J.  H.  Narbeth,  the  Assistant  Director  of  Naval  Construction,  who  was 
very  closely  associated  with  the  designs  of  most  of  the  war-time  aircraft 
carriers  and  balloon  ships,  was  anxious  to  work  Lieutenant  Holmes's  idea 
into  the  Hermes,  as  an  experimental  system  supplementary  to  all  others. 
Much  time  was  spent  in  designing  details  of  the  proposed  slipway,  or  float, 
to  enable  seaplanes  to  taxi  into  the  ship  from  the  sea,  but  the  scheme  was 
finally  abandoned  as  impracticable.      2  Glorious,  Furious,  and  Courageous. 


io  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET         [ch.  i 

on  which  work  had  been  suspended  from  the  outbreak  of 
war.  This  decision  was  recorded  in  August  1 91 6,  but  in  the 
following  month,  owing  to  the  urgent  need  for  other  naval 
construction,  it  was  decided  to  take  over  only  one  of  the 
two  vessels.  This  ship,  the  Conte  Rosso,  built  at  Messrs. 
Beardmore's,  was  renamed  the  Argus.  She  was  entirely  re- 
designed above  the  water-line,  and  it  can  be  said  that  she 
was  the  first  large  vessel  (15,750  tons  displacement)  to  be 
specially  fitted  out,  during  construction  and  completion, 
for  service  as  an  aircraft  carrier  with  the  Fleet:  she  was 
launched  in  December  191 7. 

Although  the  Board  had  decided  not  to  proceed  with 
the  building  of  an  entirely  new  ship,  they  were  in  no 
doubt  that  a  specially  designed  carrier  would  be  of  greater 
value  than  a  converted  liner,  and  they  instructed  the 
Director  of  Naval  Construction  to  prepare,  for  the  future 
consideration  of  the  Board,  designs  for  an  ocean-going 
carrier  of  not  less  than  25  knots  speed. 

The  Grand  Fleet  Aircraft  Committee  were  mindful  of 
the  fact  that  the  Argus  could  not  be  ready  before  the  end 
of  1 91 7,  and,  as  they  judged  that  the  need  of  the  Fleet  was 
urgent,  they  suggested  that  the  large  light  cruiser  Furious, 
then  completing  in  Messrs.  Armstrong's  shipyard,  would 
be  of  more  use  as  an  aircraft  carrier  than  as  a  heavy  gun- 
platform  for  which  she  had  been  designed.  She  had  high 
speed,  wide  deck  space,  and  a  long  forecastle,  and,  because 
of  her  bulges,  she  would  be  comparatively  safe  from 
torpedo-attack.  The  Committee  outlined  modifications 
in  her  design  by  which  a  number  of  reconnaissance  aircraft 
could  be  housed  and  flown  off  her  deck. 

To  meet  the  deficiency  in  fighting  aircraft,  they  re- 
commended that  certain  light  cruisers  and  other  selected 
ships  should  be  immediately  fitted  to  carry  Sopwith  Tup' 
aeroplanes.  Although  some  loss  of  gun-power  might  result, 
it  was  essential,  they  said,  that  the  Grand  Fleet  should 
have  the  means  to  attack  Zeppelins. 

The  Committee  also  made  important  recommendations 
on  the  subject  of  balloons  for  fleet  work.  The  three  balloon 
ships,  Canning,  City  of  Oxford,  and  Menelaus,  should,  they 
said,  be  paid  off  and  arrangements  made  for  storing  the 


1917]       CONVERSION  OF  THE  FURIOUS  n 

balloons  ashore.    The  balloons  could  be  inflated,  as  re- 
quired, and  taken  to  sea  in  fighting  ships.1 

A  close  examination  of  the  Committee's  recommenda- 
tions reveals  a  somewhat  startling  change  in  naval  views. 
The  significance  of  the  report  is  the  advocacy,  by  senior 
naval  officers,  of  a  sacrifice  of  gun-power  in  favour  of  air- 
craft. In  the  words  of  the  Committee,  it  was  a  'drastic 
measure'  to  recommend  the  conversion  of  the  Furious.  Sir 
David  Beatty,  forwarding  the  report  to  the  Admiralty  on 
the  7th  of  February  191 7,  expressed  his  general  agreement 
with  the  recommendations,  but  stated  that,  although  the 
provision  of  anti-Zeppelin  aircraft  and  suitable  ships  to 
carry  them  was  most  important,  he  was  not  prepared  'to 
sacrifice  the  gun-armament  of  light  cruisers  in  order  to  use 
them  as  seaplane  carriers'.  Nor  could  he  approve  the  re- 
moval of  the  heavy  guns  (two  18-inch)  from  the  Furious, 
although  he  agreed  that  it  was  essential  that  every  effort 
should  be  made  to  render  the  ship  an  efficient  aircraft 
carrier,  especially  as  the  Argus  could  not  be  expected  to 
join  the  Grand  Fleet  until  the  end  of  the  year. 

The  report  led  to  considerable  discussion  at  the  Ad- 
miralty and  brought  to  light  divergent  views  about  the 
value  of  the  Furious  as  a  fighting  ship.  It  was  argued  on 
the  one  hand  that,  offensively,  the  Furious  would  be  able 
to  out-range  anything  afloat  and  that,  defensively,  she 
would  be  enormously  superior  to  a  small  light  cruiser. 
Those  who  supported  these  views  went  on  to  point  out 
that  the  speed  and  power  of  the  Furious,  Courageous,  and 
Glorious  would  be  such  that  they  should  be  able,  in  all 
weather  conditions,  to  brush  aside  the  enemy's  light  cruiser 
forces  and  place  themselves,  with  reference  to  the  enemy's 
battleships  or  battle  cruisers,  in  a  position  from  which 
they  would  be  able  to  use  their  torpedoes,  and  their  guns, 
with  great  effect.  It  was  also  argued  that  their  very  high 
speed  would  ensure  that  they  would  be  first  on  the  scene 
in  the  event  of  raids  or  invasion  with  which  it  was 
thought  they  could  most  seriously  interfere  before  being 

1  The  Menelaus  became  an  ammunition  carrier.  The  City  of  Oxford  was 
reconverted  as  a  seaplane  carrier  for  service  in  the  Mediterranean.  The 
Canning  was  retained. 


12  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

driven  off  or  succumbing.  It  was  not  contended  that  these 
vessels  should  be  thrown  into  the  line  of  battle,  but, 
by  making  use  of  their  great  speed  and  long-range  gun- 
power,  it  did  appear,  as  it  appeared  to  Lord  Fisher  who 
conceived  them,  that  they  would  provide  a  support  of  no 
mean  value  to  the  Battle  Cruiser  Force  which  was  none 
too  strong. 

These  views  on  the  fighting  value  of  the  Furious  class  of 
ships,  however,  were  by  no  means  generally  accepted. 
Those  who  disputed  them  stated  that,  although  the 
Furious  was  decidedly  better  protected  than  a  light  cruiser, 
she  would  be  in  no  way  fit  to  come  under  the  guns  of  a 
battle-ship  or  battle  cruiser.  Her  fate,  if  she  did,  would  be 
the  same  as  that,  in  the  Jutland  battle,  of  the  Defence 
and  the  Warrior ',  both  ships  with  considerably  superior 
protection  to  the  Furious.  They  therefore  argued  that  if 
the  Furious  could  be  fitted  as  an  aircraft  carrier  without 
delaying  her  completion  unduly  there  was  no  doubt  that 
she  should  be  so  fitted. 

It  was  in  this  sense  that  the  Admiralty  decided,  and,  in 
the  result,  three  schemes  for  the  alteration  of  the  Furious 
were  prepared  and  sent  to  Admiral  Beatty  for  his  com- 
ments. The  Commander-in-Chief  replied  that,  if  the 
cruiser  was  to  be  converted  into  an  efficient  carrier,  there 
was  no  option  but  to  accept  the  most  drastic  of  the  pro- 
posed modifications,  that  is  to  say,  the  removal  of  the  for- 
ward 1 8-inch  gun  and  turret  mounting,  a  reduction  in 
the  arc  of  training  of  the  two  foremost  5'5-inch  guns,  and 
the  removal  of  the  torpedo-net  defence  fittings.  It  was 
realized  that  the  removal  of  the  more  important  part  of 
the  main  armament  would  make  the  Furious  of  little 
value  as  a  fighting  ship.1 

The  question  was  again  considered  at  the  Admiralty  on 
the  13th  of  March  1917  and,  six  days  later,  it  was  finally 
decided  that  the  complete  conversion  of  the  Furious  as  an 
aircraft  carrier  should  be  put  in  hand.  The  plans  allowed 
for  a  hangar  to  house  about  ten  aircraft  in  the  forecastle 

1  The  gun  armament  of  the  Furious,  as  originally  designed,  was  two 
18-inch  guns  in  single  turrets  fore  and  aft,  eleven  5'5-inch  guns,  and  two 
4-inch  anti-aircraft  guns. 


1917]       OTHER  CARRIER  CONSTRUCTION       13 

deck  forward,  with  the  hangar  roof  extended  to  the  bow 
of  the  ship  to  form  a  flying  deck  228  feet  long  and  fifty 
feet  wide.  From  this  deck  it  would  be  possible  for  recon- 
naissance and  fighting  aircraft  to  fly  off  under  almost  any 
weather  conditions.  The  Furious  was  duly  completed  in 
accordance  with  these  plans  and  was  commissioned  in  July 
191 7  under  the  command  of  Captain  Wilmot  S.  Nicholson, 
R.N.,  with  Squadron  Commander  E.  H.  Dunning  as  his 
senior  flying  officer.  Her  maximum  speed  was  given  as 
31  knots  and  her  displacement  as  19,100  tons.  She  was 
equipped  with  three  Short  reconnaissance  seaplanes,  and 
five  Sopwith  Tup'  aeroplanes  for  anti-Zeppelin  work. 
The  flying  officers  appointed  to  the  ship  had  undergone  a 
special  course  of  training  in  deck  flying  at  the  Isle  of  Grain. 

The  conversion  of  the  Furious  was  a  major  result  of  the 
report  submitted  by  the  Grand  Fleet  Aircraft  Committee, 
but  other  carrier  construction,  entirely  independent  of  the 
Committee's  recommendations,  was  undertaken  in  191 7. 
In  January  the  Government  had  decided  that  the  whole 
national  ship-building  programme  must  be  examined  on 
the  assumption  that  the  war  would  last  through  the  year 
191 8.  Commodore  G.  M.  Paine,  the  Fifth  Sea  Lord,  had 
thereupon  submitted  a  proposal  for  the  acquisition  of  five 
small  carriers  and  one  ocean-going  aircraft  carrier,  but  the 
Board  of  Admiralty  ultimately  embodied,  in  their  general 
statement  of  requirements,  four  carriers  for  the  replace- 
ment of  possible  losses.  When  the  Government  signified 
their  approval,  in  February  191 7,  the  Admiralty  decided 
that  two  of  the  carriers  must  be  ocean-going,  and  the 
other  two  of  the  North  Sea,  or  V  index,  type.  As  the  need 
for  the  latter  type  was  urgent,  and  as  the  laying-down  of 
entirely  new  ships  would  mean  considerable  delay,  two 
merchant  vessels,  then  under  construction,  the  Stockholme 
and  N  air  ana,  were  taken  over.  The  Stockholme,  renamed 
the  Pegasus,  of  3,300  tons  displacement,  was  launched  in 
June  1 91 7  and  was  completed  before  the  end  of  August: 
she  had  a  speed  of  twenty  to  twenty-two  knots,  could 
stow  nine  aircraft  (five  single-seater  fighting  aeroplanes 
forward  and  four  two-seater  seaplanes  aft),  was  fitted 


i4     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

with  a  flying-ofl  deck  forward,  and  had  two  cranes  aft  for 
the  handling  of  her  seaplanes.  The  Nairana  (3,070  tons, 
maximum  speed  19-5  knots),  which  was  completed  in 
September  191 7,  was  similarly  arranged,  but  she  could 
only  stow  eight  aircraft  (four  aeroplanes  forward  and 
four  seaplanes  aft).  These  two  carriers,  which  were  based 
at  Rosyth,  were  chiefly  used  for  training  pilots  in  deck  fly- 
ing for  service  in  battle  cruisers  and  light  cruisers,  but  they 
did,  in  addition,  much  spotting  practice  and  also  went  out 
with  the  Battle  Cruiser  Force  on  sweeps  into  the  North 
Sea.  To  hoist  out  the  seaplanes  it  was  not  necessary  for 
the  carriers  to  stop.  The  aircraft  could  be  slipped  from  the 
cranes  on  a  quick  release  hook  while  the  ship  was  steaming 
at  nineteen  knots,  and  they  could  be  hooked  on  again  when 
the  speed  was  six  knots. 

Designs  for  the  two  ocean-going  carriers  were  prepared 
in  April  191 7,  and  orders  for  the  ships  were  placed.  The 
orders  were,  however,  cancelled  almost  at  once,  but,  in  July, 
it  was  decided  to  proceed  with  one  of  the  ships,  and  a  con- 
tract for  a  vessel  to  be  called  the  Hermes  was  placed  with 
Messrs.  Armstrong.  This  ship,  however,  the  first  to  be 
designed  specifically  as  an  aircraft  carrier,  had  not  been 
launched  when  the  war  ended. 

In  August  191 7  the  Admiralty  again  reviewed  the  air- 
craft carrier  position,  and  decided  to  give  instructions  for 
the  modification  of  the  light  cruiser  Cavendish,  one  of  five 
ships  of  the  Raleigh  class  which  were  being  built  at  Belfast. 
The  Cavendish,  as  redesigned,  was  to  carry  six  folding 
aeroplanes,  and  was  to  be  fitted  with  a  flying-off*  deck 
forward  and  a  landing  deck  aft.  Renamed  the  Vindictive 
(maximum  speed  29*75  knots)  she  was  commissioned  in 
October  191 8  and  was  working  at  Scapa  when  the  Armistice 
came. 

Aircraft  Carrier  Operations 

As  has  been  told  the  main  British  Fleet  activity  in  191 7 
was  connected  with  the  mining  of  the  Heligoland  Bight. 
These  mining  operations  led  to  a  concentration  of 
German  patrolling  and  fighting  aircraft.1  In  April  191 7 

1  'Bases  for  seaplanes  were  constructed  on  the  North  Sea  at  List  (Sylt), 
'Heligoland,  Norderney,  Borkum,  and,  in  addition  to  these,  at  Zeebrugge 


1917]       AIRCRAFT  CARRIER  OPERATIONS        15 

an  attempt  was  made  to  surprise  the  patrolling  Zeppelins. 
At  5*30  a.m.  on  the  29th  the  Manxman,  with  a  destroyer 
screen  and  a  light  cruiser  escort,  arrived  north-east  of 
Horn  Reefs,  but  no  Zeppelins  could  be  seen  and  Flight 
Commander  F.  J.  Rutland  therefore  flew  off  in  a  Tup' 
to  patrol  an  area  in  which  they  might  be  expected.  A 
second  pilot  who  went  off  later  turned  back  with  engine 
trouble.  Flight  Commander  Rutland  did  not  return  and 
was  given  up  as  lost.  Admiral  Beatty,  reporting  on  the 
operation,  said  his  opinion  was  that  the  weather  had  been 
unfavourable  for  the  enterprise,  and  he  laid  down  guiding 
principles  for  future  action,  the  chief  of  which  was  that 
no  aeroplane  was  to  be  sent  up  unless  a  Zeppelin  was 
sighted  from  the  carrier. 

Flight  Commander  Rutland,  however,  had  not  been 
lost.  He  had,  after  an  uneventful  patrol  of  his  allotted 
area,  been  hampered  by  compass  trouble  and  had  been 
unable  to  find  his  parent  ship.  He  had  eventually  come 
down  on  the  sea  a  few  miles  from  the  Danish  coast,  where 
his  aeroplane  had  only  been  kept  afloat  by  the  air-bags  for 
twenty  minutes. 1  Not  long  after  the  aeroplane  had  alighted, 
fishermen  had  rowed  out  to  the  pilot,  who  swam  towards 
his  rescuers,  was  picked  up,  and,  pleading  he  had  landed 
outside  territorial  waters,  was  ultimately  released  as  a  ship- 
wrecked mariner;  he  rejoined  the  Manxman  at  the  end 
of  May. 

During  May,  June,  and  July,  the  Manxman  continued 
to  co-operate  with  the  mine-laying  expeditions  to  the 
German  Coast,  but  the  German  aircraft  gave  the  pilots 
in  the  carrier  no  opportunity  for  attack.  Although  these 
operations  produced  no  positive  results,  the  mere  presence 
of  the  aircraft  carrier  afforded  protection  to  the  Fleet.  An 

and  Ostend.  Further,  the  small  cruiser  Stuttgart  was  fitted  as  a  seaplane 
carrier,  after  the  necessary  experiments  had  been  made  on  the  auxiliary 
cruiser,  Santa  Elena,  and  when,  as  the  flying  machines  were  perfected,  it 
seemed  desirable  not  to  confine  their  activities  to  the  coast  of  the  North  Sea, 
but  to  make  use  of  them  at  sea  as  well.  This  development  of  flying  became 
necessary,  and  was  encouraged  by  the  urgent  need  of  the  mine-sweeping 
service.'    (Scheer,  Germany's  High  Sea  Fleet  in  the  World  War,  p.  201.) 

1  After  this  adventure,  new  air  bags  were  designed  to  keep  the  fighting 
aeroplanes  afloat  for  five  hours. 


16     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

example  of  what  could,  and  did,  happen  when  no  aircraft 
were  present  during  operations  in  the  North  Sea  may  be 
quoted.  During  a  sweep  by  light  cruisers  and  destroyers 
on  the  4th  of  May,  a  Zeppelin  (L.  43)  in  company  with  a 
number  of  U-boats,  found  and  attacked  the  British  ships. 
Three  torpedoes  were  fired  at  the  cruiser  Dublin  while  the 
Zeppelin  made  a  series  of  determined  bombing  attacks  on 
the  ships.  The  torpedoes  were  avoided,  and  the  airship's 
bombs  just  failed  to  score  hits,  although  splinters  from  them 
fell  in  several  of  the  destroyers  and  in  the  Dublin.  When 
the  Zeppelin  had  exhausted  her  load,  she  called,  by  wire- 
less, for  other  airships :  one  subsequently  appeared,  but  no 
further  bombing  attacks  were  made.  It  should  be  re- 
marked here  that  the  anti-aircraft  armament  of  the  Fleet, 
especially  in  the  smaller  ships,  was,  at  this  time,  weak. 

Flying-boat  Successes 

The  pilots  in  the  carriers  had  had  little  luck  in  their 
operations  against  the  Zeppelins,  but  flying-boats,  working 
from  East  Coast  stations,  had  achieved  important  successes. 
Before  the  war,  Commander  J.  C.  Porte,  a  retired  naval 
officer,  had  worked  in  America  with  the  Curtiss  Company 
on  the  design  of  a  large  flying-boat,  to  be  called  the 
'America',  for  a  flight  across  the  Atlantic.  When  war  came 
Commander  Porte  abandoned  the  enterprise,  returned  to 
England,  and  joined  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service.  He 
conferred  with  the  Director  of  the  Air  Department  and, 
as  a  result,  two  Curtiss  flying-boats,  with  twin  ninety 
horse-power  engines,  had  been  ordered  by  the  Admiralty 
in  August  1914  and  had  been  received  by  November. 
They  were  considered  experimental,  but  tests  which  were 
made  at  Felixstowe  proved  promising  and  a  few  more 
were  ordered.  As  a  result  of  the  trials  with  these  early 
experimental  craft  an  order  was  given,  in  March  191 5,  for 
fifty  flying-boats  of  similar  design,  but  with  engines  of 
slightly  higher  horse-power.  The  engine  unit — the 
100  horse-power  Curtiss — in  these  aircraft  was  not  satis- 
factory, but  when  Anzani  engines  of  the  same  horse-power 
were  substituted,  these  flying-boats  proved  useful  for 
training  and  for  limited  patrol  work. 


1915-16]  FLYING-BOATS  17 

Before  the  end  of  19 15  fifty  additional  flying-boats  of 
a  larger  type  had  been  ordered,  but  when  the  first  one  was 
received  in  England,  in  July  191 6,  it  was  again  found  that 
its  Curtiss  engines — of  160  horse-power — were  unsatis- 
factory. Modifications  of  the  design  were  made  in  this 
country  and  two  Rolls-Royce  engines  of  250  horse-power 
each  were  substituted.  When  the  bigger  craft  began  to 
make  their  appearance,  they  came  to  be  called  'Large 
Americas',  and  the  original  flying-boats  thereupon  became 
'Small  Americas'.  Officially,  the  smaller  boats  used  in 
England  were  known  as  the  H.4  type,  and  the  larger  ones 
as  H.8  (with  Curtiss  engines)  and  EL  12  (with  Rolls-Royce 
engines).  It  is  with  the  H.12  type  that  this  narrative  will 
be  chiefly  concerned.  It  carried  a  crew  of  four — first  pilot, 
second  pilot,  wireless  operator,  and  engineer — had  a  speed 
of  about  seventy-five  knots,  was  armed  with  from  two  to 
six  Lewis  guns,  according  to  the  duty  on  which  it  was 
engaged,  and  could,  in  addition,  carry  two  bombs  of 
230  lb.  weight. 

Another  development  of  the  original '  America'  type  was 
the  Porte  flying-boat,  similar  in  design,  but  of  larger 
dimensions  than  the  H.12.  An  estimate  of  the  size  of  the 
first  Porte  aircraft,  unofficially  called  H.M.S.  Baby,  built 
early  in  191 6  and  fitted  with  three  engines,  may  be  had 
from  the  fact  that  a  Bristol  Scout  aeroplane  was  flown  from 
its  top  plane  while  the  Porte  was  in  flight.1  Ten  of  these 
early-type  Porte  flying-boats  were  built,  but  they  proved 
too  slow  and  too  vulnerable  for  extensive  North  Sea 
operations.  They  did,  however,  demonstrate  the  advan- 
tages of  the  large  boat-type  seaplane  in  seaworthiness,  ob- 
servation facilities,  and  in  the  comfort  afforded  to  the  crew 
— an  important  feature  during  patrols  of  long  duration. 

Experience  with  the  'Small  Americas\  and  with  the  first 
boats  of  the  'Large  America?  type,  showed  that  the  hull 
was  not  satisfactory.  The  design  of  the  bottom  was  weak, 
especially  where  the  tail  portion  joined  the  step,  and  the 

1  The  Porte  flying-boat,  fitted  with  three  350  horse-power  Rolls-Royce 
engines,  carried  a  crew  of  five,  had  a  speed  of  about  80  knots,  could  climb  to 
9,000  feet  in  50  minutes  and  could  carry  a  military  load  of  2,000  lb.  Her 
span  was  about  120  feet. 


18  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET         [ch.  i 

pilot  had  to  exercise  great  care,  when  taking  off  or  alighting, 
to  avoid  the  hull  breaking.  Even  in  a  slight  sea  the  danger 
of  collapse  was  high,  and  the  result  was  that  it  was  often 
impossible  to  send  up  the  'Americas'  when  flying  condi- 
tions were  otherwise  favourable.  Another  disadvantage  of 
the  H.I 2  type  was  that  her  armament  proved  inadequate. 
Her  guns  could  not  fire  immediately  below  the  boat,  and 
the  after  gun  could  not  be  fired  towards  many  points  behind 
the  tail  of  the  flying-boat  for  fear  of  damage  to  the  tail  plane 
or  rudder.  Under  the  direction  of  Commander  Porte,  the 
'Americas'  were,  in  fact,  largely  redesigned.  The  first  ex- 
periments, made  in  191 5  at  Felixstowe  with  the  'Small 
America\  aimed  at  the  elimination  of  the  weakness  in  the 
hull.  Eventually  a  new-type  of  'Small  America\  known  as 
the  F.I.  ('F' — Felixstowe),  was  produced,  the  first  of  the 
famous  'F'  boats  provided  with  two  shallow  steps  outside 
the  skin  of  the  main  hull  which  was  of  pronounced  V  section 
throughout  its  length  with  a  keel  line  following  a  smooth 
curve  from  stem  to  stern.  Experiments  had  shown  that  this 
V  section  construction  eliminated  much  of  the  shock  of 
taking  off  and  landing,  and  the  F-type  boats  could  be 
used  safely  in  moderately  rough  water.  Furthermore,  the 
tail  in  the  F-boat  design  was  'cocked-up',  and  this  made 
it  possible  to  place  Lewis  guns  inside  the  hull,  on  the  port 
and  starboard  sides  respectively,  to  fire  through  sliding 
ports  just  aft  of  the  main  planes.  The  guns  were  mounted 
on  brackets  which  could  be  swung  outboard  to  command 
wide  arcs  of  fire,  meeting  not  more  than  twenty  feet  astern 
of  the  boat.  The  blind  spots  behind  the  tail  and  under- 
neath the  H.i  2  design,  although  not  entirely  eliminated, 
were  thus  considerably  reduced.  The  large  flying-boats 
produced  in  191 7  and  191 8  with  these  improvements 
were  known  as  the  F.2a  type.  They  were  fitted  with  two 
Rolls-Royce  engines  of  320  horse-power,  had  a  maximum 
speed  of  85  knots  and  a  cruising  speed  of  60  knots,  carried 
a  crew  of  four,  bombs  of  a  total  weight  of  460  lb.,  and  four 
Lewis  guns,  and  could  attain  a  ceiling,  with  full  load,  of 
13,000  feet.  At  cruising  speed  the  endurance  of  the  F.2a 
was  eight  hours,  bomb-loaded,  or  ten  hours  without 
bombs,  and,  at  full  speed,  five  and  a  quarter  hours,  and  six 


i9i7]  HUNTING  ZEPPELINS  19 

and  a  half  hours  respectively.  She  had  an  estimated  life, 
under  mooring  conditions,  of  six  to  eight  months.  A 
similar,  but  larger  type,  called  the  F.3,  was  built  in  191 8. 
This  type  was  a  little  slower  (75  knots  at  full  speed), 
but  had  a  little  longer  endurance  and  could  carry  bombs 
of  a  total  weight  of  920  lb.  Her  ceiling,  however,  was 
only  10,000  feet. 

In  April  191 7  it  was  decided  that  the  'Large  Americas' 
(H.I 2  type),  stationed  at  Felixstowe  and  Yarmouth  for 
general  North  Sea  reconnaissance  and  anti-submarine 
patrol  work,  should  also  be  used  to  attack  patrolling  Zep- 
pelins in  the  southern  part  of  the  North  Sea.  Flying-boats 
later  added  to  the  establishment  at  Killingholme  were  also 
employed  for  the  same  duties.  When  it  became  known  from 
wireless  interception  reports  that  one  or  more  Zeppelins 
were  out,  the  stations  were  warned  and  the  flying-boats 
were  made  ready  to  take  the  air  at  a  moment's  notice. 
As  the  Zeppelin  patrolled,  her  course  was  methodically 
plotted  by  the  British  wireless  interception  stations,  and  if 
and  when  she  approached  within  150  miles  of  the  English 
Coast  her  position,  course,  and  speed  were  communicated 
at  once,  by  telephone  from  the  Admiralty,  direct  to  one  or 
more  of  the  East  Coast  flying-boat  bases.1  Then  the  hunt 
began.  One  or  more  flying-boats,  at  the  discretion  of  the 
commanding  officers,  were  sent  away.  The  subsequent 
positions  of  the  airship  or  airships  were  passed  on,  as  they 
were  plotted,  to  the  air  stations,  whence  they  were  relayed 
by  wireless  to  the  flying-boats  already  in  the  air.  The 
receipt  of  continuous  information  also  enabled  command- 
ing officers  to  judge  the  need  for  sending  up  additional 
aircraft. 

The  new  organization  was  put  into  force  on  the  26th  of 
April  191 7  and  success  came  quickly.  Soon  after  dawn  on 
the  14th  of  May,  in  misty  weather,  news  was  received  of  a 
Zeppelin  near  the  Terschelling  Light  Vessel.  A  'Large 
America?,  manned    by  Flight  Lieutenant  C.  J.  Galpin, 

1  A  special  squared  chart  of  the  southern  part  of  the  North  Sea,  known 
as  Tracing  Z,  was  issued  to  the  East  Coast  air  stations  for  use  from  the  1st 
of  June  1 91 7.  The  positions  of  Zeppelins  were  communicated  by  code 
signals  based  on  the  chart. 


20  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  R.  Leckie,  Chief  Petty  Officer 
V.  F.  Whatling,  and  Air  Mechanic  J.  R.  Laycock,  was  sent 
out  from  Yarmouth.  When  eighty  miles  had  been  covered, 
the  flying-boat  shut  down  her  wireless  to  lessen  the  chances 
of  discovery.  Half  an  hour  later,  at  4.48  a.m.,  a  Zeppelin 
was  sighted  dead  ahead  ten  to  fifteen  miles  away.  She 
was  the  Z.22,  out  on  scouting  duties  in  connexion  with  a 
proposed  exercise  by  the  High  Sea  Fleet  in  the  Bight  on 
the  following  day.1  The  Zeppelin  was  cruising  slowly  at 
3,000  feet,  2,000  feet  lower  than  the  flying-boat  which 
proceeded  to  climb  another  1,000  feet.  Flight  Sub- 
Lieutenant  Leckie,  who  was  piloting,  made  a  skilful  ap- 
proach and  dived  on  th.tL.22  until  he  was  twenty  feet  below 
and  fifty  feet  to  starboard  of  her  gondolas,  when  Flight  - 
Lieutenant  Galpin  opened  fire  from  the  two  Lewis  guns  in 
the  forward  cock-pit.  After  a  burst  of  fire  both  guns 
jammed,  and  the  pilot  turned  away  to  give  time  for  the 
stoppages  to  be  cleared.  But  no  second  attack  was  neces- 
sary. As  the  flying-boat  turned,  the  L.22  began  to  glow, 
and  within  a  few  seconds  she  was  falling  in  flames.  Her 
skeleton  plunged  upright  into  the  sea,  leaving  no  trace  in 
the  dawning  light  save  a  mound  of  black  ash  on  the  surface 
of  the  water. 

A  similar  success  came  a  month  later.  On  the  morning 
of  the  14th  of  June  an  H.12  flying-boat  from  Felixstowe 
was  off  Vlieland,  searching  for  airships,  when  a  Zeppelin 
came  in  sight  five  miles  away.  She  proved  to  be  the  L.43 
and  she  was  at  1,500  feet,  the  same  height  as  the  flying- 
boat,  the  pilot  of  which,  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  B.  D. 
Hobbs,  climbed  another  500  feet  and  then  dived  to 
attack.  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  R.  F.  L.  Dickey  manned 
the  bow  Lewis  gun,  and  the  wireless  operator,  H.  M. 
Davies,  and  the  engineer,  A.  W.  Goody,  manned  the  amid- 
ships and  stern  guns.  The  flying-boat  passed  diagonally 
across  the  tail  of  the  Zeppelin,  and,  after  a  burst  of  tracer 
ammunition  from  the  Lewis  gun  amidships,  followed 
by  Brock  and  Pomeroy  incendiary  ammunition  from  the 
bow  gun,  the  L.43  caught  fire.  Three  of  her  crew 
dropped  from  her  as  she  went  down.  The  wreckage  of 
1  S cheer,  Germany' 's  High  Sea  Fleet  in  the  World  War,  p.  283. 


1917]        THE  L.22  AND  L.43  DESTROYED  21 

the  airship  continued  to  burn  some  time  after  she  had 
hit  the  water. 

As  a  result  of  these  disasters  the  Zeppelin  com- 
manders could  no  longer  take  the  risk  of  patrolling  at  low 
heights.  The  same  crew  who  had  destroyed  the  L.22  had, 
in  June  and  July,  five  separate  encounters  with  Zeppelins, 
but  each  time  the  airship  was  flying  high  when  discovered 
and  escaped  by  going  above  the  'ceiling'  of  the  flying-boat 
(about  12,000  feet).  It  may  be  remarked,  incidentally, 
that  the  flying-boats,  by  thus  forcing  the  Zeppelins  to  high 
altitudes,  made  it  easier  for  the  British  submarines,  on 
passage  to  and  from  German  waters,  to  escape  detection. 

So  long  as  the  flying-boats  had  been  able  to  take  the 
Zeppelins  by  surprise  they  had  had  every  chance  of 
success,  but  this  condition  was  now  extremely  difficult  to 
obtain.  Surprise,  however,  was  not  of  the  same  impor- 
tance to  pilots  of  fighting  aeroplanes  of  high  performance. 
If  these  could  be  brought  within  striking  range  of  a 
Zeppelin,  the  odds  were  all  in  favour  of  the  aeroplanes. 
Two  methods  of  getting  aeroplanes  across  the  North  Sea 
presented  themselves.  One  was  to  give  suitable  types  an 
extended  fuel  capacity  so  that  they  would  have  the  en- 
durance for  a  flight  from  the  East  Coast  across  the  North 
Sea  and  back  without  the  need  to  refuel.  The  other  was  to 
convey  them  across  in  ships  and  launch  them  into  the  air 
when  the  opportunity  came.  The  latter  method,  recom- 
mended by  the  Grand  Fleet  Aircraft  Committee,  was  to 
prove  the  true  solution  of  the  problem,  but,  meanwhile,  the 
former  was  tried.  Two  D.H.4  aeroplanes,  equipped  to  carry 
extra  fuel,  were  sent  to  Yarmouth.  The  intention  was  to 
send  out  one  of  the  aeroplanes,  in  company  with  an  H.12 
flying-boat,  when  wireless  interception  reports  indicated 
that  Zeppelins  were  patrolling  the  Terschelling  area.  The 
D.H.4  was  tQfly  high?  and  the  flying-boat  was,  from  a  lower 
.altitude,  to  make  a  feint  attack  on  any  Zeppelin  sighted  so 
as  to  induce  the  commander  to  climb,  unsuspectingly, 
within  range  of  the  De  Havilland.  If  the  aeroplane  was 
forced  down  on  the  water  the  flying-boat  would  be 
available  to  rescue  the  crew. 

At  10.30  a.m.   on   the   5th  of   September    1917   one 


22  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET         [ch.  i 

of  the  De  Havilland's  and  a  flying-boat  left  to  search 
for  a  Zeppelin  reported  near  Terschelling.  At  noon  the 
L.44  was  sighted  at  10,000  feet  and  the  attack  began 
according  to  plan.  While  the  D.H.4  climbed  and 
manoeuvred  to  give  the  final  blow,  the  flying-boat  crew 
kept  up  a  long-distance  duel  with  the  climbing  airship. 
The  L.44,  however,  was  saved  by  a  defect  which  developed 
in  the  De  Havilland's  engine.  The  D.H.4  would  not  go 
higher  than  14,000  feet  and  the  Zeppelin  out-climbed  her 
adversary  and  escaped.  A  second  airship  was  sighted,  but 
she,  also,  put  up  her  nose  and  disappeared.  This  was  a  dis- 
appointing end  to  a  well-thought-out  scheme  which  must, 
but  for  the  engine  trouble,  have  met  with  success.  The 
two  aircraft  turned  for  home,  but  fifty  miles  from  the 
English  coast  the  D  .H.4's  engine  failed  entirely  and  the  aero- 
plane crashed.  The  flying-boat  was  landed  alongside  and 
the  pilot  and  observer  were  picked  up  from  the  wreckage, 
but  a  rough  sea  was  running  and  the  overloaded  flying- 
boat,  which  had  a  leaking  hull  due  to  damage  by  anti- 
aircraft gun-fire  from  hostile  destroyers,  and  an  unsatis- 
factory port  engine,  would  not  again  take  the  air.  The  boat 
was  taxied  towards  Yarmouth  until  7  p.m.,  when  the  petrol 
supply  finished.  Four  pigeons  were  carried  in  the  flying- 
boat,  now  adrift  on  the  North  Sea,  and  these  were  released 
with  messages  at  intervals  the  same  evening  and  during  the 
next  day,  the  6th,  but  it  was  not  until  after  10  a.m.  on  the 
7th  that  one  of  the  birds  reached  its  loft  at  Yarmouth. 
The  flying-boat  and  its  crew  were  found  by  the  Halcyon 
which  took  the  aircraft  in  tow.1 

Catapult  Experiments 

It  will  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  refer  briefly  to  one 
method  for  launching  aircraft  from  ships,  although  no 
practical  use  was  made  of  it  during  the  war.  The  employ- 
ment of  an  apparatus  for  catapult  launching  had  been 
considered  by  the  Admiralty  Air  Department  before  the 
war  in  1914,  but  the  idea  had  been  shelved.  In  191 7  the 
question  was  taken  up  again  and  resulted  in  experiments 

1  For  a  detailed  account  the  reader  may  refer  to  The  Story  of  a  North  Sea 
Air  Station,  by  C.  F.  Snowden  Gamble,  pp.  259-71. 


1917]  CATAPULT  EXPERIMENTS  23 

of  considerable  interest.  Three  types  of  apparatus  were 
constructed  in  which  the  motive  force  was,  respectively, 
hydraulic,  electric,  and  compressed  air.  The  hydraulic 
and  electric  apparatus  was  never  used,  but  the  compressed 
air  type  gave  promising  results.  One  apparatus  of  this 
type,  designed  by  Mr.  R.  F.  Carey  and  built  by  Messrs. 
Waygood-Otis,  was  installed  at  Hendon,  and  Flight 
Commander  R.  E.  Penny,  a  Naval  Air  Service  pilot, 
volunteered  to  be  catapulted  in  a  modified  Avro  aeroplane. 
The  experiment  was  successful  and  Lieutenant  Penny 
landed  without  trouble.  Another  catapult,  designed  and 
built  by  Messrs.  Armstrong,  and  also  worked  on  the  com- 
pressed air  principle,  was  mounted  in  a  specially  commis- 
sioned steam  hopper,  the  Slinger,  and  the  first  experiments 
were  made  in  the  Tyne  in  September  191 7  when  an  old 
seaplane,  with  no  personnel  aboard,  was  launched  while 
the  Slinger  was  alongside  the  jetty.  The  hopper  was  after- 
wards sent  to  the  Isle  of  Grain  Experimental  Aircraft 
Depot,  where  further  trials  were  made,  from  June  191 8  on- 
wards, under  the  direction  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  R. 
Busteed.  In  these  trials  a  Fairey  type  seaplane,  specially 
strengthened,  was  successfully  catapulted  from  the  Slinger 
both  when  she  was  at  anchor  and  under  way.1  The 
apparatus  never  passed  beyond  the  experimental  stage, 
partly  because  the  view  at  the  time  was  that  it  was  too 
cumbersome  for  installation  in  fighting  ships,  and  partly 
because  the  mounting  of  launching  platforms  in  cruisers 
and  capital  ships  made  it  possible,  as  shall  be  told,  for 
aircraft  to  be  flown  off  under  their  own  power. 

Fighter  Aeroplanes  in  Light  Cruisers 
It  will  be  recalled  that  one  of  the  recommendations  of 
the  Grand  Fleet  Aircraft  Committee  was  that  fighter 
aeroplanes,  for  the  attack  of  Zeppelins,  should  be  carried 

1  The  launching  rail  in  the  Slinger,  built  in  the  form  of  a  box  girder,  was 
about  60  feet  long.  The  trolley  which  supported  the  aircraft  was  impelled 
along  the  rails  by  means  of  wire  ropes,  and  at  the  end  of  its  run  was  stopped 
by  an  arresting  device.  With  a  very  high  pressure  a  velocity  of  60  miles  per 
hour  could  be  attained,  but  the  maximum  speed  used  in  the  trials  was  about 
40  miles  per  hour. 


24     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

in  certain  light  cruisers.  Experiments  to  this  end  had, 
indeed,  been  made  in  the  Harwich  Force,  under  the 
direction  of  Commodore  R.  Y.  Tyrwhitt,  in  the  autumn 
of  1915.  On  the  5th  of  November  1915  Flight  Lieutenant 
R.  J.  J.  Hope-Vere  had  succeeded  in  flying  a  Deperdussin 
monoplane  from  an  improvised  platform  in  the  light 
cruiser  Aurora,  but  the  run  required  was  judged  to  be 
too  long  for  practical  purposes,  and,  furthermore,  after  the 
monoplane  had  flown  off,  it  had  taken  an  appreciable 
time  before  the  foremost  6-inch  gun  in  the  Aurora  could 
be  cleared  again  for  action.  There  had,  therefore,  been 
no  immediate  further  progress.1 

The  first  light  cruiser  actually  to  be  fitted  was  the 
Yarmouth,  at  Rosyth  in  191 7.  Rear- Admiral  R.  F. 
Phillimore,  who  was  generally  responsible  for  all  flying 
experiments  at  Rosyth  and  for  all  questions  relating  to  the 
Royal  Naval  Air  Service  at  that  base,  maintained  a  close 
liaison  with  Wing  Captain  R.  M.  Groves,  assistant  secretary 
of  the  Air  Board.  Captain  Groves,  an  officer  of  ideas,  was 
one  of  those  who  had  advocated  the  use  of  aeroplanes  in 
ships  instead  of  seaplanes,  and,  as  a  result  of  one  of  his 
visits  to  Rosyth,  at  the  invitation  of  Rear-Admiral 
Phillimore,  arrangements  were  made  to  experiment 
with  aeroplanes  in  the  Yarmouth.  An  extemporized 
platform  was  mounted  above  the  conning  tower  and 
the  forecastle  gun  to  give  a  run  of  twenty  feet,  and, 
in  June  191 7,  a  Sopwith  Tup'  was  successfully  flown 
from  this  platform  by  Flight  Commander  F.  J.  Rutland. 
On  the  morning  of  August  the  21st  191 7  the  Yarmouth, 
carrying  her  aeroplane,  was  covering  a  mine-laying  opera- 
tion off  the  Danish  coast  in  company  with  the  First  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron.  A  patrolling  enemy  aeroplane  sighted 
the  British  ships  and  made  a  leisurely  reconnaissance  lasting 
forty  minutes.  At  about  5.30  a.m.,  soon  after  the  German 

1  The  Harwich  command  also  made  interesting  experiments  with  air- 
craft and  submarines.  In  April  and  May  1916  Sopwith  'Schneider  Cup' 
seaplanes  were  taken  to  sea  on  board  the  E.22  and  were  successfully 
launched  and  flown  back  to  the  air  station  at  Felixstowe.  The  idea  was 
not  further  developed  chiefly  owing  to  the  difficulties  of  housing  aircraft 
without  affecting  the  submarine's  submerging  capabilities. 


1917]       THE  YARMOUTH  AND  THE  L.23  25 

aeroplane  retired,  a  Zeppelin  came  in  view.  The  British 
squadron  was  at  the  time  on  a  northerly  course  and  this 
course  was  held  to  draw  the  airship  farther  away  from  her 
base.  Soon  after  6.30  a.m.  the  squadron  turned  westward 
into  the  wind  and  the  Yarmouth  was  ordered  to  fly  her  Sop- 
with  Tup'.  The  pilot,  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  B.  A.  Smart, 
had  not  previously  flown  off  the  ship,  but  he  got  away  with- 
out mishap  and  climbed  steadily.  At  9,000  feet  he  set  course 
for  the  Zeppelin,  the  Z.23,  which  had  made  off  rapidly  and 
was  ten  to  fifteen  miles  distant.  When  he  came  within 
striking  distance  he  was  1,500  feet  above  her.  He  dived  and 
attacked  until  he  was  within  twenty  yards  of  the  Zeppelin, 
when  he  had  to  swerve  sharply  to  avoid  a  collision.  By  this 
time  the  L.23  had  caught  fire,  and  as  she  fell  her  framework 
crumpled  and  she  burned  so  fiercely  on  her  way  down  that 
not  much  of  her  remained  to  hit  the  sea.1  Flight  Sub- 
Lieutenant  Smart  returned  to  his  squadron  after  an  event- 
ful sixty  minutes  and  landed  near  the  Prince,  by  whose  boat 
he  was  rescued:  the  aeroplane  was  lost.2 

This  success  was  dramatic  in  itself,  but  to  appreciate 
its  full  significance  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  some- 
thing of  what  had  passed  at  a  conference,  four  days  earlier, 
between  Admiral  Beatty  and  the  Third  Sea  Lord.  At  that 
meeting  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  raised,  among 
other  questions,  the  subject  of  the  requirements  of  the 
Grand  Fleet  in  aircraft  carriers,  and  he  had  urged  the 
need  for  a  definite  policy  saying  that,  so  far  as  he  knew, 
no  naval  air  policy  existed.  Arising  out  of  the  discussion 
it  had  been  agreed  that  one  light  cruiser  in  each  light 
cruiser  squadron  should  be  fitted  with  a  newly  designed, 
light-weight  type  of  'flying-ofF  deck.  The  ships  chosen 
were,  in  addition  to  the  Yarmouth  (Third  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron),  the  Caledon  (First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron), 

1  A  wireless  message,  'Pursued  by  enemy  Forces',  was  sent  out  from  the 
L.23  before  she  fell.  As  her  wireless  was  thereafter  silent,  German  aircraft 
were  sent  to  search  for  her.  What  they  found,  in  the  afternoon,  was  an  oil- 
patch  and  a  charred  propeller  blade. 

2  The  usual  procedure  was  for  the  pilot  to  land  ahead  of  the  nearest 
destroyer,  and  when  this  happened  in  enemy  waters  the  aeroplane  was 
normally  abandoned  because  a  stoppage  entailed  undue  risk  from  enemy 
submarine  attack. 


26  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET         [ch.  i 

the  Dublin  (Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron),  the  Cordelia 
(Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron),  and  the  Cassandra 
(Sixth  Light  Cruiser  Squadron).  It  had  been  further 
agreed  that  the  Courageous  and  the  Glorious  should  be 
similarly  fitted,  and  that  the  policy  should  be  extended 
to  other  light  cruisers  'if  found  to  be  very  successful  and 
'desirable'.  Immediately  following  the  conference  the 
Admiralty  had  begun  a  review  of  the  whole  subject  of 
naval  air  policy  and  expansion.  The  achievement  of  Flight 
Sub-Lieutenant  B.  A.  Smart,  in  the  Yarmouth's  aeroplane, 
exerted  a  powerful  influence  on  the  discussions  and  on  the 
decisions  which  were  reached. 

Deck  Landings 

Meanwhile,  in  July  191 7,  the  Furious,  now  converted  as 
an  aircraft  carrier,  had  joined  the  Fleet  in  Scapa  Flow. 
Thereafter  the  Furious,  escorted  by  destroyers  or  by  a 
light  cruiser  squadron  with,  occasionally,  a  battle  cruiser 
squadron  in  support,  was  employed  in  sweeps  off  the 
Danish  Coast  and  the  Heligoland  Bight.  These  sweeps 
were  made  at  frequent  intervals,  but  so  far  as  the  aircraft 
carrier  was  concerned  they  proved  unproductive.  Either 
no  enemy  aircraft  were  sighted,  or,  when  they  were,  the 
weather  conditions  were  such  that  the  German  pilots 
were  able  to  disappear  before  effective  action  could  be 
taken  against  them.  During  a  mine-sweeping  operation  off 
the  Horn  Reefs  on  the  nth  of  September  191 7,  Flight 
Commander  W.  S.  Moore  flew  off  the  deck  of  the  Furious  in 
a  Sopwith  Tup'  to  attack  a  Zeppelin  which  had  been 
called  to  the  area  by  reconnoitring  German  seaplanes.  The 
British  pilot  climbed  to  10,000  feet,  but  the  Zeppelin  took 
advantage  of  oncoming  clouds  and  disappeared  from  view.1 

Although,  by  the  time  the  Furious  joined  the  Fleet,  the 
sending  up  of  aircraft,  single-seaters  or  two-seaters,  from 
the  decks  of  ships  was  regarded  as  a  fairly  simple  operation, 
dependent  only  on  the  length  of  run  available  and  the 

1  It  is  of  interest  that  soon  after  the  airship  was  sighted  from  the  Furious, 
2l  wireless  message  was  received  in  the  ship  from  the  Admiralty  in  London 
giving  the  exact  position  of  the  Zeppelin.  This  had  been  plotted  from 
bearings  obtained,  through  the  Directional  Wireless  Stations  in  England. 


1917]  DECK  LANDINGS  27 

strength  of  the  felt  wind,  the  problem  of  alighting  on  deck 
still  awaited  practical  solution.  The  introduction  of  deck 
landing  was  much  needed  in  view  of  the  obvious  objections 
to  the  use  of  aeroplanes  on  the  high  seas  if  no  landing 
facilities  other  than  the  sea  were  offered  them.  The  chief 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  deck  landing  were  two :  how  to 
overcome  the  air  disturbances  set  up  by  the  super-struc- 
ture of  the  ship  when  she  was  steaming  at  high  speed  into 
the  wind,  and  how  to  bring  the  aircraft  quickly  to 
rest  once  it  had  landed. 

The  pilots  in  the  Furious  took  up  the  challenge.  They 
practised,  in  harbour,  by  flying  slowly  beside  the  ship 
and  then,  after  passing  the  mast,  by  drifting  inwards 
over  the  centre  of  the  flying  deck.  These  preliminary  trials 
seemed  to  show  that  the  operation  was  feasible  and,  on  the 
2nd  of  August  1 91 7,  Squadron  Commander  E.H.  Dunning, 
in  a  Sopwith  Tup',  made  the  first  successful  landing.  As  the 
aeroplane  drifted  over  the  centre  line  of  the  deck,  rope 
toggles  hanging  from  the  wing  tips,  tail  skid,  and  fuselage, 
were  seized  by  a  crew  of  officers  who,  at  a  signal  from  the 
pilot  as  he  shut  off  his  engine,  hauled  the  aeroplane  down 
and  held  it  to  the  deck.  This  first  deck  landing,  a  memorable 
feat,  was  successfully  repeated,  but  in  a  third  attempt,  made 
five  days  after  the  first,  Squadron  Commander  Dunning  fell 
over  the  bows  of  the  ship  and  was  killed.  As  a  result  of  this 
disaster  to  one  of  the  most  skilful  pilots  in  the  service,  the 
tests  for  landing  on  the  forward  deck  were  abandoned.  As 
an  alternative,  the  proposal  was  made  that  the  Furious 
should  be  reconstructed  to  provide  a  flying-on  deck  aft. 
The  captain  of  the  Furious,  however,  was  against  the  pro- 
posal. He  pointed  out  that  the  after  guns  of  the  ship 
would  have  to  be  sacrificed  and  her  offensive  power  con- 
sequently lessened,  that  air  currents  from  the  funnels  and 
bridge  structure  would  make  landing  hazardous,  and,  finally, 
that  there  would  be  difficulty  and  delay  in  moving  aircraft 
from  aft  to  forward.  Opinion  about  the  further  conversion 
of  the  Furious  was,  however,  very  much  divided,  and 
Admiral  Beatty  considered  the  matter  of  such  importance 
that  he  telegraphed  to  the  Admiralty,  on  the  12th  of 
September,  requesting  that  expert  officers  should  be  sent 


28  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

from  London  to  confer  with  the  captain  of  the  Furious. 
The  question  was  immediately  considered  by  the  Board, 
who  agreed  that  no  decision  could  be  reached  about  the 
Furious  until  the  whole  problem  of  naval  air  policy  had 
been  settled. 

This  problem  had  been  raised,  as  has  been  told,  at  the 
conference  between  Admiral  Beatty  and  the  Third  Sea 
Lord  on  the  17th  of  August.  On  the  20th,  in  a  letter  to 
the  Admiralty,  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  recurred  to 
the  matter :  'A  correct  policy  is  of  vital  moment',  he  said, 
'to  our  air  supremacy  at  sea  during  the  year  191 8.  .  .  . 
'Possibly  a  definite  policy  has  been  decided  upon  by  the 
'staff,  assisted  by  the  experts  concerned.  If  this  is  so, 
'I  should  be  glad  if  a  member  of  the  naval  staff  visited  me 
'and  explained  the  proposals ;  if  no  definite  policy  has  yet 
'been  formulated,  it  is  urgent  the  matter  should  be  dis- 
'cussed  between  the  naval  staff,  the  technical  experts,  and 
'myself  at  the  earliest  possible  date.'  When  this  letter 
had  been  considered  at  the  Admiralty,  it  was  admitted 
that  no  definite  air  policy  had  been  laid  down  in  black  and 
white.  Various  memoranda  on  the  question  were  there- 
upon submitted  by  the  Sea  Lords  and,  on  the  25th  of 
August,  a  preliminary  general  statement  of  naval  air  policy, 
drawn  up  by  the  First  Sea  Lord,  had  been  sent  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief.1  The  matter  continued  to  be 
debated  at  the  Admiralty,  and,  ultimately,  on  the  25th  of 
September,  a  series  of  proposals  for  the  expansion  of  Grand 
Fleet  aircraft  were  sent  to  Admiral  Beatty  for  comment. 
The  Admiralty  had  been  greatly  influenced  by  the  success 
achieved  by  the  Yarmouth's  aeroplane  on  the  21st  of 
August,  and  they  proposed  that  as  many  additional 
cruisers  as  possible  should  be  fitted  with  flying-off  plat- 
forms. They  invited  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  state 
his  views  on  this  question;  on  the  fitting  of  an  after 
landing-deck  in  the  Furious ;  on  a  proposal  to  convert  the 
Glorious  and  Courageous  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Furious ; 
and,  finally,  on  the  desirability  or  otherwise  of  equipping 
the  Argus  exclusively  as  a  carrier  of  torpedo  aircraft.  It  so 
happened  that  Admiral  Beatty  had,  just  before  he  received 

1  Appendix  I. 


1917]        FLYING  FROM  GUN  TURRETS  29 

the  Admiralty  communication,  dispatched  a  letter  which 
covered  much  of  the  same  ground.  In  this  letter,  which  set 
forth  his  aircraft  requirements  for  the  spring  of  191 8, 
he  made  the  important  proposal  that  all  Grand  Fleet 
heavier-than-air  craft  should  be  of  the  aeroplane  type. 

While  the  matters  were  still  under  consideration,  the 
whole  outlook  was  suddenly  changed  as  a  result  of  successes 
obtained  in  revolutionary  experiments  made  by  Grand 
Fleet  pilots.  The  great  drawback  of  flying  aircraft  from 
ships,  whether  special  carriers  or  fighting  ships,  was  the 
need  to  turn  the  vessel  into  the  actual  wind.  The  turns 
which  might  be  necessary  before  an  aeroplane  could  get 
away  must  involve  a  loss  of  position  of  the  aircraft-carrying 
vessel  relative  to  the  fleet.  Because  of  this  drawback,  the 
fitting  of  aeroplanes  in  capital  ships  had  not,  hitherto,  been 
approved.  Then  had  come  a  suggestion  from  Lieutenant- 
Commander  C.  H.  B.  Gowan,  a  naval  officer  who  had 
shown  remarkable  vision  in  his  conception  of  the  impor- 
tance and  uses  of  the  naval  air  weapon,  and  who  had  been 
associated  with  the  aircraft  experiments  in  the  light  cruiser 
Yarmouth,  that  aeroplanes  might  be  flown  from  a  plat- 
form that  could  be  turned  into  the  'felt'  wind  while  the 
ship  held  its  desired  course.  The  top  of  a  gun  turret  was  a 
position  readily  available,  and  experiments  were  conducted 
in  the  Repulse,1  under  the  direction  of  Captain  J.  S. 
Dumaresq,  R.N.  On  'B'  turret  of  the  battle  cruiser  a 
sloped  platform  of  2-inch  deals,  supported  on  steel  angle 
bars,  was  constructed.  At  the  beginning  of  the  run  on  this 
platform,  the  aircraft  was  placed  so  that  the  fuselage  was 
in  a  horizontal  position,  and  this  position  was  maintained 
by  what  was  known  as  a  'tail  guide  trestle',  the  tail  skid  of 
the  aircraft  fitting  into  a  grooved  runway  attached  to  this 
trestle;  this  tail  guide  was  of  the  kind  invented  in  the 
Campania.  The  pioneer  flight  took  place  on  the  1st  of 
October  191 7.  Opinion,  before  the  flight  was  made,  was 
divided  on  the  question  whether  the  feat  was  possible,  but 
Squadron  Commander  F.  J.  Rutland  took  a  chance  and  got 
away  successfully  in  a  Sopwith  Tup'.  The  turret  was 
trained  420  on  the  starboard  bow  into  a  'felt'  wind  of 
1  The  Repulse  was  the  flagship  of  Rear-Admiral  R.  F.  Philliraore. 


3o     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

31^  miles  per  hour.  The  platform  was  subsequently  trans- 
ferred to  the  after  turret,  which  was  trained  on  a  forward 
bearing,  and  the  same  pilot  flew  off  without  mishap  on 
the  9th  of  October. 

Thus  was  solved  an  outstanding  problem  of  aircraft  co- 
operation in  fleet  activities.  Not  only  was  it  demonstrated 
that  small  aeroplanes  could  be  flown  from  a  revolving  plat- 
form on  any  suitable  deck  without  affecting  the  course  of 
the  vessel,  but  it  had  been  proved  also  that  the  turrets  of 
capital  ships  could  be  used  without  unduly  interfering  with 
the  turret  guns.  In  qualification,  however,  it  must  be 
pointed  out  that  the  aeroplanes  could  not  for  long  be 
exposed  to  the  weather  conditions  on  the  turret  plat- 
forms without  suffering  an  impairment,  more  or  less  serious, 
of  their  flying  capabilities,  and  that  flying  off  the  ship  was 
still  dependent  on  the  'true'  wind  not  being  abaft  the 
beam.  With  a  strong  stern  wind  the  ship  would  have  to 
turn  to  make  a  suitable  'felt'  wind. 

New  Proposals  for  Fleet  Aircraft 

The  Admiralty  proposals  already  formulated  for  the 
expansion  of  Grand  Fleet  aircraft  were  discussed  in 
the  light  of  these  turret-flying  experiments  at  a  meeting 
between  the  Deputy  First  Sea  Lord  and  the  Commander- 
in-Chief.  A  memorandum  outlining  Admiral  Beatty's 
views  was  drawn  up  and  was  discussed  by  the  Operations 
Committee  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty.1  As  a  result  it 
was  decided,  on  the  17th  of  October,  that: 

(i)  All  light  cruisers  and  battle  cruisers  should  carry 
fighting  aeroplanes,  provided  their  gun  armament 
was  not  interfered  with, 
(ii)  That  the  Furious  should  be  fitted  with  an  after 

1  This  Committee  had  been  set  up  by  Sir  Eric  C.  Geddes  following  his 
appointment  as  First  Lord  on  the  6th  of  September  191 7.  Its  original 
members  were  the  First  Lord,  the  First  Sea  Lord  (Admiral  Sir  John  R. 
Jellicoe),  the  Deputy  First  Sea  Lord  (Vice-Admiral  Sir  Rosslyn  E.  Wemyss), 
the  Fifth  Sea  Lord  (Commodore  Godfrey  M.  Paine),  the  Chief  of  the  Naval 
Staff  (Vice-Admiral  Sir  Henry  F.  Oliver),  the  Director  of  the  Anti-Sub- 
marine  Division  (Rear-Admiral  A.  L.  Duff),  and  a  Secretary  (Mr.  R.  F. 
Dunnell). 


1917-18]  NEW  PROPOSALS  31 

landing  deck,  300  feet  in  length,  with  such  modi- 
fication of  the  ship's  structure  as  was  entailed 
thereby. 

(iii)  That  the  Courageous  and  Glorious  should  not  be 

fitted  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Furious,  but  should 

remain  unaltered, 
(iv)  That  it  was  unnecessary  at  that  time  to  determine 

whether  the  Argus  should  be  used  exclusively  as  a 

torpedo-plane  carrier. 

The  fitting  of  turret  platforms  in  the  battle  cruisers  was 
begun  at  once.  By  the  early  part  of  1 91 8  the  Repulse, 
Renown,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  Inflexible,  Indomitable, 
Tiger,  Princess  Royal,  and  the  Lion  had  been  so  fitted,  as 
well  as  the  large  light  cruisers  Glorious  and  Courageous. 
Under  the  supervision  of  Captain  Dumaresq,  R.N.,  a 
rotatable  platform  was  designed  as  a  substitute  for  the 
fixed  flying  platforms  in  the  forecastle  of  light  cruisers.  A 
beginning  was  made  with  H.M.A.S.  Sydney,  while  she  was 
being  refitted  at  Chatham,  and  the  first  successful  flight 
from  the  Sydney's  revolving  platform  was  made  on  the  1 7th 
of  December  191 7.  The  advantages  of  the  new  platform 
were  apparent,  and  similar  ones  were  fitted  in  the  Mel- 
bourne, Birkenhead,  Southampton,  and  Chatham.  The  Tar- 
mouth  was  not  modified  until  June  191 8  and  the  Dublin 
until  August  191 8. 

In  those  light  cruisers  which  had  two  superimposed  guns 
in  the  middle  line,  the  revolving  platform,  because  of  inter- 
ference with  the  gun-fire,  could  not  be  fitted  on  the  fore- 
castle and  was  therefore  placed  instead  abaft  the  funnels. 

The  success  of  the  Repulse  experiments,  leading  as  they 
did  to  a  distribution  of  aircraft  among  Grand  Fleet  vessels, 
affected  all  previous  estimates  of  Fleet  aircraft  require- 
ments for  191 8.  On  the  16th  of  January  191 8  the  Opera- 
tions Committee  considered  a  memorandum  drawn  up  by 
the  First  Sea  Lord,  Admiral  Sir  Rosslyn  Wemyss,1  and 
their  deliberations  were  recorded  as  follows : 

I.  The  Committee   approved  the   broad  policy  that 

1  Admiral  Sir  Rosslyn  Wemyss  had  succeeded  Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe 
on  the  26th  of  December  1917. 


32     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

fighter  aeroplanes  should  be  carried  in  fighting  ships, 
and  that  reconnaissance  and  torpedo  planes  should  be 
carried  only  in  special  carriers,  but  that  this  should 
not  prevent  a  few  additional  fighters  being  carried  in 
seaplane  carriers  or  special  carriers  when  necessary. 

2.  The  Committee  agreed  that  it  was  desirable  that 
Pegasus  should  be  forthwith  altered  to  carry  fighters, 
and  should  she  prove  entirely  satisfactory,  that 
Nairana  should  be  taken  in  hand  for  the  same 
purpose.1 

3.  The  Committee  decided  to  retain  Camfania  for 
training  purposes,  and  to  postpone  consideration  as 
to  whether  she  should  be  fitted  with  a  flying-on  deck 
until  after  experience  had  been  gained  with  the  Argus 
and  Cavendish. 

4.  The  Committee  also  considered  a  proposal  that  the 
Chilean  battleship,  Almirante  Cochrane^  then  build- 
ing at  Elswick,  should  be  converted  into  an  aircraft 
carrier.  The  Committee  were  of  opinion  that  it  was 
desirable  to  carry  out  this  proposed  conversion,  pro- 
vided it  could  be  done  without  excessive  sacrifice  in 
other  directions,  and  it  was  decided  to  ask  the  Main- 
tenance Committee  to  indicate  what  dislocation  of 
other  work  would  be  entailed  if  the  proposal  were 
adopted,  and  also  to  what  extent  its  adoption  would 
affect  the  position  as  regards  the  Fleet  aircraft 
carrier  Hermes? 

The  Committee  also  considered  a  project  of  Sir  David 
Beatty  for  an  air  offensive,  early  in  191 8,  by  the  Grand 
Fleet  against  German  bases  and  ships  in  harbour.  This 
proposal  had  been  made  as  a  result  of  the  production  of  the 
new  torpedo-carrying  aeroplane  fostered  by  Commodore 
Murray  Sueter,  the  Sopwith  single-seater  'Cuckoo',  which 

1  That  is  to  say,  fighting  aeroplanes  exclusively.  At  the  time  the  Pegasus 
carried  five  fighting  aeroplanes  forward,  and  four  two-seater  seaplanes  in 
the  after  hangar.  The  Nairana  carried  four  fighting  aeroplanes  forward 
and  four  two-seater  seaplanes  aft.  Owing  to  difficulties  of  reconstruction, 
however,  this  proposal  was  not  followed  up. 

2  The  Almirante  Cochrane  was  taken  over  for  conversion  and,  renamed 
the  Eagle,  was  launched  in  June  1918:  she  was  not,  however,  completed  at 
the  date  of  the  Armistice. 


1917-18]  THE  SOPWITH  'CUCKOO'  33 

had  been  tried  out  successfully  at  the  Isle  of  Grain  in  July 
191 7.  Fitted  with  a  200  horse-power  Hispano-Suiza 
engine,  the  'Cuckoo',  carrying  a  1,000-lb.  torpedo,  could, 
in  twenty-five  minutes,  reach  10,000  feet,  at  which  height 
her  speed  was  87  knots.  After  the  trials,  orders  for  100 
'Cuckoos',  to  be  fitted  with  200  horse-power  Sunbeam 
Arab  engines,  had  been  placed.1  Sir  David  Beatty  had 
asked  for  200  of  these  torpedo-aircraft  for  an  offensive 
operation  against  the  High  Sea  Fleet.  The  Operations 
Division  at  the  Admiralty  had  submitted  a  similar  scheme. 
The  view  of  the  Committee,  however,  was  that  the 
results  obtained  by  the  persistent  heavy  bombing  opera- 
tions made  by  the  naval  air  units  at  Dunkirk  were 
not  such  as  to  encourage  an  air  offensive  against  German 
bases  by  aircraft  from  carriers.  It  was  clear  that  an 
offensive  of  the  kind  contemplated  must,  to  be  effective, 
be  continuous,  and  the  Committee  were  of  the  opinion 
that,  even  assuming  carriers  and  aircraft  would  be  avail- 
able, repeated  operations  from  carriers  were  not  feasible 
because  each  expedition  would  require  to  be  worked  out 
in  detail  and  would  involve  a  large  protective  force  of 
fighting  ships  which  must  incur  great  risks. 

The  arguments  against  bombing  and  torpedo  operations, 
as  set  out  by  the  Operations  Committee,  are  open  to 
comment.  Every  expedition  to  German  waters  had  to 
be  worked  out  in  detail,  and  a  protective  force  of  fighting 
ships  had  been  provided  time  and  again.  Furthermore, 
the  Dunkirk  air  command  had  had  no  torpedo  aircraft 
at  its  disposal,  and  the  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the 
sporadic  bombing  of  small  targets  were  not  particularly 
applicable  to  attacks  by  torpedo  aircraft  on  the  German 
High  Sea  Fleet  concentrated  in  its  harbours.  However, 
in  the  result,  the  Admiralty,  after  prolonged  deliberation, 
decided  that  all  idea  of  an  air  offensive,  by  Grand  Fleet 
aircraft,  on  German  bases  and  ships  in  harbour,  must  be 
abandoned,  and  Sir  David  Beatty  was  so  informed. 

Meanwhile  an  important  decision,  affecting  the  control 

1  Additional  orders  placed  from  time  to  time  in  191 8  brought  the  total 
number  to  350.  Deliveries,  however,  did  not  begin  until  June  1918,  and 
ninety  only  had  been  taken  into  service  by  the  time  of  the  Armistice. 

2504.4  D 


34     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

of  Grand  Fleet  aircraft,  had  been  taken.  In  November 
1 91 7  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  urged  a  centralized 
control  for  the  air-service  units  in  his  command,  and  had 
proposed  the  appointment  of  a  Flag  Officer  to  act  as  his 
adviser  and  deputy  and  to  take  full  administrative  control 
of  all  aircraft  working  with  the  Fleet.  The  Rear-Admiral 
for  Air  should,  he  suggested,  hoist  his  flag  in  the  Furious. 
The  Admiralty  agreed  and,  at  the  beginning  of  January 
191 8,  the  new  appointment  was  given  to  Rear-Admiral 
R.  F.  Phillimore,  Commanding  the  First  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron  and  flying  his  flag  in  the  Repulse.  He  was 
made  responsible  for  all  Fleet  aircraft  carriers  and  for  the 
shore  air  bases  of  the  Fleet  at  Donibristle,  Rosyth,  Smoo- 
groo,  Scapa,  and  (later)  Turnhouse.  This  appointment  of 
an  'admiral  of  the  air'  was  overdue.  The  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Grand  Fleet  had,  henceforward,  one  officer 
generally  responsible  for  all  matters  concerning  Fleet 
heavier-than-air  craft,  and  for  the  Fleet  air  bases  ashore, 
and  the  position  was  thus  brought  into  line,  in  many  re- 
spects, with  that  of  the  General  Officer  Commanding  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  in  France,  vis-a-vis  Sir  Douglas  Haig. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Operations  Committee  in 
October  191 7  had  directed  that  the  Furious  should  be 
fitted  with  an  after  landing-deck.  In  March  191 8  the 
structural  alterations  to  the  carrier  had  been  completed, 
and  she  rejoined  the  Grand  Fleet  and  became  the  flagship 
of  Rear-Admiral  R.  F.  Phillimore.  She  now  had  a  landing- 
deck,  284  feet  by  70  feet,  extending  from  the  funnel  to  near 
the  after  end  of  the  ship,  on  the  same  level  as  the  flying-off 
deck  forward  and  connected  with  it  by  gangways.  An  addi- 
tional hangar  to  house  six  aircraft  had  been  added,  as  well  as 
lifts  and  extra  workshops.  These  alterations  had  compelled 
an  important  modification  of  the  armament  in  the  Furious. 
The  remaining  18-inch  gun  had  gone  and  the  number  of 
5*5-inch  guns  had  been  reduced  from  eleven  to  ten.  She 
now  carried  fourteen  Sopwith  two-seater  reconnaissance 
aeroplanes  (\\  Strutters)  and  two  Sopwith  single-seater 
Tups'.  This  was  in  accordance  with  the  policy  laid  down 
by  the  Operations  Committee  in  January  191 8  that  recon- 
naissance aircraft  should  mainly  be  employed  from  aircraft 


i9i8]  THE  FURIOUS  35 

carriers  and  that  fighting  aircraft  should  be  carried  in 
fighting  ships.  The  number  of  aeroplanes  in  the  Furious, 
however,  was  not  constant.  Changes  were  also  made  from 
time  to  time  in  the  proportion  of  two-seaters  and  fighters, 
and,  for  special  operations,  as  many  as  twenty-five  aero- 
planes (fourteen  of  them  folding  single-seaters)  were 
carried. 

The  landing-deck  in  the  carrier  was  fitted  with  an 
arresting  gear  consisting  of  longitudinal  wire  cables  nine 
inches  above  the  deck  and  anchored  at  each  end.1  At  the 
forward  end  of  the  deck  a  wooden  ramp  was  fitted  under 
the  wires .  Across  the  wires  at  wide  intervals  ropes  were  laid . 
When  the  aeroplane  landed,  a  hook  under  the  fuselage 
engaged  the  ropes,  which  were  weighted  with  sand-bags 
at  each  end,  and  so  the  forward  movement  of  the  aircraft 
was  retarded.  Small  V-shaped  hooks,  attached  to  the 
undercarriage,  engaged  in  the  wires,  and  as  the  aircraft 
ran  up  the  ramp  the  friction  of  the  wires  in  the  hooks  in- 
creased until  the  aircraft  was  brought  to  a  standstill.  As  a 
final  precaution,  to  prevent  an  aeroplane  crashing  into  the 
funnel  casing  and  superstructure,  there  was  a  buffer  screen 
of  manilla  hawsers  stretched  at  the  forward  end  of  the 
deck.  In  order  to  decelerate  the  landing  run  still  further, 
the  aeroplanes  in  the  Furious  were  fitted  with  skid  under- 
carriages in  place  of  the  usual  wheel  type. 

These  landing  arrangements  had  been  proved  satis- 
factory by  experiments  ashore  at  the  Isle  of  Grain,  but 
it  soon  came  to  be  realized  that  the  design  of  the 
landing-deck  itself  was  wrong.  Pilots  were  dubious  about 
the  mass  of  structure  in  front  of  the  deck  which  would, 
they  suggested,  set  up  disturbed  air  conditions,  while 
it  appeared  that  the  disturbance  would  be  accentuated 
by  the  efflux  of  hot  gases  from  the  funnel.  When  landings 
came  to  be  attempted  their  views  were  proved  correct. 
The  aeroplanes  were  bumped  and  buffeted;  one  pilot 
made  many  attempts,  but  could  not  get  into  position  for 

1  This  gear  had  resulted  from  experiments  carried  out  by  Squadron 
Commander  H.  R.  Busteed  at  the  Experimental  Construction  Depot,  Isle 
of  Grain,  where  a  flat,  circular,  wooden  platform  had  been  built  flush 
with  the  ground. 


36     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

landing,  another  was  bumped  on  the  deck  and  pitched 
against  the  buffer  net,  and  a  third  (Squadron  Commander 
F.  J.  Rutland)  fell  over  the  side  and  narrowly  escaped 
with  his  life.  After  further  landing  attempts  at  various 
times,  of  which  all  except  three  ended  in  crashes,  it  was 
decided  that  landing  on  this  deck  was  impracticable. 
Captain  Nicholson,  R.N.,  of  the  Furious,  reported  that  in 
future  carriers  the  funnels  and  bridge  should  be  formed 
aft,  or  else  on  the  side  of  the  ship,  so  as  to  give  landing 
aeroplanes  'clean'  air,  and  Rear-Admiral  R.  F.  Phillimore 
strongly  supported  these  views.  Meanwhile  the  Furious 
continued  to  take  part  in  periodical  sweeps  off  the  Danish 
Coast  and  into  the  Heligoland  Bight.  Aeroplanes  were 
occasionally  flown  off  the  deck  to  make  reconnaissance 
flights,  but  on  their  return  they  were  landed  in  the  sea 
ahead  of  one  of  the  screening  destroyers  which  picked  up 
the  aeroplane's  crew. 

The  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  landing-deck  in  the 
Furious  led  to  changes  in  the  design  of  the  Argus  which  had 
been  launched  in  December  191 7.  The  Argus  embodied 
many  unusual  features,  and  was,  indeed,  a  wonder-ship  of 
her  day.  Chief  credit  for  her  design  must  be  accorded  to 
Commander  Gerard  R.  A.  Holmes,  whose  proposal  for  the 
construction  of  a  seaplane-carrying  cruiser,  submitted  to 
the  Admiralty  in  August  191 5,  had,  it  will  be  recalled, 
been  rejected.  This  officer  acted  as  a  liaison  officer  between 
the  Air  Department  and  the  Director  of  Naval  Construc- 
tion. His  original  design  for  the  Argus  allowed  for  a  flush 
upper  deck  without  obstruction  of  any  sort,  and  the  plan 
for  turning  the  funnels  into  horizontal  ducts,  an  impor- 
tant innovation,  was  his.  Before  the  Argus  had  been 
completed,  however,  modifications  in  her  design  had 
led  to  some  obstruction  of  her  flying-deck,  which  was 
cumbered  with  bridge-houses.  But  the  Furious  experi- 
ments had  confirmed  the  prudence  of  the  original  designs 
for  the  Argus,  and,  as  a  result,  it  was  decided  that  the 
upper  part  of  the  Argus  should  be  redesigned  so  as  to 
remove  the  bridge-houses  and  provide  an  absolutely  clear 
flying-deck.  This  decision  involved  a  reconstruction  of  the 
whole  of  the  navigating  and  wireless  arrangements,  and  of 


i9i8]  CLEARING  THE  DECKS  37 

the  deck  cabins,  and  also  the  abolition  of  the  cranes  at  the 
ends  of  the  bridge-houses.  The  reconstruction  was,  in  fact, 
of  a  drastic  kind,  and  the  Argus  was  not  ready  for  her  steam 
trials  until  September  191 8,  so  that  she  took  no  part  in 
the  war. 

The  task  of  providing  clear  deck  space  in  the  Almirante 
Cochrane,  which  was  being  converted  as  the  Eagle, 
presented  many  difficulties.  The  various  proposals  which 
were  put  forward  involved  the  grave  objection  that  they 
provided  for  the  discharge  of  the  hot  gases  at  a  low  level 
in  the  region  of  the  middle  of  the  length  of  the  ship.  It 
appeared,  also,  to  be  impracticable  to  carry  the  funnels 
aft  under  the  upper  deck  as  in  the  Argus.  Mr.  J.  H. 
Narbeth,  the  Assistant  Director  of  Naval  Construction, 
thereupon  devised  a  scheme  for  fitting  the  funnels  through 
an  island  on  the  starboard  side  of  the  ship.1  Models  were 
made  and  experimented  with  in  the  wind  tunnels  at 
Teddington,  and,  ultimately,  the  'one  island'  system  was 
adopted  in  the  Eagle.  Before  placing  the  island  on  the 
starboard  side,  Mr.  Narbeth  consulted  many  pilots  who 
all  told  him  that  if  they  decided  not  to  land  after  they 
had  approached  very  near  the  ship  they  would  turn  away 
again  to  the  left.  The  demand  of  the  air  service  for  a  clear 
deck  space,  however,  remained  strong,  and  in  the  general 
reconstruction  of  the  Furious  a  clear  deck  was  provided 
in  the  design.2  Post-war  experience  at  sea  with  the  Eagle 
and  the  Furious  led  to  a  revision  of  opinion  about  the 
merits  of  the  clear  deck  of  the  Furious,  and  an  island  was 
again  provided  on  the  starboard  side  in  the  Glorious  and 
Courageous,  as  it  was  also  in  the  Hermes. 

1  Mr.  Narbeth  worked  towards  this  solution  independently.  It  will, 
however,  be  recalled  that  a  similar  suggestion  had  been  made  by  Captain 
Wilmot  Nicholson.  As  a  fact,  also,  a  proposal  that  the  bridge,  mast,  and 
funnels  of  future  aircraft  carriers  should  be  enclosed  in  a  stream-lined 
casing  at  one  side  of  the  ship,  had  been  put  forward  by  Flight  Commander 
H.  A.  Williamson  in  191 5. 

2  The  reconstruction  of  the  Furious  as  a  clear-deck  aircraft  carrier  in- 
volved great  technical  difficulties.  Mr.  Narbeth  was  responsible,  under 
Sir  Eustace  H.  W.  Tennyson-D'Eyncourt,  the  Director  of  Naval  Con- 
struction, and  in  close  association  with  Mr.  C.  J.  W.  Hopkins  of  the 
Royal  Corps  of  Naval  Constructors,  for  the  redesign  of  the  ship. 


38  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

The  success  of  flying  single-seater  fighters  from  the 
turrets  of  capital  ships  had  been  so  pronounced  that  trials 
were  made  with  two-seater  reconnaissance  aircraft.  The 
turret  platform  in  the  Repulse  was  extended,  but  an 
attempt  in  a  Sopwith  i|  Strutter  in  March  191 8  failed. 
Trials  were  then  transferred  to  H.M.A.S.  Australia,  where 
a  bigger  platform  was  built,  and  on  the  4th  of  April  191 8, 
Captain  F.  M.  Fox,  R.A.F.,  in  a  Sopwith,  carrying  an 
observer  and  full  wireless  equipment,  made  the  first  flight 
in  a  two-seater  from  a  British  warship.  As  a  result  it  was 
decided  to  fit  the  forward  turrets  of  all  battle  cruisers 
with  extended  platforms  for  two-seater  aeroplanes;  the 
after  turrets  were  to  carry  the  single-seater  fighters. 

Kite  Balloons  with  the  Fleet 

Side  by  side  with  these  revolutionary  changes  in  the 
organization  and  distribution  of  the  Fleet's  heavier-than- 
air  craft,  there  had  been  a  marked  development  in  the 
airship  and  balloon  services.  In  May  191 7  Vice-Admiral 
Sir  John  M.  de  Robeck,  commanding  the  Second  Battle 
Squadron,  became  the  central  authority  for  all  matters 
relating  to  kite  balloons  for  the  Grand  Fleet.  Exercises  in 
July  191 7,  during  which  balloons  flown  from  ships  were 
sighted  by  the  'opposing'  fleet  long  before  the  ships  them- 
selves came  in  view,  led  to  a  lively  controversy.  It  was 
claimed  by  the  opponents  of  the  balloon  that  it  not  only 
revealed  the  presence  of  the  ships,  but  also  gave  clues  to 
the  composition  of  the  fleet  and  to  its  alterations  of 
course.  Sir  David  Beatty,  summing  up  the  controversy 
in  a  report  to  the  Admiralty,  stated  that  the  concensus 
of  opinion,  with  which  he  concurred,  was  that  the 
functions  of  the  balloons  were  sufficiently  promising  to 
warrant  their  retention.  They  were  wanted  in  the 
advanced  line  for  reconnaissance,  and  although  they 
might  be  seen  by  the  enemy,  the  value  of  the  informa- 
tion which  the  balloon  observers  could  give  would  far 
outweigh  the  disadvantage  of  disclosing  the  presence  of 
the  British  ships.  Balloons  would  also,  when  experience 
had  been  gained,  have  a  further  value  as  spotting  media 
for  the  guns  of  the  Battle  Fleet. 


1917-18]  KITE  BALLOONS  WITH  THE  FLEET  39 

It  was  thereupon  laid  down  that  four  light  cruisers 
{Calliope,  Caledon,  Birmingham,  and  Chester),  two  large 
light  cruisers,  two  battle  cruisers,  nine  battleships,  and 
three  destroyers,  should  be  fitted  with  winches  for  the 
towing  of  balloons.  This  was  additional  to  what  was 
required  for  the  anti-submarine  units  organized  in  July 
1 91 7,  each  consisting  of  six  destroyers  of  which  four  were 
to  carry  balloons.  The  work  of  these  units — known  as 
Destroyer  Kite  Balloon  forces — will  be  considered  in  a 
subsequent  chapter.  The  Campania,  it  was  decided, 
would  not  fly  her  balloons  on  service,  but  would  keep 
two  balloons  ready  for  transfer,  as  required,  to  ships  of 
the  Grand  Fleet.  The  Canning1  was  also  to  keep  two  or 
three  balloons  ready  and  inflated,  except  in  winter. 

When  the  balloons  were  required  for  service  at  sea, 
they  were  taken  off  the  Canning,  the  Campania,  and 
from  the  shore  bases,  in  steam  drifters,  and  were  then 
transferred  to  the  battleships,  cruisers,  and  destroyers 
which  were  to  tow  them.  Those  who  saw  the  Fleet  put 
to  sea  with  balloons  have  testified  that  the  sight  was  a 
somewhat  remarkable  one. 

The  controversy  on  the  danger  of  flying  kite  balloons 
from  a  fleet  at  sea  was  revived  as  a  result  of  further  Grand 
Fleet  exercises  in  February  191 8,  when,  once  again,  the 
balloons  were  sighted  long  before  the  ships  became  visible. 
It  was  argued  that  bearings  taken  on  the  balloons  would 
enable  torpedo  attacks  to  be  developed  with  ease  and  safety 
against  the  fleet  which  was  flying  them.  Opinion  was 
sharply  divided,  and  continued  to  be  divided  up  to  the  end 
of  the  war.  The  balloons  were,  however,  retained,  and  at 
the  date  of  the  Armistice  in  November  191 8,  eighteen 
battleships,  three  battle  cruisers,  and  seven  light  cruisers, 
in  addition  to  a  large  number  of  smaller  anti-submarine 
craft,  had  been  fitted  for  towing  balloons.  A  disadvantage 
of  the  balloons  was  that,  in  squally  weather,  they  were 
liable  to  break  away,  and  a  number  were,  in  fact,  lost  from 
this  cause.  This  weakness  tended  to  affect  the  use  of 
balloons  in  the  faster  ships  of  the  Fleet. 

1  The  Canning,  after  service  in  the  Mediterranean,  had  been  recom- 
missioned  in  December  1916  as  a  harbour  depot  ship  for  the  Grand  Fleet. 


4o  AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET        [ch.  i 

Airships 

The  first  airship  of  the  'North  Sea',  or  N.S.  type, 
originally  designed  for  patrols  of  a  minimum  of  twenty 
hours'  duration,  underwent  trials  in  February  1917.1  Her 
trial  speed  was  44  knots.  This  N.S.  1  went  to  the  air  station 
at  Pulham,  whence,  in  June  191 7,  she  made  a  flight  of  491 
hours' duration,  in  which  she  covered  1,500  miles.  Six  North 
Sea  ships  were  completed  in  1917.  In  July  1917,  when 
it  became  known  that  German  U-boats  operating  off 
the  north-east  coast  were  using  a  track  running  roughly 
north-east  from  Coquet  Island,  it  was  decided  to  con- 
centrate 'North  Sea'  type  airships  at  East  Fortune  where 
they  would  be  available  for  patrols  along  this  U-boat  track 
as  well  as  for  fleet  reconnaissance.  The  N.S. 3  was  flown 
to  East  Fortune  on  the  22nd  of  July,  the  N.S.i  in  Septem- 
ber, and  the  N.S. 4  in  October.  The  N.S.  ships,  however, 
proved  disappointing,  chiefly  because  much  trouble  was 
experienced  with  the  power  transmission  gear.  Their 
patrols  had  to  be  curtailed,  and  they  could  not,  as  had 
been  hoped,  be  relied  upon  for  use  with  the  Fleet.2  This 
N.S.  airship  disappointment  calls  for  some  comment.  The 
design  for  the  original  airship  was,  in  fact,  very  far  ahead  of 
that  of  any  previous  airship.  The  main  aim  was  to  give 
the  ship  endurance,  and,  to  achieve  this,  many  radical 
developments  in  the  design  had  to  be  made.  The  trials  of 
the  first  ship,  in  February  191 7,  were  very  satisfactory, 
and  so  anxious  was  the  Admiralty  to  get  this  new  air- 
ship to  a  patrol  station,  that  she  was  sent  away  from 

1  The  envelope  was  a  stream-lined  Astra  of  360,000  cubic  feet  capacity, 
rigged  to  an  enclosed  car  of  wood  with  steel-bracings  and  covered  with 
duralumin  sheets.  The  engines  were  two  250  horse-power  Rolls-Royce. 

2  The  N.S. 2  was  wrecked  at  Stowmarket  in  a  trial  flight;  the  N.S. 5,  on 
her  way  to  East  Fortune  in  December,  was  forced  to  land  with  engine 
failure  and  had  to  be  deflated  by  ripping ;  the  N.S.6,  completed  in  December 
1 91 7,  was  retained  at  Kingsnorth  for  the  fitting  of  Fiat  engines  with  a  direct 
drive  instead  of  the  machinery  and  transmission  gear  provided  in  the 
original  design.  She  was  ready  in  May  1918,  and  went  to  Longside,  near 
Peterhead.  The  N.S. 1  on  December  15th  1917,  forced  down  by  engine 
failure,  had  to  be  deflated  by  ripping. 

Of  thirty-seven  non-rigid  airships  of  all  types  lost  or  deflated  owing  to 
accidents  in  1917,  sixteen  were  as  the  result  of  engine  failure. 


1917]       RIGID  AND  NON-RIGID  AIRSHIPS         41 

Kingsnorth  to  Pulham,  in  spite  of  the  wish  of  those  who 
had  designed  and  built  her  that  she  should  be  kept  back 
for  further  extensive  trials  at  full  speed.  The  trouble 
with  the  transmission  gear  was  not  disclosed  until  the 
ship  had  flown  for  some  200  hours,  and  by  that  time 
the  construction  of  the  other  N.S.  ships  had  progressed 
so  far  that  only  minor  changes  were  possible.  The  lesson 
of  this  experience,  and  one  especially  applicable  to 
airships,  is  that  a  new  type,  particularly  when  the  design 
is  a  radical  advance  on  anything  previously  attempted, 
should  undergo  drastic  and  exhaustive  trials  before  being 
subjected  to  the  rigours  of  active  service. 

Nor  did  the  performance  of  the  rigid  airships,  the  de- 
velopment of  which  had  been  taken  in  hand  too  late,  come 
up  to  expectations.  The  original  ship,  R.g,  was  completed 
by  Messrs.  Vickers  in  March  191 7,  and  was  sent,  next 
month,  to  Howden,  where  she  was  used  mainly  as  a  training- 
ship.  Three  ships  of  the  R.  23  Class  were  also  completed 
during  the  year;  they  were  R.23  by  Messrs.  Vickers  at 
Barrow,  R.24  by  Messrs.  Beardmore  at  Inchinnan,  and 
R.25  by  Messrs.  Armstrong- Whitworth  at  Barlow.  The 
R.23  was  accepted  after  trial  flights  made  on  the  15th  of 
September  191 7,  and  was  sent  to  Pulham:  her  speed  was 
approximately  52  miles  per  hour.  The  R.25  was  delivered 
on  the  15th  of  October  and  went  to  Howden,  and  the 
R.24  flew  to  East  Fortune  on  the  28th  of  the  same  month. 
The  lift  of  these  ships  was  disappointing,  and  modifica- 
tions in  the  design  were  suggested  for  incorporation  in 
the  R.26,  the  remaining  ship  of  this  class.  The  three 
ships  which  had  been  delivered  were  used  occasionally  for 
escorting  convoys,  but  chiefly,  owing  to  their  unsatis- 
factory performance,  they  were  retained  for  instruction 
and  experiment. 

The  Grand  Fleet,  therefore,  had  still  to  rely,  for  such 
co-operation  as  airships  could  afford,  on  ships  of  the 
'Coastal'  type,  working  chiefly  from  the  bases  at  Longside 
and  East  Fortune.  Both  these  bases,  during  191 7,  had 
an  undue  amount  of  fog  and  squally  weather,  and  the  air- 
ship operations  were  strictly  limited.  Under  the  best 
conditions,  however,  the  radius  of  action  of  the  'Coastals' 


42     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET    [ch.  i 

was  insufficient  for  really  useful  fleet  work  and,  from 
March  191 7,  further  trials  were  made  of  towing  air- 
ships from  light  cruisers.  The  trials  by  day,  when  the  air- 
ship was  towed,  refuelled,  and  given  a  change  of  crew,  and 
by  night,  when  it  was  picked  up  and  towed,  were  success- 
ful, but  they  made  it  clear  that  a  towed  airship  was  diffi- 
cult to  control  and  that  the  consequent  strain  on  the  air- 
ship crew  was  high.  It  was  therefore  decided  that  when 
'Coastals'  were  required  for  work  in  co-operation  with 
the  fleet,  they  should  be  flown  out  and  taken  in  tow  for 
refuelling  as  necessary,  but  that  towing  for  other  reasons 
should  not  be  undertaken. 

In  a  Grand  Fleet  exercise  in  July  1917  five  'Coastal' 
airships  were  employed,  and  from  them  some  valuable 
reconnaissances  were  made.  On  this  occasion  an  attempt 
to  refuel  the  C.15  from  the  Phaeton  failed,  and  the  airship 
had  eventually  to  be  ripped.  Other  exercises  in  September 
191 7  again  showed  the  great  value  of  airship  recon- 
naissance to  the  Fleet,  but  they  confirmed  that  the  non- 
rigid  ships  had  neither  the  strength  nor  the  endurance  to 
make  them  a  reliable  reconnaissance  medium  in  the  weather 
conditions  which  the  Fleet  must  expect  in  the  North  Sea 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  year.  The  development,  how- 
ever, of  the  aeroplane  for  work  with  the  Fleet  at  sea,  and  of 
the  flying-boat  for  distant  North  Sea  reconnaissances,  made 
the  problem  of  airship  and  fleet  co-operation  less  urgent 
and  important.  The  main  work  of  the  'Coastals'  and  other 
non-rigid  airships  was  patrol  in  search  of  U-boats  and 
minefields  and  the  escort  of  convoys  along  the  various  war 
channels,  a  work  for  which  they  were  well  fitted  and  one 
which  they  splendidly  performed. 

It  was  said,  at  the  beginning  of  this  narrative,  that  in 
the  year  191 7  there  were  important  developments  in  all 
branches  of  naval  air  work.  It  may  help  the  reader  to 
appreciate  better  how  remarkable  some  of  those  develop- 
ments were  if  we  summarize  the  progress  made  with 
heavier-than-air  craft  for  the  Fleet,  and  survey  the  position 
as  it  appeared  about  March  191 8.  It  will  be  recalled  that 
when  the  Grand  Fleet  Aircraft  Committee  reported  at  the 


1917-18]  A  SUMMARY  43 

beginning  of  February  191 7,  the  Fleet  disposed  only  of 
three  carriers,  the  Campania,  Engadine,  and  Manxman, 
and  that,  except  the  Manxman,  which  carried  aeroplanes 
as  well  as  seaplanes,  they  were  equipped  with  seaplanes. 
But  these  carriers,  few  as  they  were,  were  of  doubtful 
value.  The  Engadine  could  only  be  counted  upon  when 
the  sea  was  fairly  smooth,  and  the  North  Sea  is  not  often 
smooth.  The  speed  of  the  Manxman  was  low  and  her  radius 
of  action  restricted.  Sir  David  Beatty  had  pointed  out,  in  a 
letter  to  the  Admiralty  on  the  21st  of  January  1917,  that 
the  German  Fleet  possessed  a  powerful  aid  to  reconnais- 
sance in  their  Zeppelins,  and  that  if  the  High  Sea  Fleet  came 
out  of  harbour  for  operations,  it  could  be  taken  for  granted 
that  weather  would  be  chosen  suitable  for  flying  by  Zep- 
pelins and  seaplanes.  He  had  proceeded  to  stress  how 
important  it  was  that  the  Grand  Fleet  should  also  be  in  a 
position  to  make  full  and  proper  use  of  the  air  weapon. 

By  March  191 8  the  position  had  changed  entirely. 
For  air  reconnaissance  the  Grand  Fleet  now  possessed 
the  speedy  carriers  Furious,  Pegasus,  and  N  air  ana.  The 
Campania  had  mainly  been  given  over  to  training,  and  the 
Manxman  and  the  Engadine  had  been  sent  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean. Special  land  air  bases  for  the  Fleet  had  been 
established  at  Houton  Bay  in  the  Orkneys,  at  Rosyth, 
Donibristle,  and  at  Turnhouse.  But  the  provision  of  new 
carriers  was  not  the  most  important  development.  Fight- 
ing aircraft  were  now  carried  in  many  fighting  ships,  that 
is  in  battle  cruisers  and  in  light  cruisers.  Most  revolu- 
tionary of  all,  the  aircraft  for  fleet  work  was  no  longer  the 
seaplane,  but  the  aeroplane,  which  could  take  off  from 
the  deck  of  the  carriers  and  could  also  be  flown  from  the 
turrets  of  the  fighting  ships  without  those  ships  being  re- 
quired to  leave  the  line,  or  alter  course.  In  the  early  part  of 
191 7  the  Grand  Fleet  had  had  no  reliable  assurance  that  it 
might  not  be  reconnoitred  and  attacked,  with  impunity,  by 
Zeppelins  and  by  German  seaplanes.  It  had  had  to  face  the 
possibility  that  Zeppelin  reconnaissance  might  give  such 
early  information  about  the  disposition,  course,  and  speed 
of  the  Grand  Fleet,  as  to  enable  German  mine-layers  to 
act  in  the  path  of  the  ships  without  any  knowledge  of  the 


44     AIRCRAFT  WITH  THE  FLEET 

mine-laying  activities  reaching  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief.  In  March  191 8  it  may  be  said  that  any  Zeppelin 
which  came  within  sight  of  the  Grand  Fleet  would  have 
run  such  risk  of  attack  from  fighting  aeroplanes  as  to  make 
her  survival  highly  doubtful,  and  certainly  that  no 
Zeppelin  could  have  remained  in  contact  with  the  Fleet 
for  long  enough  to  permit  of  useful  reconnaissance.  Nor 
could  enemy  seaplanes  hope  to  do  what  was  now  beyond  the 
capabilities  of  the  Zeppelins.  No  seaplane  in  the  German 
service,  or  for  that  matter  in  any  other,  was  a  match  for 
the  'Camel'  fighting  aeroplane  with  which  the  British 
battle  cruisers  and  light  cruisers  were  equipped  in  March 
191 8.  New  carriers,  which  were  to  become  known  after 
the  war,  were  already  under  construction.  In  the  same 
period  the  flying-boat  had  been  greatly  developed  and 
had  had  some  spectacular  successes,  not  only  against 
Zeppelins,  but  also  against  U-boats.  Although,  with  the 
passing  of  the  element  of  surprise,  these  successes  might 
not  be  easily  repeated,  the  flying-boat  remained  an  im- 
portant medium  for  reconnaissance,  particularly  of  the 
mined  areas  in  the  southern  part  of  the  North  Sea.  In  a 
word,  the  British  Fleet  possessed  in  March  191 8  the  means 
for  the  attainment  of  air  superiority  in  any  possible  naval 
operations  in  any  part  of  the  North  Sea,  except  within 
effective  range  of  adequate  German  fighting  aircraft 
operating  from  shore  bases. 


CHAPTER  II 
UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE 

[Map  facing  p.  i] 

The  German  submarine  threat  had,  by  the  end  of  1916, 
brought  about  changes  at  the  Admiralty.  In  December, 
as  has  been  told,  the  Anti-Submarine  Division  had  been 
created,  under  Rear-Admiral  A.  L.  Duff,  for  the  control 
and  co-ordination  of  all  the  British  anti-submarine  forces, 
and  from  this  time  dates  a  wide  expansion  in  the  naval  air 
organization.  The  officers  of  the  new  Anti-Submarine 
Division  made  an  early  survey  of  the  whole  position  and 
concluded  that  the  decisive  theatre  of  operations  would 
be  the  western  approaches  to  the  British  Isles  where  the 
oceanic  routes  converged  and  where  there  could  be  no  de- 
fence by  dispersion.  In  this  danger  area,  which  was  too  big 
for  efficient  patrolling,  U-boats  had,  in  the  later  months 
of  1916,  inflicted  increasing  losses  on  Allied  shipping. 

At  the  time  the  Anti-Submarine  Division  was  formed, 
traffic  round  the  British  Isles  was  controlled  by  a  set  of 
orders  which  aimed  at  keeping  vessels  inside  the  coastal 
zones,  and  had  the  general  effect  of  concentrating  great 
numbers  of  ships  along  the  patrol  routes  off  the  south 
coast  of  Ireland  and  in  the  Bristol  Channel.  But  the 
majority  of  the  naval  air  stations  were  on  the  East  Coast, 
where  air  patrol  of  the  shipping  routes  was  a  routine  pro- 
cedure. Except  the  airship  stations  at  Mullion  and  Pem- 
broke, there  were  no  bases  from  which  aircraft  patrols 
could  be  organized  for  the  western  channel. 

In  the  middle  of  December  1916,  Rear-Admiral  Duff, 
in  a  memorandum  to  the  First  Sea  Lord  (Admiral  Jellicoe), 
asked  that  the  Director  of  Air  Services  should  be  requested 
to  prepare  a  scheme  for  the  development  of  additional  air 
patrols  on  the  following  basis: 

Suggested  Base.  Patrol. 

(i)  Falmouth  or  the       North    of   Cornwall    up    to 
Scillies.  Lundy   Island:   westwards 

from  the  Scillies :  northern 
traffic  route  up  Channel. 


46     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 
Suggested  Base.  Patrol. 

(ii)  Queenstown.  South  coast  of  Ireland, 

(iii)  Milford  Haven.  To    Lundy    Island    and    to 

Tuskar  Light, 
(iv)   Salcombe     (Start       Up  and  down  traffic  route. 

Point), 
(v)  Berehaven.  South-west    coast    and    ap- 

proaches to  west  of  Ireland. 

In  his  memorandum  Rear-Admiral  Duff  stated  that  ex- 
perience seemed  to  show  that  for  anti-submarijie  opera- 
tions, seaplanes,  supplemented  by  aeroplanes,  should  be 
used  offensively,  and  that  airships  should  be  confined  to 
reporting  and  keeping  watch  on  U-boats  and  to  giving 
warnings  to  divert  shipping.  Kite  balloons,  he  suggested, 
might  be  used  from  sloops  or  other  special  anti-submarine 
patrol  vessels.  The  First  Sea  Lord  generally  approved  this 
outline  of  policy  and  development,  but  considered  that 
airships  should  be  used  offensively  as  well  as  defensively, 
and  that,  for  inshore  work,  aeroplanes,  because  of  their 
greater  bomb-carrying  capacity,  would  probably  prove 
more  effective  than  seaplanes. 

A  search  was  thereupon  made  for  suitable  seaplane  bases. 
From  Torquay  to  Land's  End  it  was  difficult  to  find  sites 
offering  the  necessary  shelter,  but  ultimately  two  were 
acquired  at  Cattewater  (Plymouth)  and  Newlyn  (Land's 
End).  The  waters  off  the  north-west  coast  of  Cornwall 
and  west  of  the  Fastnet  were  reported  unsuitable  for  sea- 
planes, and  the  patrol  of  these  waters  was  therefore  to  be 
undertaken  by  airships  from  Mullion  and  Pembroke.  An 
additional  shed  to  house  a  'Coastal'  airship  was  transferred 
from  Dover  to  Mullion.  The  Vice-Admiral  Commanding 
Queenstown  was  decidedly  lukewarm  about  aircraft  co- 
operation, chiefly  because  no  sloops  could  be  spared  to 
leave  their  patrols  to  attack  a  submarine  if  and  when  one 
was  reported  by  aircraft,  or  to  rescue  a  seaplane  down  on 
the  water  from  engine  trouble  or  other  cause.  'If  the 
'sloops  have  to  look  after  them,'  he  said,  'to  rescue  or  to 
'mother  them,  then  the  seaplanes  will  be  a  hindrance  and 
'a  serious  nuisance;  the  patrol  routes  will  be  dislocated, 


i9i7]  AIRCRAFT  PATROLS  47 

'and  the  submarines  will  be  able  to  reap  a  rich  harvest 
'during  the  absence  of  the  sloops.  If  seaplanes  are  not 
'wanted  elsewhere,  and  can  look  after  themselves,  they 
'will  be  useful.  If  not,  they  will  be  an  offence.'  This  re- 
presents an  attitude  of  mind  with  which  the  naval  air 
personnel  had  often  to  contend,  but  it  must  in  fairness  be 
stated  that  it  was  founded  on  experience  with  some  of  the 
earlier  and  less  reliable  types  of  aircraft.  Perhaps  the  best 
commentary  on  this  outlook  of  a  distinguished  naval  com- 
mander lies  in  the  fact,  as  shall  be  given  in  detail  later, 
that  of  four  U-boats  sunk  in  the  month  of  July  191 7  as  a 
result  of  the  full  and  combined  anti-submarine  measures 
of  the  navy,  two  were  destroyed  by  aircraft  unaided,  and  a 
third  chiefly  through  the  agency  of  a  kite  balloon.  Because 
of  the  views  expressed  by  the  Vice-Admiral  the  proposal  to 
form  additional  seaplane  bases  at  Queenstown  and  Bere- 
haven  was  left  in  abeyance  and  instead  a  base  was  ulti- 
mately opened  at  Fishguard.  In  February  191 7,  as  a  result 
of  the  increase  in  the  U-boat  successes  off  the  Scillies,  three 
H.I 2  type  flying-boats  were  flown  from  Felixstowe  to  the 
Scilly  Islands  for  anti-submarine  operations  from  moored 
positions  in  a  sheltered  bay. 

When  the  German  campaign  of  unrestricted  U-boat 
warfare  began  on  the  1st  of  February  191 7,  it  was  marked 
by  a  change  of  tactics  from  surface  attack  by  gun-fire  to 
submerged  attack  with  torpedo.  At  the  time  the  new 
campaign  began  in  U-boats  were  available.  Of  these 
forty-nine  were  based  at  North  German  ports,  thirty- 
three  at  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend,  twenty- four  at  Pola  in  the 
Adriatic,  two  at  Constantinople,  and  three  in  the  Baltic. 
No  more  than  forty  U-boats  could  be  expected  to  operate 
at  the  same  time.  In  the  first  week  of  February  thirty-five 
vessels  were  sunk  in  the  Channel  and  the  western  ap- 
proaches. In  March  the  attacks  were  intensified  and  it  was 
known  that  at  least  eight  submarines  were  operating  at  one 
time  between  the  Channel  and  western  Ireland. 

The  existing  air  patrols  proved  inadequate,  and  as  there 
were  no  seaplanes  available  by  which  the  patrols  might  be 
increased,  aeroplane  stations  were  opened  in  April  at 
Prawle  Point  (Salcombe),  Mullion,  and  Pembroke.   Each 


48     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 

station  began  with  four  Sopwith  ij  Strutters.1  On  the 
3rd  of  April  all  the  air  stations  in  the  South-Western 
Group  (Cattewater,  Scilly  Isles,  Newlyn,  Fishguard,  Mul- 
lion,  and  Pembroke)  were  made  a  separate  command  under 
Wing  Commander  E.  L.  Gerrard,  with  head-quarters  at 
Devonport.2  The  Group  was  under  the  general  orders  of 
the  Naval  Commander-in-Chief,  Plymouth.  Systems  of 
routine  patrols  by  seaplanes,  airships,  and  aeroplanes  were 
established  by  which  the  main  vulnerable  area  was 
covered,  and  aeroplanes  or  seaplanes  were  also  kept  ready 
for  emergency  patrols  on  receipt  of  specific  information.3 
Special  seaplane  patrols,  styled  'Contact-Patrols',  in  co- 
operation with  destroyers  or  motor  launches,  were  also 
organized  when  it  was  desired  to  search  definite  areas  some 
distance  from  the  land.  The  normal  patrol  of  this  type 
enabled  1,600  square  miles  of  sea  to  be  systematically 
searched. 

The  mid-Channel  patrols  were  organized  with  seaplanes 
of  the  Portsmouth  Group  air  stations  under  Wing  Com- 
mander A.  W.  Bigsworth.  In  January  191 7  this  Group, 
which  operated  under  the  orders  of  the  Naval  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Portsmouth,  comprised  the  main  air  station  at 
Calshot,  and  sub-stations  at  Bembridge  (Isle  of  Wight)  and 
Portland.  In  May  there  was  added  a  new  sub-station  at 
Newhaven,  and,  in  July,  another  at  Cherbourg.  In  the 
latter  month,  also,  the  airship  station  at  Polegate  was  taken 
over  by  the  Portsmouth  Group  from  the  Vice-Admiral, 
Dover. 

While  these  air  patrols  were  being  developed  in  the 
Channel  and  south-western  approaches,  the  waters  off  the 
East  Coast,  from  the  North  Foreland  to  the  north  of 
Scotland,  were  divided  (in  March  191 7)  into  seven  patrol 
areas   to   be   searched   by  the   seaplanes  of  the  various 

1  In  August  1917  the  aeroplane  units  had  to  be  disbanded  because  of  a 
shortage  of  pilots  resulting  from  the  necessity  of  bringing  up  to  strength  the 
R.N.A.S.  squadrons  attached  to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  in  France. 

2  In  November  191 7  Fishguard  and  Pembroke  were  separated  from  the 
South- Western  Group  and  formed  a  new  Group  under  the  Senior  Naval 
Officer,  Milford  Haven. 

3  An  example  of  a  scheme  of  seaplane  patrols  introduced  in  July  191 7 
for  the  South- Western  Group  of  air  stations  is  given  in  the  map  facing. 


SFAPLANE    and    FLYING-BOAT    PATROLS 

SOUTH-WESTERN     GROUP     of    AIR     STATIONS 

S£RI£S    II.       JULY,    1917. 

The  numbers  indioate  the  length,  In  sea  miles,  of  the  long  side  of  each  triangle 
For  a  search  In  the  direction  of  the  arrows  the  code  letter  a_  was  used,  against 
the  arrows,  b.   Example.  The  order  Routine  II  a  45  to  any  station  oalled  for  a 
patrol  of  the  triangle  numbered  45~  In  the  patrol  sector  II,  to  be  made  In  the 
direction  of  the  arrows.   If  a  more  intensive  search  was  desired,  the  seaplane 
would  cross,  and  re-cross,  the  big  triangle  at  each  intermediate  base  on  Its 
outward  flight,  but  would  normally  return  direct.   The  order  would  then  read 
Routine  II  a  15.  30.  '45. 


FRANCE 


CrJn.m.c  Sumy  1933 


1917]  HUNTING  U-BOATS  49 

commands.  Hitherto  no  limits  had  been  prescribed  for 
searching  operations  by  the  seaplanes,  and  there  had  been, 
in  consequence,  both  overlapping  and  discontinuity. 

In  the  anti-submarine  campaign  the  detective  work  of 
the  Naval  Intelligence  Division  played  a  notable  part.1 
The  U-boat  commanders  were,  like  their  colleagues  in  the 
naval  airship  service,  free  with  the  use  of  their  wireless, 
and  listening  ears  at  the  direction-finding  wireless  stations 
in  England  and  France  duly  recorded  the  signals.  It  was 
then  a  simple  matter  to  fix  the  positions  of  the  German 
craft.  It  will  be  recalled  that  when,  in  a  similar  way, 
Zeppelins  were  located,  each  was  given  an  English  Chris- 
tian name,  and  its  movements  were  thereafter  plotted 
under  its  temporary  name.  Units  in  England  which  were 
concerned  with  the  operations  of  Zeppelins  received, 
through  the  intelligence  stations,  a  stream  of  messages  tell- 
ing of  the  progress  of  Anna,  Bertha,  or  Clara,  and  they 
were  able,  on  their  charts  or  maps,  to  plot  with  tolerable 
accuracy  the  movements  of  each  individual  airship.  Each 
U-boat,  when  first  reported,  was  identified  by  the  name  of 
a  fish,  for  example,  Plaice,  Roach,  or  Salmon,2  and  the 
intelligence  staff  endeavoured  to  follow  the  subsequent 
movements  of  each  separate  craft.  Apart  from  informa- 
tion obtained  through  wireless  interception,  there  were 
reports  of  sightings  and  attacks  by  British  and  French 
air  and  surface  craft  to  be  studied,  and  there  was 
the  check  on  the  U-boats'  movements  supplied  by  the 
sinkings  of  Allied  vessels.  Some  of  the  submarines  had 
regular  rest  billets  where,  in  shallow  water  (twenty  fathoms 
or  so),  they  could  lie  on  the  bottom  between  their  tours 
of  depredation.  All  likely  places  were  methodically  noted 
and  the  movements  of  the  U-boats,  as  plotted  on  the  in- 
telligence charts,  sometimes  indicated  that  a  particular 
rest  billet  might  be  in  use,  and  led  to  an  immediate  hunt. 

1  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  Arthur  K.  Wilson,  V.C.,  who  had  retired, 
volunteered  his  services  to  the  Admiralty  on  the  outbreak  of  war  and 
spent  much  of  his  time  .tracking  and  forecasting  enemy  submarine  move- 
ments. 

2  With  the  submarines,  as  with  the  Zeppelins,  names  were  allotted 
alphabetically  in  the  order  in  which  the  enemy  craft  were  first  reported. 

2504-4  E 


50       UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE  [ch.  ii 

This  unrelenting  warfare  of  detection  was  of  enormous 
help,  at  all  times,  in  defining  the  likeliest  areas  of  search 
for  the  hunting  craft,  and,  on  occasion,  led  to  the  swift 
destruction  of  a  U-boat.  It  was  some  time,  however,  be- 
fore it  was  realized  that  the  naval  air  stations  had  the  best 
chances  of  success  in  their  campaign  against  the  submarine 
if  intelligence  about  U-boats  was  received  without  delay, 
and  it  was  not  until  May  191 7  that  orders  were  issued  that 
all  reports  of  U-boat  movements  were  to  be  communicated 
direct  to  air  stations  in  a  position  to  take  action.  In  July, 
to  make  the  passing  of  such  messages  easier,  and  to  main- 
tain secrecy,  a  special  form  of  squared  chart,  called 
Tracing  U  (Unterseeboot),  to  cover  the  North  Sea  east  of  a 
line  running  from  Flamborough  Head  to  the  Straits  of 
Dover,  was  issued  to  the  East  Coast  air  stations  required 
to  take  anti-submarine  action.  It  was  then  arranged  that 
the  positions  of  U-boats  as  determined  by  directional  wire- 
less would  be  plotted  at  the  Admiralty  and  passed  im- 
mediately to  the  air  stations  according  to  the  code  of  the 
squared  chart. 

It  was  always  difficult  to  distinguish  from  the  air  be- 
tween the  different  types  of  enemy  submarine  and,  what 
was  more  serious,  it  was  sometimes  impossible  to  decide 
whether  an  under-water  craft  was  enemy  or  friendly. 
British  submarines  were,  unhappily,  sometimes  attacked 
by  Allied  aircraft.  Recognition  signals  for  submarines  had 
continuously  been  investigated  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  but  one  which  would  be  both  practical  and  effective 
was  not  easy  to  devise.  British  submarines  at  first  used  a 
water  jet  to  establish  their  identity  when  challenged,  but 
this  proved  an  unsatisfactory  method  and  was  soon 
abolished.  In  areas  where  German  aircraft  were  unlikely 
to  operate,  British  submarines  had  identification  marks 
painted  on  their  decks,  but  in  some  conditions  of  light,  if 
the  decks  were  wet  and  the  paint  at  all  dirty,  the  marks 
could  not  be  seen  from  the  air.  Dependence  on  a  visual 
signal  from  a  submarine  in  answer  to  a  challenge  from  air- 
craft was  dangerous.  If  a  submarine  was  ready  to  dive, 
there  would  be  no  one  on  deck  to  make  a  signal,  and 
failure  to  elicit  a  reply  would  be  assumed  by  the  aircraft 


1916-17]  A  CRITICAL  SITUATION  51 

crew  to  indicate  an  enemy  vessel.  To  overcome  these 
various  difficulties,  areas  of  sea  were  reserved  for  British 
submarine  operations  and  forbidden  to  Allied  aircraft. 
Also,  while  British  under-water  craft  were  passing  through 
areas  patrolled  by  aircraft  they  did  so  on  the  surface, 
usually  under  escort.  In  addition,  the  air  stations  con- 
cerned were  previously  informed  whenever  Allied  sub- 
marines would  be  on  passage  through  patrolled  areas. 

In  April  191 7  the  U-boat  campaign  was  conducted 
with  unprecedented  intensity  and,  in  the  first  fortnight, 
the  toll  of  Allied  shipping  averaged  28,000  tons  a  day.  One 
great  area  of  destruction  spread  fanwise  into  the  Atlantic 
Ocean  from  the  south-west  point  of  Ireland,  and  another 
from  Land's  End.  The  situation  had  become  critical.  An 
arithmetical  calculation,  based  on  what  the  U-boat  had 
already  achieved,  sufficed  to  indicate  the  month  in  which 
the  Allied  cause  must  suffer  eclipse.  The  existing  anti- 
submarine defences,  widespread  and  intricate  as  they  were, 
had  proved  entirely  inadequate.  One  of  two  methods 
must  now  be  adopted.  Either  every  available  force  must 
be  concentrated  for  the  offensive  against  the  U-boat,  or 
else  distributed  in  defence  of  the  merchant  vessels.  On 
these  alternatives  naval  opinion  was  sharply  divided. 

There  was,  however,  no  time  for  debate  or  experiment. 
A  decision  must  be  taken  quickly  and  it  soon  became  clear 
what  that  decision  must  be.  It  was  indicated  in  the  ex- 
perience along  the  Dutch  trade  routes  open  to  rapid 
attack,  by  aircraft,  submarines,  or  destroyers,  from  the 
Bight  or  from  Zeebrugge.  After  the  capture  of  the 
Brussels,  in  June  191 6,  the  Harwich  Force  had  been  called 
upon  to  provide  escorts  for  British  ships  transporting  goods 
from  Holland,  a  routine  known  as  the  'Beef  Trip'.  By 
November  191 6  it  had  been  shown  that  the  convoy 
system  gave  the  greatest  security,  and  the  merchant  vessels 
in  the  Dutch  trade  assembled  for  a  bi-weekly  escort  by 
light  cruisers  and  destroyers.  As  it  was  impossible  for  ships 
to  collect  in  Dutch  waters  for  the  homeward  journey 
without  German  agents  discovering  much  of  what  was 
happening,  the  convoy  suffered  attacks  from  time  to  time, 
but,    on   the  whole,   the   arrangement  was   remarkably 


52      UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE  [ch.  ii 

successful,  although  it  constituted  a  drain  on  the  resources 
of  the  Harwich  Force.  Early  in  191 7,  the  escort  was  supple- 
mented by  flying-boats  from  Felixstowe.  On  the  evening 
before  the  departure  of  the  convoy  from  Shipwash,  a 
search  was  made  by  flying-boats  along  the  route  the  ships 
would  follow  (the  route  was  continuously  changed),  and 
next  day  a  patrol,  five  to  ten  miles  ahead  of  the  convoy,  was 
provided  by  a  relay  of  flying-boats. 

A  system  of  convoys  had  also  been  adopted  in  the 
Western  Channel  for  ships  engaged  in  the  French  coal 
trade.  This  trade  had  suffered  severe  attacks  towards  the 
end  of  1 91 6  and  many  vessels  had  been  lost.  Representa- 
tions by  the  French  authorities  led  eventually  to  a  system 
of  controlled  sailings,  which  were  put  into  force  on  the  7th  of 
February  191 7,  over  three  different  routes.  The  groups 
of  vessels,  which  steamed  in  rough  formation,  were  escorted 
by  armed  trawlers,  and  the  results  seemed  to  confirm  that 
here  was  the  means  of  defeating  the  U-boat.  In  the  three 
months,  March  to  May  1917,  only  nine  vessels  were  lost 
out  of  a  total  of  4,016  convoyed  along  the  three  routes. 
The  word  'convoyed',  however,  requires  some  qualifica- 
tion. The  escorting  vessels  were  at  no  time  considered 
adequate  to  resist  determined  attacks  and,  as  much  as  any- 
thing, their  task  was  to  give  the  masters  of  the  colliers  con- 
fidence. The  success  of  the  system  was  due  in  part  to  the 
fact  that  the  vessels  passed  over  well-patrolled  routes  and 
that  the  sailings  could  be  easily  delayed  or  altered  up  to 
the  last  moment  in  accordance  with  the  latest  Admiralty 
intelligence  about  U-boat  movements  in  the  area. 

With  the  lessons  of  the  French  coal  trade  and  of  the 
Dutch  trade  before  them,  the  Admiralty  made  their  deci- 
sion for  a  comprehensive  scheme  of  convoy.  Some  of 
the  main  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  organization  of  con- 
voys had,  by  this  time,  been  removed.  Hitherto  many 
captains  of  merchant  vessels  had  been  opposed  to  the  idea 
because  they  would  not,  they  said,  be  able  to  keep  station 
among  vessels  of  diverse  speeds  and  sea-going  qualities, 
but  they  had  come  to  realize  that,  in  face  of  the  seriousness 
of  the  U-boat  threat,  this  was  an  objection  which  must, 
and  could,  be  overcome.  For  a  long  time,  also,  an  adequate 


NORTH  HINDER     FLYING-BOAT     PATROL 

(SPIDER-WEB) 
FELIXSTOWE     AIR     STATION 

APfi/L,  1917. 


NORTH 


J~ 'PREPARED  IN  THE  HISTORICAL  SECTION  Or    THE  COMMITTEE   OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE 


Ordnanee  Survey  19S3. 


1917]  THE  CONVOY  SYSTEM  53 

number  of  destroyers,  sloops,  and  other  escorting  vessels 
had  not  been  available,  nor  had  the  necessary  guns.  Al- 
though there  had  been  a  great  expansion  in  this  class  of 
ship  there  was  still  a  shortage,  but  the  entry  of  the  United 
States  of  America  into  the  war  on  the  6th  of  April  had 
increased  the  naval  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the  Allies, 
especially  destroyers.  Furthermore,  so  long  as  America  had 
remained  neutral,  the  obstacles,  political  and  administra- 
tive, in  the  way  of  organizing  and  collecting  convoys  in 
American  harbours  had  appeared  insuperable. 

A  special  organization  was  set  up  at  the  Admiralty 
under  Rear-Admiral  Duff,  who  was  appointed  Assistant 
Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  on  the  31st  of  May  1917.1  The 
first  experimental  ocean  convoy,  of  sixteen  ships,  was 
assembled  at  Gibraltar  and  sailed  for  England  on  the  10th 
of  May.  An  escort  of  six  destroyers  met  the  convoy  out- 
side the  danger  area  on  the  1 8th,  and,  next  afternoon, 
a  flying-boat  from  the  Scillies  patrolled  the  route.  No 
attack  on  the  convoy  was  attempted  and  the  ships  dis- 
persed to  their  various  destinations. 

Felixstowe  Flying-boats 

While  the  convoy  system  was  being  organized,  an  anti- 
submarine offensive  was  being  developed  from  the  Felix- 
stowe flying-boat  station.  It  was  known  that  many  of  the 
U-boats,  on  passage  to  their  hunting-grounds,  passed  near 
the  North  Hinder  Light  Vessel  which  was  used  as  a  naviga- 
tion mark.  Because  of  their  restricted  radius  of  action 
when  driven  submerged  by  electric  motors,  and  of  their 
need  to  economize  battery  power,  most  of  these  U-boats 
crossed  the  area  on  the  surface.  A  method  of  search  by  the 
flying-boats,  to  become  familiar  as  the  Spider-Web,  was 
devised.2  The  web,  centred  about  the  North  Hinder  Light 
Vessel,  was  an  imaginary  octagonal  figure,  sixty  sea  miles  in 
diameter.  There  were  eight  radial  arms  (each  thirty  miles 
long),  and  chords,  joining  the  arms,  ten,  twenty,  and 
thirty  miles  from  the  centre.  The  web,  which  enabled 
about  four  thousand  square  miles  of  sea  to  be  searched 

1  Captain  W.  W.  Fisher,  R.N.,  succeeded  Rear-Admiral  Duff  in  the 
Anti-Submarine  Division.  2  Map  facing. 


54     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE   [ch.  ii 

systematically,  was  laid  across  the  known  tracks  of  the 
submarines  which,  at  cruising  speed,  might  be  in  danger  of 
being  seen  during  a  maximum  period  of  about  ten  hours. 
Under  normal  conditions  one  flying-boat  could  search  two 
complete  sectors,  enclosed  by  the  arms,  or  a  quarter  of 
the  whole  web,  in  five  hours. 

At  Felixstowe  a  chart  was  kept  on  which  were  fixed, 
from  time  to  time,  the  positions  of  the  U-boats  as  revealed 
by  directional  wireless.  This  chart  indicated  which  sectors 
of  the  web  were  likely  to  yield  results  to  a  search.  From 
Felixstowe  the  return  journey  to  the  North  Hinder  was 
one  hundred  miles,  and  as  the  flying-boats  had  the  endur- 
ance to  cover  approximately  three  hundred  miles,  a  sub- 
stantial area  of  the  web  could  be  patrolled  on  each  trip. 
The  Sfider-Web  scheme  was  begun  on  the  13th  of  April 
1 91 7,  with  five  flying-boats.  By  the  end  of  the  month,  in 
twenty-seven  patrols,  eight  U-boats  had  been  sighted  and 
three  of  them  had  been  bombed,  and  there  had  been  one 
engagement  with  German  destroyers.1  The  large  flying- 
boat  had  this  advantage  over  other  heavier-than-air  craft, 
that  it  could  carry  bombs  of  230-lb.  weight  which  might 
cause  serious  damage  even  though  they  did  not  score  a 
direct  hit. 

On  the  20th  of  May  the  patrol  achieved  its  first  success. 
A  flying-boat  (Flight  Sub-Lieutenants  C.  R.  Morrish  and 
H.  G.  Boswell,  1st  Air  Mechanic  W.  P.  Caston,  and 
Leading  Mechanic  A.  E.  Shorter),  on  patrol  east  of  the 
North  Hinder,  sighted  a  submarine  in  full  buoyancy  about 
five  miles  away.  The  pilot  bore  down  on  the  U-boat 
and,  as  recognition  signals  went  unanswered,  two  bombs 
were  dropped,  each  of  which  exploded  in  front  of  the 
conning  tower.  The  U-boat  went  under  and  patches  of 
oil  came  to  the  surface,  but  there  was  no  real  indication 
of  her  fate.  A  post-war  comparison  with  the  German 
records,  however,  has  revealed  that  she  was  probably  the 
U.C.36  which  never  returned  to  her  base.  This  seems  to 
have  been  the  first  direct  sinking  of  a  U-boat  by  aircraft 
during  the  war. 

1  The  Commodore  at  Harwich  reported  that  the  flying-boat  patrols  had 
brought  about  a  marked  decrease  in  enemy  mine-laying  in  the  Harwich  area. 


i9i7]  FELIXSTOWE  FLYING-BOATS  55 

Meanwhile  an  H.12  flying-boat,  which  had  been  sent 
from  Felixstowe  to  Calshot  for  mid-Channel  patrols,  was 
also  doing  good  work.1  On  the  morning  of  the  24th  of 
April  an  S.O.S.  was  received  from  an  Italian  ship  saying 
she  was  under  attack  from  a  U-boat  south  of  Portland 
Bill.  Surface  craft  and  seaplanes  were  immediately  sent 
out,  and  the  flying-boat,  which  had  landed  at  Portland  the 
previous  day  with  minor  engine  trouble,  also  went  away  to 
search  the  area.  The  flying-boat's  crew  found  the  U-boat 
on  the  surface  and,  probably  because  the  morning  was 
misty,  approached  within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  before  the 
submarine  commander  became  aware  of  the  danger  which 
threatened  him.  He  then  prepared  to  dive,  but  while  his 
conning  tower  was  still  awash,  two  bombs  of  100  lb. 
weight,  dropped  from  the  flying-boat,  exploded  above  the 
submarine.  Oil  and  bubbles  came  to  the  surface  and,  after 
a  further  uneventful  patrol  in  the  vicinity,  the  flying-boat's 
crew  returned  to  their  base  reasonably  confident  that  they 
had  disabled  or  destroyed  the  U-boat.  About  an  hour 
later,  however,  a  destroyer  saw  the  submarine  breaking 
surface  again  near  where  she  had  last  been  seen  and 
attacked.  The  destroyer  dashed  towards  her,  but  she 
had  submerged  before  the  British  vessel  reached  her. 
Judging  the  position  of  their  target  from  her  wash,  the 
crew  of  the  destroyer  dropped  two  depth-charges  and, 
following  the  explosions,  oil  gushed  to  the  surface  and 
spread  over  a  large  area.  Patrols  were  maintained  through- 
out the  day  and  a  hydrophone  watch  kept  during  the  night. 
Late  in  the  evening,  a  motor  noise  heard  in  the  hydrophone 
of  one  of  the  destroyers  seemed  to  imply  that  the  U-boat 
had  got  under  way  again,  but  the  Admiralty,  weighing  all 
the  evidence,  decided  that  the  U-boat  had  been  destroyed. 
She  may  have  been  the  U.B.39  which  sailed  on  April  the 
23rd,  but  never  returned. 

Attacks  by  German  Torpedo- carrying  Aircraft 
Alarm  had  been  raised  by  a  new  kind  of  threat  against 
British   shipping.     In   the   early  morning  of  the    19th 

1  The  establishment  laid  down  for  Calshot  was  four  200  or  240  horse- 
power Short  seaplanes  and  six  large  flying-boats. 


56     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE  [ch.  ii 

of  April  six  enemy  seaplanes  appeared  off  the  Goodwin 
Light  Vessel,  three  of  them  carrying  torpedoes  and  the 
others  acting  as  escorts.  The  first  attack  was  made  against 
the  North  Goodwin  Drifter  Division  and  one  torpedo  was 
fired,  from  a  height  described  as  'very  low',  at  the  armed 
drifter  Carolbank,  but  the  torpedo  just  missed.  The  next 
attack  was  made  on  the  s.s.  Nyanza,  but,  once  again,  the 
torpedo  missed  its  mark.  Meanwhile  two  of  the  seaplanes, 
which  were  apparently  operating  in  pairs,  had  flown  on  to 
Ramsgate.  There  they  found  the  monitor  Marshal  Ney 
which  had  been  moored  out  as  a  floating  battery  in  the 
north  entrance  to  the  Downs  to  counter  the  'cut-and-run' 
night  raids  of  German  destroyers.  The  Marshal  Ney  was 
a  bulged  monitor,  immune  from  sinking  by  torpedo 
attack,  but  the  enemy  seaplane  pilots  were  probably  un- 
aware of  this.  However  that  may  be,  one  of  them,  after 
circling  round  the  Marshal  Ney,  dropped  his  torpedo  as 
he  skimmed  the  water  at  close  range,  but  the  missile  failed 
to  score  a  hit  and  sped  on  to  Ramsgate  harbour,  where  it 
embedded  itself  in  the  mud  after  passing  harmlessly  under- 
neath a  dredger. 

The  enemy  had  achieved  surprise,  but  this  great 
advantage  was  frittered  away  because  the  various  attacks 
were  not  well  delivered.  Although  no  damage  had  been 
caused,  however,  the  moral  effect  was  great.  It  was 
supposed  that  the  effort  was  a  prelude  to  more  serious 
attacks,  and  this  fear,  which  was  shared  by  the  Admiralty, 
seemed  to  be  confirmed  when,  on  the  1st  of  May,  the 
s.s.  Gena,  while  under  way,  was  sunk  in  the  war  channel 
north-east  of  Southwold  by  a  torpedo  dropped  from  a  low 
height  by  a  seaplane  from  the  Zeebrugge  base.  Before 
the  Gena  went  under,  she  had  got  off  two  rounds  from 
her  gun  and  with  her  second  had  shot  down  the  escorting 
seaplane,  the  two  occupants  of  which  were  taken 
prisoners  by  the  patrol  vessels  which  rescued  the  Gena's 
crew. 

The  first  effect  of  these  torpedo  attacks  was  to  bring  all 
aircraft  under  suspicion,  and,  in  at  least  one  naval  com- 
mand, instructions  for  dealing  with  aircraft  were  drafted 
of  which  a  not  unfair  summary  would  be  'shoot  first  and 


1917]  AIRCRAFT  AND  TORPEDOES  57 

challenge  afterwards'.  If  British  ships  were  now  to  open 
fire  without  hesitation,  as  the  orders  stated,  on  any  air- 
craft whose  friendly  character  was  in  doubt,  the  way 
of  the  naval  airman  would  be  difficult.  A  second  effect 
of  these  aircraft  torpedo  attacks  was  the  setting  aside 
of  fighting  aircraft  specially  to  combat  the  enemy  seaplanes. 
In  the  middle  of  May,  a  Flight  of  fighting  aeroplanes, 
fitted  with  air-bags,  was  established  at  Walmer  to  protect 
merchant  vessels  in  the  Downs,  especially  vulnerable 
because  they  were  at  anchor.  At  the  same  time  arrange- 
ments were  made  for  patrols  by  fighting  aeroplanes,  from 
the  existing  air  stations  at  Yarmouth,  Felixstowe,  and 
Westgate,  over  the  war  channel  between  Yarmouth  and 
the  Dover  Straits.1  Another  arrangement  was  the  placing 
of  a  gun,  either  a  machine-gun  or  a  3 -pounder,  and  crew, 
in  merchant  vessels  moving  along  the  danger  area  up  and 
down  the  East  Coast.  When  the  vessels  had  passed  through 
the  area,  the  guns  and  crews  were  transferred  to  other 
merchant  ships  for  the  return  passage.  The  real  signifi- 
cance, however,  of  these  counter-measures  was  the  sense  of 
anxiety  which  the  threat,  rather  than  the  achievement,  of 
torpedo-carrying  aircraft  had  produced.  In  fact,  the 
apparent  half-heartedness  which  had  characterized  the 
first  efforts  persisted.  The  Admiralty  collier  Birch  grove 
was  missed  by  two  torpedoes  from  two  seaplanes  on  the 
20th  of  May.  The  first  was  fired  from  1,000  yards  and 
passed  under  the  ship,  and  the  second,  fired  from  200 
yards,  was  avoided  by  a  quick  use  of  the  helm,  and  passed 
ten  feet  from  the  stern.  The  seaplane  pilots  then  attacked 
with  their  machine-guns,  but  although  many  bullets  hit 
the  Birchgrove,  no  casualties  were  caused.  There  were  no 
further  attacks  of  this  kind  until  the  14th  of  June  when 
two  ships  off  the  Shipwash  Light  Vessel  survived  two 
similar  attacks.  Next  day,  however,  the  s.s.  Kankakee  was 
sunk  by  a  torpedo  fired  from  a  range  of  about  3,000  yards 
from  a  seaplane  off  Harwich.  There  was  quiet  after  this 
until  the  9th  of  July,  when  shipping  between  the  Sunk  and 
the  Shipwash  Light  Vessels  attracted  attention.    In  the 

1  In  August  1917  the  establishment  in  aeroplanes  for  this  anti-torpedo- 
aircraft  defence  was  laid  down  as  thirty  fighters. 


58      UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE   [ch.  ii 

afternoon  three  torpedoes,  from  a  formation  of  five  sea- 
planes, were  fired  at  three  separate  ships  of  a  convoy  of 
sixteen,  but  there  were  no  hits.  In  the  evening  two  tor- 
pedoes were  aimed,  again  without  success,  at  other  ships 
east  of  Southwold.  One  of  these,  the  s.s.  Haslingden,  shot 
down  one  of  the  seaplanes  with  her  twelve-pounder.  A 
second  German  seaplane  landed  alongside  and  rescued  the 
crew,  but  with  the  extra  load  could  not  get  off  the  water 
again  and  eventually  surrendered  to  an  armed  trawler. 
The  failure  of  these  attempts  was  followed  by  a  lull  in  this 
form  of  attack  until  the  9th  of  September,  when  seven  sea- 
planes swooped  down  on  the  coke-carrying  s.s.  Storm,  of 
264  tons,  off  the  Sunk  Light  Vessel.  Three  of  the  seaplanes 
attacked  with  torpedoes.  The  first  torpedo,  which  was 
dropped  from  a  height  of  about  twenty  feet  at  a  range  of 
200  yards,  passed  under  the  ship  whose  draught  was  1 3  feet 
6  inches.  The  torpedo  from  the  second  seaplane  hit  the 
Storm  aft,  and  the  resulting  explosion  filled  the  life-boat 
with  coke  and  made  it  impossible  to  abandon  the  ship. 
Next  came  a  bomb  which  destroyed  the  steering  gear  and 
the  captain's  cabin.  Almost  at  once  a  torpedo  from  a 
third  seaplane  hit  the  ship  forward.  The  Storm  was  now 
sinking  rapidly  and,  as  she  was  going  down,  several  more 
bombs  hit  her,  and  machine-gun  fire  from  the  seaplanes 
swept  her  decks.  From  the  time  the  first  torpedo  struck 
until  the  vessel  disappeared  under  the  water  only  two 
minutes  elapsed.  This  experience,  however,  confirmed  the 
Germans  in  their  belief  that  the  results  were  not  commen- 
surate with  the  efforts  involved,  and  operations  by  torpedo 
seaplanes  against  merchant  shipping  were  abandoned.  The 
successes  in  truth  were  not  great.  Had  the  attacks  been 
made  with  more  deliberation  and  from  closer  range  their 
effect  must  have  been  greater  but,  as  it  was,  they 
sufficed  to  create  a  new  danger  zone  for  shipping  which 
extended  along  the  waters  from  off  Cromer  round  the 
coast  to  Portsmouth.  In  this  area,  by  Admiralty  in- 
structions, all  merchant  ships  were  to  keep  a  look-out 
for  aircraft,  and  armed  vessels  were  to  keep  their  guns  laid 
on  all  approaching  aircraft,  ready  to  fire  if  an  attack 
developed. 


1917]  AIRCRAFT  AND  CONVOYS  59 

Ocean  Convoys 

After  the  first  experiment  of  convoying  ocean  traffic,  a 
committee  had  been  appointed  to  survey  the  whole  pro- 
blem. They  presented  their  report  on  the  8th  of  June 
191 7,  and  recommended  eight  outward  and  eight  home- 
ward convoys  in  every  eight  days.  The  ports  of  assembly 
suggested  for  homeward  traffic  were  New  York,  for  vessels 
in  North  American  ports;  Hampton  Roads,  for  Panama 
and  American  ports  south  of  New  York;  Dakar,  for  ships 
from  South  America,  South  and  West  Africa,  Australia 
and  the  East ;  and  Gibraltar  for  traffic  from  the  Mediter- 
ranean. From  each  of  these  ports  two  convoys  were  to 
come  home  every  eight  days. 

By  the  middle  of  July  four  homeward  bound  convoys 
were  sailing  every  eight  days,  two  from  Hampton  Roads, 
and  one  each  from  New  York  and  Sydney  (Cape  Breton, 
Canada).  The  first  of  the  regular  Gibraltar  convoys  sailed 
before  the  end  of  the  month,  and,  early  in  August,  the 
arrangement  was  extended  to  the  South  Atlantic  traffic. 
By  the  middle  of  August  a  provisional  programme  had 
been  worked  out  for  outgoing  traffic,  and  convoys  set 
out,  in  the  next  few  days,  from  the  assembly  ports  at 
Milford  Haven,  Falmouth,  Devonport,  Queenstown,  and 
Buncrana. 

The  efficient  working  of  the  scheme  required  world- 
wide organization,  co-ordinated  in  every  detail.1  So  far  as 
the  air  service  was  concerned,  the  convoy  system  brought 
great  advantages.  It  narrowed  and  defined  the  area  of 
search  and  made  it  easier  to  systematize  the  employment 
of  the  anti-submarine  aircraft.  These  could  now  be 
organized  to  provide  (i)  escorts  for  convoys,  (ii)  routine 
patrols,  and  (iii)  emergency  patrols  for  hunting  U-boats 
definitely  reported.  The  major  part  of  the  aircraft  patrol- 
ling and  escort  work  was  done  by  the  non-rigid  airships. 
Under  the  orders  of  the  senior  naval  officers  of  the 
various  commands,  the  airship  crews  searched  the  routes 
before  the  departure  of  the  vessels,  and  later  escorted 

1  For  the  organization  of  the  convoy  system,  see  Naval  Operations, 
by  Sir  Henry  Newbolt,  vol.  v,  ch.  iii,  section  3. 


60    UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE     [ch.  ii 

the  convoys  through  the  patrolled  areas.  The  cross- 
Channel  transports  on  the  Folkestone-Boulogne  route 
were  regularly  escorted  by  airships  from  the  Capel 
station;  the  traffic  between  Larne  and  Stranraer,  as  well 
as  convoys  on  their  way  to  the  north-west  passage,  by 
airships  from  Luce  Bay;  and  northward  bound  convoys 
from  the  Humber  were  escorted  by  relays  of  airships 
from  the  stations  at  Howden,  East  Fortune,  and  Long- 
side. 

The  base  at  Mullion  in  Cornwall  was,  by  reason  of 
its  position  facing  the  western  danger  zone,  the  most 
active  of  all  the  airship  stations.  Its  patrol  area  ex- 
tended eastwards  to  Plymouth,  and  westwards  into  the 
Atlantic  beyond  the  Scillies.  An  intelligence  section  was 
organized  at  the  station  to  co-ordinate  information  on  the 
ways  of  U-boats  in  general,  and  to  plot,  in  particular,  all 
that  was  learned  of  U-boat  activities  in  the  immediate 
area.  Each  night,  after  study  of  the  latest  intelligence  in- 
formation, the  airship  patrol  areas  for  the  following  day 
were  allotted.  The  airship,  slow  in  speed  and  in  man- 
oeuvre, could  seldom  hope  to  destroy  a  submarine.  The 
U-boat  commander  usually  had  time,  once  he  had  sighted 
an  airship,  to  make  an  unhurried  dive  out  of  harm's  way. 
But  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  airship  was  not  feared.  She 
could,  and  would,  call  up  surface  craft  to  attack  with 
depth-charges,  and  she  might  be  able  to  follow  the  track 
of  the  U-boat  below  the  water,  either  by  direct  observa- 
tion or  through  a  trail  of  oil.  The  submarine  could 
only  be  brought  to  the  surface  again  with  caution.  If 
she  reappeared  and  found  the  airship,  or  surface  ships, 
within  striking  distance  of  her,  she  had  to  face  certain 
attack  and  possible  destruction.  The  airships,  in  fact,  were 
treated  by  the  U-boat  commanders  with  the  respect  paid 
to  the  policeman  by  the  law-breaker  and  were  given  a 
wide  berth.  Not  by  'doing',  but  by  'being'  they  saved 
many  vessels.  Submarines,  time  after  time,  were  forced  to 
dive  to  escape  detection,  and  the  consequent  reduction  of 
their  speed  below  the  surface,  more  often  than  not,  made 
it  impossible  for  them  to  get  into  position  to  deliver  an 
attack.  Down  to  the  end  of  December  191 7  there  was  no 


1917]     THE  MULLION  AIRSHIP  STATION         61 

single  instance  of  a  ship,  escorted  by  aircraft,  being 
attacked  by  a  submarine. 

Examples  may  be  quoted  to  illustrate  the  work  of  the 
aircraft  patrols.  In  August  191 7  the  important  American 
'Cleveland'  Convoy  was  being  escorted  up-Channel.  In 
the  early  morning  of  the  9th  the  convoy  had  been  met  by 
a  flying-boat  from  the  Scillies  which  flew  with  the  ships 
until  relieved  by  a  seaplane  from  Newlyn.  Soon  after 
9  a.m.  the  air  escort  was  taken  up  by  two  airships  from 
Mullion,  and,  ninety  minutes  later,  the  airships  sighted  a 
U-boat  on  the  surface  seven  miles  ahead  of  the  convoy 
which  she  was  steaming  at  full  speed  to  intercept.  The 
airships  bore  down  on  the  U-boat  and  dropped  bombs  in 
her  wake  after  she  had  submerged.  In  answer  to  their 
signals,  escorting  destroyers  left  the  convoy  and  dropped 
depth-charges.  The  U-boat  did  not  again  show  herself 
and  the  convoy  passed  through  the  danger  area  without 
further  incident. 

In  191 7  airships  from  Mullion  flew  a  total  of  2,845 
hours,  which  was  more  than  were  flown  by  any  other  airship 
station  round  the  coasts,  escorting  convoys  and  troop-ships, 
and  co-operating  with  destroyers  and  other  surface  craft  in 
searching  wide  areas  of  sea.  One  of  the  'Coastals'  attached 
to  this  station  had  a  remarkable  record  in  the  war.  She  was 
the  C.g,  commissioned  in  July  191 6.  By  the  end  of  the 
war,  she  had  spent  2,500  hours  in  the  air,  during  which  she 
had  covered  a  distance  of  over  70,000  miles.  Associated 
with  this  ship,  as  captain,  for  much  of  her  history,  was  the 
name  of  Flight  Commander  J.  G.  Struthers,  one  of  the  best- 
known  airship  commanders  of  the  war  and  an  expert  on  the 
problems  associated  with  the  hunting  of  submarines  from 
the  air.  On  the  3rd  of  October  1917,  when  the  C.g  was 
making  her  way  back  to  Mullion,  all  airships  having  been  re- 
called owing  to  a  rising  gale,  Flight  Commander  Struthers 
saw,  about  six  miles  astern  of  the  airship,  an  explosion  amid- 
ships an  Italian  steamer,  one  of  a  group  of  six  on  a  westerly 
course  near  Bolt  Head.  The  C.g  was  at  once  swung  round 
and,  with  the  high  wind  behind  her,  made  a  speed  of  95 
knots  and  reached  the  sinking  steamer  in  two  and  a  half 
minutes.  The  residual  track  of  a  torpedo  was  visible  on  the 


62     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 

water,  and  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  track,  the  outline  of 
a  submarine,  just  below  the  surface,  was  seen  from  the  air- 
ship. Delay-action  bombs  were  dropped  on  the  U-boat, 
and  patrol  vessels  were  summoned  by  wireless  to  take  up 
the  hunt.  These,  directed  on  the  spot  by  the  airship, 
'salted'  the  area  with  depth-charges,  and  as  quantities  of 
oil  came  to  the  surface  it  seemed  probable  that  the  U-boat 
had  been  sunk.  When  the  airship  captain  was  so  informed, 
he  turned  the  C.g  for  home,  but  with  the  full  force  of  the 
gale  against  him  had  difficulty  in  making  his  station, 
the  journey  of  forty  miles  taking  six  hours.  At  times,  when 
the  force  of  the  wind  approached  sixty  miles  an  hour,  the 
ship  could  make  no  progress  at  all.  According  to  the  Ger- 
man lists  of  U-boat  losses,  none  was  destroyed  in  this  area  on 
the  3rd  of  October,  and  it  must  be  assumed  that  the  sub- 
marine, although  possibly  damaged,  got  back  to  her  base. 
There  were  many  similar  instances  of  this  kind,  not  only 
from  Mullion,  but  from  the  other  airship,  seaplane,  and 
aeroplane  bases  round  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain,  and 
what  has  been  said  before  may  be  repeated,  that,  apart 
altogether  from  the  known  sinkings,  the  anti-submarine 
aircraft  imposed  restrictions  on  the  U-boats  which  severely 
limited  their  activities. 

There  was  one  area,  occasionally  patrolled  by  airships, 
which  the  enemy  contested.  In  the  southern  part  of  the 
North  Sea,  attacks  were  made  on  the  airships  from  time  to 
time  by  fighting  seaplanes  from  Zeebrugge.  On  the  21st 
of  April  1917  the  coastal  airship,  C.J7,  from  Pulham,  had 
drifted  off  her  course  in  thick  weather  and  had  been  shot 
down  in  flames  off  the  North  Foreland.  As  a  result  of  this 
loss,  patrolling  airships  had  been  ordered,  when  out  of  sight 
of  land,  to  check  their  positions  by  wireless  every  hour, 
a  proceeding  which  had  the  disadvantage  that  listening 
enemy  stations  could  pass  the  information  to  the  German 
seaplane  commanders.  On  the  morning  of  the  nth  of 
December  191 7  the  C.27,  also  from  Pulham,  on  patrol 
east  of  the  Norfolk  coast,  was  silent  after  exchanging  wire- 
less messages  for  two  hours.  It  was  afterwards  learned  that 
she  had  gone  down  in  flames  with  her  crew  of  five  as  a 
result  of  an  attack  by  a  seaplane  from  Zeebrugge.   After 


1917]   KITE  BALLOONS  AND  DESTROYERS       63 

this  loss,  patrols  by  non-rigid  ships  south  of  the  Norfolk 
coast  were  abandoned. 

Kite  Balloons 

As  for  co-operation  with  the  Fleet,  so  for  anti-submarine 
work  the  merits  and  disadvantages  of  the  kite  balloon 
aroused  keen  controversy.  A  balloon  flown  from  a  vessel 
escorting  a  convoy  might  advertise  the  presence  and  course 
of  the  ships  to  a  distant  and  invisible  U-boat  which  would 
then  be  able  to  submerge  and  get  into  position  for  attack. 
For  this  reason  balloons  were  not,  at  the  outset,  used  by 
convoy  escorts  but,  flown  from  destroyers,  they  came  into 
limited  use  for  independent  submarine  hunting.  Ex- 
perience gained  during  Grand  Fleet  operations  in  June  and 
July  191 7  gave  a  decided  stimulus  to  the  use  of  the  balloon. 
The  tracks  followed  by  the  ocean-going  U-boats  across  the 
North  Sea  were  by  this  time  fairly  well  known,  and  an 
operation  was  planned  by  Admiral  Beatty  in  June  to  catch 
the  incoming  boats.  The  British  forces  maintained  their 
dispositions  in  the  North  Sea  for  nine  days,  and  during 
that  time  U-boats  were  sighted  sixty-one  times.  Only 
twelve  attacks,  however,  could  be  made,  none  of  which 
was  successful,  and  Admiral  Beatty  formed  the  opinion 
that,  had  the  patrolling  destroyers  carried  balloons,  the 
hunting  of  the  submarines  could  have  been  directed  with 
greater  chances  of  success.  On  his  recommendation,  there- 
fore, a  Kite  Balloon  Force  of  six  destroyers,  five  of  which 
carried  balloons,  was  organized.  The  destroyers  were  to 
spread  out  across  the  U-boat  tracks  and  make  an  experi- 
ment in  co-operative  stalking.  During  the  first  operation, 
early  in  July,  although  submarines  were  sighted  from  the 
balloons,  no  attacks  could  be  developed,  but  when  the 
force  (five  destroyers,  of  which  three  towed  balloons)  went 
out  again,  on  the  nth  of  July,  success  was  achieved.  In  the 
early  morning  of  the  12th  the  observer  in  the  balloon 
flown  from  the  Patriot  (Flight  Lieutenant  O.  A.  Butcher) 
sighted  a  U-boat  on  the  surface  twenty-eight  miles  distant, 
and  the  destroyer  raced  away  to  the  area.  Before  she 
arrived,  the  submarine  had  gone  under,  but  shortly  re- 
appeared on  the  surface  four  miles  off.  The  Patriot  opened 


64     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE  [ch.  ii 

fire,  but  the  U-boat  went  under  again  before  a  hit  could  be 
made,  whereupon  the  destroyer,  guided  by  the  observer 
in  the  balloon,  dropped  depth-charges.  A  small  quantity 
of  oil  came  to  the  surface,  insufficient  to  indicate  certain 
damage  to  the  submarine,  and  a  close  watch  over  the  area 
was  maintained.  Sometime  later,  however,  there  was  an 
under-water  explosion  in  the  place  where  the  U-boat  had 
submerged,  and  a  great  oil  patch  began  to  form.  Such 
was  the  end  of  the  U.6g,  and  this  success  led  to  the 
opening  of  new  balloon  bases  at  ports  where  destroyers  and 
other  patrol  vessels  were  favourably  placed  for  submarine 
hunting.  By  the  end  of  191 7  additional  bases  were  in 
operation  at  Tipnor  (Portsmouth),  Rathmullen  (Lough 
Swilley),  and  Immingham.1 

Flying-boats  and  U -Boats 

Meanwhile  the  Felixstowe  flying-boats  had  been  greatly 
harassing  the  smaller  U-boats.  On  the  28th  of  June  a 
submarine  in  full  buoyancy  was  sighted  from  a  large  flying- 
boat  (Flight  Lieutenant  W.  R.  Mackenzie,  Flight  Sub- 
Lieutenant  R.  F.  L.  Dickey,  Air  Mechanic  J.  Watts,  and 
Air  Mechanic  E.  E.  Hughes),  which  was  escorting  the 
'Beef  Trip'.  The  pilot  promptly  dived  on  her  and  three 
100-lb.  bombs  were  dropped  before  the  U-boat  was  com- 
pletely submerged.  Oil  and  air  bubbles  appeared  to 
indicate  that  the  enemy  vessel  had  been  destroyed  or 
damaged,  but  the  loss  cannot  be  confirmed,  although  she 
may  have  been  the  U.B.36  which  met  her  end  about  this 
time  in  unknown  circumstances. 

The  enemy  pilots  took  up  the  challenge.  Fighting  sea- 
planes began  to  appear  in  the  area  of  the  North  Hinder 
Light  Vessel,  and,  on  the  4th  of  July,  the  offensive  was 
carried  to  Felixstowe  when  fourteen  aircraft  bombed  the 
air  station  sheds.  A  flying-boat  was  destroyed,  another 
badly  damaged,  five  ratings  and  three  civilians  were  killed, 
and  nineteen  ratings  and  one  civilian  injured.  On  the 
22nd  the  raiders  came  again,  but  they  caused  no  further 
damage  or  casualties  at  the  seaplane  base. 

1  These  were  additional  to  existing  balloon  bases  at  Scapa,  Rosyth, 
Lowestoft,  Shotley,  Sheerness,  Devonport,  and  Milford  Haven. 


1917]  TWO  U-BOATS  DESTROYED  65 

That  the  German  antipathy  to  the  Felixstowe  flying- 
boats  was  well  founded  was  again  made  clear  two  days 
later.  On  the  24th  of  July  Wing  Commander  J.  C.  Porte 
led  five  of  his  boats  to  the  North  Hinder,  near  which  the 
periscope  of  a  U-boat  was  sighted.  Five  bombs  of  230-lb. 
weight  were  dropped  ahead  of  the  periscope  by  three  of 
the  flying-boats,  and  oil  and  wreckage  came  to  the  surface 
to  mark  the  end  of  the  U.C.i. 

The  next  success  came  quickly  and  in  peculiar  circum- 
stances. On  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  July  the  U.B.20, 
which  had  been  undergoing  a  two  months'  overhaul,  left 
Zeebrugge  for  diving  trials  outside  the  harbour.  As  the  day 
was  fine  and  the  trip  promised  to  be  uneventful,  the  com- 
mander of  the  submarine  had  invited  some  of  his  friends  to 
go  with  him,  among  them  two  nursing  sisters  from  a  local 
hospital.  The  U-boat  was  found  on  the  surface  by  a  Felix- 
stowe flying-boat,  which  put  her  out  of  control  with  four 
bombs.  As  she  lay  helpless  a  second  flying-boat  appeared 
and  completed  her  destruction. 

These  air  successes  exceeded  naval  expectations.  As  a 
result  of  the  whole  naval  offensive  against  the  U-boats, 
in  July,  four  submarines  were  destroyed,  and  one  was 
damaged  and  forced  into  Corunna,  where  she  was  interned. 
Of  the  four  destroyed,  Felixstowe  flying-boats,  unaided, 
accounted  for  two,  and  a  third  was  lost  chiefly  through 
the  agency  of  a  destroyer's  kite  balloon. 

Towards  the  end  of  August  U-boat  activity  increased 
off  the  mouth  of  the  Tees,  and  as  no  seaplanes  could  be 
diverted  from  other  and  regular  danger  areas,  a  Flight  of 
four  Handley  Page  aeroplanes  was  brought  back  tempo- 
rarily from  Coudekerque,  France,  for  inshore  patrols  off 
the  north  Yorkshire  coast.  The  aeroplanes  reached  Redcar 
on  the  5th  of  September  191 7  and  operated  for  about 
one  month,  during  which  time  eleven  U-boats  were  found 
and  seven  of  them  attacked  with  bombs.  None  was  de- 
stroyed, but  the  harassing  effects  of  the  Handley  Page 
patrols  greatly  eased  the  situation  off  the  Tees.  On  the 
2nd  of  October  the  Flight  was  transferred  to  Manston  as 
the  nucleus  of  a  bombing  squadron,  called  'A'  Squadron 
(later  216  Squadron),  for  independent  bombing  operations, 

2504.4  F 


66     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 

in  co-operation  with  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons,  from 
the  Nancy  area,  against  industrial  centres  in  southern  Ger- 
many. It  may  be  noted  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  Hand- 
ley  Pages,  which  had  proved  their  value  for  anti-submarine 
patrol  work,  was  a  result  of  the  German  attacks  on  London 
which  had  led  to  the  proposal  to  form  an  independent 
bombing  unit  for  raids  into  southern  Germany. 

The  next  definite  success  of  the  Felixstowe  Spider-web 
patrol  came  at  the  end  of  September.  On  the  morning  of 
the  28th  wireless  interception  indicated  a  U-boat  near 
the  North  Hinder,  and  a  flying-boat  took  up  the  hunt.1 
The  flying-boat  reached  the  North  Hinder  at  8  a.m.  and 
then  began  to  search  in  a  southerly  direction.  After 
twenty-eight  minutes,  the  wireless  operator  in  the  flying- 
boat  reported  that  he  was  intercepting  signals  from  some 
type  of  enemy  vessel  less  than  ten  miles  distant.  Within 
six  minutes  a  submarine,  in  full  buoyancy,  and  showing  a 
mast  and  a  gun,  was  sighted  a  mile  ahead.  Recognition 
signals,  fired  from  the  flying-boat,  went  unanswered,  and 
the  pilot  thereupon  steered  direct  for  the  U-boat.  A 
230-lb.  bomb  was  dropped  on  her,  from  600  feet,  but 
before  it  exploded  a  shell  from  the  submarine's  gun  burst 
fifty  feet  from  the  flying-boat.  Then,  looking  down,  the 
crew  of  the  aircraft  saw  their  bomb  blow  in  a  part  of  the 
U-boat's  deck.  Meanwhile  fire  from  another  direction 
was  opened  on  the  aircraft  and  three  U-boats,  with  a 
destroyer  and  seaplane  escort,  were  seen  approaching 
through  the  mist.  The  pilot  of  the  flying-boat  thereupon 
made  a  second  run  over  the  crippled  U-boat  and  com- 
pleted her  destruction  with  another  230-lb.  bomb.  She 
was  the  U.C.6,  a  mine-laying  craft  from  Zeebrugge.  The 
flying-boat,  with  no  bombs  left,  made  direct  for  home, 
but  as  she  went  she  sent  out  a  wireless  message  giving 
the  position  of  the  U-boat  and  destroyer  formation.  The 
message  was  received  at  Felixstowe  and  three  'Large 
Americas'  were  dispatched  independently,  but  although 

1  The  flying-boat's  crew  were  Flight  Lieutenant  B.  D.  Hobbs,  Flight 
Sub-Lieutenant  R.  F.  L.  Dickey,  and  Air  Mechanics  E.  M.  Nicol  and  J.  A. 
Mortimer.  The  two  officers  had  been  responsible  for  the  destruction  of  the 
Zeppelin  L.43  on  the  14th  of  June  1917. 


i9i?]  THE  NORTH  SEA  BARRAGE  67 

they  found  the  destroyers  and  the  seaplanes,  they  could 
not  get  into  position  for  effective  attack. 

On  the  1st  of  October  191 7  one  of  the  Porte  flying- 
boats  from  Felixstowe,1  while  on  patrol  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  North  Hinder  Light  Vessel,  was  attacked  by  an 
aeroplane  and  two  fighting  seaplanes.  There  was  a  run- 
ning fight  for  twenty  minutes,  but,  by  skilful  side-slipping, 
Flight  Lieutenant  B.  D.  Hobbs,  who  was  at  the  controls, 
avoided  many  of  the  attacks,  and  a  vigorous  fire  was  mean- 
while maintained  from  the  Porte's  machine-guns.  Finally, 
however,  the  centre  and  port  engines  in  the  flying-boat 
were  shot  out  of  action  and  she  was  forced  down  on  the 
water.  As  she  lay  on  the  surface  she  was  again  raked  with 
machine-gun  fire  from  the  attacking  seaplanes,  and  a  bullet 
wounded  Air  Mechanic  H.  M.  Davies.  When  the  enemy 
aircraft  had  gone,  the  crew  worked  on  the  repair  of  the 
damaged  engines  which  were  patched  sufficiently  to  enable 
the  flying-boat  to  be  taxied  slowly  in  the  direction  of  the 
English  coast.  At  1.30  a.m.,  nine  hours  after  she  was  shot 
down,  and  after  a  difficult  and  trying  journey  with 
frequent  stoppages,  the  flying-boat  safely  reached  Sizewell 
Gap,  north  of  Orfordness,  whence  she  was  towed  back, 
without  mishap,  to  Felixstowe  during  the  morning.  In 
the  fight  with  the  enemy  aircraft,  Air  Mechanic  C. 
Spikings,  by  continuing  to  serve  his  gun  after  the  engines 
near  him  had  been  set  on  fire  and  he  had  been  scalded  with 
water,  helped  to  keep  the  enemy  pilots  from  pressing  home 
their  attacks.  He  also  worked  on  the  repair  of  the  engines 
for  some  hours  during  the  night  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
his  hands  were  badly  burned.  As  a  result  of  this  experience, 
it  was  decided  not  to  use  the  Porte  flying-boats  for  the 
patrol  of  areas  where  they  would  be  liable  to  attack,  unless 
they  could  be  given  an  escort  of  America  type  aircraft. 

The  North  Sea  Barrage 

In  September  191 7,  at  an  Allied  Naval  Conference, 
Admiral  Jellicoe  put  forward  a  scheme  for  a  minefield  from 

1  Crew:  pilots,  Flight  Commander  N.  Sholto  Douglas  and  Flight- 
Lieutenant  B.  D.  Hobbs ;  engineer,  Lieutenant  M.  W.  W.  Cross,  R.N.V.R. ; 
armament  officer,  Sub-Lieutenant  H.  O.  Fry;  air  mechanics,  C.  Spikings 
and  H.  M.  Davies. 


68     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 

Scotland  to  Norway  with  the  object  of  closing  to  U-boats 
the  north-about  route  to  the  Atlantic.  The  scheme,  which 
was  approved,  contemplated  patrols  by  a  special  force  of 
destroyers,  sloops,  T'  boats  and  trawlers,  and,  in  the  western 
section  of  the  barrage  line,  by  flying-boats,  airships,  and 
by  balloon-carrying  vessels.  Arrangements  were  begun, 
but  it  soon  became  clear  that  without  a  naval  base  in 
Norway,  adequate  support  for  the  patrol  vessels  could  not 
be  guaranteed  and,  in  January  1918,  it  was  decided  to  shift 
the  mine-barrage  and  patrol  line  farther  north.  This  al- 
teration made  no  great  difference,  except  to  aircraft  co- 
operation. Airships,  it  was  considered,  could  not  be 
effectively  used  from  the  base  at  Longside,  nor  seaplanes 
from  Dundee,  and  the  patrolling  had  now  to  be  ensured 
.by  balloon-carrying  vessels  and  by  a  few  large  flying-boats 
from  the  station  at  Houton  Bay,  and  from  moored  positions 
in  Loch  Stenness,  Strath  Beg,  and  Catfirth.1  Flying-boats 
had  operated  from  moorings  in  the  Scilly  Islands  with  fair 
success  during  the  summer  of  191 7,  but  the  weather  con- 
ditions in  the  northern  waters  proved  much  less  favour- 
able for  mooring  and  for  flying. 

The  French  Coast 

Anti-submarine  operations  in  the  English  Channel  were 
the  concern  of  France  as  well  as  England,  and  there  was 
close  liaison  between  the  two  countries.  By  an  agreement 
of  May  1 91 7,  special  areas  of  search  had  been  allotted  to 
the  French  air  services,  and  a  common  code  for  aircraft 
communication  with  surface  ships  had  been  drawn  up. 

On  the  2 1  st  of  July,  a  Naval  Air  Service  station  was 
opened,  with  three  seaplanes,  at  Cherbourg,  as  a  sub- 
station of  Calshot.  The  new  station  had  an  early  success. 
In  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  August  a  U-boat  had  been 
reported  north-east  of  Cherbourg.  The  pilot  of  a  Wight 
seaplane,  who  went  up  in  search,  had  sighted  the  sub- 
marine, but  could  not  get  up  with  her  in  time  to  attack, 

1  The  air  stations  at  Houton  Bay  and  Peterhead  were  intended  to  serve 
as  repair  and  store  depots  for  Loch  Stenness  and  Strath  Beg,  and  a  repair 
&c.  shed  for  the  flying-boats  was  built  at  Catfirth.  At  Houton  Bay  a  great 
amount  of  constructional  work  for  the  housing  of  the  flying-boats  was 
undertaken. 


1917]  THE  FRENCH  COAST  69 

nor  could  he  find  the  craft  again  although  he  patrolled 
for  some  time.  The  same  Wight  was  taken  up  later  in 
the  afternoon  by  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  C.  S.  Mossop, 
with  Air  Mechanic  A.  E.  Ingledew,  and  the  U-boat  was 
found  again  on  the  surface.  This  time  she  could  not  com- 
pletely submerge  before  the  Wight  got  into  a  favourable 
position  to  attack,  and  the  first  100-lb.  bomb  from  the  sea- 
plane exploded  just  ahead  of  the  periscope.  The  pilot 
turned  for  a  second  attack,  but,  in  fact,  this  was  un- 
necessary. The  U.B.32  had  gone  down  with  her  crew, 
the  first  submarine  to  be  destroyed  in  the  Channel  by 
direct  attack  by  British  aircraft. 

U-boat  hunting  in  the  Dover  Straits  and  the  Flanders 
Bight  by  naval  aircraft  from  the  Dunkirk  and  Dover  bases 
met  with  keen  opposition.  German  aircraft,  operating 
from  Zeebrugge,  maintained  a  troublesome  activity,  and 
British  patrolling  aircraft  had  to  be  given  an  escort  of 
fighting  seaplanes.  In  November  1916  Wing  Captain 
C.  L.  Lambe  had  asked  for  an  increase  in  his  establishment 
of  fighting  seaplanes  from  six  to  twenty.  This  proposal  had 
been  approved  by  the  Admiralty  and,  in  January  191 7,  the 
Dover-Dunkirk  seaplane  organization  was  standardized 
into  Flights  (six  aircraft)  of  which  three  were  to  be  stationed 
at  Dover  and  four  at  Dunkirk.  But  although  the  increased 
establishment  was  approved,  the  Admiralty,  in  February 
191 7,  warned  Captain  Lambe  that  in  view  of  the  great 
demands  for  aircraft  to  patrol  the  western  approaches  to 
the  Channel,  it  would  be  some  time  before  his  require- 
ments would  be  met. 

Early  in  March  191 7  the  enemy  opened  an  additional 
seaplane  base  {Flanders  II)  at  Ostend.  By  May  Flanders 
II  had  ten  seaplanes  available  and  the  Zeebrugge  station 
{Flanders  I)  thirty-seven.  These  figures  represented  a 
notable  increase  in  German  seaplane  strength  and  the 
effect  was  soon  apparent.  In  May  six  French  flying-boats 
were  shot  down,  four  by  Flanders  I  and  two  by  Flanders  II. 
The  Commodore,  Dunkirk,  thereupon  reported  to  the 
Vice-Admiral,  Dover,  that  if  the  Dunkirk  fighting  air 
strength  was  not  increased  it  would  be  impossible  to  cope 
with  the  enemy  in  the  air  off  the  Belgian  Coast  or  over  the 


70     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE   [en.  n 

southern  part  of  the  North  Sea.  The  French,  he  said,  had 
few  aircraft  left  after  their  recent  losses,  and  the  Dunkirk 
seaplane  base  could  muster  no  more  than  five  fighters  of 
which  three  were  under  repair.  The  Admiralty  thereupon 
allotted  an  additional  nine  'Baby'  seaplanes  to  Dunkirk. 

In  spite  of  the  enemy  air  opposition,  anti-submarine 
patrols  were  attempted  on  suitable  flying  days,  usually  at 
dawn  and  dusk.  On  the  evening  of  the  25th  of  May  191 7 
a  routine  patrol  of  this  kind,  made  by  two  Short  seaplanes 
escorted  by  two  'Baby'  seaplanes,  found  a  U-boat  north  of 
Dunkirk.  One  of  the  Short  pilots  made  to  attack,  but 
engine  failure  forced  him  to  alight  on  the  sea  near  where 
the  U-boat  was  diving.  The  other  Short  and  one  of  the 
escorting  seaplanes  returned  to  Dunkirk  for  assistance,  and 
the  remaining  escort,  after  circling  for  some  time,  was 
compelled  to  follow  them  through  lack  of  petrol.  A  later 
aircraft  patrol,  specially  sent  out  from  Dunkirk,  found  the 
Short  seaplane  with  a  U-boat  alongside.  The  pilot  dived 
and  the  submarine  went  under,  taking  with  her,  as 
prisoners,  the  two  officers  (Flight  Lieutenant  C.  Laurence 
and  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  L.  J.  Bennett)  from  the 
Short.1 

The  inability  of  the  Dunkirk  seaplane  pilots  to  do  useful 
work  in  face  of  the  opposition  by  German  fighting  aircraft, 
led  Captain  Lambe,  in  June  191 7,  to  propose  that  the  sea- 
plane fighting  pilots  should  be  transferred  to  land  aircraft, 
and  he  suggested  Sopwith  Tups'  (eighty  horse-power  Le 
Rhone  engines),  fitted  with  air-bags.  The  matter  was 
referred  to  the  Admiralty  by  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Reginald 
H.  S.  Bacon. 

While  the  submissions  of  Captain  Lambe  were  under 
consideration,  they  were  given  point  by  another  episode 
involving  Dunkirk  seaplanes.  At  6  a.m.  on  the  19th  of  June 
a  Short  seaplane,  escorted  by  two  Sopwith*'Baby'  seaplanes, 

1  There  is  another  instance  of  flying  officers  being  captured  by  a  sub- 
marine. On  the  28th  of  November  1916  a  Short  seaplane  from  Felixstowe 
(Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  G.  L.  Davies  and  Sub-Lieutenant  A.  C.  Stevens), 
while  on  reconnaissance  patrol,  was  forced  to  land  with  engine  failure.  The 
two  officers  were  captured  by  a  U-boat  they  had  been  hunting,  and  were 
taken,  as  prisoners,  to  Germany. 


1917]  A  SEAPLANE  FIGHT  71 

set  out  on  a  mine  and  U-boat  patrol.  An  hour  later,  while 
a  thunderstorm  was  raging  over  Dunkirk,  the  bell  in  the 
pigeon-loft  rang  to  give  warning  of  the  arrival  of  a  bird. 
When  the  messages  were  retrieved  (two  pigeons  had  flown 
in),  they  proved  to  be  from  one  of  the  Sopwith  'Baby'  sea- 
plane pilots,  Flight  Lieutenant  R.  Graham.  They  read: 
(i)  'Short  shot  down — Potvin  ?  Ten  NNE  Nieuport.  One 
'Hun  shot  down.  My  tanks  shot.  French  TBD  on  its  way. 
'Send  fighters,'  and  (ii)  'Short  landed  O.K.  down  NNE 
'Nieuport — Potvin  ?  I  shot  one  down  but  he  did  not  crash. 
'My  tanks  no  good — can't  climb.  French  TBD  on  its  way. 
'Send  more  fighters.  Quick.'  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant 
J.  E.  Potvin  was  the  pilot  of  the  second  escorting  Sopwith 
'Baby'  seaplane,  and  the  queries  in  the  messages  had 
reference  to  his  fate.  The  officers  in  the  Short  were  Flight 
Sub-Lieutenant  L.  P.  Paine,  pilot,  and  observer  Sub- 
Lieutenant  T.  Rogers  and,  at  7.20  a.m.,  the  pigeon-loft  bell 
told  of  the  arrival  of  a  bird  from  the  Short.  The  message, 
signed  by  Paine,  read:  'Am  shot  down.  Hit  in  tank, 
radiator.   Rogers  dead.   Please  send  C.M.B.  at  once.' 

The  records  of  the  German  seaplane  unit  at  Ostend 
{Flanders  II)  have  been  made  available  to  the  author  and 
it  is  now  possible  to  say  exactly  what  happened.  Twelve 
miles  north-east  of  Nieuport,  when  they  were  half  an  hour 
out  from  Dunkirk,  the  British  seaplanes  were  attacked 
by  three  enemy  fighting  seaplanes  (pilots  Bieber,  Bach- 
mann,  and  Dyck).  The  German  pilot  Dyck,  after  a  sharp 
encounter,  shot  down  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  Potvin, 
whose  seaplane  crashed,  but  Dyck  was  himself  shot  down 
with  a  bullet  in  the  abdomen  from  the  machine  gun  of 
Flight  Lieutenant  Graham  in  the  second  Sopwith  'Baby' 
seaplane.  Before  Flight  Lieutenant  Graham  could  turn  to 
engage  the  other  enemy  fighters,  one  of  them  (Pilot 
Bieber)  had  killed  the  observer  in  the  Short  and  had  shot 
through  the  seaplane's  tank  and  radiator,  forcing  the  Short 
pilot  to  land.  In  a  further  fight,  the  remaining  Sopwith 
'Baby'  seaplane  was  shot  about  and,  with  a  failing  engine, 
Flight  Lieutenant  Graham  had  no  choice  but  to  run  for 
home.  He  eventually  alighted  alongside  a  French  de- 
stroyer and  asked  her  commander  to  go  to  the  assistance  of 


72     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 

the  British  and  German  seaplanes  down  on  the  water.  He 
himself  was  taken  in  tow  by  a  French  trawler  back  to 
Dunkirk.  Meanwhile  Bieber  had  landed  his  seaplane  be- 
side his  comrade  Dyck,  had  managed  to  get  the  wounded 
pilot  aboard  his  own  aircraft,  a  single-seater,  and  had 
succeeded  in  reaching  Ostend.  His  fine  effort,  however, 
was  made  in  vain  as  Dyck  failed  to  survive  the  journey. 

When  the  various  messages  were  brought  in  to  Dunkirk 
by  the  pigeons,  the  raging  thunderstorm  made  it  im- 
possible to  send  other  fighter  seaplanes  away.  The  Com- 
modore, Dunkirk,  was  at  once  informed  with  a  view  to  the 
dispatch  of  surface  craft.  As  the  reported  position  of  the 
damaged  seaplanes  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Ostend,  only 
craft  of  high  speed  stood  a  chance  of  making  a  rescue,  that 
is  to  say,  it  was  a  question  of  sending  out  coastal  motor- 
boats.  These  torpedo-carrying  craft  were,  however,  a 
naval  secret  and  there  would  be  some  risk,  if  they  went  out 
unescorted,  of  their  falling  into  enemy  hands.  The  Com- 
modore decided  that  the  risk  must  be  taken,  and  two  of  the 
boats  were  dispatched.  On  the  way,  the  engine  in  one 
of  the  boats  broke  down  and  the  other  boat  went  on 
alone,  but  was  soon  afterwards  attacked  by  four  German 
destroyers  and,  after  firing  a  torpedo  at  one  of  them 
without  making  a  hit,  had  to  turn  back.  She  reached 
harbour  safely  without  having  seen  anything  of  the  sea- 
planes. The  other  coastal  motor-boat,  however,  crippled 
by  its  engine  trouble,  was  cut  off  from  Dunkirk  by  Ger- 
man destroyers  and  fell  into  enemy  hands.  Soon  after 
10  a.m.  another  pigeon  came  in  from  the  Short  with  a 
message,  timed  9.10  a.m.,  which  said  the  seaplane  was  still 
afloat  near  the  pillar  buoy,  and  asked  that  the  pilot  should 
be  picked  up.  But  by  this  time  it  was  too  late  to  do  any- 
thing further.  Soon  after  the  message  had  been  written, 
German  destroyers  had  gone  alongside  the  Short  and  had 
taken  off  her  unwounded  pilot  and  dead  observer. 

This  episode,  which  led  to  the  loss  of  two  seaplanes  and 
an  important  coastal  motor-boat,  emphasized  the  need  for 
first-class  fighting  aircraft  to  combat  the  German  seaplanes. 
The  Admiralty  thereupon  decided  that  Dunkirk  should 
give  up  all  seaplanes  and  be  provided  with  aeroplanes, 


1917]  THE  U.C.72  DESTROYED  73 

fitted  with  a  flotation  gear,  in  their  stead.  As  a  result,  the 
seaplane-carrier  Riviera  was  withdrawn  from  the  Dover- 
Dunkirk  command  in  July  191 7  and  sent  to  Falmouth  to 
supplement  the  air  patrols  of  the  western  approaches  to 
the  Channel.  The  Sopwith  'Baby'  seaplane  ceased  to  fight 
off  the  Belgian  Coast  and  gave  way  to  the  Sopwith  Tup' 
with  which  a  so-called  'Seaplane  Defence  Flight',  formed 
at  St.  Pol,  was  equipped.  In  September  191 7  the  Tups' 
were  replaced  by  Sopwith  'Camels'  and  the  Flight  was 
expanded  into  the  'Seaplane  Defence  Squadron',  after- 
wards (January  1918)  called  No.  13  Naval  Squadron. 

Meanwhile  Short  seaplanes  continued  to  be  used,  with 
aeroplane  escort,  for  occasional  mine  and  anti-submarine 
patrols.  In  July  1917,  also,  a  Large  America  flying-boat 
had  been  sent  to  operate  from  Dunkirk  for  anti-submarine 
work.  A  drawback  was  that  when  the  flying-boat  was 
sent  out  on  patrol  an  escort  of  fighting  aeroplanes  had  to 
be  provided,  and  as  the  petrol-carrying  capacity  of  the 
fighters  was  strictly  limited,  the  radius  of  action  of  the 
flying-boat  was  greatly  reduced.  In  the  early  morning  of 
the  22nd  of  September  191 7  the  flying-boat,  with  a 
Sopwith  'Camel'  escort,  found  a  U-boat,  fully  blown, 
near  the  West  Hinder.  Before  the  submarine  could  sub- 
merge, the  flying-boat  (Flight  Sub-Lieutenants  N.  A. 
Magor  and  C.  E.  S.  Lusk,  Chief  Petty  Officer  E.  A.  Boyd 
and  Leading  Mechanic  R.  A.  Lucas)  attacked  her  with 
two  230-lb.  bombs.  These  scored  direct  hits  on  the  hull, 
and  the  submarine — the  U.C.J2 — heeled  over  and  sank 
at  once. 

This  success  prompted  the  air  commander  at  Dunkirk  to 
ask  for  two  more  flying-boats  for  anti-submarine  work,  but 
Admiral  Bacon  had  just  previously  told  the  Admiralty  that, 
'given  good  aeroplanes,  I  never  wish  to  have  another  sea- 
'plane  except  as  a  life-saving  appliance  on  rare  occasions', 
and,  despite  the  success  of  the  flying-boat,  Admiral  Bacon 
saw  no  reason  to  change  his  opinion.  His  contention  was 
that  as  the  water  area  over  which  the  Dunkirk  aircraft  had 
to  operate  was  very  limited  in  extent,  the  aeroplane,  which 
was  faster  than  the  flying-boat  and  had  the  advantage  that 
it  could  fight  on  equal  terms  with  enemy  aeroplanes  or 


74     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 

fighting  seaplanes,  was  more  generally  efficient  for  the 
purpose,  especially  as  the  aeroplane  engines  were  now  very 
reliable.  The  views  of  the  Dunkirk  air  officers  were  con- 
sidered by  the  Admiralty  in  conjunction  with  Admiral 
Bacon's  reports,  and,  as  a  result,  the  use  of  seaplanes  from 
the  Dunkirk  base  was  finally  abandoned,  except  for  com- 
munication purposes  and  for  restricted  patrols,  for  which 
a  Flight  of  Shorts  was  retained  at  Dover.  The  Admiralty 
adopted  a  proposal  of  Wing  Captain  Lambe  that  the  anti- 
submarine patrols  should  be  taken  over  by  a  Flight  of 
D.H.4  aeroplanes.  The  6  Large  America?  was  transferred  to 
Felixstowe ;  the  seaplane  station  at  Dunkirk  was  given  over 
to  the  American  Air  Service  (1st  of  February  191 8),  and 
No.  17  (Naval)  Squadron  was  formed  at  Bergues  Aero- 
drome with  D.H.4  aeroplanes  on  the  13th  of  January  191 8. 
This  squadron,  to  the  end  of  the  war,  was  responsible  for 
anti-submarine  patrols  over  the  Straits  and  over  the  Belgian 
coastal  waters. 

The  introduction  by  the  enemy  of  the  campaign  of  un- 
restricted U-boat  warfare  in  February  191 7  was  followed, 
as  has  been  indicated,  by  a  great  development  in  all  anti- 
submarine measures.  These  may  be  broadly  summarized 
as  follows: 

(i)  Operations  in  ike  vicinity  of  the  Coasts,  including 
protection  of  ships  in  convoy  or  dispersed,  organized 
hunts,  and  other  specific  offensive  actions, 
(ii)  Protection  of  shipping  on  the  high  seas,  that  is  to  say, 
convoy,  changing  of  shipping  routes  according  to 
the  latest  information  of  U-boat  movements,  &c. 

(iii)  Action  to  bar  the  passage  of  U-boats  through  narrow 
or  restricted  waters. 

(iv)  Attacks  on  submarine  bases  and  on  submarines  in 
harbour. 

In  the  period  under  review,  the  general  operations  were 
confined  mainly  to  (i)  and  (ii),  but  efforts  were  also  made 
to  close  the  Dover  Straits,  and  to  restrict  the  passage  of 
U-boats  from  German  North  Sea  ports  by  extensive  mine- 
laying  in  the  Heligoland  Bight.  In  addition,  as  will  be  told 


1917-18]  A  SUMMARY  75 

in  the  next  chapter,  aircraft  bombing  attacks  were  made 
on  the  U-boat  bases  in  Belgium. 

The  main  work  of  aircraft  came  under  the  heading 
Operations  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Coasts,  and  consisted  chiefly 
of  patrols  in  search  of  U-boats  and  the  supply  of  escorts 
for  merchant  shipping.  The  employment  of  the  various 
types  of  aircraft  had  come  to  be  fairly  well  defined.  Air- 
ships were  best  suited  to  keep  constant  watch  over  given 
areas,  and  to  escort  convoys  through  danger  zones,  a  task 
for  which  they  were  particularly  well  fitted  by  their  ability 
to  keep  station.  Their  long  endurance,  also,  made  them 
invaluable  for  co-operation  with  surface  craft  in  protracted 
hunts.  Flying-boats  had  some  of  the  advantages  of  the 
airships.  That  is  to  say,  they  could  carry  heavy  bombs,  of 
a  weight  likely  to  inflict  serious,  and  possibly  vital,  damage 
to  any  U-boat  which  was  hit,  they  had  good  radius  of 
action,  the  accommodation  for  the  crew  was  fairly  com- 
fortable, and  the  view  was  good.  They  had  the  advantage 
over  the  airship  that  they  were  far  less  vulnerable  to  attack 
by  enemy  aircraft,  that  they  were  comparatively  seaworthy, 
and  that  they  could,  because  of  their  greater  speed  and 
manoeuvrability,  more  often  get  into  position,  once  a 
U-boat  had  been  sighted,  to  make  an  effective  attack.  As 
compared  with  the  airship  the  flying-boat  suffered  the 
disadvantage  that  it  could  not  keep  station  with  a  convoy, 
nor  had  it  the  endurance  for  protracted  patrols.  Further- 
more, there  were  occasions  when  airships  could  get  into 
the  air  although  the  surface  of  the  sea  might  be  too  rough 
to  permit  of  flying-boats  getting  off.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  winds  might  be  too  high  for  airships  to  operate,  it 
was  often  possible  for  heavier-than-air  craft  to  be  used. 
Flying-boats  were  best  employed  for  offensive  action 
against  U-boats  definitely  reported,  or  suspected,  in  waters 
outside  the  range  of  smaller  seaplanes  or  of  aeroplanes. 
These  last-named,  which  could  get  into  the  air  quickly 
and  under  almost  any  weather  conditions,  except  mist  or 
fog,  were  best  used  when  immediate  action  was  called  for 
as  a  result  of  reports  of  U-boats  in  inshore  waters.  Sea- 
planes were  employed  from  time  to  time  on  convoy  work, 
but  they  suffered  the  disadvantage,  as  compared  with  the 


76     UNRESTRICTED  U-BOAT  WARFARE    [ch.  ii 

airship,  that  their  speed,  relative  to  the  convoy,  made  it 
difficult  for  them  to  keep  good  station.  Kite  balloons, 
towed  by  patrol  vessels,  had  proved  their  value  as  elevated 
observation  posts. 

Statistics  are  available  which  show  the  action  of  anti- 
submarine aircraft  in  home  waters  during  191 7  and  the 
first  quarter  of  191 8.  In  this  period  there  were  170 
sightings  of  U-boats  by  seaplanes  (including  flying-boats) 
and  aeroplanes,  and  on  107  occasions  the  U-boats  were 
attacked.  Airships  reported  sighting  submarines  on  thirty- 
two  occasions,  and  they  made  eighteen  attacks.1  From 
kite  balloons,  nine  U-boats  were  sighted  and  four  of  them 
were  attacked  by  patrolling  vessels. 

The  aircraft  patrols  traced  a  net-work  round  the  whole 
of  the  British  Isles  with  the  exception  of  a  part  of  the 
west  coast  of  Scotland.  By  the  end  of  March  191 8  airships 
were  operating  from  Luce  Bay,  Larne,2  Anglesey,  Pem- 
broke, Mullion,  Laira,3  Bridport,3  Polegate,  Capel  (Folke- 
stone), Howden  (rigid  and  non-rigids),  East  Fortune,  and 
Longside.  The  inland  airship  stations  were  Kingsnorth 
(construction,  repair,  and  experiment),  Cranwell  (School), 
Pulham  (rigids  and  non-rigids,  experimental),  and  Worm- 
wood Scrubbs  (construction  and  tests).  Kite  balloons  for 
towing  by  destroyers,  sloops,  and  other  vessels  were  based 
at  Milford  Haven,  Merifield  (Devonport),  Tipnor,  Hythe, 
Shotley,  Lowestoft,  Immingham,  North  Queensferry 
(Rosyth)  and  Caldale.  Seaplane  (including  flying-boat) 
stations  were  at  Fishguard,  Scillies,  Newlyn,  Cattewater, 
Torquay,  Portland,  Cherbourg,  Calshot,  Bembridge, 
Newhaven,    Dover,    Westgate,    Felixstowe,    Yarmouth, 

1  For  sightings  of  U-boats  by  aircraft  from  the  various  patrol  stations 
in  1917,  see  Appendix  II. 

2  The  shed  at  Larne  was  used,  from  time  to  time,  for  the  temporary 
housing  of  an  airship,  particularly  in  connexion  with  the  escorting  of 
steamers  on  the  Larne-Stranraer  route. 

3  At  Laira,  a  sub-station  of  Mullion,  a  clearing  was  made  in  the  trees,  so 
that  a  small-type  airship  could,  when  required,  be  tethered  in  the  open. 
The  idea  was  to  extend  the  patrol  area,  and  it  was  so  successful  that  it  was 
decided  to  establish  a  series  of  mooring  sites,  between  permanent  stations, 
to  provide  a  closer  linked  system  of  airship  patrols.  Under  this  scheme 
Bridport  became  a  second  sub-station  of  Mullion. 


1917-18]  AIRCRAFT  STATIONS  77 

Killingholme,  Hornsea,  Seaton  Carew,  South  Shields, 
Dundee,  and  Strath  Beg.  In  addition,  naval  aeroplanes 
were  stationed  at  Mullion,  Padstow,  Prawle  Point,  Dover, 
Walmer,  Yarmouth,  Burgh  Castle,  and  Redcar. 

To  these  various  stations  must  be  added,  also,  those 
which  operated  directly  under  the  orders  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Grand  Fleet,  namely,  Catfirth,  Stenness, 
Scapa  Flow,  Houton,  and  Rosyth  (seaplanes) ;  Turnhouse, 
Smoogroo,  and  Donibristle  (aeroplanes) ;  and  Houton  Bay 
(kite  balloons).  The  Scapa  seaplane  station  was  chiefly  a 
repair  and  storage  base  for  the  Campania,  the  captain  of 
which,  working  under  the  orders  of  the  Admiral  Com- 
manding Orkneys  and  Shetlands,  supplied  all  aircraft  and 
personnel  for  the  Scapa  station  as  required  from  time  to 
time.  Whenever  enemy  submarines  were  expected  to  be 
on  passage  through  the  Fair  Island  Channel,  seaplane 
patrols  were  made  as  far  north  as  the  Shetlands.  When  the 
Campania  could  be  spared  from  the  Grand  Fleet,  she  was 
sent  north,  occasionally,  to  a  small  anchorage  in  the 
northern  islands  of  Orkney  to  form  a  base  closer  to  the  air- 
craft patrol  area. 


CHAPTER  III 

NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS  FROM  DUNKIRK 

igiy-March  igi8 

[Map  facing  p.  i] 

Naval  air  operations  from  the  Dunkirk  area  in  19 1 7 
were  governed  by  three  main  considerations.  These  were 
the  activities  by  U-boats  and  destroyers  based  on  the 
Belgian  ports,  the  bombing  operations  of  enemy  aeroplanes 
working  from  aerodromes  in  Belgium,  and,  in  the  last  half 
of  the  year,  the  Allied  military  offensive  in  Flanders.  The 
U-boat  and  destroyer  bases  at  Bruges,  Zeebrugge,  and 
Ostend,  and  the  aerodromes  from  which  the  German 
heavy  bombing  aeroplanes  set  out  to  attack  London  and 
the  south-eastern  counties  of  England,  were  open  to 
attack  from  the  air,  and  the  systematic  bombing  of  these 
various  targets  became  possible  in  the  spring  of  191 7  with 
the  arrival  at  Dunkirk  of  improved  types  of  night  and  day 
bombers,  that  is,  the  Handley  Page  and  the  De  Havilland  4. 
Dunkirk  aircraft  also  co-operated  in  the  general  bombing 
offensive  against  military  targets  during  the  battles  of 
Ypres.  To  resist  the  British  bombing  formations,  and 
for  retaliation,  the  German  air  strength  in  the  Belgian 
coast  area  was  progressively  increased  and  demanded  a 
corresponding  expansion  of  the  Dunkirk  fighting  squadrons. 

The  first  bombing  operations  of  the  year  were  made  in 
connexion  with  German  destroyer  activity  in  the  Dover 
Straits.  In  October  191 6  two  enemy  destroyer  flotillas  had 
been  sent  from  the  north  German  coast  to  Zeebrugge  for 
attacks  on  British  shipping  in  the  Downs  and  on  drifters 
watching  the  mine-barrage  line.  After  a  successful  attack 
on  the  drifters  on  the  26th  of  October  191 6  one  of  the 
flotillas  had  been  sent  back  to  Wilhelmshaven.  In  January 
1 91 7  the  British  Admiralty  learned  that  a  destroyer  flotilla 
was  again  about  to  leave  its  base  on  the  German  coast  to 
reinforce  the  destroyers  in  Zeebrugge.  The  Harwich  Force 
was  at  once  ordered  to  intercept  the  enemy,  but  when 
contact  was  made,  early  on  the  23rd  of  January,  there 
was  an  indecisive  action  in  which  the  German  leader  was 


1917]      BOMBING  SHIPPING  AT  BRUGES  79 

seriously  damaged,  but  escaped,  and  during  which  the 
British  destroyer  Simoon  was  lost.  A  photographic  recon- 
naissance made  about  noon  of  the  same  day  by  aeroplanes 
of  No.  2  Squadron  at  Dunkirk,  revealed  that  the  German 
destroyers  had  arrived  at  Zeebrugge  and  were  lying  behind 
the  Mole.  Almost  at  once  gales  and  a  severe  frost  set  in, 
but  when  air  reconnaissance  again  became  possible,  on  the 
1st  of  February,  an  unusual  state  of  affairs,  offering  a 
unique  opportunity,  was  disclosed.  As  a  result  of  the  severe 
weather  conditions,  German  shipping  had  been  con- 
centrated in  the  harbour  at  Bruges,  and  the  way  out  was 
temporarily  closed  by  the  locks  and  canals  being  frozen : 
air  photographs  revealed  that  among  other  vessels  so  im- 
mobilized were  twenty  torpedo  craft  and  three  submarines. 

The  bombing  aircraft  attached  to  Nos.  4  and  5  Wings  at 
Dunkirk  were  ordered  to  attack  and,  though  much 
hampered  by  engine  trouble  due  to  freezing  water  and  oil, 
they  had,  by  the  10th  of  February,  dropped  three  and  a  half 
tons  of  bombs  on  the  docks.1  A  German  report  on  the 
effect  of  this  bombing  shows  that  no  destroyers  or  sub- 
marines were  hit,  but  that,  among  minor  results,  three 
ammunition  sheds  and  a  guard  house  were  destroyed.  In 
one  of  the  sheds  8*8  cm.  shrapnel  shells,  packed  in  sheet 
metal  cases,  were  stored,  but  although  a  direct  hit  was 
made  on  the  shed  and  some  of  the  broken  cartridge  cases 
were  destroyed  by  burning,  none  of  the  ammunition  ex- 
ploded. A  second  shed,  in  which  was  cordite  stored  in 
boxes,  was  hit  and  set  on  fire,  but  the  flames  were  put  out 
after  about  two  hours.  Much  of  the  ammunition  in  the 
third  shed  was  rendered  useless  but,  again,  failed  to  ex- 
plode. Had  matters  gone  a  little  differently  and,  as  might 
easily  have  happened,  had  exploding  ammunition  been 
flung  across  the  harbour,  the  shipping  must  have  suffered 
severely. 

Retaliation  was  not  long  delayed.  Between  the  8th  and 
14th  of  February,  night  and  dawn  attacks  on  Dunkirk 

1  The  day  bombers  at  Dunkirk  at  this  time  were  Sopwith  i£  Strutters 
(130  horse-power  Clerget).  For  night  bombing  there  were  Caudrons  (two 
100  horse-power  Anzani  engines)  and  Shorts  (250  horse-power  Rolls-Royce 
.engines). 


80    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.iii 

killed  sixteen  and  wounded  thirty-six  persons,  but  inflicted 
little  material  damage.  On  the  14th  and  on  the  16th  the 
docks  at  Bruges  were  again  attacked,  and  on  the  latter  day 
the  German  aerodrome  at  Ghistelles  was  also  bombed. 

From  the  middle  of  February  to  the  end  of  March  there 
were  few  days  when  useful  flying  was  possible.  The  menace 
of  the  German  destroyers  based  on  the  Belgian  ports 
was  again  made  clear  on  the  I7th/i8th  of  March,  when  a 
sortie  against  the  Dover  barrage  patrol  and  shipping  in 
the  Downs  led  to  the  destruction  of  the  British  destroyer 
Paragon  and  damage  to  the  Llewellyn,  as  well  as  to  the 
sinking  of  the  s.s.  Greypoint.  A  few  days  later  it  was  known 
that  another  destroyer  flotilla  had  arrived  at  the  Belgian 
ports  from  Germany,  and  as  it  appeared  that  the  Germans 
intended  to  follow  up  their  success,  special  precautions 
were  taken  in  the  Thames  and  in  the  Dover  Straits  area. 

Meanwhile,  on  instructions  from  Vice-Admiral  Bacon, 
bombing  attacks,  in  retaliation  for  the  raids  on  Dunkirk 
and  the  French  coast,  were  ordered  against  the  seaplane 
base  at  the  Zeebrugge  Mole  and  against  active  aerodromes 
in  Belgium.  Night  attacks  by  Short  seaplanes  were  made 
on  the  4th,  5th,  and  6th  of  April  on  the  Mole,  when,  in 
addition  to  many  65-lb.  bombs,  six  of  520-lb.  weight  were 
dropped.  It  was  learned  during  these  attacks  that  when 
the  first  aircraft  appeared  over  the  port,  the  German 
destroyers  put  to  sea  and  anchored  about  a  mile  off  the 
end  of  the  Mole.  Vice-Admiral  Bacon  saw  an  opportunity 
to  use  some  of  his  torpedo-carrying  coastal  motor-boats  for 
attacks  on  the  anchored  destroyers  and,  on  the  night  of 
the  7th  of  April,  the  destroyer  Falcon,  with  four  coastal 
motor-boats,  set  out.  The  Short  seaplanes  were  sent  out 
later,  at  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  interval,  and  the  opera- 
tions were  so  planned  that  the  motor-boats  were  four  miles 
off  Zeebrugge,  ready  to  close  the  port  at  slow  speed,  as 
soon  as  the  bombing  began.  The  first  Short  seaplane 
pilot  opened  the  attack  at  1 1. 15  p.m.  with  one  520-lb. 
bomb,  and  twenty  minutes  later  65-lb.  bombs  came 
from  a  second  seaplane.  A  third  appeared  within  ten 
minutes  and,  after  dropping  a  264-lb.  and  a  100-lb.  bomb, 
attacked  the  Mole  searchlights  with  machine-gun  fire. 


1917]         THE  HANDLEY  PAGE  BOMBER  81 

Meanwhile  the  motor-boats  had  quietly  approached  four 
German  destroyers  which  were  found  lying  in  the 
Wielingen  Channel,  and  had  effected  a  complete  surprise. 
Hits  were  made  on  the  destroyer  G.88,  which  was  in  a 
sinking  condition  when  the  motor-boats  turned  for 
home:  the  boats  reached  Dunkirk  safely  between  four 
and  five  in  the  morning. 

On  the  evening  of  the  20th  of  April  the  German  de- 
stroyers again  raided  the  Straits  and  shelled  Calais  and 
Dover,  ineffectually,  for  some  minutes.  Soon  after  mid- 
night, the  British  destroyer  leaders  Swift  and  Broke  sighted 
the  enemy  vessels  and,  in  a  memorable  action,  the  G.42 
and  G.85  were  sunk.  As  a  result  of  this  disaster  the  German 
destroyers  avoided  the  Dover  Straits  area  for  many  months. 

In  April  191 7  the  Dunkirk  air  units  were  reorganized, 
following  the  dispatch  of  four  naval  fighting  squadrons 
to  reinforce  the  Royal  Flying  Corps.  Arrangements  were 
made  for  No.  1  Wing  at  St.  Pol  to  administer  also  the  sea- 
planes at  Dover  and  Dunkirk.  The  Wing  was  made  re- 
sponsible for  all  naval  co-operation,  such  as  spotting  the 
fire  of  monitors  and  naval  siege  guns  on  shore  targets,  and 
for  aircraft  reconnaissance  and  photography  of  the  Belgian 
coast  bases.  No.  4  Wing,  whose  head-quarters  was  moved 
to  La  Panne,  was  instructed  to  provide  offensive  patrols  and 
escorts,  and  was  also  made  responsible  for  the  protection 
from  the  air  of  surface  craft.  No.  5  Wing  was  charged  with 
the  duty  of  day  and  night  bombing.1 

For  bombing  there  was  now  arriving  the  Handley  Page, 
which  could  carry  fourteen  112-lb.  bombs  as  compared 
with  the  Short  Bomber's  eight  65-pounders.  The 
Handley  Pages  were  first  used  for  daylight  patrols  off  the 
coast,  and,  on  the  23rd  of  April,  had  some  success.  Three, 
each  loaded  with  fourteen  65-lb.  bombs,  went  out  to 
search  for  five  German  destroyers  reported  off  Ostend. 

1  No.  4  (Fighting)  Squadron  was  transferred  from  Coudekerque  (No.  5 
Wing)  to  a  new  aerodrome  at  Bray  Dunes  (No.  4  Wing).  No.  10  (Fighting) 
Squadron  was  moved  from  St.  Pol  (No.  I  Wing)  to  Fumes  (No.  4  Wing). 
No.  5  (Bombing)  Squadron  moved  from  Coudekerque  to  Petite  Synthe,  and 
No.  7  (Bombing)  Squadron  from  Petite  Synthe  (No.  4  Wing)  to  Coude- 
kerque (No.  5  Wing),  where  it  was  amalgamated  with  the  Handley  Page 
Squadron. 

2504.4  g 


82    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [en.  m 

The  enemy  vessels  were  found  five  miles  off  the  coast  and, 
although  they  broke  formation  when  the  Handley  Pages 
attacked,  one  of  the  destroyers  was  stopped  by  direct  hits 
and  developed  a  list. 

Three  days  later  the  Handley  Pages  were  again  in  action 
with  German  destroyers  off  Ostend,  but  on  this  occasion 
the  bombing  inflicted  no  visible  damage.  One  of  the 
Handley  Pages,  venturing  too  far  from  the  fighting  escort, 
received  bullets  in  the  petrol  tanks  from  an  enemy  single- 
seater  and  was  eventually  forced  down  on  the  water,  where 
it  came  under  fire  from  the  coastal  batteries.  The  pilots  of 
two  French  flying-boats  attempted  to  rescue  the  British 
crew.  The  first  one  landed  alongside  the  Handley  Page, 
took  off  the  observer,  who  had  been  wounded,  and  got 
safely  back  to  Dunkirk.  The  second  French  pilot  was  not  so 
lucky.  He  had  taken  on  board  another  member  of  the 
Handley  Page  crew,  but  he  could  not  subsequently  get 
off  the  water,  and  German  motor-boats,  from  Ostend, 
captured  the  whole  party.  As  a  result  of  this  misad- 
venture, it  was  decided  to  restrict  the  activities  of  the 
Handley  Pages  to  night  bombing.  At  first,  raids  were 
confined  to  moonlight  nights,  but  as  pilots  gained 
experience  the  attacks  came  to  be  made  on  any  night 
when  the  general  weather  conditions  were  favourable. 

The  D.H.4  aeroplane,  fitted  with  a  250  horse-power 
Rolls-Royce  engine,  made  its  appearance  concurrently 
with  the  Handley  Page,  and  was  used  for  the  re-equipment 
of  No.  2  Squadron  at  St.  Pol.  Fully  loaded,  the  D.H.4 
could  climb  to  over  20,000  feet  as  compared  with  a  ceiling 
of  approximately  15,000  feet  for  the  Sopwith  two-seaters, 
and  photographs  of  the  enemy  defences  and  bases  in 
Belgium  were  soon  being  taken  from  heights  above  1 8,000 
feet.  As  the  supply  of  these  aeroplanes  increased,  they 
replaced  the  Sopwith  bombers  of  No.  5  Squadron  and, 
from  July  191 7  onwards,  the  greater  part  of  the  day  bomb- 
ing was  done  by  the  D.H.4's. 

The  Bombardments  of  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend 

Meanwhile  the  Vice-Admiral  at  Dover  had,  for  some 
time,  been  preparing  plans  for  a  bombardment  of  the  lock 


1917]       BOMBARDMENT  OF  ZEEBRUGGE         83 

gates  at  Zeebrugge  which  were  a  vital  link  in  the  com- 
munications between  that  port  and  Bruges,  where  the 
U-boats  and  destroyers  were  based.  The  destruction  of 
the  lock  gates  would  make  the  canal  tidal  and  probably 
sever  connexion  with  Bruges.  Direct  hits  from  two 
fifteen-inch  shells,  it  was  calculated,  would  suffice  to 
destroy  the  lock  gates,  but  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
effective  bombardment  were  great.  The  Knocke  battery 
{Kaiser  Wilhelm  II)  could  make  good  shooting  up  to  a 
range  of  twenty  sea  miles,  and,  therefore,  the  monitor 
which  was  to  be  used  as  a  back  aiming  mark  would  have 
to  be  anchored  far  out  at  sea  to  render  her  reasonably  safe 
from  the  fire  of  the  German  guns.  This,  in  turn,  meant 
that  the  bombarding  ships  would  be  almost  at  their  ex- 
treme range.  Aeroplane  spotting  was  essential  because  the 
bursts  of  the  shells  could  not  be  located  in  any  other  way. 
Vice- Admiral  Bacon  calculated  that  252  rounds  would  be 
required  to  ensure  the  probability  of  a  hit  on  the  lock  gates, 
and  as  the  rate  of  fire  for  each  of  the  three  available  moni- 
tors {Erebus,  Terror,  and  Marshal  Soult)  was  one  round  a 
minute,  the  bombardment  would  have  to  go  on  for  eighty- 
four  minutes.  A  calm  sea,  weather  conditions  giving 
favourable  winds  to  allow  of  the  maintenance  of  a  smoke- 
screen to  protect  the  bombarding  ships,  a  tide  running 
along  the  coast  so  that  the  anchored  monitors  could  keep 
their  broadsides  to  the  target,  and  the  absence  of  low 
clouds  which  would  prevent  aircraft  working,  were  the 
exacting  essentials  if  the  bombardment  was  to  be  made 
with  a  likelihood  of  success.  Furthermore,  to  ensure  sur- 
prise, the  monitors  must  be  in  position  before  dawn,  and 
there  was  the  risk  that,  with  all  other  conditions  satisfied, 
morning  mists  might  shroud  the  target  from  the  view  of 
the  airmen. 

Three  times  Vice-Admiral  Bacon  had  to  turn  back  from 
the  enterprise  because  of  a  change  in  the  weather,  but,  on 
the  morning  of  the  12th  of  May,  at  4.15  a.m.,  the  monitors 
and  their  attendant  ships  were  in  position  under  conditions 
judged  to  be  favourable.  The  ships,  however,  owing  to 
the  slow  passage  of  the  Marshal  Soult,  which  had  to  be 
towed,  arrived  later  than  had  been  planned  and  the  delay 


84    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  m 

was  fatal.  The  first  wireless-fitted  aeroplane  had  been  over 
the  target  from  3  a.m.,  but  a  ground  mist  had  obscured  the 
lock  till  3.40  a.m.  At  this  time  the  observer  sent  out  a 
message  that  he  was  ready  to  begin,  but  it  was  not  until 
4.47  a.m.  that  fire  was  opened.  A  precious  hour  had  been 
lost  and  matters  were  made  worse  because  the  two 
relieving  Sopwiths  had  engine  failure  and  did  not  arrive  to 
take  over  the  spotting  from  the  first  aeroplane  which  had 
to  turn  for  home,  through  petrol  shortage,  at  5.30  a.m. 
Up  to  that  time,  however,  forty-five  corrections  were 
signalled  from  the  air,  and  the  Erebus  and  Terror  had  got 
directly  on  their  target,  but  many  of  the  shells,  it  was 
reported,  failed  to  explode.  The  monitors  continued  to 
fire  without  air  observation  up  to  6  a.m.,  when  a  change  of 
wind  ended  the  operation.  It  is  of  interest  that  the  monitors 
bombarded  at  a  range  of  26,200  yards,  and  that  the  visibility 
from  the  ships  was  never  more  than  4,000  yards.  Up  to 
the  time  the  firing  ceased  enemy  aircraft  were  inactive, 
and  a  patrol  of  Sopwith  triplanes,  in  the  area  of  the  moni- 
tors, passed  without  incident.  A  second  patrol,  however, 
of  seven  Sopwith  Tups'  of  No.  4  Squadron,  was  met  by  a 
formation  of  Albatros  fighters  near  Zeebrugge  at  6.25  a.m. 
and,  in  a  sharp  fight,  three  of  the  German  aeroplanes  fell 
into  the  sea  and  two  others  were  reported  shot  down.  A 
third  patrol,  a  little  later,  again  found  opposition  and, 
after  losing  one  of  its  number,  shot  down  a  seaplane  which 
crashed  in  Ostend  harbour.  This  activity  over  the  Belgian 
ports  prevented  serious  molestation,  by  aircraft,  of  the 
British  ships  as  they  withdrew,  and  two  German  seaplanes 
which  slipped  through  with  the  evident  intention  of 
making  a  bombing  attack,  were  met  and  driven  off  by  the 
second  of  two  patrols  of  fighting  seaplanes  which  escorted 
the  British  ships  on  their  homeward  journey. 

The  results  obtained  proved  disappointing.  Air  photo- 
graphs revealed  that  nineteen  shells  had  exploded  within 
a  few  yards  of  the  target,  but  that  the  gates  had  not 
suffered  any  damage.  Although  considerable  damage  was 
inflicted  on  buildings  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  target 
and  went  some  way  to  soften  the  failure,  the  value  of 
Zeebrugge  as  a  U-boat  and  destroyer  base  had  not  been 


i9i7]  BOMBARDMENT  OF  OSTEND  85 

impaired.  The  incidence  of  the  shots  and  the  conditions 
which  prevailed,  including  the  advantage  of  surprise, 
would  seem  to  show  that,  had  the  monitors  been  ready 
to  fire  when  the  aeroplane  observer  gave  the  signal,  or, 
alternatively,  had  their  fire  been  reported  from  the  air 
throughout,  the  chances  of  a  direct  hit  were  high. 

Vice-Admiral  Bacon  next  turned  his  attention  to  the 
dockyard  at  Ostend,  a  larger  target,  but  one  that  was 
flanked  by  houses,  which  must  be  avoided.  After  earlier 
attempts,  made  abortive  by  the  weather,  the  Erebus  and 
Terror,  with  destroyers  and  auxiliary  craft,  set  out  on  the 
evening  of  the  4th  of  June.  To  cover  the  operation  in  the 
direction  of  the  Thornton  Bank  and  the  Schouwen  Bank, 
Commodore  Tyrwhitt  went  out  with  the  Harwich  Force, 
and,  early  next  morning,  he  intercepted  two  German 
destroyers,  one  of  which,  the  S.20,  he  sank.  In  the  later 
stages  of  this  destroyer  action,  German  seaplanes  from 
Zeebrugge  took  part  and,  coming  down  on  the  water,  they 
picked  up  and  carried  home  one  officer  and  seven  men  of 
the  crew  of  the  S.20. 

From  16,000  feet  above  Ostend,  part  of  the  destroyer 
action  was  watched  from  the  aeroplanes  which  were  in 
position  ready  to  direct  the  fire  of  Vice- Admiral  Bacon's 
monitors.  There  were  two  D.H.4  aeroplanes  for  spotting, 
escorted  by  two  others  and  by  two  Sopwith  Tups'.  In 
addition,  to  prevent  German  aircraft  spotting  for  the 
shore  batteries  against  the  ships,  or  from  making  direct 
bombing  attacks  on  them,  there  were  two  fighter  patrols 
in  the  neighbourhood. 

The  air  observer's  signal  that  he  was  ready  was  made 
at  3.22  a.m.  and  fire  was  opened  within  a  few  minutes. 
To  avoid  a  possible  initial  shelling  of  the  town,  the  moni- 
tors were  ranged  on  a  point  about  a  1,000  yards  short 
of  the  eastern  boom,  and  the  guns  were  not  lifted  on 
their  target  until  the  line  and  direction  had  been  given  as 
correct.  When  the  range  was  lengthened,  fire  was  at 
once  reported  on  the  target,  and  a  central  hit  was  quickly 
signalled.  Soon  after  fire  was  opened  a  German  kite 
balloon  ascended  5,000  feet  behind  Ostend  presumably  to 
direct  the  enemy  coast  batteries  on  the  bombarding  ships. 


86    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  m 

One  of  the  patrolling  pilots  in  a  Sopwith  Tup',  diving 
from  18,000  feet,  shot  the  balloon  down.  Meanwhile 
numerous  enemy  smoke  screens  had  been  started  and,  by 
3.45  a.m.,  the  docks  and  the  surrounding  country  had 
become  obscured.  The  smoke  spread  until  it  covered 
about  ten  to  fifteen  square  miles,  including  the  entire 
harbour,  and,  at  4  a.m.,  Vice-Admiral  Bacon  judged  it  was 
useless  to  continue.  Of  115  rounds  fired  by  that  time,  thirty- 
six  had  been  spotted  from  the  air,  and  photographs  taken 
later  in  the  day  showed  that  at  least  twenty  shells  had 
fallen  on  the  docks.  One  object  of  the  bombardment,  the 
infliction  of  damage  on  the  destroyer  repair  shops,  had 
been  attained.  It  was  also  revealed  by  U-boat  prisoners, 
taken  shortly  afterwards,  that  the  bombardment  led  to  the 
sinking  in  the  harbour  of  the  submarine  U.C.jo,  as  well  as 
an  armed  trawler,  and  that  three  destroyers  which  could 
not  get  out  of  harbour  in  time  were  damaged.  The 
U.C.jo  had  been  lying  alongside  a  petrol  lighter  which 
was  exploded  by  a  direct  hit;  the  U-boat  was  afterwards 
raised  and  repaired  at  Bruges.1 

The  Belgian  Coast  Barrage 

For  some  weeks  after  this  attack  on  Ostend  the  weather 
conditions  provided  no  suitable  opportunity  for  a  renewal 
of  the  bombardments  and,  towards  the  end  of  July  1917, 
Vice-Admiral  Bacon  decided  to  reinstitute  the  Belgian 
coast  barrage.2  This  barrage,  as  in  the  previous  year,  was 
to  consist  of  a  twenty-three  mile  line  of  net  mines,  supple- 
mented by  deep  minefields,  parallel  with  the  Belgian 
coast  between  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend.  The  laying  of  the 
net  barrage  was  begun  on  the  25  th  of  July.  While  the  ships 
were  assembling  on  the  previous  evening,  air  patrols  were 
maintained,  from  5  p.m.  until  dark,  over  the  Dunkirk 
Roads,  but  no  German  aircraft  appeared.  From  the  25th 
to  the  27th  inclusive,  when  the  barrage  was  being  put 
down,  there  were  fighting  patrols,  by  formations  of  five  to 
seven  Sopwith  Tups'  or  'Camels',  to  protect  the  ships 
against  attack  from  the  air.    In  this  they  succeeded.    On 

1  German  records  confirm  the  sinking  of  the  U.C.jo.  She  was  ultimately 
destroyed  in  the  North  Sea  in  August  191 8.  2  See  vol.  ii,  pp.  431-2. 


1917]       THE  BELGIAN  COAST  BARRAGE  87 

the  evening  of  the  25th  a  German  seaplane,  which  ap- 
peared over  the  Fleet,  was  driven  off  and  eventually  shot 
down  on  the  sea  by  Sopwiths  of  No.  4  Squadron.  Next 
evening  there  was  a  clash  between  a  patrol  of  'Camels'  and 
a  formation  of  Albatros  fighters,  with  the  loss  of  one  aero- 
plane to  each  side.  On  the  27th  the  enemy  attempted  an 
attack  on  the  ships  with  torpedo-carrying  seaplanes,  four 
of  which,  with  one  fighting  seaplane  as  escort,  were  seen 
approaching  from  Ostend  by  five  Sopwith  'Camel'  pilots 
patrolling  over  the  ships.  The  'Camel'  pilots  attacked, 
the  enemy  formation  scattered,  and  the  German  pilots 
turned  back  to  their  base:  one  of  the  enemy  seaplanes 
crashed  in  the  sea  off  Ostend. 

After  the  barrage  had  been  laid,  a  strong  patrol  was 
maintained  by  monitors  and  destroyers  to  the  north- 
westward of  the  nets  to  protect  the  net  drifters  and  to 
prevent  the  sweeping  of  the  minefields.  At  dawn  each 
day  three  D.H.4  aeroplanes,  one  of  which  carried  wireless, 
flew  over  the  area  in  advance  of  the  patrolling  ships  to  give 
warning  if  German  forces  were  lying  in  wait.  During  the 
remainder  of  the  day  until  dusk,  fighting  formations, 
usually  of  five  or  six  'Camels'  or  'Pups'  on  high  patrol 
(above  17,000  feet)  and  three  on  low  patrol  (under  7,000 
feet),  were  sent  out  periodically.  The  aeroplane  pilots, 
especially  those  on  low  patrol,  had  to  face  the  risk  of  loss 
if  they  were  compelled,  through  engine  failure  or  other 
cause,  to  alight  on  the  sea  out  of  sight  of  surface  craft.1 

When  these  aircraft  patrols  were  first  instituted,  there 
were  a  fair  number  of  combats,  but,  during  August  and 
September  191 7,  the  German  pilots  paid  little  atten- 
tion to  the  barrage  line.  In  October,  however,  their  interest 
revived  and  many  bombing  attacks  against  the  ships  were 
attempted.  On  the  27th  one  such  attack  was  made  with 
twenty  aeroplanes,  and  casualties  were  inflicted  among  the 
ships'  crews.  Next  day  an  attack  by  an  electrically  con- 
trolled motor-boat,  called  a  Fernlenkboot,  was  made  on  the 

1  Flight  Commander  A.  J.  Chadwick,  forced  down  on  the  28th  of  July, 
was  drowned.  In  a  bomb  raid  on  the  Zeppelin  sheds  at  Evere,  in  October 
1916,  this  officer  had  been  shot  down,  but  had  eluded  capture  and,  after 
many  adventures,  had  eventually  got  through  to  Holland. 


88    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  in 

monitor  Erebus.  In  the  forepart  of  the  Fernlenkboot  was 
placed  a  charge  of  high-explosive,  and  in  the  stern  was  a 
drum  of  many  miles  of  insulated  cable  by  which  the  boat 
could  be  directed  electrically  from  the  shore.  The  crew 
started  the  boat  and  then  left,  after  which  the  observer  in 
a  seaplane,  by  wireless  signal  to  the  shore  station,  indicated 
what  helm  was  to  be  given  the  boat  to  direct  it  on  its 
target.  These  boats  had,  twice  before,  been  run  at  a 
patrol,  but  on  the  first  occasion  the  motor-boat  had  been 
sunk  by  the  M.23  and,  on  the  second  occasion,  had  failed 
to  reach  the  patrolling  vessels.1  In  the  attack  on  the 
Erebus  on  the  28th  of  October  the  German  seaplane 
observer  played  his  part  well,  and  the  Fernlenkboot  hit  the 
monitor  amidships,  where  it  automatically  exploded.  The 
debris  thrown  by  the  explosion  killed  two  men  and 
wounded  fifteen,  and  the  bulge  of  the  monitor  was 
damaged,  so  that  she  had  eventually  to  be  sent  to  Ports- 
mouth for  repair.  After  one  more  attack  of  this  kind,  in 
which  the  Fernlenkboot  was  sunk  by  a  pom-pom  shell  from 
the  destroyer  North  Star,  the  Germans  abandoned  this 
method  of  attack.  The  reasons  they  gave  were  that  no 
large  warships  approached  the  Belgian  coast  and  that  it 
appeared  hardly  worth  while  to  send  the  motor-boat 
against  smaller  craft  whose  power  of  rapid  manoeuvre 
rendered  the  chances  of  success  very  small. 

By  this  time  the  air  patrols  in  defence  of  the  Fleet  had 
had  to  be  curtailed  owing  to  a  depletion  of  the  pilot 
strength  at  Dunkirk.  In  the  five  weeks  previous  to  the 
attack  on  the  Erebus,  sixty-one  pilots  had  been  struck  off 
the  strength  through  sickness,  injury,  or  transfer  home, 
and  no  more  than  nineteen  new  pilots  had  arrived  to 
replace  them.  The  German  attacks  on  the  barrage-line 
could  not,  therefore,  be  watched  with  any  degree  of  con- 
tinuity and  the  ships  were  often  bombed.  Several  of  the 
electric-battery  cases  used  with  the  electrical-contact  net 
mines  were  destroyed  from  time  to  time,  and  this  led  to 
their  being  placed  in  mine  cases  which  were  then  sunk 

1  The  first  boat  of  this  kind  had  been  run  against  the  pier  at  Nieuport  on 
the  1st  of  March  1917.  Fragments  of  the  boat  were  salved  and  sufficed  to 
reveal  the  principles  of  the  design. 


1917]         OSTEND  AGAIN  BOMBARDED  89 

to  the  bottom  of  the  sea,  a  procedure  which  proved 
effective,  but  highly  inconvenient.1 

Bombardments  of  Ostend 

The  monitors  of  the  barrage  patrol  had  orders,  when 
the  weather  and  other  conditions  were  favourable,  to 
bombard  the  dockyard  at  Ostend,  the  harbour  at  Blanken- 
berghe,  and  the  Mole  at  Zeebrugge.  Arrangements  were 
also  in  being  for  a  set  shoot  on  these  targets  with  aircraft 
co-operation,  when  the  conditions  made  success  likely. 
Set  bombardments  of  the  dockyard  at  Ostend,  with  aero- 
plane co-operation,  were  attempted  on  the  4th  and  15th 
of  September,  but  they  failed  chiefly  owing  to  the  effective- 
ness of  enemy  smoke-screens  and  to  bad  wireless  com- 
munication. On  the  22nd  of  September,  however,  there 
was  an  appreciable  success.  The  captain  of  the  Terror, 
finding  the  weather  calm  and  the  visibility  good,  signalled 
for  spotting  and  fighting  aircraft  to  be  sent  to  Ostend. 
Four  D.H.4's  and  three  Sopwith  'Camels'  were  sent  out, 
and  the  observer  in  one  of  the  D.H.4's  was  ready  to  spot 
the  fire  at  6.25  a.m.2  Fire  was  opened  and,  corrected  from 
the  air,  was  soon  on  the  target.  The  German  batteries, 
'Tirpitz'  and  'Deutschland',  retaliated  and,  with  the  help 
of  enemy  seaplane  observation,  began  to  drop  shells  within 
two  dozen  yards  of  the  monitor.  There  were  low  cloud 
banks,  but  the  German  seaplane  was  found  by  a  'Camel' 
patrol  and  forced  down  on  the  water,  whence  it  was  salved 
by  the  British  destroyer  Nugent,  A  formation  of  seven 
enemy  seaplanes  now  came  up  and,  in  a  brief  fight,  the  two 
remaining  'Camels'  of  the  British  patrol  forced  two  more 
seaplanes  down,  one  of  which  crashed  and  was  wrecked. 

Meanwhile  the  bombardment  of  Ostend  continued,  and 
although  twelve  smoke  screens  were  put  up  they  did  not 
obscure  the  target,  nor  did  bursts,  artificially  produced 
in  the  outer  harbour,  deceive  the  air  observer.  At  five 
minutes  to  seven,  by  which  time  the  Terror  had  fired 
thirty-five    rounds    from    her    15 -inch    gun,    the    wind 

1  See  The  Dover  Patrol,  1913-1917,  by  Admiral  Sir  Reginald  Bacon, 
vol.  i,  p.  171. 

2  A  high  patrol  of  five  Sopwith  'Camels'  and  a  low  patrol  of  three  also 
covered  the  area. 


90    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  m 

freshened  and  the  monitor  withdrew.  Air  photographs 
showed  that  considerable  damage  had  been  done.  One 
launching  slip  had  been  destroyed  and  others  damaged, 
and  a  floating  dock,  on  which  were  a  destroyer  and  a  sub- 
marine, had  been  sunk,  while  one  of  the  lock  gates  had  suf- 
fered so  that  the  basin  had  been  drained  to  low- water  mark. 

Three  days  later  the  Terror  tried  again,  but  the  enemy 
had  profited  by  his  experience,  and  started  an  effective 
smoke  screen  within  a  few  seconds  of  fire  being  opened. 
Thirty-one  rounds  were  fired  with  the  help  of  approximate 
corrections  from  the  air,  and  the  result  was  that  a  machine- 
shop  was  wrecked  and  the  floating  dock  was  further 
damaged.  As  the  monitor  withdrew,  four  German  two- 
seater  seaplanes,  escorted  by  two  fighting  seaplanes,  came 
out  from  Zeebrugge,  and  were  engaged  by  two  patrolling 
Sopwith  'Camels'  (pilots,  Flight  Commander  R.  Graham 
and  Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  L.  H.  Slatter).  Each  'Camel' 
pilot  shot  down  one  of  the  enemy,  a  two-seater  and  a 
fighter.  The  latter  collapsed  on  the  water,  but  the  former 
landed  under  control,  and  one  of  its  occupants,  wounded, 
was  taken  off  by  another  German  two-seater  which  landed 
alongside.  The  'Camel'  pilots  emptied  their  remaining 
ammunition  into  this  seaplane,  which  could  not,  apparently, 
get  off  the  water  again.  Flight  Commander  Graham,  whose 
oil-tank  had  been  shot  through,  had  to  come  down  on  the 
water  in  Dunkirk  Roads :  he  was  picked  up,  and  his  aero- 
plane was  salved  by  a  destroyer  directed  to  the  spot  by  his 
companion  pilot. 

Two  further  attempts  to  bombard  Ostend  in  October — 
on  the  20th  and  21st — were  foiled  by  smoke  screens,  and 
another,  on  the  19th  of  December,  failed  because  the  air- 
craft spotting  arrangements  broke  down.  The  effect  of 
these  bombardments  of  Ostend,  apart  from  the  damage 
inflicted,  was  to  restrict  the  use  of  the  port  as  a  destroyer 
station  and  repair  base. 

A  Projected  Landing1 

Vice- Admiral  Bacon  had,  from  the  time  of  taking  com- 
mand of  the  Dover  Patrol,  concerned  himself  with  plans 
1  See  also  Ch.V,  pp.  138,  147,  and  150. 


1917]  A  BEACH  SURVEY  91 

to  facilitate  a  landing  of  troops  to  wrest  the  Belgian 
coast  from  the  enemy.  What  could  be  done  depended  on 
the  progress  made  by  the  Allied  left  flank  in  France  and 
Belgium.  After  many  earlier  disappointments,  it  seemed 
that  the  opportunity  would  come  in  191 7,  in  conjunction 
with  the  British  offensive  in  Flanders,  and  Vice-Admiral 
Bacon  pushed  ahead  with  his  preparations.  By  the  summer 
of  191 7  his  arrangements  had  been  completed,  but  as  the 
long-drawn-out  battle  of  Ypres  trailed  to  its  conclusion, 
hope  drooped,  and,  by  October,  the  project  had  been 
abandoned.  Part  of  the  aircraft  work  in  the  preparations 
merits  a  brief  mention  for  its  general  rather  than  its 
particular  interest.  The  places  chosen  for  the  landings  of 
the  military  force  were  three  beaches,  a  mile  apart,  between 
Nieuport  and  Middelkerke.  The  troops  were  to  be  landed 
off  long  pontoons  (500  feet  by  30  feet  beam),  which  were 
to  be  pushed  into  position  by  monitors.  Air  photographs 
of  these  beaches,  taken  at  low  water,  indicated  that  they 
sloped  unevenly,  and  there  appeared  to  be  a  danger  that  the 
pontoons,  which  were  wedge-shaped,  might  ground  on 
ridges  with  the  surrounding  water  too  deep  for  the  troops 
to  get  ashore.  To  avert  this  danger,  which  would  jeopard- 
ize the  success  of  the  operation,  it  was  imperative  that 
the  beaches  should  be  closely  surveyed  and  this  could 
only  be  done  from  the  air.  The  method  adopted  by  Vice- 
Admiral  Bacon  was  based  on  the  fact  that  as  the  tide 
fell  on  a  calm  day  the  line  of  water,  visible  from  the  air, 
formed,  in  effect,  a  series  of  contours  along  the  beach. 
From  air  photographs  taken,  at,  say,  each  foot  of  fall  in  the 
tide,  from  high  to  low  water,  it  would  be  possible  to  plot 
the  whole  beach  with  sufficient  accuracy.  It  was  unneces- 
sary that  the  timing  of  the  photographs  should  be  so  exact 
as  to  ensure  one-foot  contours.  So  long  as  the  time  when  the 
photographs  were  taken  was  carefully  noted,  intermediate 
positions  could  be  calculated.  In  a  preliminary  survey,  to 
get  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  tide  curves  along  this  stretch  of 
coast,  a  submarine  was  sent  to  lie  on  the  bottom  off  Nieu- 
port for  twenty-four  hours  and  the  height  of  water  above 
her  hull  was  continuously  registered  from  readings  on  the 
depth  gauge. 


92    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS   [cam 

The  main  photographic  survey  of  the  beaches  was  made 
by  No.  2  Squadron  on  the  2nd  of  July  when,  from  11.25 
a.m.  to  5.36  p.m.,  batches  of  photographs  were  taken  at 
intervals  of  twenty  minutes.  So  that  the  attention  of  the 
enemy  should  not  be  unduly  attracted  to  the  vital  beaches, 
other  photographs  were  taken  east  of  Ostend.  From  the 
air  photographs,  charts  and  sections  of  the  beach  were 
compiled  by  a  scientific  officer  on  the  Vice-Admiral's  staff. 
To  check  the  accuracy  of  this  method  of  survey,  an  experi- 
ment was  tried.  Two  surveys  were  made  of  a  comparable 
section  of  beach  near  Dunkirk,  one  by  air  photography  and 
calculation,  the  other  by  direct  observations.  The  two 
independent  results  coincided  almost  exactly.  'It  was  a 
good  performance',  says  Admiral  Bacon,  'to  deduce  the 
'slope  of  the  beach  to  within  an  accuracy  of  six  inches  from 
'photographs  taken  14,000  feet  up  in  the  air.'1 

Naval  Air  Co-operation  in  the  Flanders  Offensive 

The  Flanders  offensive  brought  the  centre  of  activity  on 
the  Western  Front  adjacent  to  the  Dunkirk  air  base,  and  the 
naval  air  units  were  called  upon  to  give  a  helping  hand  to 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  mainly  in  the  direction  of  day  and 
night  bombing  and  of  fighting.  In  the  early  summer  of 
191 7,  before  the  British  offensive  opened,  the  enemy  air- 
men, intent  on  reconnoitring,  photographing,  or  bombing 
the  British  back  areas,  developed  a  habit  of  making  their 
approach  by  sea.  The  fighters  of  No.  4  (Naval)  Wing, 
therefore,  had  been  allotted  patrol  areas  off  the  coast  to  a 
point  north  of  Ostend. 

The  battles  of  Ypres  opened  on  the  31st  of  July,  a  few 
days  after  Vice- Admiral  Bacon  had  re-instituted  the  mine- 
barrage  off  the  Belgian  coast,  and  air  protection  for  the 
Fleet  now  became,  as  has  been  told,  the  first  consideration 
of  the  Dunkirk  fighting  squadrons.  This  was  purely  defen- 
sive work  which  absorbed  the  major  part  of  the  fighting 

1  The  Dover  Patrol,  igi^-igiy,  vol.  i,  p.  237.  An  example  of  the  clarity 
of  the  air  photographs  may  be  quoted.  On  prints  made  from  plates  exposed 
over  the  seaplane  base  at  Ostend  at  this  time,  from  a  height  of  17,000  feet, 
the  black  crosses  on  the  wings  of  a  seaplane  outside  the  sheds  are  clearly 
visible. 


i9i7]       PATROLS  BY  FIGHTING  AIRCRAFT    93 

strength.  The  offensive  patrols,  over  land,  had  to  be 
curtailed,  and,  although  the  seaward  patrols  could  still 
watch  for  enemy  formations  using  the  sea  approach  to  the 
Ypres  area,  interception  became  a  secondary  duty.1 

The  help  given  by  the  Dunkirk  fighters  in  the  land 
operations,  therefore,  was  confined  to  occasional  pre- 
arranged offensive  sweeps,  and  to  attacks  on  German 
artillery  aeroplanes  under  a  special  scheme.  This — known 
as  the  Wireless  Interception  Scheme2 — was  put  into  use 
along  the  front  of  the  Fourth  Army — which  had  relieved 
the  French  in  the  coastal  area — as  it  was  in  the  other 
British  Armies.  A  ground  station  had  been  set  up  in  the 
Fourth  Army  area  south-west  of  Nieuport,  to  signal  to 
patrolling  aircraft  particulars  of  enemy  aeroplanes  working 
along  the  front.  At  the  request  of  the  army  this  branch  of 
the  offensive  against  the  artillery  aeroplanes  was  under- 
taken by  the  squadrons  of  No.  4  (Naval)  Wing.3  The 
scheme  was  put  into  force  on  the  9th  of  August  when 
arrangements  were  made  for  one  Flight  from  each 
squadron  to  be  in  immediate  readiness  to  go  up  on  receipt 
of  a  message  from  the  Army  Station.  When  a  message 
came,  the  leader  flew  over  the  Station  to  learn  what  was 
the  latest  position  of  the  enemy  aircraft.  The  method  of 
conveying  this  information  was  simple  and  effective.  The 
area  opposite  the  Fourth  Army  front  was  divided  into 
three  numbered  sectors.  An  oblong  grid,  laid  out  near  the 
Wireless  Station,  was  divided  to  correspond  with  these,  and 
a  white  disk  sufficed  to  indicate  in  which  sector  the  enemy 
aeroplanes  were  working.  An  arrow  of  white  strips  gave 
further  indication  of  their  bearing  from  the  station,  and 
bars  on  either  side  of  the  arrow  told  of  their  height.  In 
August  and  September,  sixty  patrols  were  sent  out  in 
answer  to  messages  from  the  ground  signal  station,  and 

1  In  three  months  from  June  to  September  1917,  forty-six  offensive 
patrols  over  land  were  made  compared  with  289  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
the  barrage-line.  2  See  vol.  iii,  p.  319. 

3  At  this  period  Nos.  3,  4,  and  11  (Naval)  Squadrons.  At  the  end  of 
August  1 91 7  No.  II  (Naval)  Squadron  had  to  be  disbanded  because  of 
the  shortage  of  pilots.  No.  9  (Naval)  Squadron  rejoined  the  Dunkirk 
Command  from  service  with  the  R.F.C.,  at  the  end  of  September,  and 
Nos.  1  (Naval)  and  10  (Naval)  from  similar  service  in  November. 


94    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  m 

although,  as  a  result,  no  more  than  two  German  artillery 
aeroplanes  were  definitely  destroyed,  the  work  of  directing 
the  German  guns  from  the  air  was  appreciably  curtailed. 
Not  much  of  the  fighting  strength  of  the  Dunkirk  Naval 
Air  Service  units  could  be  diverted  to  help  the  Flanders 
offensive,1  but  something  like  the  maximum  strength  of 
the  bombing  squadrons  was  available.  The  view  at  the 
time  was  that  bombing  by  day,  when  the  raiding  aircraft 
were  seen  over  a  wide  area,  created  more  fear  than  night 
attacks  and  was  more  likely  to  induce  the  enemy  to  with- 
draw fighters  to  protect  his  vulnerable  back  areas.  It 
could  be  argued,  about  night  bombing,  that  it  was  not 
much  use  sending  up  fighting  aircraft  to  search  the  dark- 
ness for  the  raiders,  but  no  such  argument  could  be  used 
to  quieten  demands  which  would  arise  for  protection 
against  attacks  by  day.  The  main  object  of  day  bombing, 
therefore,  was  to  induce  the  enemy  to  divert  his  fighting 
strength  from  the  important  area  of  operations.2  Day 
attacks  had  to  be  made  from  great  heights  owing  to  the 
efficiency  of  the  German  anti-aircraft  gun-fire,  and,  there- 
fore, against  definite  small  targets  such  as  railway  junctions 
or  ammunition  dumps,  they  could  seldom  be  delivered 
with  an  accuracy  sufficient  to  make  them  of  direct  military 
value.  Although  its  effect  on  morale  might  be  less  power- 
ful, night  bombing  had  the  advantage  that  a  high  per- 
formance aeroplane  was  not  essential  (about  three  times 
the  weight  of  bombs  per  horse-power  was  carried  by  the 
night-bombers),  and  the  bombers,  less  subject  to  accurate 
gun-fire,  could  attack  from  low  heights.  There  were  the 
further  advantages  that  effective  targets  were  multiplied 
at  night,  because  air  observation  had  led  to  all  important 
troop  movements  being  made  in  the  hours  of  darkness,  and 

1  It  should,  however,  be  remembered  that  five  naval  fighter  squadrons 
from  the  Dunkirk  Command  were,  at  this  time,  attached  to  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  on  the  Western  Front. 

2  Cf.  the  immediate  effect  of  the  German  daylight  attacks  on  London 
on  the  13th  of  June  and  the  7th  of  July  1917.  Pending  the  formation  of 
three  special  day  fighting  squadrons,  first  No.  56  (S.E.5)  Squadron  (21st 
June)  and  then  No.  46  ('Pup')  Squadron  (loth  July)  were  temporarily  with- 
drawn from  France  to  England.  In  addition  No.  66  ('Pup')  Squadron  was 
sent  to  Calais  to  patrol  the  route  of  the  raiders.   See  pp.  134-5  and  152-5. 


1917]  BOMBING  OPERATIONS  95 

also  that  attacks  on  enemy  aerodromes  would  be  made 
when  the  aeroplanes  were  in  their  sheds. 

The  naval  bombing  squadrons  available  were  Nos.  5,  7, 
and  7a1  of  No.  5  (Naval)  Wing.  By  the  middle  of  August 
191 7,  the  Sopwiths  of  No.  5  Squadron  had  been  replaced 
by  D.H.4's.  At  this  time  Nos.  7  and  7a  Squadrons 
possessed  between  them  twenty  Handley  Pages.  Each 
night-bombing  Handley  Page  could  carry  an  aggregate 
weight  of  1,344  to  J?792  lb.  of  bombs,  and  its  two  engines 
consumed  about  fifty-four  gallons  of  petrol  per  hundred 
miles.  To  carry  a  similar  weight  of  bombs  six  day-bombing 
D.H.4's  were  necessary,  and  their  combined  petrol  con- 
sumption for  each  hundred  miles  was  120  gallons.  In  per- 
sonnel, the  D.H.4's  required  six  pilots  and  six  observers  as 
compared  withone  pilot  and  two  observers  in  a  Handley  Page. 

In  July,  when  the  final  preparations  for  the  Flanders 
campaign  were  being  made,  the  targets  for  the  naval  day- 
bombers  were,  in  the  main,  German  aerodromes.  These 
targets  were  chosen  to  help  the  Flying  Corps  offensive 
and,  apart  from  the  material  damage  caused,  the  in- 
creasing opposition  to  the  naval  air  attacks  made  it  clear 
that  some  of  the  German  fighting  strength  was  being 
diverted  for  aerodrome  defence.  Additional  escorts  for 
the  D.H.4's  were  provided  by  Bristol  Fighter  formations 
of  No.  48  Squadron  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  and,  so  long 
as  close  formation  was  maintained,  the  enemy  fighters 
were  not  unduly  aggressive,  preferring  to  await  the  op- 
portunity to  pounce  on  stragglers.  The  night  bombing, 
in  July,  was  chiefly  directed  against  the  railway  junctions 
and  sidings  at  Ghent,  Ostend,  Thourout,  &c,  and 
against  the  electricity  works  at  Bruges  and  Zeebrugge. 

When  the  battle  of  Ypres  opened,  at  the  end  of  July, 
the  weather  stopped  bombing,  and  not  much  could  be  done 
until  the  middle  of  August,  when  attacks  were  resumed  on 
the  railway  junctions  and  aerodromes.  In  addition  to  day 
and  night  bombing,  dawn  attacks  were  made  from  low 
heights  (50-100  feet)  on  aerodromes  and  troops  by 
Sopwith  'Camels'  of  No.  3  (Naval)  Squadron. 

1  No.  7a  was  formed  from  No.  7  in  July  191 7.  It  was  the  nucleus  of 
No.  14  (Naval)  Squadron,  formed  on  the  9th  of  December  1917. 


96    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  hi 

Two  examples  of  the  bombing  may  be  quoted.  In  the 
afternoon  of  the  16th  of  August  a  formation  of  nine 
D.H.4's,  with  an  escort  of  six  R.F.C.  Bristol  Fighters,  first 
dropped  three  65 -lb.,  one  50-lb.,  and  thirty  16-lb.  bombs, 
from  a  height  of  13,000  feet,  on  Sparappelhoek  aerodrome 
near  Thourout,  and  then  flew  on  to  Ghistelles  aerodrome, 
where  the  remainder  (nine  65-lb.,  two  50-lb.,  and  forty- 
eight  16-lb.)  were  dropped.  As  the  attack  was  made  from 
a  height,  many  bombs  of  small  weight  were  carried,  rather 
than  a  few  heavy  ones,  to  increase  the  chances  of  direct 
hits,  but,  as  has  been  told,  the  main  object  of  this  day 
bombing  was  to  induce  the  enemy  to  divert  fighting  air- 
craft to  defence. 

On  the  same  night — the  1 6th/ 17th  August — fourteen 
Handley  Pages  set  out  about  midnight  for  the  railway 
system  at  Thourout.  There  was  no  moon,  but  the  night 
was  clear  so  that  the  targets  were  defined  and  many  hits  on 
the  two  junctions  and  on  the  railway  lines  were  reported. 
Early  in  the  attack  an  ammunition  dump  was  set  on  fire, 
and  the  subsequent  explosions  were  heard  and  seen  from 
the  British  lines  throughout  the  night.  In  all,  189  bombs, 
of  a  total  weight  of  over  nine  tons,  were  dropped  by  the 
Handley  Pages  on  the  Thourout  railways. 

By  the  end  of  August  the  enemy  air  opposition  to  the 
day  bombing  had  stiffened,  and,  on  the  3rd  of  September, 
so  effective  was  it  that  an  attempted  attack  on  Varssenaere 
aerodrome  was  frustrated.  Groups  of  fighters  repeatedly 
dived  on  the  eight  D.H.4  bombers  and  on  the  Bristol 
Fighter  escorts  and  succeeded  in  scattering  the  British 
formations.  Two  enemy  fighters  were  destroyed,  but  all 
the  British  pilots  made  a  safe  return. 

To  counter  this  opposition  offensive  sweeps  were  tried. 
The  opportunity  came  in  conjunction  with  air  attacks  on 
the  dockyard  at  Bruges,  on  which  the  bombing,  day  and 
night,  was  temporarily  concentrated  during  a  lull  in  the 
military  operations  in  Flanders.  This  dockyard  bombing 
was  made  in  co-operation  with  the  abortive  bombardment 
of  Ostend  on  the  4th  of  September.1  Between  the  2nd 
and  the  5th  of  September  eighteen  tons  of  bombs  were 

1  Seep.  89. 


1917]        GERMAN  AERODROMES  BOMBED        97 

dropped  on  the  Bruges  docks.  The  offensive  sweeps, 
notably  on  the  4th,  when  the  bombardment  was  made, 
failed  to  bring  the  enemy  fighters  to  combat. 

It  was  seen,  however,  that  when  fire  was  opened  by  the 
monitor,  the  enemy  torpedo  craft  steamed  out  of  harbour 
and  anchored  off  shore.  It  was  therefore  decided  that 
when  the  next  bombardment  was  made  D.H.4  bombers 
should  be  in  the  air  ready  to  attack  the  German  vessels. 
On  the  afternoon  of  September  the  15th,  when  the  Terror 
and  Erebus  fired  on  Ostend,  eleven  D.H.4' s  were  in  the  air. 
When  the  shipping  began  to  move  and  concentrate,  the 
leading  pilot  gave  the  signal  to  attack,  and  nineteen  65-lb., 
two  50-lb.,  and  eighty-four  16-lb.  bombs  were  aimed  at 
the  ships.  Two  hits  were  made,  one  on  an  armed  trawler 
and  the  other,  with  a  65-lb.  bomb,  on  a  destroyer. 

Following  this  temporary  bombing  diversion  to  objec- 
tives of  purely  naval  interest,  attacks  on  military  targets 
were  resumed  in  conjunction  with  the  battle  of  the  Menin 
Road  Ridge.  Night  flying  was  impossible  during  the 
I9th/20th  of  September  (the  allotted  objective  was 
Thourout),  but  in  the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  D.H.4' s  of 
No.  5  Naval  Squadron,  escorted  by  Bristol  Fighters  of 
No.  48,  attacked  the  aerodromes  at  Aertrycke  and  Sparap- 
pelhoek.  In  the  early  hours  of  September  the  21st,  five 
tons  of  bombs  were  dropped  from  eight  Handley  Pages  on 
the  junctions  at  Thourout,  and,  later  in  the  morning, 
eleven  D.H.4's  repeated  an  attack  of  the  previous  day  on 
the  two  German  aerodromes  north-east  of  Thourout. 
Fifteen  German  fighters,  waiting  for  the  D.H.4's,  with- 
held their  attacks  until  the  bombers  had  broken  formation 
over  their  targets.  They  then  dived  and  succeeded  in  pre- 
venting the  bombers  from  re-forming.  In  a  series  of  in- 
dividual combats  on  the  homeward  journey  a  D.H.4  pilot 
was  wounded  and  one  of  the  escorting  Bristol  Fighters  was 
shot  down.  During  the  night  of  the  2ist/22nd  of  Septem- 
ber nine  Handley  Pages  dropped  six  tons  of  bombs  on  the 
junctions  at  Thourout  and  Cortemarck,  and  caused  ex- 
tensive fires  in  the  station  buildings  of  the  latter  town. 

For  the  next  daylight  attack — made  on  Varssenaere 
aerodrome  on  the  24th — the  bombers  were  given  an  escort 

2504.4  w 


98    DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS     [ch.  m 

of  eight  naval  'Camels'.  The  visibility  was  exceptional  and 
many  direct  hits,  from  among  the  nineteen  65 -lb.  and 
eighty-four  16-lb.  bombs,  were  reported.  The  escorting 
'Camels'  and  the  bombers  had  to  fight  continuously,  but 
there  were  no  decisive  combats.  On  the  25th  the  target 
was  Sparappelhoek  aerodrome  and  the  fighting  escort  was 
further  strengthened.  Six  R.F.C.  Bristol  Fighters  ac- 
companied the  D.H.4's  and  ten  naval  'Camels'  made  an 
offensive  sweep  along  the  route.  The  British  formations 
were  closely  maintained  and  the  numerous  enemy  pilots 
kept  at  a  distance.  That  same  night,  under  adverse  condi- 
tions of  weather,  nine  and  a  half  tons  of  bombs  were 
dropped  by  the  Handley  Pages  on  the  Thourout-Corte- 
marck-Lichtervelde  railway  triangle.  After  this  attack, 
naval  bombing  was  concentrated  against  the  aerodromes 
from  which  German  squadrons  were  known  to  be  develop- 
ing their  new  night-bombing  campaign  against  England. 

The  German  Bombing  Squadrons. 

The  bombing  attacks  which  began  by  daylight  in  May 
191 7  on  the  south-eastern  counties  of  England,  and 
reached  London  in  June  and  July,  were  made  by  the 
German  No.  3  Bombing  Squadron.  This  squadron  had 
been  formed  in  March  191 7  with  four  Flights,  each  of 
six  twin-engined  Gotha  aeroplanes.  Two  Flights  were 
stationed  at  the  airship  base  at  Gontrode  and  two  at 
St.  Denis  Westrem.  The  squadron  was  at  full  strength — 
six  Flights — by  July. 

After  the  June  raid  on  London,  when  the  casualties 
were  162  killed  and  432  wounded,  the  Dunkirk  air  units 
were  given  the  task — additional  to  their  usual  duties — of 
intercepting  the  German  bombing  formations  on  their 
homeward  flights  from  England.  When  Harwich  and 
Felixstowe  were  under  attack  on  the  4th  of  July,  Dunkirk 
was  informed  and  fighters  were  sent  up.  One  Flight  of  five 
'Camels'  met  and  fought  the  raiders  north-west  of  Ostend, 
but  the  combats  were  apparently  indecisive.  Fighting 
formations  were  sent  up  from  Dunkirk  on  the  7th  of  July, 
when  it  became  known  that  London  was  again  being 
attacked,  and  also  on  the  22nd,  when  news  was  received  that 


1917]      GERMAN  BOMBING  SQUADRONS  99 

the  bombers  were  over  Harwich,  but  on  neither  occasion 
were  the  enemy  aeroplanes  found.  The  threat  of  the 
Dunkirk  fighters  led  to  escorts  being  provided  to  meet  the 
German  bombing  formations  on  their  homeward  journeys. 

There  was  comparative  quiet  in  August,  but  in  Sep- 
tember a  new  series  of  night  attacks  on  England  was  begun, 
culminating  in  a  week  of  intensive  effort  at  the  end  of  the 
month.  As  a  counter-measure  the  bombing  of  the  St. 
Denis  Westrem  and  Gontrode  aerodromes,  by  Dunkirk 
and  by  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons,  was  ordered.  On 
St.  Denis  Westrem,  between  the  27th  of  September  and 
the  1st  of  October,  eight  tons  of  bombs  were  dropped  by 
Dunkirk  squadrons.  On  the  night  of  the  30th  a  shed  on 
the  aerodrome  was  fired  by  a  direct  hit,  and  was  gutted. 
Following  these  attacks,  two  Flights  of  the  German 
bombing  squadron  were  transferred  from  St.  Denis 
Westrem  to  Mariakerke,  west  of  Ghent,  and  two  others 
from  Gontrode  to  Oostacker,  north  of  Ghent. 

The  total  of  bombs  dropped  by  the  Dunkirk  squadrons 
(available,  eighteen  D.H.4's  and  sixteen  Handley  Pages)  in 
September  weighed  over  eighty-seven  tons. 

There  was  retaliation  against  Dunkirk.  The  first  attack 
began  about  8  p.m.  on  the  24th  of  September  on  the  Naval 
Air  Service  depot  at  St.  Pol.  Aided  by  a  parachute  flare, 
which  burned  for  several  minutes,  the  German  pilots  got 
many  hits.  The  pump-house,  which  supplied  the  water 
for  the  fire  mains,  was  put  out  of  action  and  no  hose 
could  be  used  when  the  engine  repair-shed  was  set  on  fire 
by  an  incendiary  bomb.  About  a  thousand  men  were 
organized  to  save  material  from  the  adjacent  buildings,  but 
in  spite  of  their  work,  great  damage  was  caused.  The 
engine  repair-shop,  saw-mill,  machine-shop,  spare  engine- 
shop,  engine  packing-shed,  and  the  drawing  and  records 
offices  were  destroyed.  In  the  engine  packing-shed  one 
hundred  and  forty  engines  were  lost.1  The  raids  on  the 
depot  were  repeated  each  night  for  a  week  and  ended  with 
a  severe  attack  on  the  1st  of  October.  Between  9.30  p.m. 

1  83  (130  h.p.)  Clerget;  10  (no  h.p.)  Clerget;  37  (80  h.p.)  Le  Rhone; 
5  (150 h.p.)  B.R.i;  1  (200 h.p.)  B.H.P.;  1  (90 h.p.)  Rolls-Royce;  1  (250 h.p.) 
Rolls-Royce;  and  2  (275  h.p.)  Rolls-Royce. 


ioo  DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  hi 

on  this  evening  and  2  a.m.  on  the  2nd,  about  one  hundred 
bombs  were  dropped.  It  is  now  known  that  the  attack  on 
this  night  was  made  by  twenty-two  Gothas  and  by  two 
smaller-type  bombers,  all  belonging  to  No.  1  Bombenge- 
schzvader,  and  that  the  weight  of  bombs  dropped  was 
approximately  ten  tons.1  A  direct  hit  on  the  aircraft  erect- 
ing shop  started  a  fire  which  consumed  twenty-three  aero- 
planes (three  D.H.4's,  ten  'Camels',  eight  Triplanes,  and 
two  Sopwith  two-seaters),  eighteen  sets  of  instruments, 
and  three  engines.  Once  again,  luck  was  with  the  attackers : 
the  water-mains  were  buried  five  feet  below  ground,  but  a 
chance  hit  put  them  out  of  action  and  there  was  no  water 
to  fight  the  fire.  Three  other  sheds  were  set  on  fire,  and 
gutted,  as  was  a  Bessonneau  hangar  erected  on  the  site  of 
the  engine  repair-shed  which  had  been  destroyed  in  the 
raid  a  week  earlier.  In  these  sheds  six  engines  were  lost. 
Elsewhere  thirty  aeroplanes  suffered  minor  damage. 

The  German  airmen  had  concentrated  on  one  important 
target  and,  with  luck  on  their  side,  had  done  their  work 
thoroughly.  All  departments  of  the  depot  went  out  of 
action  and  repair  work  came  to  a  standstill.  It  was  im- 
possible, for  some  time,  to  make  good  the  losses  in  engines, 
and  the  efficiency  of  the  naval  squadrons  in  France,  in- 
cluding those  attached  to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  was 
temporarily  impaired. 

The  supply  and  repair  system  had  to  be  reorganized. 
The  enemy  had  left  no  doubt  about  the  weakness  of 
concentrating  supply  and  repair  activities  in  one  large 
works  within  range  of  bombing  aircraft.  The  sections 
of  the  depot  were  therefore  decentralized.  Work  was 
begun  on  the  construction  of  a  new  aeroplane  supply 
depot  at  Guines,  near  Calais,  under  the  energetic  direction 
of  Lieutenant-Commander  Warwick  Wright,  R.N.V.R., 
and,  meanwhile,  an  acceptance  park  for  new  aeroplanes 
and  for  the  repair  of  damaged  aircraft,  was  established  at 
Dover.   An  engine  repair-shop  and  depot  was  temporarily 

1  During  the  week  September  the  27th  to  October  the  3rd,  the  two 
German  bombing  squadrons  stationed  in  Flanders,  Nos.  I  and  3,  dropped 
a  total  of  123  tons  of  bombs,  by  night,  on  Dunkirk,  Calais,  St.  Omer,  and 
Poperinghe. 


i9i7]     BOMBING  ATTACKS  ON  DUNKIRK      101 

set  up  at  the  frontier  aerodrome  of  Bray  Dunes,  and  small 
workshops,  for  aeroplane  repairs,  were  taken  over  at  Malo 
les  Bains  and  Rosendael,  near  Dunkirk.  Spare  aeroplanes, 
and  men  skilled  in  major  repair  and  construction  work, 
were  distributed  from  the  depot  among  the  active 
squadrons. 

While  the  German  bombers  were  making  their  intensive 
effort  to  wipe  out  the  naval  aircraft  depot,  the  Handley 
Pages  were  concentrating  on  a  more  difficult  target.  Night 
bombing  attacks,  at  maximum  strength,  had  been  ordered 
by  Vice- Admiral  Bacon  with  the  object  of  destroying  the 
lock  gates  at  Zeebrugge.  On  the  27th  of  September  and 
during  the  four  nights  from  the  29th  to  the  2nd  of  October, 
two  hundred  and  twenty  bombs  of  65 -lb.,  112-lb.,  or 
250-lb.  weight,  (i2|  tons)  were  aimed  at  the  lock  gates, 
but  the  gates  escaped  destruction,  although  several  of  the 
bombs  fell  near  enough  to  damage  them. 

One  of  the  results  of  the  September  night  raids  on 
London  was  a  Government  decision  for  counter-attacks 
against  military  objectives  in  Germany.  Arising  out  of 
this  decision,  a  bombing  wing  was  established  in  the  Ochey 
area  and  formed  the  nucleus  of  the  command  which  later 
became  the  Independent  Force.  A  secondary  result  was 
the  allotment  of  objectives  in  the  Cologne  neighbourhood 
to  the  Dunkirk  Handley  Pages.  An  attempt  was  made  on 
the  evening  of  the  28th  of  October  when  nine  Handley's 
set  out  to  bomb  the  station  and  military  barracks  at 
Cologne.  East  of  Brussels,  the  weather  conditions  became 
unfavourable  and  six  of  the  pilots  turned  to  Antwerp  and 
dropped  their  bombs  on  the  Cockerill  Works  at  Hoboken, 
and  on  the  railways  and  docks.  Two  others  attacked 
Bruges  docks  and  trains  south-west  of  Ghent.  The  re- 
maining pilot  (Flight  Lieutenant  R.  G.  Gardner)  persisted 
towards  his  objective,  but,  hampered  by  rain,  eventually 
dropped  his  twelve  112-lb.  bombs  on  a  lighted  factory  east 
of  Duren.  This  pilot,  on  the  return  journey,  had  to  fly 
'blind'  through  the  clouds  for  2f  hours,  but  he  made  a 
good  landing  on  the  small,  unlighted  aerodrome  of  a 
Flying  Corps  squadron  after  being  in  the  air  seven  and  a 
half  hours. 


102  DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  hi 

Down  to  the  end  of  the  year,  the  weather  was  too  bad 
for  anything  more  than  sporadic  short-distance  bombing. 
Opportunity  was  taken  during  this  period  of  restricted 
activity  to  give  the  Dunkirk  fighting  squadrons  a  rest  in 
England:  they  were  sent,  two  at  a  time,  to  Dover  or 
Walmer.  There  was  also,  in  this  winter  period,  some 
reorganization.  The  seaplane  unit  was  disbanded  and  its 
duties  of  anti-submarine  patrol  were  taken  over  by  No.  17 
(D.H.4)  Squadron,  newly  formed  for  this  work.  The 
former  fighting  squadrons — Nos.  6  and  11 — which  had 
been  broken  up  in  the  summer  of  191 7  owing  to  a  shortage 
of  pilots,  were  revived  as  D.H.4  day-bombing  squadrons. 
No.  6  was  equipped  at  Dover  and  crossed  to  Petite 
Synthe  in  January  191 8:  No.  11  began  to  form  in  March 
1918. 

Frequent  reference  has  been  made  to  the  reconnaissance 
and  photographic  work  of  the  Dunkirk  air  squadrons,  but 
it  has,  perhaps,  not  been  made  clear  how  continuous  and 
how  important  that  work  was.  The  information  revealed 
by  the  air  photographs,  and  brought  back  by  the  pilots  and 
observers,  was  sifted  and  co-ordinated  in  the  naval  air 
intelligence  section  at  Dunkirk,  under  the  direction  of 
Lieutenant-Commander  O.  G.  G.  Villiers.  It  provided 
material  for  a  treatise,  with  maps  and  illustrations,  of  the 
whole  range  of  intricate  German  defence  systems  from 
Nieuport  to  the  Dutch  frontier,  with  the  detailed  charac- 
teristics of  the  coast  and  inland  batteries,  the  general 
topography,  and  much  miscellaneous  information  about 
such  matters  of  military  importance  as  the  slopes  of  the 
beaches,  locations  and  heights  of  sea  walls,  &c.  This 
material,  amended  in  minor  details  in  the  Intelligence 
Department  of  the  Naval  Staff  at  the  Admiralty,  was 
printed  for  the  guidance  of  all  those  concerned  with  the 
dispositions  of  the  enemy  in  the  Belgian  coast  sector, 
and  the  book  formed  the  basis  for  many  of  the  activities 
of  the  Dover  Patrol  and  of  all  the  actions  directed  against 
the  enemy  in  the  Belgian  coastal  area.  Three  times  during 
the  war,  in  April  1916,  March  191 7,  and  May  191 8,  the 
book  was  printed,  and  in  the  intervals  between  publication 


1916-18]    WAR  DEVELOPMENT  OF  BRUGES      103 

its  matter  was  kept  up-to-date  by  the  constant  air  work 
of  the  Dunkirk  Command. 

A  review  of  the  general  activities  of  the  Dunkirk  air 
units  throughout  1917  and  early  1918  reveals  many 
features  of  interest  to  the  student.  The  naval  squadrons 
were  operating  on  the  flank  of  the  armies,  which  were 
engaged  in  a  critical  struggle.  It  was  natural  that  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  should  look  to  Dunkirk  for  all  the  help  he 
could  get  in  furtherance  of  his  land  operations.  The 
Dunkirk  air  squadrons  had  certain  work  to  do  in  co-opera- 
tion with  the  naval  forces  against  the  Belgian  coast,  but 
when  the  essentials  had  been  provided  for,  there  remained, 
from  time  to  time,  surplus  pilots  and  aeroplanes,  and  it 
is  not  unfair  to  conclude  that  the  conviction  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief was  that  this  surplus  energy  should  be 
directed  against  military  objectives  to  strengthen  his  air 
offensive  against  the  enemy. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  were  in  Belgium  bases  of  great, 
even  vital,  naval  interest.  One  of  these,  Bruges,  the  most 
important,  could  be  attacked  only  from  the  air.  Let  us 
consider  the  development  of  this  base.  On  the  outbreak  of 
war,  Bruges,  as  a  maritime  port,  was  still  young,  but  its 
possibilities  were  enormous  and,  soon  after  the  occupation, 
the  Germans  began  the  enlargement  of  the  port  for  war 
purposes.  In  191 5  three  submarine  shelters  were  built, 
floating  docks  constructed,  and  great  stores  of  mines  and 
ammunition  were  collected  and  housed  in  the  dock  ware- 
houses and  in  specially  built  sheds.  Towards  the  end  of 
1916  the  Germans  decided  to  make  Bruges  an  Imperial 
Dockyard  with  Ostend  and  Antwerp  as  dependent,  subsi- 
diary bases.  Under  this  scheme  the  large  pre-war  ware- 
houses at  Bruges  were  turned  into  dockyard  workshops, 
and  other  accommodation  had  to  be  found  for  the  stores 
of  explosive  material.  191 7  was,  therefore,  a  year  of 
widespread  activity,  during  which  the  whole  face  of  the 
harbour  was  changed. 

In  the  winter  of  1916-17,  bombing  by  naval  aircraft 
began  to  be  effective,  and  as  the  year  191 7  progressed  and 
the  weight  and  number  of  the  bombs  grew,  we  find  the 
Germans    continually    modifying    their    building   plans. 


104  DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  hi 

Sheds  and  shelters  of  a  standard  type  of  brick  and  ferro- 
concrete, designed  as  bomb-proof,  became  out-of-date 
almost  before  they  were  built,  owing  to  the  increasing 
effectiveness  of  the  heavy-weight,  delay-action  bombs. 
More  ferro-concrete  was  used  until,  by  the  end  of  191 7, 
structures  wholly  composed  of  this  material  were  being 
built.  Thus  the  duel,  in  naval  warfare,  between  armour 
and  shell,  may  be  said  to  have  had  its  counterpart  in 
this  race  between  ferro-concrete  and  the  bomb.  By  the 
spring  of  1 91 8  the  Germans  had  decreed  a  standard  thick- 
ness of  two  metres  for  the  roof  and  one  metre  for  the 
walls  of  protected  buildings. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  set  out  in  detail  the  vast  amount  of 
construction  which  took  place  in  191 7.  One  example  will 
suffice  to  illustrate  the  influence  of  the  bomb.  In  August 
191 7  the  first  pile-driving  operations  began  in  the  North 
Darse,  at  Bruges,  for  a  group  of  ferro-concrete  submarine 
shelters.  The  design  was,  in  effect,  a  roofing  over,  with 
bomb-proof  covering,  of  a  large  stretch  of  the  basin,  the 
rows  of  columns  on  which  the  roof  rested  forming  separate 
bays  in  which  the  submarines  could  lie.  Eleven  or  twelve 
bays  were  designed  and  nine  had  been  completed  when  the 
war  ended.  Rammed-in  wooden  piles  formed  the  founda- 
tions; upon  these  rested  horizontal  ferro-concrete  beams 
supporting  the  long  lines  of  ferro-concrete  columns  bearing 
in  their  turn  horizontal  beams.  The  roof,  which  was  two 
metres  in  thickness,  was  not  solid  ferro-concrete  and  did 
not,  therefore,  conform  with  the  latest  German  design. 
On  o-8o  metre  ferro-concrete  beams,  laid  transversely  and 
touching  one  another,  was  a  layer  of  ferro-concrete,  o-6o 
metre  thick  and  doubly  re-inforced.  Then  came  an 
'elastic  stratum'  of  0*30  metre  of  gravel,  with  another 
layer  of  0*30  metre  of  doubly  re-inforced  concrete  to  serve 
as  a  detonating  platform.  No  roof  of  this  construction,  nor 
one  of  the  same  thickness  of  solid  ferro-concrete,  was  hit 
by  a  bomb  during  the  war.  A  few  bombs  of  1,600  lb. 
weight  were  dropped  from  August  191 8  onwards  by 
British  aircraft,  but  whether  the  German  buildings  could 
have  stood  up  to  this  bomb  is  a  matter  for  conjecture.  The 
chances  are  they  could  not,  and  a  prolongation  of  the  war, 


1917-18]  SUBMARINE  SHELTERS  105 

which  would  have  brought  great  expansion  in  the  produc- 
tion of  these  heavy-weight  bombs  and  of  aircraft  capable 
of  carrying  them,  may  have  made  obsolete  the  elaborate 
structures  on  which  rested  the  efficiency  of  Bruges  as  a  war 
maritime  base. 

Two  officers,  Majors  Erskine  Childers  and  E.  N.  G. 
Morris,  who  visited  Belgium  after  the  war  to  report  on  the 
effect  of  aircraft  bombing,  and  on  German  defensive 
measures  against  it,  were  impressed  with  the  simple 
dignity  of  the  ferro-concrete  shelters  in  the  North  Darse. 
The  charm  for  us',  they  said,  'was  partly  due  perhaps  to 
the  silence  and  solitude  of  the  scene — the  stupendous 
fabric  of  concrete  stretching  out  echelon  after  echelon 
into  a  deserted  basin,  its  vistas  of  graceful  columns  dimly 
recalling  the  submerged  ruins  of  the  temples  and  palaces 
of  Luxor,  or  the  mythical  stories,  immortalized  by 
Turner's  brush,  of  the  building  of  Dido's  Carthage.  But, 
aside  from  such  fancies,  the  building  has  real  architectural 
merit.  The  proportions  are  good;  the  roof-cornices  are 
ably  handled,  and  the  brickwork  for  the  back  and  sides, 
which  were  meant  only  to  be  proof  against  flying  splinters 
of  bombs,  is  skilfully  employed  in  conjunction  with  the 
concrete  to  produce  an  effect  of  dignity  and  strength. 
Stripped  of  its  grim  associations  with  one  of  the  most 
formidable  forms  of  warfare  ever  devised,  we  may  hope 
that  some  useful  economic  purpose  will  be  found  for 
this,  the  strangest  of  all  the  strange  crop  of  edifices  which, 
like  armed  men,  germinating  from  the  dragon's  teeth, 
were  engendered  in  such  numbers  and  variety  by  the 
bomb.' 

Such  in  brief  was  the  growth  of  Bruges  from  which, 
towards  the  end  of  the  war,  thirty  destroyers  and  thirty- 
five  submarines  operated.  Construction  work  of  a  similar 
kind,  although  less  extensive,  went  on  at  Zeebrugge  and 
Ostend.  The  electric  power  for  the  dockyards  was 
supplied  by  the  affiliated  generating  stations  at  Slyken 
(Ostend),  at  the  Solway  works  (Zeebrugge),  and  at  La 
Brugeoise  works  (Bruges).  The  three  ports  offered  targets 
of  purely  naval  interest,  and  of  an  importance  which  the 


io6  DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS    [ch.  hi 

reader  may  judge,  against  which  the  whole  of  the  energy 
of  the  Dunkirk  bombing  squadrons  might  justifiably  have 
been  concentrated. 

The  bombing  throughout  191 7  was,  however,  divided 
between  naval  and  military  objectives,  with  minor  attacks 
on  the  German  Gotha  aerodromes.  In  the  ten  months 
during  which  bombing  operations  were  made  (there  were 
no  attacks  in  January  and  March  191 7),  344  tons  of  bombs 
were  dropped  by  the  Dunkirk  squadrons.  Of  this  total 
weight  80  tons  were  dropped  on  Bruges  docks  and  the 
adjacent  La  Brugeoise  works,  30  tons  on  Zeebrugge,  and 
10  tons  on  Ostend.  Against  the  railway  system,  mainly  in 
the  Thourout  area,  a  military  target,  88J  tons  were  aimed, 
while  114  tons  were  dropped  on  aerodromes  in  the  coastal 
region,  which  again  may  be  classified  as  targets  chiefly  of 
military  importance. 

That  the  bombing  caused  considerable  minor  damage 
there  is  no  doubt — how  much  it  is  difficult  to  say  because 
the  Germans  immediately  set  to  work  to  repair  or  re-build 
the  structures  which  received  hits — and  the  magnitude 
of  the  defensive  measures,  which  made  great  demands  on 
material  and  labour,  is  a  sufficient  tribute  to  those  who 
organized  and  executed  the  attacks.  But  no  damage  of 
definite  strategical  importance  was  inflicted,  and  the 
question  arises  whether  the  policy  which  directed  the 
bombing  was  sound.  The  striking  force  was  comparatively 
small.  The  dissipation  of  that  force  over  a  number  of 
objectives  of  diverse  military  and  naval  interest  militated 
against  definite  material  results.  When  the  German  pilots 
bombed  the  aircraft  depot  at  St.  Pol,  they  kept  up  their 
attacks  until  the  depot  was  destroyed,  and  although  it 
must  be  admitted  that  luck  was  on  their  side  and  that  the 
target  was  exceptional,  they  achieved  their  object  because 
they  persisted. 

The  moral  effect  was  no  doubt  enhanced  by  the  diffuse 
nature  of  the  bombing  by  the  Dunkirk  squadrons,  but  had 
less  been  attempted,  had  the  striking  force  been  con- 
centrated on  one  important  target  at  a  time  until  a  definite 
result  was  achieved,  the  material  effects  must  have  been 
greater.  Bruges  throughout  the  year  was  a  hive  of  industry. 


1917]   DUNKIRK  AIR  WORK  SUMMARIZED     107 

Most  of  the  naval  repair  and  building  construction  work 
was  done  during  the  day.  Continuous  day-bombing,  to 
send  the  workmen  into  their  shelters  and  to  sap  their 
morale,  and  continuous  night-bombing  aimed  at  the  de- 
struction of  their  handiwork,  might  have  made  the  base 
untenable,  and  must,  at  least,  have  slowed  down  the  de- 
velopment of  the  port  and  have  impaired  its  efficiency.  It 
is  fairly  certain  that  the  enemy  would  have  assembled 
strong  fighting  air  units  to  counter  the  threat  of  concen- 
trated bombing.  If  this  had  been  done  one  object — the 
drawing  away  of  fighters  from  the  main  front — would  have 
been  achieved.  The  bombing  could  then  have  been 
diverted  to  a  second  important  target,  say  Zeebrugge,  or 
the  Gotha  aerodromes.  To  sum  up,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  Dunkirk  air  command  was  called  upon  to  do  too  much 
by  too  many  people.  There  was  all  the  diverse  work, 
of  purely  naval  interest,  required  by  the  Vice-Admiral 
commanding  the  Dover  Patrol,  and  there  were  the  de- 
mands in  connexion  with  the  various  military  offensives  in 
Flanders.  The  fortifications  along  the  Belgian  coast  had 
to  be  continuously  reconnoitred  and  photographed  to  a 
depth  of  about  four  miles.  Dunkirk  was  a  port  of  great 
naval  and  military  activities  and  the  Dunkirk  air  squadrons 
had  to  be  ready  to  repel  air  attacks  by  day  or  night.  The 
shelling  of  Dunkirk  by  long-range  German  guns  was  very 
much  the  concern  of  the  naval  airmen.  They  were  even 
charged  with  the  duty  of  catching  and  destroying  Zeppe- 
lins or  aeroplanes  which  passed  over  Belgium  to  raid 
English  cities.  This  diversity,  while  it  multiplied  the  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  Dunkirk  air  personnel,  certainly  made 
their  work  peculiarly  interesting,  but  it  also  made  a  con- 
certed policy  for  the  employment  of  the  Naval  Air  Service 
squadrons  almost  impossible.  There  were  too  many  dis- 
tractions and  too  many  changes  of  objective.  It  seems  a 
not  unfair  criticism  to  say  that  the  duties  of  the  naval  air 
units  at  Dunkirk  should  have  been  confined  to  what  was 
required  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  Vice-Admiral  of 
the  Dover  Patrol,  that  is,  should  have  been  purely  of  naval 
interest,  and  that  all  work  of  military  interest  should  have 
been  the  task  of  military  squadrons   under   the  direct 


108  DUNKIRK  NAVAL  AIR  OPERATIONS   [ch.  in 

control  of  the  army.  Such  a  division  of  duties,  more  or  less 
well  defined  by  agreement  between  the  naval  and  military 
authorities,  would  have  made  it  possible  to  formulate  a 
real  policy.  Moreover,  it  would  have  ensured  that  any 
naval  fighting  or  bombing  squadrons,  not  required  for 
purely  naval  work,  would  have  been  made  available  to 
the  British  Commander-in-Chief  in  France  for  employ- 
ment, at  his  discretion,  in  accordance  with  the  changing 
military  situation. 

It  is  of  historical  interest  that  flights  in  British  aero- 
planes were  made  over  the  trenches,  and  beyond  into 
Belgium,  by  the  King  of  the  Belgians.  When  the  King 
came  down  from  his  first  flight,  made  over  Nieuport  and 
Dixmude  under  anti-aircraft  gun-fire  in  a  Belgian  aero- 
plane in  March  1917,  he  spoke  of  the  value  of  such  flights 
to  staff  officers  and  to  commanding  officers  because  of  the 
clear  and  comprehensive  idea  to  be  obtained  of  the  field  of 
operations.  King  Albert  made  many  subsequent  flights  in 
Belgian  and  in  British  aeroplanes.  Twice  in  191 7  he  took 
the  observer's  seat  in  a  Bristol  Fighter  of  No.  48  Squadron, 
Royal  Flying  Corps,  and,  during  one  of  these  flights,  re- 
connoitred Ostend.  The  Queen  of  the  Belgians  caught 
and  shared  the  King's  interest  in  the  air.  Her  Majesty 
accompanied  King  Albert  in  a  Royal  Naval  Air  Service 
Handley  Page  in  a  flight  over  Coudekerque  in  June  191 7, 
and  flew  with  him  to  Folkestone  on  the  5th  of  July  191 8 
en  route  for  London  to  join  King  George  and  Queen  Mary 
for  the  celebration  of  their  silver  wedding.  Unlike  King 
Albert,  who  flew  as  a  soldier,  Queen  Elizabeth  had  to  wait 
until  the  day  of  the  armistice  before  making  a  flight  over 

the  area  of  the  trenches.1 

1 
1  In  recognition  of  his  flights  over  the  lines  in  British  aeroplanes  during 
the  war,  the  Distinguished  Flying  Cross  was  conferred  on  His  Majesty  the 
King  of  the  Belgians. 


7^^ 


BATTLE    of  MESSINES 

yth  JUNE,  1917. 
DISPOSITION     OF   R.F.C.  CORPS    SQUADRONS 


APPROXIMATE     BRITISH    LINE      6thJUNE,  1917. 
n  »»  »        IS<iJUNE,  1917. 

PRINCIPAL     GERMAN     TRENCH    LINES 


SCALE  OF  YARDS 

1000  2000  3000  4000 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES 
yth-i4th  of  June  igiy 

[Maps  facing,  and  p.  212] 

After  the  failure  of  the  Nivelle  spring  offensive  on  the 
Aisne,  it  was  decided,  in  principle,  at  a  conference  of  Allied 
statesmen  and  service  representatives  held  in  Paris  on  the 
4th  and  5th  of  May  191 7,  to  transfer  the  main  Allied  effort 
to  the  British  front  in  Flanders  in  accordance  with  plans 
which  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  elaborated  some  months 
before.1  The  object  of  this  offensive  was  to  clear  the 
enemy  from  the  Belgian  coast,  particularly  from  his 
U-boat  bases,  and  to  turn  the  flank  of  the  German 
western  defence  system.  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  however, 
could  not  direct  his  operations  solely  according  to  the 
strategic  possibilities.  The  reverse  on  the  Aisne  had 
shaken  the  morale  of  the  French  armies.  General 
Nivelle  had  been  dismissed,  and  General  Petain  ap- 
pointed Commander-in-Chief,  but  such  operations  as 
the  French  command  was  able  to  plan  throughout  the 
remainder  of  the  year  1917  were  of  strictly  limited  scope. 
While  the  confidence  of  the  French  troops  was  being  re- 
stored, the  British  in  Flanders  had  to  shoulder  the  burden 
of  the  western  offensive,  and  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  always 
to  be  mindful  of  the  possible  effect  on  the  French  armies 
of  any  slackening  of  the  British  effort.  In  the  course  of 
the  operations,  also,  he  was  warned  by  high  naval  authorities 
that  if  the  enemy  was  not  cleared  from  the  Belgian  coast 
the  Fleet  might  not  be  able  to  hold  the  Channel  and,  as  a 
consequence,  it  might  not  be  possible  to  continue  the  war 
in  1918. 

As  a  preliminary  to  the  main  offensive  it  was  judged 
essential  to  capture  the  group  of  hills  forming  the  Messines- 
Wytschaete  ridge,  and  so  rob  the  enemy  of  direct  observa- 
tion over  much  of  the  countryside  in  which  the  prepara- 
tions   for   the    campaign   would    be  completed.     From 

1  The  British  Government  did  not,  in  fact,  finally  approve  Sir  Douglas 
Haig's  plans  for  the  main  Flanders  offensive  until  the  20th  of  July. 


no  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

the  ruins  of  Wytschaete  in  the  north,  260  feet  above  sea 
level  on  the  highest  point  of  the  ridge,  Ypres  and  the 
British  trenches  to  the  east  of  the  town  could  be  watched, 
while  from  Messines,  at  the  southern  end,  the  positions  on 
the  river  Douve  could  be  enfiladed  and  an  important  area 
of  the  valley  of  the  Lys  commanded. 

The  British  front  at  Ypres  was  held  by  the  Second  Army, 
whose  commander,  General  Sir  Herbert  Plumer,  had  pre- 
pared plans  for  the  Messines  attack  more  than  a  year 
before.1  Immediately  after  the  Paris  decision  of  May  191 7 
Sir  Douglas  Haig  conferred  with  his  army  commanders, 
and  it  was  decided  that  the  capture  of  the  Messines  ridge 
should  constitute  a  distinct  and  separate  operation:  the 
Second  Army,  it  was  agreed,  should  aim  at  the  seizure  of 
the  main  positions  in  one  day. 

The  German  defences  in  the  Messines  area  were  manned 
by  troops  of  the  4th  Corps  which  formed  part  of  General 
Sixt  von  Armin's  Fourth  Army.  The  front  trenches 
skirted  the  western  slopes  of  the  ridge  so  as  to  form  a  deep 
salient  running  west  to  beyond  Wytschaete  with  a  base 
from  the  river  Lys,  opposite  Frelinghien,  to  a  point  just 
short  of  the  Menin  road.  A  second  line  followed  an  inner 
curve  along  the  crest  of  the  ridges,  but,  in  addition  to 
these  main  systems,  two  chord  lines  had  been  cut  across  the 
base  of  the  salient.  One,  called  the  Oosttaverne  line,  run- 
ning north  and  south,  lay  a  little  to  the  east  of  the  hamlet  of 
that  name,  and  the  other,  the  Warneton  line,  ran  roughly 
parallel  with  the  Oosttaverne  line  about  a  mile  farther 
east.  The  British  ultimate  objective  was  the  first  chord 
position — the  Oosttaverne  line — the  capture  of  which 
would  reduce  the  salient  and  leave  the  whole  Messines- 
Wytschaete  ridge,  and  a  portion  equal  to  it  of  the  main 
Ypres  ridge,  in  British  hands.  To  attain  their  objective, 
the  British  troops  would  have  to  penetrate  the  enemy 
front  along  about  ten  miles  to  a  maximum  depth  of  two 
and  a  half  miles. 

1  That  is  when  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  planned,  in  the  event  of  the  1916 
Somme  offensive  proving  a  complete  failure,  to  transfer  troops  northward 
to  make  the  Messines  attack  in  1916.  See  Military  Operations,  France  and 
Belgium  1916,  vol.  i,  p.  32. 


i9i7]  AIR  CONCENTRATION  in 

On  the  British  front  of  assault  were  three  of  the  six 
Corps  of  the  Second  Army;  on  the  right  was  the  II  Anzac 
Corps,  in  the  centre  opposite  Wytschaete  the  IX  Corps, 
and  on  the  left,  to  a  point  opposite  Mount  Sorrel,  the 
X  Corps.  The  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons  attached  to 
these  three  Corps  were  No.  42  (II  Anzac),  No.  53  (IX),  and 
No.  6  (X) ;  their  strength  for  the  battle  was  raised  to  twenty- 
one  aeroplanes  each.1  A  shortening  of  the  Fourth  Army 
front  as  a  result  of  an  extension  of  the  French  line,  released 
No.  7  Squadron  which  moved  north  into  the  Ypres  area. 
The  three  Flights  (each  of  six  B.E.2e's)  of  this  squadron 
were  used  to  reinforce  Nos.  42,  6,  and  21  Squadrons.  The 
last-named  squadron  was  attached  to  the  VIII  Corps  on 
the  northern  flank  of  the  X  Corps,  and  it  was  re- 
inforced because  the  narrow  front  held  by  the  IX  Corps, 
in  the  centre,  precluded  the  use  of  additional  wireless 
aircraft. 

In  the  Second  Army  area,  before  the  final  preparations 
for  the  battle  were  made,  the  Eleventh  Army  Wing  was 
made  up  of  two  fighter  reconnaissance  squadrons,  Nos.  20 
and  45,  and  three  single-seater  fighter  squadrons,  Nos.  I, 
41,  and  46.  In  the  middle  of  May  the  Wing  was  rein- 
forced by  No.  10  (Naval)  Squadron  from  Dunkirk, 
equipped  with  fifteen  Sopwith  Triplanes,2  and,  on  the  1st 
of  June,  by  No.  I  (Naval)  Squadron,  similarly  equipped, 
withdrawn  from  the  Third  Army.  In  addition,  No.  70 
Squadron,  from  the  Head-quarters  Ninth  Wing,  was 
attached  temporarily  to  the  II  Brigade  for  distant  photo- 
graphic reconnaissance.  The  remaining  squadrons  of  the 
Ninth  Wing,  Nos.  19,  56,  and  66  (fighters),  and  Nos.  27 
and  55  (day  bombers),  together  with  the  Special  Duty 

1  For  the  Order  of  Battle,  Royal  Flying  Corps,  on  the  7th  of  June,  see 
Appendix  III.  The  Corps  squadrons  which  had  been  raised  to  twenty- 
four  or  twenty-one  aeroplanes  for  the  Arras  battle  had  afterwards  again 
been  reduced  to  an  establishment  of  eighteen  aeroplanes.  Although  the 
War  Office  had  sanctioned  a  general  increase  of  Corps  squadrons  to  twenty- 
four  aeroplanes,  sufficient  aircraft  were  not  forthcoming  to  make  this 
possible. 

2  Owing  to  a  shortage  of  pilots,  the  five  naval  squadrons  attached  to  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  had  been  reduced  from  eighteen  to  fifteen  aeroplanes  in 
May  1917. 


ii2  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES         [ch.  iv 

Flight,1  moved  north  to  the  Messines  area  at  the  beginning 
of  June.2  On  the  immediate  right  of  the  Second  Army,  the 
First  Army  received  an  extra  fighting  squadron,  No.  23, 
from  the  Fifth  Army,  and  a  night-bombing  squadron, 
No.  100,  from  the  Third  Army;  the  latter  squadron 
operated  under  the  direct  orders  of  Royal  Flying  Corps 
head-quarters. 

The  eighteen  squadrons  (excluding  No.  23  Squadron)  in 
the  actual  battle  area  had  300  aeroplanes  serviceable  on 
the  opening  day  of  the  battle — the  7th  of  June — of  which 
rather  more  than  one-third  were  single-seater  fighters. 
But  the  offensive  patrols  of  Nos.  23  and  40  Squadrons  of 
the  First  Army  were  extended  to  include  the  Ypres  area, 
and  these  two  squadrons  may  therefore  rightly  be  included 
in  the  air  concentration  for  the  battle. 

While  these  British  preparations  were  being  made,  the 
Germans,  who  were  well  aware  of  what  was  taking  place, 
were  also  strengthening  their  air  units  in  Flanders.  When 
the  Arras  offensive  began  to  slacken,  a  general  move  north 
had  begun.  Between  the  4th  of  May  and  the  7th  of  June 
Armin's  Fourth  Army  along  the  front  from  the  river 
Douve  to  the  sea  was  increased  from  fifteen  air  units  (ten 
reconnaissance  and  artillery  Flights  and  five  fighter 
Flights)  to  forty-four  (nineteen  reconnaissance,  eight  pro- 
tection, eleven  single-seater  fighter,  and  six  bomber- 
fighter  Flights).  These  units  represented  a  nominal 
strength  of  about  300  aeroplanes  of  which  half  were 
fighters.  That  is  to  say,  the  German  air  strength  from 
Messines  to  the  sea  was  approximately  the  same  as  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  strength  available  for  the  ten-mile  front 
along  the  Messines  ridge.  The  total  British  air  strength 
along  the  whole  front  opposed  to  General  Sixt  von  Armin's 
army  was  approximately  500  aeroplanes,  and  this  number 
was  augmented  by  a  few  French  and  Belgian  air  units 

1  The  Special  Duty  Flight  had  been  formed  in  April  1917  for  night 
duties  as  ordered  by  General  Head-quarters  (Intelligence).  The  Flight  was 
responsible,  among  other  tasks,  for  the  landing  of  agents  in  enemy  territory. 

2  The  squadrons  of  the  Ninth  Wing  were  kept  working  over  the  southern 
area  until  the  end  of  May  to  induce  the  enemy  to  believe  that  the  Arras- 
Vimy  front  remained  the  main  battle  area. 


i9i7]  CONCENTRATION  OF  GUNS  113 

operating  between  Zillebeke  and  the  coast.  It  may  be 
assumed  that  the  Allied  aircraft  outnumbered  the  enemy 
by  about  two  to  one  along  this  stretch  of  front  generally, 
and  that  the  disproportion  was  a  little  greater  in  the 
Messines  area.1 

Because  the  Messines  ridge  completely  overlooked  the 
British  positions,  the  success  of  the  operations  would 
chiefly  depend  on  the  ability  of  the  British  batteries  to 
dominate  those  of  the  enemy.  During  May,  many  heavy, 
siege,  and  field  batteries  were  moved  from  the  First, 
Third,  and  Fifth  Armies  into  the  Second  Army  Area,  and 
when  the  battle  opened  the  artillery  concentration  sur- 
passed anything  previously  attempted.2  The  artillery 
plans,  worked  out  in  close  co-operation  with  the  staff  of 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  allowed  for  destructive  fire,  be- 
ginning some  weeks  before  the  main  bombardment,  by 
groups  of  batteries.  German  gun  positions,  wire,  and 
selected  strong  points  were  to  be  subjected  to  systematic, 
concentrated  fire.  As  new  British  batteries  came  into  the 
area  they  were  to  take  up  their  allotted  tasks  in  accordance 
with  the  prearranged  programmes,  but  to  screen  from 
the  enemy  the  increasing  strength  of  the  artillery  the 
number  of  batteries  to  be  disclosed  in  any  one  Corps  area 
on  any  one  day  was  carefully  limited.  So  that  the  Germans 
should  not  be  made  unduly  alert  by  this  type  of  prepara- 
tion for  the  actual  battle,  artillery  concentrations  had,  for 
some  months  past,  been  made  periodically  within  the 
separate  Corps  of  the  Second  Army. 

The  main  tasks  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  therefore, 
were  to  give  the  maximum  help  to  the  British  guns  and  to 

1  The  Germans,  however,  continued  to  reinforce  the  air  units  in 
Flanders  for  the  main  battle.  General  von  Hoeppner,  in  Deutschlands 
Krieg  in  der  Luft  (p.  115),  writing  of  the  Flanders  offensive,  says:  'Because 
'of  their  number  and  their  sporting  audacity,  the  English  continued  to  be 
'our  most  dangerous  adversaries  and,  as  before,  the  major  part  of  the 
'German  air  strength  was  concentrated  against  them.' 

2  'On  the  front  of  attack,  roughly  10,000  yards,  in  the  inclusive  period 
'of  ten  days  from  noon  1st  to  noon  10th  June  191 7,  2,233  8uns  ^rec^  no 
'less  than  2,843,163  rounds,  weighing  64,164  tons.  This  represents  a  gun 
'to  every  4$  yards  and  6$  tons  of  ammunition  to  every  yard  of  front  attacked.' 
(Second  Army  records.) 

2504.4  T 


ii4  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

prevent  German  aeroplanes  from  registering  the  battery 
positions.  Favoured  by  the  weather  conditions,  and  by 
the  effective  patrolling  of  the  fighting  squadrons  during 
the  preparatory  period  preceding  the  main  bombardment, 
the  pilots  and  observers  of  the  Corps  squadrons  methodi- 
cally fulfilled  their  part  of  directing  the  artillery  on  their 
targets. 

Systematic  trench  bombardment  and  wire-cutting  were 
begun  on  the  2 1st  of  May,  the  fire  on  the  rear-line,  by 
6-inch  howitzers,  being  directed  from  the  air.  According 
to  the  original  plan,  the  main  bombardment  was  to  open 
five  days  before  the  infantry  attack,  but  at  a  conference  on 
the  30th  of  May  this  plan,  largely  as  a  result  of  what  was 
learned  from  captured  German  documents,  was  modified. 
These  documents  revealed  that  the  enemy  would  rely,  for 
defence,  mainly  on  prearranged  schemes  of  artillery  fire — 
a  fact  which  enhanced  the  importance  of  counter-battery 
work.  It  was  therefore  decided  that  the  bombardment 
should  be  put  forward  two  days,  and  that  the  two  days 
before  the  battle  should  be  chiefly  devoted  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  German  artillery.  To  induce  the  enemy  to  dis- 
close the  positions  of  his  barrage  batteries,  it  was  arranged 
that  a  full-dress  rehearsal  of  the  artillery  bombardment, 
as  it  would  be  at  zero  hour,  with  a  smoke  demonstration 
along  the  front  of  attack,  should  take  place  on  the  3rd  of 
June.  The  hour  for  this  rehearsal  was  to  be  fixed  on  the 
advice  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  because  it  was  essential 
to  choose  conditions  favourable  for  the  placing  of  the 
maximum  strength  in  the  air  to  discover  the  enemy  guns. 

The  scope  of  the  air  offensive,  by  which  the  freedom  of 
movement  of  the  Corps  aeroplanes  was  to  be  ensured,  was 
more  limited,  and  at  the  same  time  more  concentrated, 
than  that  of  the  air  offensives  waged  during  the  Somme 
and  the  Arras  battles.  The  Messines  air  offensive  aimed 
chiefly  at  the  domination  of  the  immediate  battle  area, 
and  the  enemy  balloon  line,  approximately  10,000  yards 
distant  from  the  British  front  line  trenches,  was  to  mark 
the  main  offensive  patrol  area  for  the  fighters  of  the  Army 
Wing  squadrons.  The  effective  patrol  of  this  line  would 
give  the  British  artillery  aeroplanes  ample  depth  in  which 


i9i7]         THE  AIR  OFFENSIVE  SCHEME  115 

to  work,  was  calculated  to  keep  the  enemy  air  observers  at 
such  a  distance  as  to  make  the  accurate  ranging  of  the 
German  guns  difficult  or  impossible,  and  would  help  to 
keep  down  the  enemy  balloons.  The  orders  were  that  no 
enemy  aeroplane  was  to  be  allowed  to  cross  the  German 
balloon  line  between  Perenchies  and  Langemarck,  a  distance 
of  about  seventeen  miles.  This  stretch  of  barrage-line  was 
divided  into  two  beats,  northern  and  southern,  and  each 
beat  was  patrolled  from  dawn  to  dusk,  during  the  seven 
days'  preliminary  bombardment,  by  formations  of  fighters 
from  15,000  feet  upwards.  In  addition,  the  central  section 
of  the  barrage-line  was  strengthened  by  a  patrol  of  six  to 
eight  fighters,  at  1 2,000  feet  or  under,  to  ensure  two  layers 
of  fighting  aircraft  over  the  more  important  sector  of  the 
battle  front.1 

No  series  of  barrage  or  offensive  patrols,  however,  could 
be  expected  to  prevent  determined  German  two-seater 
pilots  from  getting  through,  from  time  to  time,  to  work 
with  the  German  artillery  or  to  bomb  the  British  lines  of 
communication.  To  deal  with  enemy  co-operating  aero- 
planes, the  wireless  interception  organization,  in  all  armies, 
had  been  recently  expanded.  It  will  be  recalled2  that  a 
scheme  to  make  use  of  the  army  wireless  stations — known  as 
'Compass'  stations — for  the  rapid  location  of  enemy  air- 
craft working  over  the  lines,  had  been  adopted  in  October 
1916.  The  compass  stations  took  bearings  on  a  German 
aeroplane  making  use  of  wireless,  and  when  they  had,  by 
intersection,  determined  its  position,  passed  on  the  infor- 
mation to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  and  to  forward  ground 
stations.  The  ground  stations  thereupon  displayed  code 
strip  signals  to  notify  patrolling  British  fighting  pilots  of 
the  areas  in  which  German  aeroplanes  had  been  reported : 
only  in  exceptional  circumstances  would  fighting  aero- 
planes be  sent  out  specially.  At  the  time  the  scheme  was 
put  into  force  the  expectation  was  that  fighters  would,  in 
the  near  future,  be  fitted  with  wireless  receiving  sets,  and 
that  when  this  was  done  the  information  obtained  by  the 

1  On  the  day  of  the  battle  (7th  of  June),  to  protect  the  low-flying 
contact-patrol  aeroplanes,  some  of  the  lower  fighting  patrols  were  brought 
down  to  5,000  feet.  2  Vol.  iii,  pp.  319-20. 


n6  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

compass  stations  would  be  transmitted  to  the  fighting  pilots 
in  the  air  direct.  This  expectation,  however,  was  not 
realized.  The  main  reason  was  that,  to  ensure  reception  in 
the  aircraft,  transmitting  stations  of  comparatively  high 
power  were  required  and  these  could  only  be  worked  at 
the  cost  of  considerable  interference  with  all  other  wireless 
communication  in  the  front  line  area. 

In  spite  of  this  disappointment,  the  wireless  interception 
scheme  had  given  good  results  and,  in  May  191 7,  it  had 
been  decided  to  decentralize  the  work  from  the  Army 
compass  stations  and  to  establish  new  stations  to  be  con- 
cerned exclusively  with  hostile  aircraft.  Under  the  new 
scheme,  two  Aeroplane  Compass  Stations  and  one  Aeroplane 
Intercepting  Station  were  allotted  to  each  Army.  The  com- 
pass stations  were  placed  to  give  good  intersections  on 
enemy  aircraft,  and  were  in  direct  communication  with 
the  Army  Wing  head-quarters  or  a  selected  fighting  squad- 
ron, with  the  head-quarters  of  the  Anti-Aircraft  Area  Com- 
mander, with  the  ground  signal  stations,  and  with  the 
head-quarters  of  Corps  Heavy  Artillery.  The  intercepting 
station,  which  was  mainly  concerned  to  gather  detailed 
information  about  the  'shoot',  was  placed  with  one  of  the 
compass  stations,  and  the  two  together  formed  what  was 
known  as  the  Control  Post  of  the  Army,  where  information 
was  centralized  and  the  enemy  aircraft  activity  throughout 
the  day  continuously  plotted.  The  Royal  Flying  Corps 
was  kept  informed  not  so  much  of  every  German  aero- 
plane working  as  of  the  general  trend,  both  as  to  area  and 
intensity,  of  the  enemy  air  activity.  Patrolling  aircraft 
could  be  directed  accordingly,  and  the  British  artillery 
aeroplanes  could  be  concentrated  on  those  areas  where  the 
German  batteries  were  shown  to  be  most  active.  The 
anti-aircraft  personnel  were  responsible,  on  receipt  of  a 
warning  from  the  compass  station,  for  ascertaining  the 
height  of  the  enemy  aeroplane,  and  for  passing  on  this 
information  to  the  forward  ground  stations  (which  laid 
out  additional  code  ground  strips),  and,  usually,  to  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  unit  concerned.  The  fact  that  the 
compass  stations  were  in  direct  touch  with  the  artillery 
enabled  counter-artillery  action  to  be  taken  if  the  German 


i9i7]  WIRELESS  INTERCEPTION  117 

aeroplane  activity  indicated  an  impending  bombardment 
of  any  particular  area. 

The  new  organization,  under  the  guidance  of  the  intel- 
ligence officer  attached  to  each  Army  head-quarters  for 
aeroplane  wireless  duties,  also  contributed  much  useful 
miscellaneous  information  about  the  enemy's  intentions. 
The  habits  of  the  various  German  air  observers  and  the 
ranging  activities  of  the  enemy  batteries  were  studied. 
A  'black-list'  was  drawn  up  of  all  wireless  calls  which  ex- 
perience showed  to  presage  important  activity,  and  special 
attention  was  directed  to  a  hostile  aeroplane  immediately 
a  'black-list'  call  was  intercepted  by  the  compass  station. 
From  the  information  collated  by  the  intelligence  officer 
a  general  picture  of  the  enemy's  aeroplane  and  artillery 
activity,  and  of  his  ground  wireless  organization,  emerged. 
An  increase  or  decrease  in  the  work  attempted,  and  in  the 
number  of  ground  receiving  stations,  was  at  once  clear  and 
often  gave  an  early  indication  of  the  enemy's  intention  to 
reinforce  or  weaken  a  particular  sector  of  front. 

It  is  of  interest  that  the  Germans  had  a  similar  organiza- 
tion for  intercepting  and  recording  British  aeroplane  wire- 
less calls.  Documents  captured  in  June  191 7  revealed  that 
the  scheme  had  been  in  operation  since  July  of  the  previous 
year,  and  showed  that  the  enemy  made  use  of  it  to  give 
specific  warnings  whenever  the  aeroplane  calls  indicated 
definite  targets.  An  example  of  the  kind  was  recounted  in 
an  enemy  newspaper  by  a  member  of  a  German  battery 
working  on  the  Western  front.  He  told  how,  on  more  than 
one  occasion,  his  battery  had  been  informed,  through  the 
German  Central  Wireless  Warning  Station,  that  British 
aircraft  had  discovered  the  battery  position  and  were 
about  to  direct  the  British  guns  on  it.  These  early  warn- 
ings, which  excited  the  admiration  of  the  German  gunner, 
gave  the  gun  detachments  ample  time  to  seek  cover. 

Such,  in  outline,  was  the  wireless  interception  organiza- 
tion that  came  into  general  effect  at  the  time  of  the  battle 
of  Messines.  Under  the  specific  arrangements  on  the 
Second  Army  front,  preparatory  to  the  battle,  the  central 
compass  station,  or  'Control  Post',  passed  all  information 
about  enemy  wireless  aircraft,  attempting  to  work  in  the 


u8  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

area  of  the  Messines  ridge,  by  direct  telephone  to  the 
Eleventh  Army  Wing  head-quarters  which  retained  one 
fighter  squadron,  each  day,  to  deal  with  aircraft  so  notified. 

The  general  air  offensive  arrangements  for  the  Messines 
battle  may  be  thus  summarized.  There  was  a  so-called 
air-barrage  line  covering  the  main  battle  area,  and  a 
special  arrangement  whereby  enemy  aircraft  which  eluded 
the  barrage  patrols  could  be  quickly  attacked.  In  addition, 
distant  offensive  patrols  made  up  of  one  or  two  Flights 
(six  to  twelve  aeroplanes)  were  sent  out,  about  once  a 
day,  as  far  east  as  the  line  Lille-Menin-Roulers.  Wider 
offensive  patrols  were  made  by  the  squadrons  of  the  Ninth 
Wing  in  the  area  Houthulst  Forest-Roulers-Menin- 
Quesnoy.  A  reference  to  the  map  will  show  that  these 
various  patrol  areas  spread  out  fan-wise  from  the  Messines 
ridge,  with  the  greatest  concentration  immediately  east 
of  the  ridge.1 

The  main  bombardment  opened  as  arranged  on  the  31st 
of  May,  and,  except  for  a  thunderstorm  on  the  evening  of 
the  6th  of  June,  was  made  under  favourable  weather  con- 
ditions so  that  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons  and  kite 
balloon  sections  were  enabled  to  fulfil  their  detailed 
programmes.  Two  Flights  from  each  of  the  three  Corps 
squadrons  in  the  battle  area  were  used  for  observation  of 
counter-battery  fire,  while  the  third  Flight — called  the 
'Bombardment  Flight' — worked  with  specially  organized 
artillery  'Bombardment  Groups'  for  the  destruction  of 
wire,  trench  positions,  &c.2  The  'Bombardment  Flights', 
on  the  opening  day  of  the  infantry  attack,  became 
Contact-patrol  Flights.  Systematic  photography,  to  show 
the  effect  of  the  British  fire,  was  a  duty  of  all  Flights  in 

1  It  should  be  noted  that  the  air-barrage  line  was  well  over  the  enemy 
side  of  the  lines,  and  formed  a  part  only  of  the  general  air  offensive  patrol 
scheme. 

2  The  Royal  Flying  Corps  wireless  stations  with  the  Second  Army 
artillery  were  increased  from  100  at  the  end  of  April  to  280  on  the  7th  of 
June.  Their  efficiency  was  ensured  by  an  elaborate  system  of  inspection  and 
supervision.  By  strict  attention  to  the  details  of  wireless  co-operation  it 
was  found  possible  to  provide  one  wireless  aeroplane  for  every  400  yards  of 
front  without  undue  risk  of  jamming.  This  compares  with  one  for  every 
t,ooo  yards  of  front  at  the  battle  of  Arras. 


1917]    AIR  OBSERVATION  FOR  ARTILLERY     119 

their  respective  areas,  and  an  increase  in  the  strength  of 
the  squadron  photographic  sections,  combined  with  con- 
tinuous day  and  night  work  on  developing  and  printing, 
enabled  the  squadrons  to  keep  their  respective  Corps 
supplied  with  timely  copies  of  all  important  photographs.1 
While  the  jxiain  bombardment  was  in  progress,  the  Corps 
aeroplanes  enjoyed  almost  complete  freedom  of  movement. 
On  the  2nd  of  June  two  Corps  aircraft  were  attacked,  but 
it  was  not  until  the  7th  that  an  artillery  aeroplane  was  shot 
down  by  enemy  aircraft.2  In  the  week  ending  the  7th  of 
June,  aircraft  with  the  Second  Army  observed  for  destruc- 
tive fire  on  231  German  batteries,  observed  for  225  trench 
bombardments,  and  sent  down  716  zone  calls  for  fire  on 
important  miscellaneous  targets.3  The  enemy  also  made  a 
determined  effort,  especially  between  Ypres  and  Wyt- 
schaete,  that  is  to  say,  on  the  northern  flank  of  the  front  to 
be  attacked,  to  register  his  guns  with  the  help  of  aircraft 
observation.  The  calls  intercepted  by  the  compass  stations 
in  the  first  week  in  June  indicated  an  appreciable  increase 
in  the  number  of  German  wireless  receiving  ground 
stations  on  this  flank.  The  enemy  activity,  on  the  Second 
Army  front,  was  most  marked  on  the  4th  and  5th  of  June, 
and,  during  these  two  days,  seventy-four  British  batteries 
were  engaged,  through  the  agency  of  German  aircraft,  with 
the  result  that  twenty-seven  guns  were  damaged  and  three 
battery  ammunition  dumps  were  exploded.  Throughout 
the  whole  week  ending  the  7th  of  June,  wireless  signals 
intercepted  by  the  compass  stations  showed  that  sixty-two 
German  aircraft  directed  the  fire  of  batteries  opposite  the 
Second  Army  front.  On  forty-seven  occasions  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  was  informed,  and  the  fighter  squadrons, 

1  Photography  to  a  depth  of  5,000  yards  behind  the  German  front  line 
was  the  duty  of  the  Corps  squadrons :  beyond  that  area  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
army  squadrons.  The  first  prints  from  negatives  were  made  in  the  squad- 
rons for  immediate  distribution.  The  negatives  were  then  sent  to  the  Army 
Printing  Section  at  Hazebrouck  for  additional  prints  to  be  made. 

2  Of  thirty- three  aeroplanes  of  the  II  Brigade  reported  missing  between 
the  15  th  of  May  and  the  9th  of  June,  twenty-nine  belonged  to  the  Army 
Wing  and  four  only  to  the  Corps  Wing. 

3  For  detailed  figures  of  the  artillery  work  by  squadrons  of  the  Second 
(Corps)  Wing  from  the  15th  of  May  to  the  9th  of  June,  see  Appendix  IV. 


120  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

specially  allocated  to  deal  with  these  German  aircraft, 
were  successful  in  twenty- two  instances  in  terminating  the 
'shoot' .  One  enemy  aeroplane  was  destroyed  and  seven  were 
forced  down  damaged.  Apart  from  these  special  attacks  in 
response  to  compass  calls,  many  two-seaters  were  engaged 
by  patrolling  formations.1  The  enemy  attempted,  with  a 
measure  of  success,  to  counter  the  attacks  on  his  artillery 
aeroplanes  by  providing  them  with  a  fighting  escort,  as 
many  as  seven  escorting  single-seaters  being  encountered. 
There  was  much  sporadic  air  fighting,  in  the  bombard- 
ment period,  along  the  line  of  the  offensive  barrage  patrol 
east  of  the  Messines  ridge,  but  the  main  encounters  took 
place  over  the  Ypres-Roulers-Menin  area.  These  en- 
counters, usually  involving  large  numbers  of  aeroplanes  on 
both  sides,  were  for  the  most  part  protracted  'dog-fights' 
in  which  decisive  combats  were  few.  On  the  morning  of 
the  4th  of  June  a  patrol  of  ten  Sopwith  triplanes  of  No.  I 
(Naval)  Squadron  met  a  German  formation  of  fifteen 
fighters  over  Moorslede.  In  the  engagement  which  fol- 
lowed six  Flying  Corps  aeroplanes  joined.  One  of  these — 
an  S.E.5 — was  shot  down,  and  two  of  the  enemy  aero- 
planes were  also  destroyed.  The  fighting  lasted  twenty 
minutes,  and  as  the  pilots  on  both  sides  early  lost  formation, 
it  was  of  a  confused  kind.  On  the  following  day — the  5th 
— enemy  fighters  had  a  successful  encounter  with  eight 
Sopwith  two-seaters  of  No.  45  Squadron  on  their  way  to 
make  a  photographic  reconnaissance  near  Menin.  The 
two-seater  Sopwiths  were  outclassed,  at  this  time,  by  the 
German  single-seater  fighters,  and  the  advantage  was  with 
the  enemy  when  a  formation  of  five  Albatros  Scouts 
attacked.  Other  German  pilots  joined  in  later  and, 
although  the  Sopwiths  fought  hard  and  sent  down  one 
Albatros  in  flames,  they  themselves  suffered  severely.  Two 
were  destroyed,  a  third  was  forced  to  land  in  enemy  terri- 
tory, and  two  others,  shot  about,  were  wrecked  in  forced 
landings  on  the  British  side  of  the  lines.  The  successful 
German  formation  then  attacked  seven  Sopwith  'Pups'  of 

1  In  all,  between  the  1st  and  7th  of  June,  aircraft  of  the  Second  Army 
destroyed  thirty-two  enemy  aeroplanes  at  a  cost  of  eighteen  aeroplanes 
missing. 


1917]  AIR  COMBATS  121 

No.  46  Squadron  which  were  patrolling  the  northern 
section  of  the  barrage  line  near  Polygon  Wood.  In  the 
fight  which  ensued  some  of  the  Tups'  had  gun  trouble,  as 
did  three  Spads  of  No.  19  Squadron  which  joined  in:  one 
Spad  and  one  of  the  enemy  fighters  were  shot  down.  In 
the  afternoon  of  the  5th  a  formation  of  seven  F.E.2d's  of 
No.  20  Squadron  had  a  running  fight  with  about  fifteen 
Albatros  Scouts  above  the  Ypres-Menin  road.  The 
German  leader,  in  a  red  Albatros,  early  attacked  one  of 
the  F.E.'s  and  mortally  wounded  its  pilot,  Lieutenant 
W.  W.  Sawden,  who  dived  for  home  closely  pursued  by 
the  Albatros.  Another  of  the  F.E.2d's  (pilot,  Lieutenant 
H.  L.  Satchell,  observer,  Second  Lieutenant  T.  A.  M.  S. 
Lewis)  went  to  the  assistance  of  Lieutenant  Sawden  and 
engaged  the  red  Albatros  in  a  combat  lasting  fifteen 
minutes.  The  German  pilot  showed  exceptional  skill  and 
tenacity,  but,  eventually,  a  burst  of  bullets  fired  from  the 
F.E.2d  at  very  close  range  shattered  a  part  of  the  Albatros, 
which  broke  up  in  the  air  and  crashed  near  Zandvoorde. 
The  pilot  proved  to  be  Lieutenant  Karl  Schaefer,  one  of 
the  foremost  German  fighting  pilots  who  had,  at  the  time 
of  his  death,  thirty  Allied  aeroplanes  to  his  credit. 

On  the  following  day — the  6th  of  June — the  fighting 
was  in  favour  of  the  British,  and  the  Sopwith  triplanes  of 
the  naval  squadrons  did  conspicuous  work.  In  the  morn- 
ing, ten  triplanes  of  No.  1  (Naval)  Squadron  made  many 
successful  attacks  on  small  groups  of  hostile  aeroplanes. 
Over  Roulers,  where  they  were  joined  by  two  groups  of 
Flying  Corps  fighters,  they  attacked  a  German  formation, 
two  of  which  were  shot  down :  the  others  spun  away  and 
escaped.  Later  the  same  morning  thirteen  triplanes  of 
No.  10  (Naval)  Squadron  were  engaged  with  fifteen 
German  aeroplanes  on  the  offensive  barrage  line.  Some  of 
the  enemy  aircraft  were  two-seaters  which  appeared  to  be 
on  their  way  to  the  British  lines  when  the  triplanes  met 
and  attacked  them.  The  German  formation  was  routed: 
two  Albatros  fighters  were  shot  down  in  flames  (both  by 
Flight  Sub-Lieutenant  R.  Collishaw),  and  two  others  and 
a  two-seater  crashed  to  the  ground :  there  were  no  British 
casualties. 


122  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

Strategic  air  reconnaissances,  before  the  battle  began, 
were  made  of  the  enemy's  main  railway  communications 
as  far  east  as  Bruges,  Ghent,  Grammont,  and  Ath,  and 
particular  attention  was  paid  to  the  lines  converging  on 
Courtrai  and  Menin.  The  more  distant  reconnaissances 
were  usually  made  by  single  D.H.4  aeroplanes  of  No.  55 
Squadron,  fitted  with  cameras,  which  flew  between  16,000 
and  21,000  feet.  The  nearer,  and  more  detailed,  strategic 
reconnaissances  were  made  by  formations  of  Sopwith  two- 
seaters  (usually  nine)  of  No.  70  Squadron,  escorted  by  a 
Flight  of  fighters.  The  various  reports  revealed  no  unusual 
enemy  rail  movements,  but  told,  from  time  to  time,  of 
considerable  mechanical  transport  on  the  roads  westwards 
of  Menin. 

The  day  bombing,  chiefly  by  Nos.  27  (Martinsyde)  and 
55  (D.H.4)  Squadrons,  helped  to  divert  enemy  air  activity 
from  the  impending  battle  front.  The  operations  began 
on  the  3rd  of  June,  when  six  Martinsydes  of  No.  27 
Squadron  scored  hits  with  four  of  their  twelve  112-lb. 
bombs  on  an  ammunition  dump  at  Vyfwegen.  This  raid 
was  made  in  conjunction  with  the  feint  attack  along  the 
Messines  front.1  Next  day,  the  activities  of  the  squadron 
were  diverted  to  an  attack  on  the  aerodrome  at  St.  Denis 
Westrem  which  housed  two  Flights  of  the  German 
bombing  squadron  responsible  for  the  recently  inaugurated 
day-bombing  offensive  against  England.  Thirty-nine  light- 
weight bombs2  were  dropped  and  one  shed  on  the  aero- 
drome was  damaged.  The  formation  of  nine  Martinsydes 
was  escorted  for  part  of  the  outward  journey  by  six  Sop- 
with Tups',  but  no  enemy  appeared.  On  the  homeward 
journey,  however,  the  Martinsydes  were  attacked  by  a 
formation  of  nine  Albatros  fighters  and  lost  one  of  their 
number. 

While  the  Martinsydes  were  making  the  journey  to  St. 

1  See  p.  124. 

2  The  standard  light-weight  bomb  was  now  the  25-lb.  Cooper,  a  simpler 
type  than  the  20-lb.  Hales  which  it  had  superseded.  Supplies  of  the 
Cooper  bomb  had  begun  to  arrive  in  France  in  December  1916  and  were 
usually  issued  to  squadrons  to  meet  demands  for  the  20-lb.  bomb.  Issues 
from  the  existing  stocks  of  20-lb.  Hales  bombs,  however,  continued  to 
July  1917. 


i9i7]  NOS.  27  AND  55  SQUADRONS  123 

Denis  Westrem,  six  D.H.4's  of  No.  55  Squadron  were 
fighting  their  way  to  Ingelmunster,  midway  between 
Courtrai  and  Thielt,  to  bomb  the  railway  sidings.  Ten 
single-seaters  dived  on  the  de  Havillands  soon  after  they 
had  crossed  the  lines,  and  continued  to  attack  all  the  way 
to  Ingelmunster  and  back  again.  One  D.H.4  was  shot 
down  and  one  enemy  aeroplane  was  destroyed:  the  re- 
maining five  D.H.4's  persisted  to  their  objective,  but  their 
pilots  had  no  opportunity  to  watch  the  effect  of  their 
bombing:  they  successfully  fought  their  way  home.  An 
attack  by  a  similar  formation  of  the  same  squadron  on  an 
ammunition  dump  at  Iseghem  was  not  opposed.  Seventy- 
two  light-weight  bombs  fell  near  the  target  and  started 
several  fires,  but  the  dump  escaped  destruction. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  5th  of  June  eight  Martinsydes, 
escorted  part  of  the  way  by  six  Sopwith  Tups',  attacked 
the  station  at  Audenarde  without  encountering  opposi- 
tion, and,  at  the  same  time,  two  formations  of  D.H.4's 
bombed  the  German  aerodromes  at  Bisseghem  and 
Marcke,  south-west  of  Courtrai.  On  these  targets  a 
total  of  sixty  light-weight  bombs  were  dropped  from 
14,000  feet,  but  no  direct  hits  were  reported.  Once 
again,  there  were  no  encounters  with  enemy  aircraft. 

On  the  6th  of  June,  the  day  preceding  the  infantry 
assault,  the  bombing  by  No.  55  Squadron  was  concen- 
trated on  the  German  aerodrome  at  Reckem,  south-east  of 
Menin  and  directly  behind  the  impending  battle-front. 
Three  attacks  were  made  during  which  179  bombs  of  20-lb. 
or  25 -lb.  weight  were  dropped  from  heights  between 
12,000  and  14,000  feet:  some  hits  were  made  on  the  aero- 
drome buildings.  The  formation  in  the  last  of  the  three 
raids  met  and  attacked  three  German  two-seaters  on  the 
homeward  journey  and  shot  one  of  them  down,  but  there 
was  no  other  fighting  as  a  result  of  the  raids.  Nor  did 
escorted  formations  of  No.  27  Squadron,  which  bombed 
the  railway  bridge  over  the  Escaut  river  at  Escanaffles, 
south-east  of  Courtrai,  meet  with  opposition.  In  two 
attacks,  twenty- two  112-lb.  bombs  were  dropped,  but 
although  part  of  the  railway  track  was  destroyed,  the 
bridge  was  not  hit. 


i24  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

The  material  effect  of  the  day  bombing  was  not  great 
because  the  attacks  were  made  against  relatively  small 
targets  from  high  altitudes.  The  night  bombers  of  No. 
ioo  (F.E.2b)  Squadron,  however,  who  dropped  their 
bombs  from  a  few  hundred  feet,  inflicted  appreciable 
damage.  Their  objectives  were  railway  stations  and  trains 
along  the  lines  behind  the  active  front.  During  the  night 
of  the  2nd/3rd  of  June,  in  the  light  of  a  full  moon,  seven 
F.E.'s  of  the  squadron  partly  wrecked  a  train  near  Wervicq 
and  damaged  three  other  trains  and  hit  rolling-stock  in 
Menin  and  Warneton  stations.  Next  night  thirteen  pilots 
damaged  two  trains  near  Quesnoy,  hit  rolling-stock  in 
Courtrai  station,  and  started  a  fire  in  the  goods  station 
at  Menin  that  was  still  burning  some  hours  later.  On 
the  night  of  the  4th/5th  of  June  the  stations  at  Wervicq, 
Comines  and  Roulers,  and  a  train  on  the  line  between 
Menin  and  Roulers,  were  hit :  a  230-lb.  bomb  which  struck 
the  last-named  station  failed  to  explode.  On  the  5th/6th 
a  train  north  of  Roulers,  hit  by  two  112-lb.  bombs,  was 
wrecked,  and  bombs  exploded  in  Roulers  and  Wervicq 
stations.  Next  night  the  operation  orders  for  the  squadron 
were  for  attacks  on  Courtrai,  Halluin,  Ingelmunster,  and 
Comines  stations,  and  on  trains  along  the  lines  Lille— 
Comines,  Courtrai-Comines,  Roulers-Ypres,  and  Roulers- 
Menin.  The  night,  however,  was  stormy,  and  bombing 
was  impossible  until  towards  dawn,  when  selected  pilots 
attacked  Wervicq  and  Comines. 

The  full-dress  rehearsal  of  the  artillery  barrage  on  the 
Messines  ridge  was  made  in  the  afternoon  of  the  3rd  of 
June  when  thirty-one  Corps  aeroplanes  kept  watch  to  note 
the  positions  of  the  German  batteries.  They  were  ill- 
rewarded.  The  enemy  retaliation  was  feeble,  and  not 
many  new  emplacements  were  discovered.  Much,  how- 
ever, was  learned  from  air  photographs  taken  to  show  the 
accuracy  of  the  barrage :  gaps  in  the  barrage  at  different 
stages,  and  firing  short  by  specific  guns,  were  revealed. 
The  information  thus  obtained,  together  with  what  was 
learned  by  artillery  staff  officers  who  were  flown  over  the 
front  while  the  bombardment  was  in  progress,  enabled 
many  minor  errors  of  timing  to  be  adjusted.  In  a  further 


i9i7]  THE  ATTACK  125 

attempt  to  discover  some  of  the  new  German  batteries  the 
bombardment  demonstration  was  repeated  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  5th,  and  on  this  occasion  there  was  more 
success,  except  in  the  Wytschaete  area. 

The  special  counter-battery  effort  made  on  the  5th  and 
6th  of  June  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  many  known 
German  gun  pits.  The  entire  programme  of  aircraft 
observation  of  the  fire,  however,  could  not  be  fulfilled.  On 
the  morning  of  the  5th  an  ammunition  train  near  the 
aerodrome  of  Nos.  1,  1  (Naval),  42,  and  53  Squadrons,  at 
Bailleul,  was  hit  by  a  bomb  dropped  from  a  German  air- 
craft. For  three  hours  exploding  shells  and  smoke  and  fire 
made  it  impossible  for  any  aeroplanes  to  leave  the  ground, 
and  for  this  important  period  the  artillery  of  two  of  the 
three  attacking  Corps  was  robbed  of  all  aircraft  co-opera- 
tion. The  work  was  again  impeded  on  the  6th,  when  many 
of  the  British  batteries  were  heavily  fired  upon.  On  both 
days  the  systematic  bombardment  of  the  enemy  wire  and 
trenches,  out  of  sight  of  the  ground  stations,  was  con- 
tinued with  the  help  of  the  aeroplane  and  balloon  observers. 

The  Attack 

From  January  1916  tunnelling  companies  had  been  busy  7  June 
under  the  Messines  ridge,  and,  on  the  evening  of  the  6th 
of  June  191 7,  nineteen  mines,  charged  with  over  400 
tons  of  ammonal,  were  ready  for  explosion.  At  3.10  a.m. 
on  the  morning  of  the  7th  the  mines  were  exploded  within 
twenty  seconds  under  the  German  defences,  and,  before 
the  roar  had  died  down,  every  British  gun  opened  fire  and 
the  infantry  assault  was  launched. 

Over  the  attacking  divisions  flew  the  contact-patrol 
aeroplanes  whose  observers  were  ready  to  call,  by  Klaxon 
horn  or  Very  light,  for  the  lighting  of  flares  at  intervals  in 
accordance  with  the  prearranged  time-schedule  for  each 
stage  of  the  advance.1  Because  the  enemy  was  known  to 
be  using  red  flares,  green  ones  had  been  issued  to  the 
British  infantry  for  this  attack,  but  after  the  sun  rose  on 
the  7th  of  June  the  green  flares  were  robbed  of  their 

1  Two  contact-patrol  aeroplanes  were  maintained  on  each  Corps  front 
throughout  the  day. 


126  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

7  June  colour  and  proved  difficult  to  locate  from  the  air.  The 
forward  infantry,  however,  also  carried  supplies  of  the 
'Watson'  fan — a  pleated  disk,  white  on  one  side  and  of  a 
neutral  tint  on  the  other — which,  when  rapidly  turned, 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  air  observers.  In  general, 
the  contact-patrol  officers  had  no  difficulty  in  plotting  the 
progress  of  those  troops  who  had  previously  practised 
similar  co-operation  with  aeroplanes,  or  who  had  been  well 
instructed,  by  lectures,  on  its  difficulties  and  importance. 
These  made  doubly  sure  that  their  positions  should  be 
made  clear,  by  waving  helmets,  bayonets,  or  map  cases. 
But  where  troops  had  not  been  sufficiently  practised  or 
instructed,  'they  seemed  to  think',  says  a  X  Corps  staff 
appreciation  of  the  battle,  'aeroplanes  were  only  having  an 
'interesting  time  watching  the  attack,  and  consequently 
'they  made  no  signal'.  This  comment  requires  to  be 
qualified.  What  the  forward  infantry  feared  was  to  dis- 
close their  positions  to  the  enemy,  and  it  was  this  fear 
which  made  them  reluctant  to  light  flares  or  otherwise 
signal  to  the  air  observers.  Only  by  experience,  or  by  in- 
telligent instruction,  could  the  infantry  be  made  to  realize 
how  important  to  themselves  it  was  that  they  should  make 
their  position  known,  that  their  lives  might  depend  on  the 
air  observers'  reports.  It  was  not  indifference,  but  lack  of 
experience  which  caused  some  of  the  troops  to  withhold 
their  signals.  One  result  was  that  the  contact-aeroplane 
pilots  had  to  fly  over  these  troops  at  dangerously  low 
heights  before  the  observers  could  see  what  was  happen- 
ing, and  four  of  the  aeroplanes  so  employed  were  shot  down.  * 

1  A  former  Corps  squadron  commander  comments :  'When  troops  really 
'required  a  contact  aeroplane,  that  is,  when  they  were  out  of  touch  or  cut 
'off  from  their  main  forces,  they  were  generally  afraid  of  showing  flares 
'because  they  feared  retaliation  from  the  enemy  artillery.  The  result  of 
'this  was  that,  where  a  contact  aeroplane  had  to  be  sent  out  for  a  specific 
'and  important  duty,  and  was  generally,  as  was  the  case  on  our  side,  flying 
'against  a  head  wind,  it  had  to  fly  so  low  to  obtain  the  necessary  informa- 
'tion  that  it  was  often  shot  down.  This  was  lamentable,  since  the  supply  of 
'trained  contact  pilots  or  observers  was  very  limited,  and  it  was  one  of  the 
'very  serious  responsibilities  and  difficulties  of  a  Corps  squadron  commander 
'to  decide  when  to  send  out  a  contact  aeroplane  and  what  amount  of  risk 
'was  justified.' 


i9i7]  CONTACT  PATROL  REPORTS  127 

Four  copies  of  each  report  and  map — on  specially  pre-  7  June 
pared  map  blocks  (scale,  1 :  10,000) — were  made  in  the  air 
and  then  dropped,  by  message  bag,  at  divisional  head- 
quarters and  at  the  Corps  report  centres.  From  these  re- 
ports the  progress  of  the  battle  is  clear.  The  battered 
German  front  line  trenches  offered  little  resistance  to  the 
attacking  battalions  which  pressed  on  to  the  assault  of  the 
line  on  the  crest.  By  10  a.m.  the  forward  infantry  of 
the  II  Anzac  and  X  Corps  had  reached  the  final  objective 
of  the  first  phase  and  were  consolidating  their  hold  on  the 
captured  positions,  which  included  Messines  village.  An 
example  of  the  value  of  the  air  co-operation  with  the 
artillery  during  the  preliminary  bombardment  was  offered 
by  the  ease  with  which  the  leading  waves  of  the  25th 
Division  crossed  the  line  of  the  Steenebeek,  west  of 
Messines.  This  obstacle,  completely  hidden  from  ground 
observation,  had  been  heavily  wired  and  was  reckoned  for- 
midable, but  systematic  howitzer  fire  had  been  directed  on 
it  with  such  precision  from  the  air  that  the  infantry,  on 
the  morning  of  the  7th,  were  able  to  cross  it  with  little 
difficulty  and  strictly  according  to  time-table.  In  the 
centre,  the  IX  Corps  met  with  stiffer  opposition  and  was, 
at  10  a.m.,  fighting  in  Wytschaete  village.  By  noon,  how- 
ever, nothing  remained  to  the  enemy  of  the  crest  of  the 
ridge  except  a  few  isolated  positions.  There  followed  a 
halt,  during  which  reserve  troops  were  deployed  for  the 
further  advance  to  the  Oosttaverne  line.  An  air  observer, 
who  flew  over  this  line  just  before  noon,  at  a  height  of  400 
feet,  reported  that  it  was  only  thinly  manned  by  the  enemy. 

About  2  p.m.  an  observer  in  one  of  two  kite  balloons 
which  had,  during  the  previous  night,  been  brought  for- 
ward within   3,000  yards   of  the   German  front   line,1 

1  One  balloon,  in  direct  communication  with  the  Second  Army  report 
centre,  had  the  task  of  reporting  tactical  information,  and  the  other  was 
attached  to  a  forward  group  of  artillery  to  direct  fire  on  distant  targets 
when  the  line  advanced.  A  tribute  to  the  work  of  the  balloons  is  paid  in  a 
Second  Army  Summary  of  Intelligence  as  follows :  'Most  useful  work  was 
'done  by  Kite  balloon  observers  on  the  7th,  reporting  the  intensity  and 
'extent  of  enemy  barrages,  progress  of  our  own  barrages,  sections  of  hostile 
'artillery  activity  centres,  and  the  progress  and  location  of  tanks.'  Six 
balloons  were  used  in  the  battle  solely  on  artillery  work. 


128  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES         [ch.  iv 

t  June  reported  the  beginning  of  a  heavy  enemy  barrage  along  the 
new  front  of  the  II  Anzac  Corps.  Almost  at  once  news 
came,  from  another  source,  of  German  infantry  advancing 
against  the  line  north  and  south  of  Messines.  A  protective 
barrage  was  promptly  ordered  and,  by  2.30  p.m.,  the 
German  counter-attack  had  been  crushed  solely  by  artillery 
fire. 

At  3.10  p.m.  the  reserve  divisions  began  the  second 
phase  of  the  advance,  and  their  progress,  under  cover  of  an 
effective  barrage,  was  rapid.  At  3.45  p.m.  the  village  of 
Oosttaverne  was  taken  and,  fifteen  minutes  later,  the 
Oosttaverne  line  was  entered.  By  the  evening,  the  whole 
final  objective  had  been  captured  and  consolidated  except 
east  of  Messines  where  the  situation  on  a  part  of  the  front 
of  the  II  Anzac  Corps  was  still  obscure. 

Although  the  air  observers'  reports  gave  a  fairly  com- 
plete picture  of  the  battle,  they  served  chiefly  to  check  and 
amplify  the  information  sent  back  by  the  infantry.  The 
counter-battery  work  of  the  British  artillery  proved  very 
accurate  and  the  enemy  guns  were,  on  the  whole,  domi- 
nated. One  consequence  was  that  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion by  which  the  forward  troops  sent  their  messages 
suffered  only  occasional  interruption.  Also,  once  the  ridge 
had  been  captured,  daylight  signalling  lamps  were  exten- 
sively and  effectively  used.  In  addition  to  the  aircraft 
arrangements  for  reporting  the  progress  of  the  British 
infantry,  each  Corps  squadron  maintained  one  aeroplane  in 
the  air,  from  an  hour  after  the  infantry  attack  began,  to 
give  early  warning  of  German  counter-attacks  and  to 
report  movements  of  enemy  troops.  The  observers  had 
instructions  to  send  a  call  for  barrage  fire  immediately 
German  infantry  were  seen  leaving  their  trenches,  and  to 
report  other  suitable  targets  by  zone  call.  The  enemy 
counter-attack  on  the  II  Anzac  Corps,  warning  of  which 
was  given  by  a  balloon  observer,  was  also  reported  by  an 
aeroplane  counter-attack  patrol.  A  few  zone  calls  for  fire  on 
small  bodies  of  German  infantry  were  sent  down  and 
answered,  but  so  swift  and  methodical  was  the  British 
advance  that  the  enemy  resistance  was  paralysed  and  there 
was  little  useful  opportunity  for  this  form  of  co-operation. 


1917]  LOW-FLYING  ATTACKS  129 

There  were,  however,  many  opportunities  for  low-flying  2  June 
attacks  on  ground  targets  by  fighting  pilots.  An  example 
of  what  surprise  and  daring  could  achieve  had  been  afforded 
by  a  low-flying  feat  of  Captain  W.  A.  Bishop  of  No.  60 
Squadron,  south  of  the  main  battle  area,  on  the  2nd  of 
June.  This  officer  had  been  flying  alone  in  a  Nieuport 
Scout,  in  search  of  German  aircraft,  when  he  saw  seven 
aeroplanes  lined  up  on  an  aerodrome  near  Cambrai.  He 
flew  low  over  them  and  opened  fire  with  his  machine- 
guns.  One  of  the  German  aeroplanes  left  the  ground,  but 
was  attacked  by  Captain  Bishop  from  a  height  of  sixty 
feet,  and,  after  fifteen  rounds  had  been  fired,  the  enemy 
crashed.  A  second  aeroplane  took  off  and  was  in  turn 
attacked  until  it  fell  into  a  tree.  By  this  time  two  others 
had  got  into  the  air  and  Captain  Bishop  climbed  to 
engage  them.  He  caught  up  with  them  at  about  1,000 
feet  and,  after  emptying  part  of  a  drum  of  ammunition 
into  one,  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  it  fall  to  the  ground 
near  the  aerodrome.  He  fired  his  last  drum  into  the  fourth 
German  aeroplane  and  then  flew  home:  his  aeroplane  had 
been  shot  about  by  machine-gun  fire  from  the  ground.  For 
his  exploit  Captain  Bishop  was  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  about  three  weeks  before,  to- 
wards the  end  of  the  Arras  battle,  aeroplanes  had,  on  two 
separate  occasions,  gone  'over  the  top'  ahead  of  the  attack- 
ing infantry,  and,  with  machine-gun  fire  and  bombs,  had 
helped  to  demoralize  the  enemy  troops.1  For  the  Messines 
battle  something  similar  was  attempted,  but  this  time  the 
low-flying  attacks  were  only  loosely  related  to  the  infantry 
operations.  The  pilots  were  to  rove  at  their  will  and  shoot 
at  any  troops,  guns  or  transport  which  they  discovered.2 

1  Vol.  iii,  pp.  378-9. 

2  In  a  letter  to  the  Officer  Commanding  the  Ninth  Wing,  Major-General 
Trenchard  said :  'My  advice  to  the  pilot  is,  although  I  would  leave  it  for 
'him  to  decide,  that  he  should  cross  the  line  at  Armentieres  very  low  and 
'then  shoot  at  everything  he  can,  recrossing  the  lines  at  a  high  altitude. 
'This  is  in  order  to  harass  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible  and  to  spoil  the 
'morale  of  his  troops  .  .  .' 

The  operation  orders  for  the  Ninth  Wing  for  the  7th  of  June  stated : 
'2  Sopwith  Scouts,  I  Spad,  and  1  S.E.5  to  leave  the  ground  as  soon  as  there 
'is  sufficient  light  and  attack  troops  on  the  road,  and  the  aerodromes  at 

2504-4  v 


130  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

7  June  Specific  attacks,  however,  were  ordered  on  the  German 
aerodromes  at  Bisseghem  and  Marcke,  near  Courtrai.  At 
dawn  on  the  7th  of  June  fourteen  pilots  crossed  the  lines 
on  low-flying  missions  from  No.  43  Squadron  (from  the 
First  Army  area;  six  Sopwith  two-seaters),  from  No.  66 
(two  Sopwith  Tups'),  No.  1  (two  Nieuports),  No.  41 
(two  F.E.8's),  No.  19  (one  Spad)  and  from  No.  56  (one 
S.E.5).  They  found  and  attacked  small  parties  of  in- 
fantry, transport,  gun-teams,  machine-gun  emplacements, 
and  aerodrome  buildings.  As  an  example  of  their  work, 
the  adventures  of  the  S.E.5  pilot,  Second  Lieutenant 
L.  M.  Barlow,  may  be  quoted.  He  flew  first  to  the 
German  aerodrome  at  Bisseghem,  where  he  fired  into 
the  sheds  from  a  height  of  twenty  feet ;  a  nearby  train 
then  attracted  his  attention,  and  he  fired  into  this  with 
his  Vickers  and  Lewis  guns,  first  from  one  side  of  the 
train  and  then  the  other.  In  the  village  of  Wevelghem 
he  found  and  scattered  troops  in  the  main  street,  after 
which  he  fired  into  rolling-stock  in  the  station  yard. 
Thence  he  flew  to  Reckem  aerodrome,  where  he  finished 
his  ammunition  by  firing  into  the  aeroplane  sheds.  Marcke 
aerodrome  was  attacked  by  the  Spad  pilot  of  No.  19 
Squadron.  The  low-flying  machine-gun  attacks  were  con- 
tinued at  intervals  throughout  the  day:  two  of  the  aero- 
planes were  shot  down  and  wrecked,  but  two  others,  in 
which  the  engines  were  damaged  by  fire  from  the  ground, 
made  safe  landings  on  British  aerodromes. 

All  the  time  the  British  infantry  were  moving  forward  on 
the  7th  of  June,  the  artillery  aeroplane  observers  kept  watch 
on  the  German  batteries.  Every  howitzer  that  could  be 
spared  from  barrage  work  was  given  the  task  of  neutraliz- 
ing the  fire  of  the  enemy  guns,  but  the  air  observers  were 
able  to  report  more  active  targets  than  the  artillery  could 
engage.1  The  bombardment  of  the  Oosttaverne  line, 
'Bisseghem  and  Marcke.  On  no  account  will  any  troops  be  fired  at  west  of 
'the  Oosttaverne  line.  Every  opportunity  must  be  taken  to  harass  hostile 
'reinforcements  with  machine-gun  fire.  Machines  returning  from  patrols, 
'who  have  seen  columns  of  infantry  more  than  half  a  mile  in  length,  will 
'report,  immediately  on  landing,  their  location,  time  seen,  and  the  direction 
'they  were  moving  in.  This  is  extremely  important.' 

1  Of  398  zone  calls  for  fire  on  German  batteries  sent  down  from  the  air, 


1917]    ON  THE  FLANK  OF  THE  ATTACK        131 

during  the  halt  in  the  infantry  advance,  was  regulated  by  7  June 
the  aeroplane  observers  who  used  a  special  call  (O.Z.),  and 
gave  general  observations  of  the  fire,  specifying  portions  of 
the  line  by  map  square.  For  example,  the  wireless  signal, 
O.L.0.22.a.  M.A.3.,  told  those  batteries  which  were  firing 
on  the  part  of  the  Oosttaverne  line,  shown  as  cutting  across 
square  0.22a.  on  the  map,  that  most  of  their  shells  were 
bursting  fifty  yards  east  of  the  line. 

Although  the  infantry  of  the  VIII  Corps  on  the  left 
flank  of  the  attack  were  not  engaged  in  the  battle,  the  artil- 
lery of  the  Corps  was  particularly  well  placed  to  deal  with 
German  batteries  which  threatened  the  X  Corps  area  with 
enfilade  fire.  For  three  days  before  the  attack  began,  air 
observers  of  No.  21  Squadron  (eighteen  R.E.8's  with  six 
B.E.2e's  of  No.  7  Squadron  attached)  had  helped  the  VIII 
Corps  artillery  to  master  the  German  guns  on  this  flank  of 
the  battle  area.  On  the  morning  of  the  attack  five  aero- 
planes of  the  squadron  were  maintained  in  the  air  from 
dawn,  and  so  effectively  were  the  numerous  zone  calls  of 
the  observers  answered  that  few  of  the  German  batteries 
in  this  area  could  fire  for  long.  By  the  afternoon  the 
enemy  fire  had  fallen  away  so  much  that  the  number  of 
patrolling  aeroplanes  was  reduced  from  five  to  three. 
The  artillery  war  diary  of  the  VIII  Corps  records  that 
the  constant  watch  kept  by  the  pilots  and  observers  of 
No.  21  Squadron  was  chiefly  responsible  for  the  mastery 
of  the  German  batteries.  During  seventy-five  hours  of 
flying  on  this  day,  ninety-six  zone  calls  were  sent  down 
by  the  squadron  and,  as  a  result  of  this  information  and 
of  subsequent  observation  of  fire,  seventy-two  German 
batteries  were  silenced. 

The  day  bombing  on  the  7th  of  June  was  concentrated 
against  the  German  aerodromes.  The  objectives  were 
Ramegnies  Chin  near  Tournai,  Coucou  west  of  Menin, 
Bisseghem  west  of  Courtrai,  and  Rumbeke  south-east  of 
Roulers,  and  the  bombing  was  again  done  by  Nos.  55 

no  more  than  165  could  be  answered  in  time  for  the  air  observers  to  give 
general  corrections.  At  zero  hour,  in  the  three  attacking  Corps,  265 
howitzers,  of  6-inch  or  more,  were  employed  on  counter-battery  work  as 
compared  with  252  on  general  bombardment. 


132  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES         [ch.  iv 

73^  (D.H.4)  and  27  (Martinsyde)  Squadrons.  A  total  of  335 
bombs  of  20-lb.  or  25-lb.  weight  were  dropped  by  these 
two  squadrons,  but  owing  to  clouds  few  direct  hits  on  the 
targets  were  made.  As  a  result  of  reconnaissance  reports, 
made  by  No.  43  Squadron,  which  told  of  troop  and 
traffic  concentrations  in  the  Quesnoy-Warneton  area,  five 
F.E.2d's  of  No.  25  Squadron  (I  Brigade)  were  sent  out, 
a  few  minutes  after  the  report  had  been  made,  to  bomb 
the  enemy.  Thirty  25-lb.  bombs  were  dropped  on  the 
railway  north-west  of  Quesnoy,  at  a  detraining  point, 
and  on  roads  in  the  neighbourhood.  During  the  night 
of  the  7th/8th  F.E.'s  of  No.  100  Squadron  dropped  two 
and  a  half  tons  weight  of  bombs  on  the  stations  at  Warne- 
ton,  Menin,  and  Courtrai,  and  on  trains. 

The  German  fighting  aircraft  showed  more  activity  over 
the  battle  area  on  the  7th  than  they  had  done  for  some  days 
past  and,  in  the  morning  particularly,  repeatedly  tried  to 
get  through  to  attack  the  Corps  aeroplanes.  For  the  most 
part  they  were  frustrated  by  the  barrage  patrols,  while  the 
distant  offensive  patrol  pilots  also  engaged  many  forma- 
tions which  might  otherwise  have  penetrated  to  the  Mes- 
sines  area.  In  this  distant  fighting  the  pilots  of  the  Sopwith 
triplanes  of  No.  10  (Naval)  Squadron  showed  their 
superiority  over  the  enemy.  Three  Albatros  Scouts,  which 
eluded  the  barrage  in  the  morning,  attacked  an  R.E.8  of 
No.  42  Squadron  over  the  ridge.  They  put  the  Vickers 
gun  out  of  action  and  otherwise  shot  the  R.E.8  about,  but 
the  observer  fired  into  one  Albatros  at  point  blank  range 
and  sent  it  down  in  flames,  and  then  damaged  one  of  the 
others,  which  gave  up  the  fight  and  dived  away  east  with 
its  companion.  In  the  afternoon  an  R.E.8  of  No.  6  Squad- 
ron, on  photographic  duty  with  an  escort  of  three  Sopwith 
two-seaters,  was  shot  down  in  an  attack  by  four  Albatros 
fighters.  An  F.E.2d  formation  of  No.  20  Squadron  from 
the  barrage  patrol  saw  the  fight  and  joined  in;  they 
destroyed  one  Albatros  and  scattered  the  remainder,  but 
not  before  one  F.E.  had  been  shot  down  and  a  Sopwith 
badly  damaged.  On  the  whole,  in  spite  of  the  increased 
German  air  activity,  the  Corps  aeroplanes  were  able  to 
fulfil  their  tasks  with  inappreciable  hindrance. 


i9i7]  CONSOLIDATION  133 

As  has  been  told  the  situation  on  the  evening  of  the  7th 
of  June  was  still  obscure  along  part  of  the  front  of  the  II 
Anzac  Corps.  There  was  further  confused  fighting  in  this 
area  during  the  night,  and  an  urgent  request  was  made  to 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps  to  ascertain,  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  the  exact  position  at  the  junction  of  the  3rd  and 
4th  Australian  divisions.  At  daylight  on  the  8th  two  aero- 
planes of  No.  42  Squadron  were  sent  out.  The  pilots  flew 
low  over  the  forward  positions  of  the  Australian  infantry, 
and  in  response  to  the  observers'  calls,  flares  were  plenti- 
fully lighted,  enabling  the  flying  officers  to  make  a  clear 
and  detailed  report  of  the  position  along  the  whole  line 
about  which  doubts  had  existed.  Throughout  the  8th, 
consolidation  of  the  gains  of  the  previous  day  was  con- 
tinued. Special  air  reconnaissances  revealed  intense  road 
traffic  in  the  Roulers-Menin-Comines-Warneton-Lille 
areas.  In  the  evening  a  German  counter-attack,  made 
about  7  p.m.  against  the  greater  part  of  the  new  line,  was 
defeated  by  the  British  artillery  barrage.  The  bombing 
on  the  8th,  again  done  by  Nos.  27  and  55  Squadrons, 
was  confined  to  an  ammunition  depot  near  Dadizeele, 
and  hutments  in  the  wood  known  as  Holle  Bosch.  Night 
bombing,  on  railway  junctions  and  trains,  was  repeated 
during  the  8th/9th  of  June  by  No.  100  Squadron. 

With  the  defeat  of  the  German  counter-attack  on  the 
evening  of  the  8th,  the  main  phase  of  the  battle  ended  and 
the  next  few  days  were  spent  in  consolidation.  There  were 
no  further  bombing  operations  by  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
until  the  17th  of  June.  Nor,  during  the  intervening 
period,  was  there  much  decisive  air  fighting,  partly  be- 
cause of  low  clouds  and  mist  on  a  number  of  days,  but 
chiefly  because  of  a  curtailment  of  the  Flying  Corps 
offensive.  There  was  an  outburst  of  activity  on  the  9th, 
when  German  formations  harassed  the  Corps  squadrons, 
and  again  on  the  14th  and  15th,  but  the  chief  objectives  of 
the  Messines  battle  had  been  won  and  the  strength  of  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  had  now  to  be  conserved  for  the  main 
Flanders  offensive.  In  a  memorandum  to  his  Brigade 
Commanders  on  the  10th  of  June,  Major-General  Tren- 
chard  had  stated :  'I  would  ask  that  as  far  as  possible  you  do 


134  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

your  best  to  point  out  to  your  Armies  that  it  is  of  the 
utmost  importance  that  the  Flying  Corps  should  avoid 
wastage  in  both  pilots  and  machines  for  some  little  time. 
My  reserve  at  present  is  dangerously  low,  in  fact,  in  some 
cases  it  barely  exists  at  all,  and  the  supply  from  home  is 
not  coming  forward  sufficiently  freely  to  enable  us  to 
continue  fighting  an  offensive  in  the  air  continuously.  It 
is  just  as  impossible  for  the  air  forces  to  fight  a  continuous 
offensive  as  it  is  for  the  infantry,  and  as  we  have  no  reserve 
squadrons  it  is  necessary  to  do  everything  to  avoid  losses. 
...  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  however,  that  the 
offensive  spirit  is  maintained  in  the  Flying  Corps.' 

The  progress  of  the  British  infantry  on  the  right  of  the 
battle  front  had  made  the  enemy  positions  between  the 
river  Lys  and  St.  Yves  untenable.  These  were  gradually 
evacuated  and,  by  the  evening  of  the  14th  of  June,  the 
capture  of  the  whole  of  the  German  front  and  support  lines 
north  of  the  Lys  had  been  completed.  On  the  same  even- 
ing final  attacks  were  made  south  and  east  of  Messines  and 
on  both  sides  of  the  Ypres-Comines  Canal,  and,  as  a  result, 
strong  enemy  points  which  had  held  out  north  of  the 
Canal  were  taken.  This  action  marked  the  clearing  up  of 
the  battle  and  the  British  troops  settled  down  to  strengthen 
their  new  positions. 

In  the  air,  however,  activity  broke  out  afresh.  Freiherr 
Manfred  von  Richthofen,  who  had  been  on  leave  in 
Germany  since  the  beginning  of  May,  returned  to  the 
front  on  the  14th  of  June  and,  in  the  following  week,  made 
his  presence  felt.  The  recrudescence  of  enemy  aggressive- 
ness in  the  air  above  Flanders  followed  the  first  daylight 
bombing  raid  on  London.  A  formation  of  fourteen  Gothas 
attacked  the  City  and  East  End  of  London  on  the  13th 
of  June  and  inflicted  heavy  casualties.  So  great  was  the 
public  demand  for  a  strengthening  of  the  London  air 
defences  that  the  Government  decided,  pending  the  for- 
mation of  special  fighting  squadrons  in  England,  to  with- 
draw two  of  the  most  efficient  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
fighting  squadrons  working  under  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  to 
use  them  for  the  patrol  of  both  sides  of  the  Dover  Straits. 
On  the  2 1st  of  June,  No.  56  (S.E.5)  Squadron  flew  to 


1917]  LESSONS  OF  THE  BATTLE  135 

England  and  No.  66  (Sopwith  Tup')  Squadron  to  Calais. 
The  temporary  withdrawal  of  these  two  squadrons  left  the 
head-quarters  Ninth  Wing  in  France  with  only  one  fighting 
squadron — No.  19 — whose  efficiency  at  this  time  was 
seriously  impaired  by  engine  troubles.1  The  absence  of  the 
two  squadrons  was  seriously  felt  because  of  the  increased 
German  air  activity:  the  enemy  pilots  attacked  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  balloons,  registered  the  German  guns  on  the 
British  batteries,  flew  low  over  the  trench  positions  which 
they  attacked  with  machine-gun  fire,  and  did  a  fair  amount 
of  day  and  night  bombing.  On  the  24th  of  June  all  six 
balloons  on  the  front  of  the  Second  Army  were  attacked 
and  three  of  them  were  sent  down  in  flames :  later  in  the 
week  two  other  balloons  were  similarly  destroyed.  Such 
air  fighting  as  there  was  during  this  period  was  mostly 
indecisive.2 

The  battle  of  Messines — an  action  of  limited  objectives 
— has  been  described  as  a  tactical  masterpiece  of  its  kind. 
In  a  single  day's  fighting  the  Second  Army  advanced  two 
and  a  half  miles  on  a  ten-mile  front  and  captured  a  formid- 
able natural  position  which  had  been  made — so  the  enemy 
considered — impregnable  by  defensive  science.  At  small 
loss  to  the  attackers  there  had  been  great  gains  also  in 
prisoners,  guns,  trench  mortars,  and  machine-guns.  A 
memorandum  by  the  X  Corps  staff  on  the  Lessons  of  the 
Battle  said :  'The  success  was  due  to  a  great  extent  to  the 
'excellent  work  of  the  artillery  which  made  the  work  of  the 
'infantry  exceptionally  easy  as  there  was  practically  no 
'wire  left.'  This  may  appear  an  overstatement  in  so  far  as 
it  concerns  the  task  of  the  infantry,  but  it  is  true  that  the 
part  played  by  the  artillery  was  vital,  and  it  is  clear  that 

1  The  Spads  of  No.  19  Squadron  were  equipped  with  150  horse-power 
Hispano-Suiza  engines :  their  armament  was  one  fixed  Vickers  gun.  An  im- 
proved type,  mounting  two  fixed  Vickers  guns,  and  equipped  with  the 
200  horse-power  Hispano,  was  brought  into  general  use  in  November  1917. 

2  No.  56  Squadron  returned  to  France  on  the  5th  of  July.  No  raid  on 
London  was  attempted  while  the  squadron  was  in  England,  but  on  the  7th, 
after  the  squadron's  departure,  London  was  attacked  again.  No.  66 
Squadron  was  withdrawn  from  Calais  on  the  6th  of  July.  While  at  Calais 
this  squadron  had  been  under  the  direct  orders  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Home  Forces.   See  also  pp.  152-5. 


136  THE  BATTLE  OF  MESSINES        [ch.  iv 

the  work  of  the  air  artillery  observers,  favoured  by  good 
weather,  was  an  outstanding  contribution  to  the  success  of 
the  battle.  This  aircraft  and  artillery  co-operation  had 
been  well  organized,  but  experience  in  the  battle  showed 
that  the  artillery  had  often  been  unable  to  answer  calls  from 
the  air  for  fire  on  fleeting  targets.  A  General  Staff  memo- 
randum1 stated  that  many  more  batteries  must,  in 
future  actions,  be  made  responsible  for  answering  such 
calls.  Periods  of  consolidation  were  of  particular  im- 
portance for  bringing  fire  to  bear  on  fleeting  targets 
because  the  enemy  troops  were  then  most  likely  to 
be  on  the  move.  During  this  time  bombardment  groups 
would,  normally,  be  keeping  up  a  slow  rate  of  fire 
and  could,  therefore,  temporarily  allot  batteries  to  deal 
with  fleeting  targets,  but  it  was  emphasized  that  this  allot- 
ment must  be  made  beforehand  as  part  of  the  battle  plans. 
Furthermore,  the  fact  that  many  important  calls  sent 
down  from  the  air  had  not  been  answered  made  it  clear 
that  the  orders  to  groups  and  batteries  relative  to  their 
responsibilities  in  this  connexion,  both  during  and  after 
the  infantry  assault,  must  be  made  more  detailed,  com- 
prehensive, and  definite.  The  memorandum  instanced  an 
episode  on  the  7th  of  June  when  an  air  observer's  call  for 
fire  on  a  column  of  German  infantry,  batteries,  and  trans- 
port on  the  move,  was  not  acted  upon,  owing  to  in- 
adequate prearrangement.  As  a  contrast,  to  show  the 
value  of  efficient  co-operation,  an  example,  afforded  by 
the  destruction  of  a  German  battery,  was  quoted.  This 
battery  was  first  reported  active  east  of  the  Messines  ridge 
(by  NF  call),  and  was  promptly  engaged  under  the  air 
observer's  direction.  Soon  after  fire  was  opened,  however, 
the  enemy  battery  moved,  but  was  reported  on  the  move 
by  a  different  call  (LL),  and  was  again  fired  on  by  many 
British  batteries.  In  spite  of  this  fire  the  German  guns  were 
once  more  brought  into  action,  whereupon  the  observer 
changed  his  call  (to  MQNF)  and  proceeded  to  direct  a 
battery  of  the  II  Anzac  Corps  on  the  enemy  positions  until 

1  For  the  information  of  the  service  student,  this  memorandum,  under 
the  title,  Notes  on  Co-operation  between  Aircraft  and,  Artillery  during  recent 
operations  on  the  Second  Army  Front,  was  printed  in  June  191 7  as  S.S.170. 


BATTLES  of  YPRES,   1917. 


Qrtfnane*  Surrtf,  1935. 


1917]  ARTILLERY  ORGANIZATION  137 

the  guns  were  destroyed.1  The  point  of  this  example  is 
that  the  air  observer  altered  his  wireless  calls  to  meet 
different  circumstances,  and  that  the  unhesitating 
response,  at  each  stage,  of  the  British  artillery  meant 
that  the  German  battery  had  little  chance  of  escape. 

1  The  NF  call  reported  an  active  German  battery.  The  LL  call  was 
for  all  available  batteries  to  open  fire  to  meet  a  sudden  attack,  or  to 
engage  an  important  target.  The  MQNF  call  reported  activity  and 
warned  all  concerned  that  a  particular  battery  would  be  called  up  subse- 
quently to  engage  the  target  for  destruction,  i.e.  a  battery  with  which  the 
air  observer  had  prearranged  liaison. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES 

31st  July-ioth  November,  igiy 

[Map,  pp.  137  and  212] 

The  concentration  for  the  Flanders  campaign  proceeded 
independently  of  the  preparations  for  the  subsidiary  attack 
at  Messines.  Following  the  conference  of  Allied  statesmen 
which  had  been  held  in  Paris  at  the  beginning  of  May, 
at  which  it  had  been  decided,  in  principle,  that  the 
main  Allied  offensive  should  be  transferred  to  Flanders, 
the  British  and  French  Commanders-in-Chief  and  their 
staffs  had  met  at  Amiens  on  the  18th  of  May  to  discuss 
the  plan  of  operations.  This  plan,  which  aimed  at  the 
ultimate  capture  of  the  Belgian  coast  as  far  as  the  Dutch 
frontier,  particularly  of  the  U-boat  bases,  may  be  broadly 
summarized  as  follows.1  In  the  first  instance  there  was  to  be 
an  advance  from  the  front,  Hooge-Steenstraate,  with  the 
object  of  securing  possession  of  the  Passchendaele-Staden 
ridge  and,  subsequently,  of  the  Roulers-Thourout  rail- 
way, thus  threatening  the  rear  of  the  German  defences  to 
the  north.  When  the  Passchendaele-Staden  ridge  had 
been  captured,  it  was  intended  that  a  landing  should  be 
made  on  the  coast  between  the  Yser  river  and  Ostend,  in 
conjunction  with  which  an  attack  would  be  delivered  on 
the  Nieuport  front. 

It  was  agreed  at  the  Amiens  conference  that  the  French 
should  hand  over  the  Nieuport  sector  to  the  British  to 
facilitate  these  combined  naval  and  military  operations, 
and,  further,  that  the  French  and  Belgians  should  each 
provide  a  force  of  six  divisions  to  take  part  in  the  offensive. 
It  was  suggested  that  the  French  and  Belgian  divisions 
should  be  combined  under  Belgian  command,  but,  on  the 
1st  of  June,  it  was  finally  arranged  that  the  French 
divisions  should  be  grouped  to  form  the  French  First 
Army,  and  that  its  commander,  General  Anthoine,  should 
receive  general  orders  (directives)  from  Sir  Douglas  Haig  in 

1  The  British  Government,  it  may  be  repeated,  did  not  approve  Sir 
Douglas  Haig's  plan  for  the  Flanders  offensive  until  the  20th  of  July. 


1917]  THE  FIFTH  ARMY  139 

the  same  manner  as  a  British  army  commander.  The 
Belgian  Army,  also,  although  remaining  an  independent 
command,  was  to  conduct  its  operations  in  accordance 
with  the  general  British  strategical  plans. 

The  main  thrust,  that  is,  the  capture  of  the  Passchen- 
daele-Staden  ridge  and  the  Roulers-Thourout  railway, 
was  allotted  to  General  Sir  Hubert  de  la  Poer  Gough, 
the  Commander  of  the  Fifth  Army.  The  control  of  the 
coastal  operations  was  to  be  the  task  of  General  Sir 
Henry  S.  Rawlinson,  commanding  the  Fourth  Army. 
Between  these  two  Armies  were  the  Belgians  and  the 
French.  The  latter,  on  the  left  of  the  Fifth  Army,  were 
to  form  a  defensive  flank  for  that  Army;  the  subsequent 
advance  of  the  French  and  Belgians  would  be  conducted 
in  such  a  way  as  to  link  the  main  movement  on  Roulers- 
Thourout  with  the  coastal  landing.  The  British  Second 
Army,  on  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Army,  was  to  form  a 
defensive  flank  for  the  initial  operations. 

To  assist  the  Flanders  operations  the  French  had 
extended  their  front  in  the  Somme  area,  northwards  to 
the  Omignon  river  on  the  20th  of  May.  At  that  time 
the  Fifth  Army  had  been  on  the  right  of  the  British  line 
and,  in  order  that  Sir  Hubert  Gough,  the  army  com- 
mander, and  his  staff,  might  be  released  for  the  Flanders 
campaign,  the  command  of  all  the  troops  in  what  had 
been  the  Fifth  Army  area,  had  been  handed  over  to  the 
Third  Army  at  the  end  of  May.  Sir  Hubert  Gough 
reformed  the  Fifth  Army  in  the  Ypres  area  on  the  10th 
of  June  by  taking  over  the  II,  VIII,  and  XIV  Corps  from 
the  Second  Army,  and  the  line  from  Observatory  ridge 
to  Boesinghe.  On  the  4th  of  July  the  Fifth  Army  front 
was  extended  southwards  to  the  Zillebeke-Zandvoorde 
road,  giving  the  Army  a  total  of  seven  and  a  half  miles 
of  line  along  which  the  main  opening  blow  was  to  be 
struck.  By  the  31st  of  July,  when  the  infantry  attacks 
began,  redistributions  of  divisions,  and  reinforcements, 
had  increased  the  strength  of  the  Fifth  Army  to  four 
Corps  in  the  line  (II,  XIX,  XVIII,  and  XIV)  and  to  two 
Corps  in  reserve  (VIII  and  V). 

The  Fourth  Army,  for  the  operations  on  the  coast,  had 


140  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

begun  to  move  north  in  June,  when  the  XV  Corps 
(Lieutenant-General  Sir  J.  P.  du  Cane)  began  to  relieve 
the  French  in  the  Nieuport  area.  General  Sir  Henry 
Rawlinson  arrived  at  Malo-les-Bains,  which  he  made  his 
head-quarters,  on  the  8th  of  July,  and  took  over  command 
of  the  line  from  the  sea  to  St.  Georges. 

Air  Concentration  for  the  Offensive 

The  head-quarters  of  the  V  Brigade,  Royal  Flying  Corps 
(Brigadier-General  C.  A.  H.  Longcroft),  had  moved  north 
with  the  staff  of  the  Fifth  Army  early  in  June  and  had 
taken  over  Nos.  4,  7,  and  21  Squadrons  from  the  II 
Brigade,  and  No.  9  Squadron  from  the  IV  Brigade.  By  the 
beginning  of  July  all  four  of  these  squadrons — which  made 
up  the  Fifteenth  (Corps)  Wing — were  equipped  with 
R.E.8  aeroplanes.1  By  this  time,  also,  the  transfers  of 
fighting  squadrons  to  the  Army  Wing  (the  Twenty-Second) 
had  been  completed.  They  were  No.  23  (Spad),  No.  10 
Naval  (Sopwith  Triplane),  No.  32  (D.H.5),  and  No.  29 
(Nieuport  Scout).  The  Wing  also  received  No.  57  (D.H.4) 
day  bomber  squadron.  Of  the  four  balloon  companies 
(Nos.  17,  20,  8,  and  13)  transferred  to  the  V  Brigade,  three 
had  been  working  in  the  area  of  the  impending  battle 
when  it  was  held  by  the  Second  Army,  and  the  balloon 
observers  knew  the  ground  well.  The  Ninth  Wing,  we 
have  seen,  had  already  moved  north  for  the  Messines 
battle. 

The  air  co-operation  with  the  Fourth  Army  on  the 
coast  was  provided  by  the  IV  Brigade.  The  Third  (Corps) 
Wing  of  this  brigade,  made  temporarily  into  an  inde- 
pendent mixed  command,  had  moved  north  with  the  XV 
Corps  in  June,  and  was  made  responsible  for  the  air  co- 
operation and  protection  while  the  line  was  being  taken 
over  from  the  French.  By  the  10th  of  July,  two  days  after 
General  Rawlinson  arrived  at  Malo-les-Bains,  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  concentration  for  the  coastal  operations — 
including  the  IV  Brigade  and  the  Fourteenth  (Army)  Wing 
head-quarters — was  complete.  The  air  units  included  two 

1  On  the  31st  of  July  No.  4  Squadron  was  with  the  II  Corps,  No.  21 
with  the  XIX,  No.  7  with  the  XVIII,  and  No.  9  with  the  XIV. 


i9i7]  THE  AIR  CONCENTRATION  141 

R.E.8  squadrons,  Nos.  34  and  52,  of  the  Third  Wing 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  R.  Ludlow-Hewitt),  and  four 
fighter  squadrons,  Nos.  6  Naval  (Sopwith  'Camel'),  9 
Naval  (Sopwith  Triplanes  and  Tups'),  48  (Bristol  Fighter), 
and  54  (Sopwith  Tups')  of  the  Fourteenth  Wing  (Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel R.  P.  Mills).  No.  9  (Naval)  Squadron  had 
been  completely  re-equipped  with  Sopwith  'Camels'  by 
the  4th  of  August.  The  balloons  were  supplied  by  two 
sections  of  No.  9  Balloon  Company. 

With  the  French  First  Army,  on  the  31st  of  July,  were 
about  two  hundred  aeroplanes  of  which  one-half  were 
single-seater  fighters.1  The  Belgians  had  about  forty 
artillery  aeroplanes. 

If,  therefore,  we  include  the  squadrons  of  the  II  Brigade 
with  the  Second  Army,  we  get  an  Allied  air  concentration 
from  the  Lys,  north-east  of  Armentieres  (that  is,  the  right 
flank  of  the  Second  Army)  to  the  sea,  of  508  British  aero- 
planes (230  single-seater  fighters),2  200  French  (about  100 
single-seater  fighters)  and  40  Belgian,  or  a  total  of  748 
aeroplanes  of  which  330  were  fighters.  To  these  figures, 
however,  must  be  added  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  air- 
craft, totalling  104,  which  operated  from  the  Dunkirk  area 
over  the  Belgian  coast. 

It  is  not  possible  to  give  exact  figures  for  the  German  air 
concentration  from  the  Lys  to  the  sea  because  the  German 
Fourth  Army,  which  was  in  this  area,  held  a  front  from 
La  Bassee  to  the  coast.  The  air  strength  with  this  army 
was  doubled  between  the  7th  of  June  and  the  31st  of  July.3 
By  the  latter  date  the  German  Fourth  Army  Commander 
had  at  his  disposal  about  600  aeroplanes  of  which  one- 
third  were  single-seater  fighters,  including  Richthofen's 
new  squadron  of  four  fighter  Flights.4 

1  Thirty  of  these  fighters  (No.  13  Group)  were  withdrawn  on  the  7th  of 
August  and  a  second  group  (No.  11)  early  in  September. 

2  For  the  Order  of  Battle,  Royal  Flying  Corps,  on  the  31st  of  July,  see 
Appendix  V. 

3  The  German  air  concentration  had  been  completed  when  the  offensive 
opened.  There  was  very  little  subsequent  change  in  the  air  units  with  the 
German  Fourth  Army  between  July  and  November  1917. 

4  Richthofen  himself  was  out  of  action  from  early  in  July  until  the  16th 
of  August.  On  the  6th  of  July  an  offensive  patrol  formation  of  six  F.E.2d's 


i42  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

But  opposite  part  of  the  German  Fourth  Army  front, 
that  is  to  say,  between  La  Bassee  and  the  Lys,  was  part  of 
the  British  First  Army  and,  along  this  stretch  of  front,  was 
approximately  half  the  strength  of  the  I  Brigade,  Royal 
Flying  Corps,  or,  say,  some  ninety  aeroplanes  of  which 
twenty  were  single-seater  fighters.  The  German  figures 
do  not  include  naval  air  units  working  on  the  Belgian  coast.1 
The  military  figures,  therefore,  taken  alone,  give  the  Allies 
about  840  aeroplanes  and  the  Germans  some  600  between 
La  Bassee  and  the  sea.  In  fighting  aircraft  the  Allies  dis- 
posed of  350  as  compared  with  200  German,  or  enjoyed  a 
numerical  superiority  of  3-i-  to  2. 

As  it  seemed  fairly  certain  that  the  offensive  would  be 
long  sustained,  and  as  there  was  little  immediate  prospect 
that  sufficient  pilots  and  aeroplanes  would  be  forthcoming 
from  England  to  keep  the  squadrons  up  to  strength  once 
the  battle  began,  it  was  decided  at  the  end  of  June  to 
create  a  special  reserve  by  reducing  the  squadrons  of  the 
I  and  III  Brigades  to  seventeen  pilots  and  fifteen  aero- 
planes. The  pilots  and  aeroplanes  in  the  reserve  pool  were 
to  be  posted,  as  required,  to  the  squadrons  on  the  active 
front.  To  offset  the  reduction  in  the  strength  of  the  I  and 
III  Brigades,  the  French  were  asked  to  assume  responsi- 
bility from  the  5th  of  July,  as  a  temporary  measure,  for  all 

of  No.  20  Squadron  was  engaged  by  Richthofen  and  numerous  enemy 
groups  of  fighters  to  the  total  of  forty.  Four  Sopwith  triplanes  of  No.  10 
(Naval)  Squadron  joined  the  encounter.  The  latter,  without  loss  to  them- 
selves, drove  down  four  enemy  fighters  out  of  control,  one  of  which  was  seen 
to  crash.  The  F.E.2d's  also  fought  magnificently,  but  lost  two  of  their 
number  and  had  an  observer  wounded  in  a  third.  The  pilot  and  observer 
in  one  of  the  F.E.2d's  (Captain  D.  C.  Cunnell  and  Second  Lieutenant  A.  E. 
Woodbridge)  sent  down  four  of  the  enemy  out  of  control.  The  observer, 
Second  Lieutenant  Woodbridge,  sent  down  another,  an  all-red  Albatros, 
but  did  not  claim  it,  because,  although  it  spun  down,  he  did  not  see  it 
crash.  This  aeroplane,  in  fact,  was  piloted  by  Richthofen  who  had  been  hit 
in  the  head  by  a  bullet.  Temporarily  blinded  and  paralysed,  the  German 
leader  fell  for  some  distance,  but  succeeded  in  making  a  landing.  He  was  in 
hospital  until  the  beginning  of  August,  when  he  returned  to  his  squadron, 
although  there  is  evidence  that  he  had  not  properly  recovered  from  his 
wound.   He  was  in  action  again  on  August  the  16th. 

1  The  best  available  figures  give  the  German  naval  air  units  49  seaplanes 
and  14  single-seater  aeroplanes. 


i9i7]  EMPLOYMENT  OF  AIRCRAFT  143 

air  protection  and  general  reconnaissance  on  the  British 
front  south  of  Havrincourt.  To  this  request  the  French 
agreed,  and  the  III  Brigade  Commander  was  instructed  to 
confine  his  activities,  on  that  part  of  the  Third  Army  front 
between  Havrincourt  and  the  Omignon  river,  to  trench 
reconnaissance,  photography,  and  the  work  of  artillery 
co-operation. 

Employment  of  Aircraft 

The  Allied  forces,  we  have  seen,  were  to  operate  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  general  plans  of  British  head-quarters, 
and  Major-General  Trenchard,  therefore,  with  the 
authority  of  General  Head-quarters,  issued  instructions, 
or  made  suggestions,  which  aimed  at  co-ordinating  the 
employment  of  the  British  and  French  aircraft.  On  the 
7th  of  July  his  initial  orders  were  issued  defining  the 
reconnaissance,  offensive  patrol,  and  bombing  areas  of 
the  various  commands  from  the  Lille-Armentieres  railway 
to  the  sea.  These  were  to  come  into  force  from  midnight 
on  the  8th  of  July  (see  table,  p.  144). 

The  various  air  groups  mentioned  in  the  table  were  to 
make  arrangements  for  all  necessary  reconnaissance,  offen- 
sive and  defensive  work,  in  the  areas  allotted  to  them, 
without  reference  to  Royal  Flying  Corps  advanced  head- 
quarters. Armies  which  required  additional  air  protection 
in  connexion  with  local  operations,  or  for  any  other  pur- 
pose, were  to  apply  to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  head- 
quarters. Armies  were  to  make  their  own  arrangements 
for  the  interchange  of  reconnaissance  reports  which  might 
be  of  special  interest  to  adjacent  commands.  The  Royal 
Flying  Corps  would  arrange  for  copies  of  reconnaissance 
reports,  made  by  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing,  to  be  sent 
direct  to  any  French,  Belgian,  or  British  Army  interested. 
Each  command  was  supplied  by  Royal  Flying  Corps 
head-quarters  with  a  map  showing  targets  for  its  bomb- 
ing squadrons.  These  targets  were  not  selected,  but 
included  all  known  enemy  aerodromes,  ammunition  and 
other  depots,  railway  and  other  communications,  billeting 
centres,  &c.  The  orders  for  day  and  night  bombing  by  the 
Ninth  Wing  and  by  the  Naval  Air  Service  squadrons, 


144 


THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES 


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1917]        GENERAL  AIR  INSTRUCTIONS  145 

would,  it  was  stated,  be  issued  by  Royal  Flying  Corps  head- 
quarters, but  targets  for  day  bombing  by  other  units  would 
be  at  the  discretion  and  direction  of  the  various  Army 
Commanders.  If  any  command  intended  to  bomb  a 
target  outside  their  normal  reconnaissance  area,  Royal 
Flying  Corps  advanced  head-quarters  was  to  be  kept  in- 
formed. The  French  First  Army  aviation  was  to  bomb  by 
night  any  targets  selected  by  their  army  within  the  area 
allotted,  and  was  to  inform  advanced  Royal  Flying  Corps 
head-quarters,  by  noon  each  day,  of  the  specific  targets 
chosen  for  the  following  night.  The  Belgian  aviation  re- 
ceived copies  of  these  orders,  for  information,  and  was  also 
requested  to  keep  Royal  Flying  Corps  head-quarters  in- 
formed of  any  targets  bombed  by  Belgian  pilots  at  night. 
If  the  French  First  Army  issued  no  night-bombing 
instructions,  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  it  was  stated,  would 
allot  targets  to  the  French  aviation.  Alternatively,  if  the 
French  air  service  was  unable  to  fulfil  any  orders  for  night 
bombing  issued  by  the  French  First  Army,  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  would  make  other  arrangements  for  the  work 
to  be  done.  These  preliminary  instructions  gave  wide  dis- 
cretion to  various  commands  for  bombing,  but  later  orders, 
issued  in  connexion  with  the  opening  of  the  battle,  show 
that  specific  targets,  chiefly  enemy  aerodromes  and  railway 
communications,  were  allotted  or  suggested  by  Royal 
Flying  Corps  head-quarters  in  accordance  with  a  general 
strategic  plan.1 

The  insfructions  of  the  7th  of  July  concluded  by  order- 
ing the  immediate  opening  of  the  air  offensive  on  a  limited 
scale  on  the  British  Fifth  and  Second  Army  fronts;  this 
offensive,  it  was  stated,  was  to  be  increased  gradually  to  its 
full  power.  Later  the  same  day,  however,  a  special  supple- 
mentary order  was  issued  which  stated  that  the  air 
offensive  on  these  fronts  must  be  fully  developed  from  the 
8th  onwards.  This  was  judged  to  be  necessary  to  curtail 
the  amount  of  air  and  artillery  co-operation  which  the 
enemy  was  doing,  and  to  prevent  interference  by  enemy 
aircraft  with  the  British  Corps  aeroplanes.  At  the  same 
time  the  French  First  Army  were  asked  to  send  out  their 
1  See  Appendix  VI. 


146  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

full  offensive  patrol  strength  as  soon  as  possible.  The 
French  air  offensive  actually  began  on  the  nth,  and,  two 
days  later,  the  IV  Brigade  and  the  Dunkirk  naval  air  units  on 
the  coast  were  asked  to  put  their  full  strength  into  the  air. 

On  the  front  of  the  Fifth  Army,  the  immediate  object 
of  the  air  offensive  was  to  stop  the  enemy  from  patrolling 
the  area  between  the  German  balloon  line  and  the  front- 
line trenches,  which  he  had  been  doing  for  some  time 
with  increasing  aggressiveness.  Until  the  effect  of  the 
air  offensive  should  make  itself  felt,  an  inner  patrol  of 
four  fighters  was  to  be  maintained  over  the  above  area 
to  protect  the  Flying  Corps  artillery  aeroplanes  and  to 
interfere  with  the  artillery  work  of  the  enemy.  The 
remainder  of  the  fighting  aeroplanes  of  the  Fifth  Army 
were  to  be  employed  on  high  offensive  patrols  as  the  situa- 
tion required,  but  each  patrol  sent  out  was,  first  of  all,  to 
clear  the  area  between  the  front-line  trenches  and  the 
German  balloon  line.  The  enemy  balloons  were  to  be 
attacked  periodically  by  selected  single-seater  pilots  until 
the  day  the  battle  began,  when  organized  low  attacks 
would  be  made.  Fighter  reconnaissance  aeroplanes,  in 
addition  to  their  photographic  and  reconnaissance  duties, 
were  to  be  employed  for  bombing  enemy  aerodromes  in  co- 
operation with  attacks,  by  fighting  formations,  on  enemy 
aeroplanes  attempting  to  leave  the  ground.  Up  to  the 
opening  of  the  battle,  the  Corps  aeroplanes  were  to  be  used 
entirely  for  artillery  work  and  for  photography :  thereafter 
they  would  be  used,  in  addition,  for  contact-patrol  duties 
and  for  machine-gun  attacks  to  harass  the  enemy. 

A  modification  of  the  wireless  interception  scheme  was 
introduced  into  the  V  Brigade.  A  section,  styled  the 
Aerial  Activity  Office,  was  established  at  Brigade  head- 
quarters to  co-ordinate  information  about  enemy  air 
activity.  Five  minutes  before  each  fighter  patrol  was  due 
to  leave  the  ground,  the  squadron  commander  was  to  ask 
the  'Activity  Office'  what  the  hostile  air  service  was  doing. 

The  German  Attack  at  Lombartzyde 

While  the  numerous  preparations  were  in  progress,  the 
Germans  delivered  a  surprise  attack  in  the  coastal  area. 


i9i7]  ATTACK  AT  LOMBARTZYDE  147 

Unusual  precautions  had  been,  and  were  being  taken  to 
keep  secret  the  plans  for  the  landing  of  troops  between  the 
Yser  and  Ostend.  This  was  to  be  made  by  the  1st  Division 
which  was  put  inside  a  camp  enclosed  with  barbed  wire. 
So  that  the  training  of  the  men  might  proceed  without 
arousing  suspicion,  it  was  given  out  that  the  division  was 
in  quarantine  owing  to  an  outbreak  of  infectious  disease. 
Some  of  the  pilots  and  observers  of  No.  52  Squadron, 
allotted  for  contact-patrol  duties  in  connexion  with  the 
landing,  were  segregated  for  training  with  the  1st  Division. 
To  keep  enemy  aeroplanes  away  from  the  practice  areas, 
special  fighter  patrols  were  organized  and,  in  addition, 
arrangements  were  made  to  obtain  early  warning  of  hostile 
aircraft  approaching  the  Dunkirk  area,  and  to  have  fighting 
aircraft  in  constant  readiness  to  go  up  immediately  a 
warning  was  received.  In  spite  of  these  precautions,  the 
German  Command  knew,  through  its  Intelligence  Service, 
that  a  landing  might  be  attempted,  and  also  discovered 
the  change  from  French  to  British  occupation  in  the 
Nieuport  sector.  This  was  because  the  French  insisted  that 
the  British  infantry  should  take  over  the  line  from  the 
French  infantry  before  the  artillery  relief  took  place.  The 
infantry  should  have  been  changed  gradually  before 
the  projected  attack,  but  the  French  contention  was 
that  the  support  of  the  British  guns  would  be  insufficient, 
and  the  artillery  relief  did  not  take  place  until  the  French 
infantry  were  clear  of  the  defences.  As  a  result,  the  enemy 
had  ample  warning,  and  the  German  XIV  Reserve  Corps, 
which  had  been  ordered  to  the  coast  sector  on  the  19th  of 
May  to  deal  with  a  possible  coast  landing  or  an  attempted 
inroad  by  way  of  Holland,1  knew  the  best  moment  to  make 
a  counterstroke. 

The  line  taken  over  from  the  French  in  the  Nieuport 
area  comprised  three  well-defined  sectors.  On  the  right 
was  the  St.  Georges  sector,  almost  surrounded  by  inunda- 
tions ;  in  the  centre  was  the  Lombartzyde  sector,  with  its 
flanks  protected  by  inundations;  and  on  the  left  was  the 
Nieuport  Bains  sector,  divided  bytheGeleide  Brook.  It  was 

1  See  Feldzugsaufzeichnungen  1914-18,  by  General  von  Moser,  pp. 
278-84. 


148  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

a  difficult  area  to  defend,  and  a  still  more  difficult  jump- 
ing off  ground  for  an  offensive.  In  the  front  line  the  only 
means  of  communication  between  one  sector  and  the  next 
was  by  single  bridges  across  the  inundated  areas.  The  front 
line  itself  was  separated  from  its  supporting  troops  by  the 
Yser  and  Dunkirk  canals,  of  which  the  former  particu- 
larly constituted  a  serious  obstacle.  The  way  over  was  by 
three  floating-barrel  pier  bridges  {Richmond,  Kew,  and 
Mortlake)  at  the  mouth  of  the  canal  near  Nieuport  Bains, 
and  by  three  others  {Barnes,  Putney,  and  VauxhalV),  near 
Nieuport  itself.  There  was,  also,  a  permanent  roadway 
over  the  lock  gates  east  of  Nieuport,  and  another  bridge 
{Crowder)  was  added,  later,  between  Putney  and  Vauxhall 
bridges.  In  the  centre  of  the  front  there  was  a  stretch  of 
over  2,000  yards  along  which  there  was  no  crossing  over 
the  Yser.  Apart  from  these  basic  difficulties,  there  were 
others,  such  as  the  absence  of  cover  for  guns  in  the 
polder,  and  the  risk  of  machine-gun  stoppages  due  to  sand 
storms. 

While  the  Allied  preparations  were  in  hand,  the 
Germans  took  the  initiative  and  launched  their  attack.1 
The  visibility  on  the  7th,  8th,  and  9th  of  July  was  poor, 
with  ground  mist,  and  clouds  about  900  feet.  There  was, 
in  consequence,  very  little  flying.  This  was  the  more  un- 
fortunate because  there  had  been  various  reports,  of  an 
indefinite  nature,  of  unusual  enemy  activity,  and  air  recon- 
naissances, favoured  by  reasonably  good  weather,  should 
have  given  some  warning  of  the  German  intentions.  The 
observer  in  one  reconnaissance  aeroplane,  who  had  been 
specially  sent  out  early  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  to  look 
for  signs  of  this  activity,  returned  with  a  report  that  move- 
ments behind  the  German  lines  were  normal.  Although 
this  was  probably  true  at  the  time  the  reconnaissance 
was  made,  it  is  a  fact  that  there  was  exceptional  activity 
within  the  German  lines  for  some  days  before  the  attack 
was  launched,  and  it  is  a  fact  also  that  no  indications  that 

1  During  the  night  of  the  6th/7th  of  July,  enemy  aeroplanes  success- 
fully bombed  the  main  aerodrome  at  Bray  Dunes.  Twelve  aeroplanes  and 
some  motor  transport  were  damaged  and  nine  casualties  were  caused  to 
personnel.    The  weight  of  bombs  dropped  was  750  kg. 


1917]     THE  ATTACK  AT  LOMBARTZYDE        149 

the  attack  was  impending  were  seen  by  the  few  air 
observers  who  flew  over  the  German  lines.  On  the  9th 
of  July,  the  most  important  day  for  observation,  there 
was  no  flying  at  all  owing  to  the  bad  weather  and  visibility 
conditions. 

About  5.30  a.m.  on  the  10th  of  July  a  heavy  bom- 
bardment opened  along  the  whole  front  of  the  XV 
Corps  and  lasted,  with  a  short  break  at  midday,  until 
7  p.m.,  by  which  time  all  the  bridges  across  the  Yser  had 
been  destroyed.  Between  7.15  p.m.  and  7.40  p.m.  the 
Germans  attacked  and,  except  on  the  extreme  right,  over- 
ran the  front.  By  noon  on  the  nth  the  enemy  was  in 
possession  of  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Yser  from  the  coast  to 
Nieuport.  The  British  casualties  were  heavy.  Of  the  two 
battalions  holding  the  front  from  the  coast  to  the  Geleide 
Brook,  only  four  officers  and  seventy  men  got  back  by 
swimming  the  Yser;  in  all,  during  the  two  days,  126 
officers  and  3,000  men  were  lost. 

To  cover  his  attack,  the  enemy  made  extensive  use  of 
smoke  screens  which  greatly  impeded  air  observation, 
already  difficult  in  the  conditions  of  low  cloud.  Also, 
German  fighting  aircraft  made  many  attacks.  Some  new 
German  battery  positions  were  discovered  by  the  air  ob- 
servers, but  most  of  the^  guns  reported  active  had  been 
previously  located  from  the  air.  Air  observers,  during  the 
evening  of  the  10th  and  again  next  morning,  plotted  the 
battle-line,  and  from  their  reports  a  situation  map,  showing 
the  front  line  on  the  nth,  was  compiled. 

It  was  clear  that  the  enemy  had  made  a  formidable  con- 
centration of  guns  in  the  area,  and  No.  52  Squadron  was 
therefore  increased  to  four  Flights  by  the  transfer  of  one 
Flight  from  No.  34  Squadron,  and  was  specifically  allotted 
to  the  artillery  for  counter-battery  work.  The  enemy 
took  measures,  often  effective,  to  impede  this  co-operation. 
Smoke  'pots'  were  placed  in  a  circular  position  round 
the  main  German  batteries,  and  when  the  aeroplanes  of 
No.  52  Squadron  appeared  to  direct  the  fire  of  the  British 
guns,  a  smoke  screen  was  started  which  concealed  the 
enemy  battery  positions  and  made  it  very  difficult  for 
the  air  observers  to  give  useful  fire  corrections. 


150  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

The  coastal  attack  was  to  begin  when  the  Fifth  Army 
had  progressed  as  far  as  Roulers.  This  condition,  as  shall 
be  told,  was  never  fulfilled.  The  troops  in  the  coastal 
area  and  the  co-operating  naval  units  waited  in  readiness 
throughout  the  summer  and  into  the  autumn,  until,  in 
October  191 7,  the  project  was  abandoned.  The  Royal 
Flying  Corps  and  naval  squadrons,  in  the  time  of  waiting, 
were  kept  fully  occupied  in  the  work  of  co-operation  with 
the  artillery,  surveying  and  mapping  the  coast,  and  in 
general  bombing.1 

There  were,  during  this  period,  some  experiments  of 
general  interest.  No.  52  Squadron,  under  Major  A.  A. 
Walser,  and  the  Fourth  Balloon  Wing,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  the  Hon.  J.  D.  Boyle,  developed  co-operation 
between  aeroplane  and  balloon  observers  working  for  the 
artillery,  a  form  of  co-operation  which  had  been  tried 
elsewhere  on  the  front,  notably  in  the  III  Brigade.  The 
initial  desire  was  to  economize  the  use  of  trained  aero- 
plane pilots  and  observers  of  the  Corps  squadrons.  In  the 
III  Brigade  arrangements  had  been  made  at  the  end  of 
April  for  artillery  aeroplane  observers  to  make  a  special  call 
to  the  balloons  when,  through  any  reason,  the  aeroplane 
was  compelled  to  return  before  the  'shoot'  had  been  com- 
pleted. Any  balloon  section  which  took  in  this  signal  and 
was  in  a  position  to  observe  the  target,  would  at  once  get 
into  communication  with  the  battery  concerned  and 
proceed  with  the  observation  of  fire.  The  arrangement 
developed  by  No.  52  Squadron  was  for  the  balloon 
observers  to  do  the  preliminary  ranging,  whenever  possible, 
that  is  to  say,  when  the  observers  could  see  the  target  well 
enough  to  direct  the  fire  of  the  battery  until  the  shells  were 
falling  in  close  proximity.  Then  the  aeroplane  could  take 
over  control  and,  because  the  observer  had  direct  observa- 
tion from  above,  could  give  whatever  final  corrections  were 
required.  Another  development  was  that,  after  the 
aeroplane  observer  had   ranged   the   British   battery  to 

1  In  November  1917  the  French  took  over  the  coastal  sector,  but  the 
squadrons  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  stayed  on,  under  the  general  command 
of  the  French,  until  December,  when  they  were  withdrawn  into  General 
Head-quarters  reserve. 


1917]  SOUND  RANGING  151 

the  satisfaction  of  its  commander,  the  balloon  observer 
took  over  general  observation  for  destructive  fire.  Apart 
from  the  fact  that  the  help  given  by  the  balloon  sections 
effected  some  saving  in  aeroplanes  and  in  the  time  of  flying 
officers,  preliminary  ranging  by  the  balloon  observers, 
whenever  it  was  possible,  had  a  notable  advantage  during 
periods  of  intense  artillery  activity.  At  these  times  shells 
from  many  batteries  might  be  falling  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  target  which  was  being  ranged,  but  the  balloon 
observer,  who  was  in  communication  with  his  chart-room 
and  knew  the  moment  when  the  round  he  was  required 
to  observe  would  burst,  could  usually  identify  the  shell 
fired  by  the  battery  which  he  was  ranging.  As  no  wireless- 
receiving  sets  were  as  yet  carried  in  the  Corps  aeroplanes, 
the  battery  could  not  inform  the  observer  in  an  aeroplane 
the  exact  moment  of  firing,  and  it  might  not  always  be 
possible,  therefore,  for  the  aeroplane  observer  to  discrimi- 
nate between  the  various  shell  bursts. 

Another  development  in  the  Fourth  Army  area  on  the 
coast,  but  one  which  was  also  receiving  attention  at  the 
same  time  in  the  First  Army,  was  co-operation  between  air- 
craft and  the  sound-ranging  sections  of  the  Royal  Engineers. 
These  sections  made  use  of  a  series  of  electrical  sound 
receivers  spaced  along  the  front  and  connected  to  a  Central 
Station  in  the  rear.  A  forward  ground  observer,  from  a  post 
in  front  of  the  receivers,  as  soon  as  he  heard  an  enemy  gun 
fire,  put  the  system  into  operation  by  closing  the  electrical 
circuit.  At  the  Central  Station,  the  sounds  taken  in  by  the 
receivers  were  recorded  photographically,  and  the  range  and 
bearing  of  the  enemy  gun  could  then  be  computed  from 
the  information  shown  on  the  film.  One  weak  link  in  this 
system  was  the  forward  observer  whose  task  was  to  put  the 
apparatus  into  action.  Owing  to  enemy  shell-fire  there 
were  many  times  when  he  became  isolated  and  unable  to 
communicate,  and  it  seemed  that  the  air  observers  might 
often  prove  an  invaluable  substitute  for  the  forward  ground 
observing  officers.  The  aeroplane  artillery  observers,  in  the 
course  of  their  ordinary  duties,  passed  down,  usually  by 
NF  call,  information  about  active  enemy  batteries,  giving 
their  approximate  positions.    In  the  Fourth  Army  the 


152  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

sound-ranging  section  was  equipped,  experimentally,  with 
a  wireless  apparatus  so  that  the  aeroplane  signals  could  be 
received.  These  signals,  travelling  quicker  than  sound, 
enabled  the  sound-ranging  section  to  start  its  apparatus 
in  time  to  take  a  record  of  the  actual  round,  the  flash 
of  which  had  been  observed  and  reported  from  the  aero- 
plane. This  form  of  co-operation  also  proved  valuable 
to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  because  it  enabled  a  hostile 
battery  to  be  located  by  sound  when,  for  various  reasons, 
the  aeroplane  observer  found  it  impossible  to  give  an  ac- 
curate indication  of  the  position.  Balloon  observers  were 
also  employed  to  signal  to  the  sound-ranging  sections 
when  the  flash  of  an  enemy  gun  was  seen  from  the  basket. 
By  the  beginning  of  191 8  co-operation  between  air  ob- 
servers and  sound-ranging  sections  had  been  adopted  along 
the  whole  front.  At  the  report  centres  in  each  army 
the  wireless  messages  from  the  air,  information  from 
balloon  observers,  and  all  other  immediate  intelligence 
about  enemy  gun  activity,  were  co-ordinated,  and  from  this 
centre  the  sound-ranging  apparatus  was  also  set  in  motion 
as  required.  The  Corps  squadrons  did  not,  as  a  result  of 
this  organization,  undertake  additional  duties,  but  sent 
down,  in  the  normal  way,  indications  of  active  German 
batteries. 

The  Influence  of  Air  Raids  on  England 

It  will  be  recalled  that  after  the  first  daylight  aeroplane 
attack  on  London  on  the  13th  of  June  1917,  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  had  been  requested  to  send  to  England  one  of  his 
single-seater  fighter  squadrons,  and  to  send  another,  for 
interception,  to  Calais.1  In  the  first  week  of  July,  as  the 
attack  on  London  had  not  been  repeated,  the  two 
squadrons  had  rejoined  the  Head-quarters  Wing  in  France, 
but,  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  London  was  bombed  again, 
and  General  Sir  William  Robertson,  the  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff,  thereupon  telegraphed  to  General 
Head-quarters  in  France :  'In  view  of  to-day's  raid  and  pro- 
aspect  of  its  early  repetition  Cabinet  have  decided  at  a 
'special  meeting  this  afternoon  that  Home  Defence  Forces 
1  See  pp.  134-5. 


1917]   INFLUENCE  OF  RAIDS  ON  ENGLAND  153 

'must  be  strengthened  at  once  by  two  first-class  fighting 
'squadrons  and  have  accordingly  ordered  me  to  direct  you 
'to  dispatch  two  squadrons  to-morrow  to  England,  aero- 
'planes  by  air,  personnel  by  boat,  as  in  previous  cases. 
'Exact  period  for  which  the  squadrons  will  be  needed  can- 
'not  be  given,  but  it  is  hoped  it  may  be  possible  to  reinforce 
'Home  Defence  from  other  sources  so  as  to  allow  one 
'squadron  to  return  in  about  a  fortnight.  Cabinet  are 
'further  desirous  of  your  making  an  air  raid  on  Mannheim, 
'but  before  deciding  they  wish  you  to  report  to  what 
'extent  this  will  interfere  with  your  operations.' 

Sir  Douglas  Haig  replied  that  two  good  fighting  squad- 
rons would  be  sent  to  England  next  day  (July  the  8th),  but 
asked  Sir  William  Robertson  to  inform  the  War  Cabinet 
that  the  fight  for  air  supremacy,  preparatory  to  the 
forthcoming  operations,  had  begun.  The  air  struggle, 
it  was  anticipated,  would  be  'the  most  severe  we  had 
'yet  had'.  The  withdrawal  of  two  fighting  squadrons 
would  delay  a  favourable  decision  in  the  air  and  make 
victory  more  difficult  and  more  costly  in  aeroplanes  and 
pilots.  If,  in  addition,  the  raid  on  Mannheim  had  to  be 
undertaken,  the  plans  for  the  whole  offensive  would  require 
to  be  reconsidered,  and  the  operations,  dependent  as  they 
were  on  the  gaining  of  air  supremacy,  might  have  to  be 
stopped.1  On  these  representations  the  War  Cabinet 
reduced  their  demands ;  one  squadron  only  would  be  re- 
quired from  France,  and  the  project  to  bomb  Mannheim 
would  be  abandoned.  No.  46  (Sopwith  'Pup')  Squadron 
was,  therefore,  sent  home  on  the  10th  of  July,  and 
remained  in  England  until  the  end  of  August,  when  it 
returned  to  France. 

The  loss  to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  in  France  of  one 
first-class  fighting  squadron  for  a  vital  period,  was  not, 
however,  the  only  effect  of  the  threat  to  London.   Three 

1  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  been  asked,  after  the  June  attack  on  London, 
to  report  on  the  possibility  of  a  bombing  raid  on  Mannheim.  He  had 
stated,  on  the  22nd  of  June,  that  he  had  no  aeroplanes  to  spare  for  such  an 
operation.  The  diversion  of  aeroplanes  for  a  bombing  attack  of  this  kind 
would,  he  said,  'entail  such  risk  to  the  Army  Operations  that  I  am  not 
justified  in  recommending  it'. 


154  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

days  after  No.  46  Squadron  crossed  to  England,  Major- 
General  Trenchard  was  informed  by  War  Office  letter 
that  twenty-four  Sopwith  'Camels'  promised  to  him  for 
the  re-equipment  of  a  two-seater  Sopwith  squadron,1  to- 
gether with  an  undelivered  balance  of  four  D.H.4's  for 
another  squadron,  would  be  diverted  to  Home  Defence 
squadrons.   There  had  been  no  hint  of  such  intentions  in 
the  earlier  communications  from  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff,  and  Major-General  Trenchard  brought  the 
matter  to  the  notice  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig.    The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief wrote  to  Sir  William  Robertson  on  the 
14th  of  July:  'A  serious  reduction  has  been  made  at  the 
last  moment  in  the  supply  of  aircraft  on  which  I  was 
counting  for  my  operations.   I  have  no  information  as  to 
the  authority  on  which  such  an  important  decision  has 
been  arrived  at,  and  I  have  only  learnt  of  it  through  these 
communications,  addressed  by  a  Directorate  to  a  General 
Officer  under  my  command,  who  has  brought  them  to 
my  notice.    You    will   appreciate,   without  explanation 
from  me,  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  such  a  method  of 
procedure,  and  still  more  the  seriousness  of  my  being 
deprived  suddenly  and  unexpectedly,  at  the  present  junc- 
ture, of  forces  on  which  I  was  counting  to  carry  through 
an  offensive  of  such  great  importance,  the  preparations  for 
which  have  reached  such  an  advanced  stage  that  no  altera- 
tion or  modification  can  now  be  made  without  grave  dis- 
advantage.'  The  War  Office  replied  that  the  diversion 
of  aircraft  for  home  defence  resulted  from  a  War  Cabinet 
decision.2    And   there   the   matter  was  allowed  to  rest. 
These  happenings  have  conspicuous  importance.    They 
make  clear  how  immediate  may  be  the  effect,  on  the  main 

1  Three  Sopwith  two-seater  squadrons  were  due  to  be  re-equipped  with 
the  single-seater  'Camel' ;  No.  70  Squadron  was  re-equipped  according  to 
schedule  by  the  31st  of  July;  No.  45  Squadron,  due  to  be  re-equipped  by 
the  15th  of  August,  was  not  completed  until  the  1st  of  September;  and 
No.  43  Squadron,  the  final  re-equipment  of  which  was  scheduled  for  the 
31st  of  August,  had  to  wait  until  the  3rd  of  October  before  the  last  of  its 
'Camels'  was  delivered. 

2  The  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  at  Dunkirk  was  also  affected,  although  to 
a  lesser  extent.  A  Flight  of  Sopwith  'Camels',  earmarked  for  Dunkirk,  was 
diverted,  in  the  middle  of  June,  to  Eastchurch  for  home  defence. 


1917]  PRELIMINARY  AIR  OFFENSIVE         155 

theatre  of  operations,  of  the  threat  of  air  attacks  on 
important  centres  of  industry  and  population.  The 
material  and  moral  results  of  the  two  daylight  aero- 
plane raids  on  London  in  June  and  July  were  serious. 
The  real  military  consequence  was  the  diversion,  at  a 
critical  time,  of  appreciable  fighting  air  strength  from 
France  to  England.  Thus  did  the  German  bombing 
squadrons  strike  a  shrewd  blow  to  help  their  comrades 
on  the  Western  front.  To  ensure  that  the  military  effect 
should  be  maintained,  the  German  bombing  squadrons 
needed  only  to  make  sufficient  attacks  on  England  to 
keep  the  threat  alive;  they  could  be  mainly  employed 
against  objectives  on  the  Western  front.  That  is  to 
say,  they  could  be  made  to  pull  their  full  weight, 
whereas  the  defence  aircraft  in  England,  except  on  such 
occasions  as  the  enemy  chose  to  raid,  would  be  inactive. 

These  daylight  attacks  on  London  suggest,  also,  a  more 
general  comment.  The  people  had  been  so  stirred  that  the 
Government  had  been  forced  to  take  energetic  action  to 
prevent  a  repetition  of  the  raids.  That  a  nation  might  be 
forced  to  sue  for  peace  through  an  air  offensive  against  its 
most  important  centres  has  been  put  forward  as  a 
post-war  doctrine,  and  a  study  of  the  results  of  the 
(comparatively)  slight  German  daylight  raids  in  191 7 
will  lend  support  to  this  teaching. 

The  Preliminary  Air  Offensive 

The  question  of  withdrawing  squadrons  from  the 
Western  Front  for  home  defence  was  opened,  it  will  be 
recalled,  on  the  7th  of  July,  the  day  on  which  the  orders 
to  begin  the  air  offensive  had  been  issued.  That  offensive 
was  to  start  on  the  8th  of  July,  but  bad  weather  on 
that  day  and  on  the  two  following  days  restricted  flying, 
and  the  air  offensive  could  not  be  effectively  launched 
until  the  nth.  On  that  day  there  was  a  fair  amount 
of  fighting,  particularly  in  the  evening,  when  enemy 
fighters  attacked  balloons  and  shot  three  down  in  flames 
on  the  front  of  the  II  Brigade.  A  feature  of  the  air 
offensive  was  night  bombing  by  the  F.E.'s  of  No.  100 
Squadron  directed  against  German  aerodromes  opposite 


156  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

the  Second  and  Fifth  Army  fronts,  and  against  railway 
junctions.  It  was  known  that  Richthofen's  newly  created 
'Circus'  was  stationed  at  aerodromes  near  Courtrai. 
Richthofen's  head-quarters  were  at  Marcke,  where  was 
Jagdstaffelu,  and  the  other  units  of  his  command  were  at 
Heule  (jagdstaffel  jo),  Cuerne  (4),  and  Bisseghem  (6). 
The  three  last-named  aerodromes  were  attacked  by  No. 
100  Squadron  during  the  early  nights  of  the  air  offensive, 
but  Marcke  was  reserved  for  a  series  of  concentrated 
bombing  attacks  just  before  the  main  battle  opened. 

The  1 2th  of  July  brought  a  burst  of  air  activity  greater 
than  anything  the  war  had  yet  produced.  There  was 
fighting  all  day  along  the  whole  front,  but  it  was  most  con- 
centrated in  the  area  opposite  the  Fifth  Army.  What  was 
noticeable  was  a  change  in  the  scale  of  these  clashes  in  the 
air.  The  German  formations  were  often  formidable,  and 
they  tended  to  attract  a  series  of  smaller  British  formations 
until  an  action  on  a  large  scale  was  in  progress.  For  ex- 
ample, in  the  evening  there  was  a  general  engagement, 
lasting  an  hour,  between  a  mixed  formation  of  thirty 
German  single-seaters,  and  a  force  of  British  and  French 
fighters  of  similar  strength.  Two  of  the  enemy  aeroplanes 
were  destroyed,  but  all  the  Allied  pilots  returned  safely, 
many  of  them  with  damaged  aeroplanes.  This  was  the 
biggest  clash  of  the  day,  but  elsewhere  fighting  went 
on  ceaselessly  from  dawn  to  dusk  with  both  sides  in 
determined  mood.  Nine  British  aeroplanes  were  shot 
down  in  the  enemy  lines,  and  fourteen  German  aircraft 
were  reported  destroyed,  three  of  them  falling  in  the 
British  area. 

From  now  on  to  the  end  of  the  month,  air  activity  con- 
tinued to  be  intense.  Reconnaissances,  artillery  co-opera- 
tion, air  photography,  and  day  and  night  bombing,  were 
maintained.  Gradually,  the  righting  aircraft  wore  down 
the  resistance  of  the  enemy  and  it  was  noticeable  that  the 
German  pilots  showed  decreasing  inclination  to  cross  the 
British  lines.  The  enemy  tendency  towards  concentra- 
tion of  fighting  strength  in  the  air  continued.  The  reports 
of  an  air  battle,  which  took  place  on  the  evening  of 
the  26th  of  July  near  Polygon  Wood,  show  the  enemy 


1917]  INTENSIVE  AIR  FIGHTING  157 

forces  disposed  as  follows:  at  5,000  feet  were  a  few  two- 
seaters;  at  8,000  feet,  or  under,  were  thirty  Albatros 
Scouts  in  combat  with  seven  D.H.5's;  at  12,000-14,000 
feet  were  ten  Albatros  Scouts  being  fought  by  various 
British  formations  totalling  thirty  single-seater  fighters; 
and  higher  still,  at  about  17,000  feet,  were  ten  Albatros 
Scouts  in  action  with  seven  naval  Sopwith  triplanes.  This 
gives  a  total  of  ninety-four  single-seaters  in  combat. 
The  fighting  by  the  various  formations,  which  partly 
intermixed,  was  long  drawn  out  and  none  of  it  was 
decisive.  While  the  fight  was  in  progress  four  of  the 
German  two-seater  aeroplanes  took  the  opportunity  to 
slip  away  over  the  British  lines  where  they  made  a  recon- 
naissance of  the  Ypres  area. 

In  a  clash  with  about  twenty  Albatros  Scouts  in  the 
same  area  on  the  following  evening,  the  27th,  the 
British  fighters  had  remarkable  success.  A  formation 
of  eight  F.E.2d's  of  No.  20  Squadron  set  out  to  patrol 
lin  the  neighbourhood  of  Menin,  with  orders  to  attract 
and  then  decoy  enemy  fighters  towards  Polygon  Wood, 
where  layered  formations  of  single-seaters,  totalling  fifty- 
nine  aeroplanes,  chiefly  from  the  Ninth  Wing,  were  to 
be  patrolling  in  readiness.  The  F.E.2d's  crossed  the  lines 
at  7.15  p.m.  and  proceeded  without  incident  to  Menin, 
where,  in  due  course,  some  twenty  Albatros  Scouts 
gathered.  The  F.E.  pilots  were  soon  involved  in  a  fight,  but 
they  skilfully  lured  the  enemy  north-westwards  towards 
Polygon  Wood.  Within  a  short  time  a  general  fight  was  in 
progress,  in  which  all  the  British  formations  in  the  area, 
some  French  fighters,  and  additional  enemy  single-seaters, 
took  part.  Combats  were  continous  for  an  hour,  at  the  end 
of  which  time  the  enemy  had  been  completely  routed,  and 
no  German  aeroplane  could  be  seen  in  the  sky  over  a  wide 
area.  The  F.E. 2d  pilots  and  observers  had  the  greatest 
success.  This  two-seater  'pusher'  carried  three  Lewis 
guns,  two  of  which  were  controlled  by  the  observer  and 
one  by  the  pilot.  In  their  fight  on  the  evening  of  the  27th 
the  F.E.2cI's  destroyed  six  enemy  aeroplanes — two  in 
flames,  one  which  broke  up  in  the  air,  and  three  which 
crashed.  The  only  casualties  suffered  by  the  F.E.2d's  were 


158  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

a  wounded  pilot  and  observer  who  safely  landed  their 
damaged  aeroplane.  Of  the  other  enemy  aircraft  in  the 
encounter,  triplanes  of  No.  10  (Naval)  Squadron  destroyed 
two  and  S.E.5's  of  No.  56  Squadron  destroyed  one.  One 
S.E.5  and  one  triplane  were  missing  after  the  fight,  but 
there  were  no  other  British  losses.  This  encounter  on  the 
27th  was  of  a  kind  calculated  to  exert  a  powerful  influence 
on  the  general  air  position.1 

Special  instructions  issued  to  the  squadrons  of  the  V 
Brigade  on  the  27th  of  July  stated  that  on  the  29th  and 
30th  there  would  be  large  concentrations  of  British  troops 
in  the  forward  areas  which  the  enemy  airmen  must  not 
be  permitted  to  reconnoitre.  The  outer  offensive  patrols, 
maintained  by  the  fighter  squadrons  of  the  Brigade,  would, 
therefore,  be  drawn  in  closer  to  the  lines,  and  there  would 
be  a  special  continuous  patrol,  on  both  days,  by  pairs  of 
fighters  flying  at  2,000  feet  immediately  behind  the  Fifth 
Army  front-line  trenches.  The  outer  offensive  patrols, 
it  was  stated,  would  be  supplied  by  the  French  Army 
aviation  service  and  by  Ninth  Wing  formations.  As  it 
happened,  the  weather  on  the  29th  was  stormy  and  the 
visibility  poor,  and  few  enemy  aeroplanes  were  encountered. 
On  the  30th  the  conditions  were  still  worse  and  there  were 
no  air  combats.  The  air  position  is  summarized  in  the  war 
diary  of  the  Fifth  Army  at  the  end  of  July  as  follows : 
Enemy  has  shown  less  individual  activity  and  does  not 
cross  our  line  as  often  as  he  used  to  do.  He  works  now  in 
large  formations  which  we  have  successfully  encountered 
on  many  occasions,  and  nearly  all  encounters  have  taken 
place  on  the  enemy  side  of  the  lines.' 

The  opening  of  the  battle,  originally  fixed  for  the  25th 
of  July,  was  twice  postponed.  The  first  postponement 
was  a  direct  result  of  effective  counter-battery  work, 
aided  by  air  observation.  This  induced  the  enemy 
to  withdraw  many  of  his  batteries  to  areas  of  greater 
security,  and  the  opening  of  the  offensive  was  first  post- 

1  Sir  Douglas  Haig  wrote  to  Major-General  Trenchard  on  the  28th: 
'I  hope  you  will  convey  to  all  concerned  my  very  hearty  appreciation  of  the 
'strenuous  efforts  which  have  been  made  to  obtain  this  grand  result,  and 
'best  congratulations  on  the  success  of  yesterday's  flying.' 


1917]     GERMANS  RE-ADJUST  THEIR  LINE    159 

poned  to  the  28th  of  July  to  give  time  for  British  guns  to 
be  moved  farther  forward,  and  for  the  Flying  Corps  ob- 
servers to  locate  the  new  German  battery  positions.  But 
subsequent  bad  weather  of  low  visibility,  combined  with 
difficulties  which  the  French  encountered  in  bringing  up 
their  artillery,  led  to  a  second  postponement  to  the  31st 
of  July. 

As  the  day  for  the  attack  drew  near  the  Flying  Corps 
squadrons  were  instructed  to  watch  carefully  for  any  signs 
of  an  enemy  intention  to  withdraw  to  one  of  the  rear  lines 
of  defence.  In  the  early  morning  of  the  27th  of  July  a 
pilot  and  observer  of  No.  9  Squadron,  who  were  directing 
the  fire  of  a  siege  battery,  were  struck  by  the  absence  of 
any  sort  of  anti-aircraft  fire,  although  the  aeroplane  circled 
over  the  target  many  times  at  low  heights.  In  his  report, 
the  observer,  noting  this  fact,  referred  also  to  the  neglected 
state  of  the  trenches.  No  attempts  had  been  made  to 
repair  damage  done  by  shell-fire,  nor  was  there  any  indica- 
tion that  positions  suitable  for  strong-points,  which  had 
escaped  damage  by  the  bombardment,  were  to  be  used  for 
machine-gun  posts.  As  the  morning  wore  on,  other  pilots 
and  observers  of  the  same  squadron  brought  in  additional 
evidence  of  an  apparent  withdrawal.  Two  officers  who,  at 
noon,  had  flown  low  over  rear  lines  of  trenches  opposite 
the  XIV  Corps  front  stated  they  bore  all  the  outward  signs 
of  disuse.  .  .  .  'Not  the  slightest  sign  of  life  or  movement', 
they  said,  'was  detected  during  the  whole  of  the  recon- 
naissance!' 

In  consequence,  infantry  patrols  were  pushed  forward 
in  the  afternoon.  Opposition  was  encountered  in  several 
places,  but  the  general  result  was  that  the  northern  section 
(XIV  Corps)  of  the  Fifth  Army  front  secured  a  footing  in 
the  original  German  trench  system  on  a  front  of  about 
3,000  yards.  During  the  night,  patrols  were  sent  out  along 
the  whole  front  of  the  Fifth  Army,  when  it  was  made  clear 
that  no  general  withdrawal  had  taken  place. 

Next  day,  the  28th,  seventeen  bridges  were  thrown 
across  the  Yser  canal  by  the  Guards  Division,  and  the 
new  positions  were  consolidated  without  undue  interfer- 
ence from  the  enemy.  A  'sham'  attack  was  made  in  the 


160  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

early  morning  by  the  XVIII  Corps,  and  practice  barrages 
were  put  down  along  the  fronts  of  the  other  Corps  of 
the  Fifth  Army.  The  German  batteries  retaliated  and  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  observers,  co-operating  in  the  demon- 
stration, were  able  to  plot  the  positions  of  many  additional 
guns.  Two  observers  of  No.  9  Squadron  alone  discovered 
and  reported  thirty-five  active  German  batteries  in  new 
positions. 

The  Battle  Opens 
31  July  At  dawn,  3.50  a.m.,  on  the  31st  of  July  the  offensive 
was  launched  from  the  river  Lys  in  the  south  to  the  inun- 
dated area  about  the  St.  Jansbeek  in  the  north.  The  Fifth 
Army,  in  the  centre,  had  a  front  of  about  seven  and  a  half 
miles,  while  the  Second  Army  on  its  right,  and  the  French 
First  Army  on  its  left,  each  had  a  front  of  attack  of  about 
three  miles,  with  the  object  of  forming  defensive  flanks 
for  the  main  action. 

The  morning  was  dull  with  clouds  at  500-800  feet,  at 
which  height  they  lay  over  the  battle-field  throughout  the 
day.  The  main  attack,  by  the  Fifth  Army,  was  organized 
in  three  stages  to  objectives  marked  on  the  map  by  blue, 
black,  and  green  lines.  The  first  and  second  stages  each 
called  for  an  advance  of  about  1,000  yards,  and  the  third 
stage  for  one  of  1,000-1,500  yards.  Covered  by  artillery 
and  machine-gun  barrages,  the  assaulting  battalions  made 
good  progress  and,  within  half  an  hour,  had  entered  their 
first  objective,  the  second  line  of  the  German  forward 
system  of  trenches.  After  a  fifty-minute  interval  to  allow 
fresh  troops  to  pass  through  the  original  leading  waves,  the 
attack  was  resumed  against  the  second  objective — the 
black  line — the  German  second  defence  system.  At  5.13 
a.m.  the  barrage  again  crept  forward  and,  except  on  the 
extreme  right,  the  advancing  infantry  overcame  the 
enemy  resistance  and  entered  the  second  line  of  trenches. 
By  10  a.m.  the  whole  of  this  line  had  been  captured,  except 
the  section  on  the  right.  Preparations  were  hurried  forward 
for  the  advance  to  the  green  line,  the  third  and  final 
objective  of  the  day.  This  advance  began  along  most  of 
the   front   according   to   time-table,  and,   although  the 


i9i7]  THE  BATTLE  OPENS  161 

resistance  was  stronger,  the  advance  was  held  in  two  places  31  July 
only — at  the  railway  point  south-west  of  Langemarck 
called  Vulcan  Crossing,  and,  as  before,  on  the  right  where 
the  II  Corps  could  make  little  progress.  Strong  German 
counter-attacks  on  the  green  line  were  made  against  the 
troops  of  the  XIX  and  XVIII  Corps,  the  attacks  on  the 
former  Corps  being  closely  supported  by  low-flying  aircraft. 
The  enemy  succeeded  in  recapturing  part  of  the  line, 
particularly  on  the  XVIII  Corps  front  which,  except  on 
the  left,  was  pushed  back  short  of  the  third  objective. 

The  subsidiary  actions  fought  by  the  Second  Army  and 
by  the  French  First  Army  were  completely  successful. 
The  Second  Army,  on  the  right,  captured  Hollebeke  and  a 
line  of  strong-points,  so  that  the  whole  front  was  linked  up 
and  ran  continuously.  On  the  left,  the  French  First  Army 
carried  the  whole  of  the  German  first  trench  system  with 
scarcely  a  check,  and,  by  the  end  of  the  day,  was  holding 
positions,  in  line  with  the  left  of  the  Fifth  Army,  through 
Bixschoote  to  the  Yser  canal  south  of  Noordschote.  In 
other  words,  the  flanks  of  the  main  thrust  were  pro- 
tected. 

To  sum  up  the  results  of  the  first  day's  fighting,  the 
German  first  defence  system  had  been  overrun  as  far  north 
as  Westhoek,  while  north  of  that  place  the  troops  of  the 
Fifth  Army  and  of  the  French  First  Army  had  established 
themselves  in  and  beyond  the  German  second  line. 
North  of  the  village  of  St.  Julien,  the  Fifth  Army,  up 
to  its  junction  with  the  French,  held  the  line  of  the 
Steenebeek,  whence  the  Allied  line  gradually  fell  back 
towards  the  original  line  along  the  Yser  canal. 

As  a  result  of  the  bad  weather,  with  low  clouds  all  day 
and  rain  in  the  afternoon,  the  extensive  prearranged  pro- 
gramme for  the  co-operation  of  the  squadrons  of  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  could  not  be  put  into  force.1  Much 
of  the  low  flying  that  was  done  was  against  chance  targets. 
Fifty-eight  contact  patrols  were  made  during  the  day  to 
report  the  progress  of  the  battle.  The  air  observers  had, 
once  again,  to  complain  of  the  failure  of  the  infantry  to 

1  For  the  information  of  the  student,  the  operation  order  issued  by  the 
V  Brigade  for  the  31st  of  July  is  given  as  Appendix  VII. 

2504-4  M 


162  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

31  July  light  flares  when  called  upon  by  Klaxon  horn  to  do  so,  and 
pilots  had  to  go  low  enough  for  their  observers  to  dis- 
tinguish the  uniforms  of  the  men.  As  a  result,  of  thirty 
aeroplanes  made  temporarily  unserviceable  on  this  day, 
most  were  put  out  of  action  by  hits  from  bullets  or  shells. 
Some  of  the  air  reports,  so  perilously  compiled,  although 
they  were  dropped  at  the  prearranged  report  centres, 
did  not,  apparently,  reach  the  Army  Corps  staffs. 

On  the  whole,  the  air  observers  gave  a  fairly  complete 
picture  of  the  general  progress  of  the  attack,  and  instances 
are  recorded  where  the  artillery,  as  a  result  of  Flying  Corps 
information  about  German  machine-gun  posts  responsible 
for  a  temporary  check  in  the  advance,  were  prompted  to 
strengthen  the  barrage  fire  and  so  enable  the  infantry  to 
overcome  the  obstacles. 

While  the  Corps  squadrons  were  contending,  as  best 
they  could,  with  the  elements  over  the  trench  area,  the 
pilots  of  the  army  squadrons,  unable  to  do  much  in  the 
way  of  offensive  patrols,  were  roving  about  the  German 
immediate  back  areas,  looking  for  ground  targets  suitable 
for  attack  with  machine-guns.  Troops  on  the  march,  or 
concentrated  in  the  woods  and  villages,  horse  and  motor 
transport  convoys,  staff  motor-cars,  machine-gun  em- 
placements, aeroplanes  lined  up  on  aerodromes,  and 
battery  positions,  were  fired  upon  from  low  heights. 

The  fighter  and  bomber  squadrons  of  the  head-quarters 
Ninth  Wing  had  been  ordered  to  give  special  attention  to 
the  German  aerodromes,1  and,  in  spite  of  the  bad  weather, 
all  the  specified  targets  were  reached  and  bombed.  Bombs 
of  light  weight  were  dropped  by  No.  27  (Martinsyde) 
Squadron  on  the  aerodromes  at  Marcke,  Heule,  and 
Ingelmunster,  and  others  of  230-lb.  weight  were  aimed 
at  the  railway  centres.2 

1  For  the  Operation  Order  issued  to  the  Ninth  Wing  Squadrons  see 
Appendix  VIII. 

2  One  230-lb.  bomb,  dropped  from  a  height  of  150  feet,  hit  the  railway- 
track,  but  failed  to  explode.  Protracted  experiments  with  bombs  from  the 
same  stock  ultimately  revealed  that  the  tail  fuses  had  become  damp,  and  there- 
fore ineffective,  through  exposure  in  the  heavy  rains.  The  230-lb.  bomb 
had  been  designed  for  dropping  from  heights  above  400  feet,  but  the  ex- 
periments showed  that,  fitted  with  a  15 -second  delay-action  fuse,  the  bomb 


1917]  BOMB-LOADED  FIGHTERS  163 

A  new  development  was  the  use  of  single-seater  fighters  31  July 
for  low  bombing,  particularly  against  aerodromes,  with 
the  object  of  keeping  the  enemy  fighters  on  the  ground,  at 
least  during  the  early  stages  of  the  offensive.   As  pilots  in 
some  of  the  head-quarters  fighting  squadrons  were  up  most 
of  the  night  before  the  attack,  fitting  the  improvised 
bombing  racks  to  the  aeroplanes,  it  may  be  assumed  that 
the  idea  was  adopted  in  a  hurry.  Four  25-lb.  Cooper  bombs 
were  fitted  to  each  of  three  aeroplanes  in  the  four  head- 
quarters squadrons,  and  when  the  pilots  went  off  on  their 
missions   many  who  watched  doubted  whether  any  of 
them  would  return,  holding  the  view  that  bombs  and 
racks  attached  to  aircraft  not  designed  to  carry  them  must 
seriously  endanger  their  flying  capabilities.   The  Spads  of 
No.  19  Squadron  could  not,  it  was  found,  be  made  to  take 
the  bomb  racks.    The  technical  sergeant-major  of  the 
squadron  produced  a  form  of  box-container  to  be  carried 
inside  the  fuselage  behind  the  pilot,  but  the  Spads  had  no 
form  of  tail-plane  adjustment  and  their  balance  was  dis- 
turbed. There  was,  in  consequence,  misgiving  among  the 
pilots  who  were  called  upon  to  test  the  device  in  the  battle. 
These  bomb-loaded  fighters  flew  over  the  enemy  back 
areas  and  the  pilots  attacked  such  targets  as  they  saw.  As 
an  example  of  this  individual  type  of  air  warfare,  the 
report  of  Lieutenant  R.  A.  Maybery,  an  S.E.5  pilot  of 
No.  56  Squadron,  may  be  quoted.  'Left  Estree  Blanche  at 
4.45  a.m.    Crossed  the  lines  over  Ypres  at  500  feet  just 
underneath  very  thick  clouds.   Got  into  the  smoke  from 
the  artillery  barrage  and  found  it  impossible  to  see  ahead 
at  all.  Went  south-east  and  found  myself  over  Wervicq  at 
200  feet.   Dived  down  to  about  30  feet  and  flew  straight 
along  the  road  to  Gheluwe.    From  there  I  went  due 
east  to  Bisseghem.    I  could  then  see  Courtrai  and  went 
north-east  to  strike  Heule,  but  two  E.A.  [enemy  aircraft] 
scouts  appeared  from  over  Courtrai  and  attacked  me.    I 
manoeuvred  to  try  and  throw  them  off,  pulling  down  my 
Lewis  gun  and  firing  short  bursts  to  try  and  frighten  them 

could  be  dropped  from  150  feet  without  danger  to  the  bombing  aircraft. 
This  fuse  was  taken  into  use.  Other  fuses  used  gave  a  delay  action  of 
i\  seconds  and  of  '05  second. 


i64  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

31  July  'away,  but  they  would  not  be  shaken  off,  so  I  made  west 
'again.  Both  E.A.  followed  until  I  reached  the  lines  south 
'of  Armentieres,  when  they  turned  south-east  towards 
'Lille.  I  then  turned  north,  striking  the  canal  at  Comines, 
'and  again  followed  the  same  route  to  Bisseghem,  when  I 
'saw  a  Spad  just  south  of  me  firing  at  something  on  the 
'ground  and  flying  west.  It  was  now  getting  a  little  clearer 
'and  I  could  see  Courtrai  more  easily  though  the  clouds 
'were  still  at  500  feet.  From  Bisseghem  I  went  north-east 
'and  immediately  saw  Heule  aerodrome.  I  zoomed  up  to 
'just  under  200  feet.  Circling  round  the  aerodrome,  the 
'only  sign  of  activity  I  could  see  was  one  man  lighting  two 
'smoke  fires  at  the  Heule  end  of  the  aerodrome.  This  man 
'looked  at  me,  but  did  not  seem  to  take  any  particular 
'notice.  I  then  flew  east,  turned  and  came  back  along  the 
'line  of  the  southernmost  sheds  and  dropped  my  first 
'bomb,  which  hit  the  third  shed  from  the  east  and  ex- 
'ploded.  This  caused  immense  excitement,  and  I  could  see 
'people  running  about  all  round  the  sheds.  Turning  sharp 
'to  the  left,  I  flew  north  along  the  line  of  the  easternmost 
'sheds  and  dropped  another  bomb,  which  hit  the  first  shed 
'from  the  south  and  exploded.  Turning  sharp  to  the  west, 
'I  flew  straight  at  the  sheds  at  the  Heule  end  of  the  aero- 
'drome  and  dropped  my  third  bomb,  which  hit  the  second 
'shed  from  the  east  and  either  went  through  the  roof  or  in 
'at  the  front,  as  I  could  see  smoke  coming  out  of  the  front 
'and  heard  and  felt  the  explosion,  but  could  not  see  it. 
'Turned  north  and  again  flew  down  the  line  of  the  eastern- 
'most  sheds  from  the  north.  As  I  came  near,  a  machine- 
'gun  opened  fire  from  the  back  of  these  sheds.  I  pulled  the 
'bomb  release,  but  nothing  happened.  Flying  straight  on 
'and  still  watching  for  the  explosion,  I  found  myself  ap- 
'proaching  Courtrai  station,  so  pulled  the  bomb  release 
'again.  The  bomb  fell  and  exploded  between  a  goods  train 
'and  a  big  shed.  Turned  north  again  to  Heule  aerodrome, 
'and  the  same  machine-gun  and  another,  which  I  could 
'not  locate,  opened  fire.  I  dived  at  the  former,  shooting 
'with  both  guns,  and  the  crew  dispersed.  Turning  to  try 
'and  locate  the  second  gun,  it  suddenly  stopped.  I  then 
'flew  straight  across  the  aerodrome  at  the  southernmost 


i9i7]  LOW-FLYING  ATTACKS  165 

'sheds,  firing  both  guns  into  the  sheds  from  20  feet.  31 July 
'Changed  Lewis  drum  and  flew  straight  across  the  aero- 
'drome  from  the  west,  firing  both  guns  at  the  sheds  in 
'front,  and  at  one  time  actually  touched  the  ground. 
'Zoomed  over  the  sheds  and  flew  straight  on  to  Cuerne 
'aerodrome,  again  attacking  the  sheds  with  both  guns, 
'driving  back  a  machine  which  was  just  being  got  out. 
'Leaving  the  aerodrome,  saw  two  horsemen,  who  looked  like 
'officers.  Attacked  them  and  their  horses  bolted.  Turned 
'west  and  attacked  a  goods  train  going  from  Courtrai  to 
'Menin  via  Bisseghem.  Saw  a  column  of  infantry  about 
'200  strong  on  the  road  just  west  of  Wevelghem  marching 
'towards  Menin  and  attacked  them  with  both  guns.  They 
'scattered  to  both  sides  of  the  road.  Changed  drums. 
'Turned  back  east  and  attacked  infantry  again.  Looking 
'up  saw  one  E.A.  two-seater  at  about  500  feet,  just  below 
'the  clouds  making  east.  Zoomed  up  and  got  very  close 
'under  E.A.'s  tail  without  being  observed.  Pulled  down 
'Lewis  gun  and  fired  half  a  drum  into  E.A.,  which  started 
'going  down  in  a  steep  left-handed  turn.  E.A.  straightened 
'out  again,  and  I  followed,  firing  Vickers  gun.  E.A. 
'crashed  just  north  of  the  railway  south  of  the  G  in 
'Wevelghem.  Only  one  man  got  out.  A  small  crowd 
'started  to  collect,  and  I  dived,  firing  both  guns.  The 
'crowd  either  ran  or  lay  down  flat.  Saw  a  passenger  train 
'coming  (towards  Courtrai)  and  attacked,  but  Lewis  gun 
'ran  out  of  ammunition  and  Vickers  gun  stopped.  Flew 
'west,  recrossed  the  line  south  of  Messines  and  returned.' 
While  other  pilots  did  not  perhaps  crowd  so  much 
variety  into  their  flights,  their  experiences  were  similar  in 
kind.  One  kept  up  a  running  duel  with  a  staff  motor-car, 
from  which  revolver-fire  was  directed  at  him,  and  followed 
the  car  to  a  house.  There  two  men  jumped  from  the  car 
and  dragged  a  third  into  shelter.  The  same  pilot  then 
attacked  troops  crossing  a  bridge,  who  scattered  but  left 
five  men  lying  on  the  roadway.  Another  pilot  bombed 
Abeelhoek  aerodrome  and  attacked  the  running  mechanics 
with  his  machine-guns.  Transport  and  troops  on  the  road 
were  frequent  targets.  Of  one  party  of  infantry,  about 
fifty  strong,  all  except  four  scattered  when  a  pilot  turned 


166  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

3i  July  his  machine-guns  on  them:  the  four  stood  their  ground 
with  their  officer  and  opened  fire  on  the  aeroplane. 

Such,  in  brief,  was  the  work  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
on  the  opening  day  of  the  battle.  Not  much  of  it  was  of 
the  kind  which  had  been  carefully  prepared  beforehand, 
but  it  represented  a  determined  effort,  dictated  by  the 
special  conditions,  to  give  the  infantry  a  helping  hand  in 
weather  that  would  normally  have  been  judged  unfit  for 
flying.  In  the  active  squadrons,  three  pilots  and  one 
observer  were  killed,  two  pilots  with  their  observers  were 
made  prisoners,  and  four  pilots  and  four  observers  were 
wounded.  Twenty-three  combats  for  the  day  are  recorded 
as  a  result  of  which  eight  enemy  aeroplanes  were  destroyed. 

Reports  which  came  in  from  the  battle-field  indicated 
the  demoralizing  effect  of  the  low-flying  attacks  on  the 
German  troops,  but  made  clear  also  that  these  attacks 
should  not  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  individual  pilots,  but 
must  be  properly  organized  in  co-ordination  with  the 
ground  operations.  Unless  the  air  attacks  were  made  at  a 
time  and  place  which  gave  the  British  infantry  the  oppor- 
tunity to  follow  them  up  quickly,  much  of  the  demoraliz- 
ing effect  was  dissipated.  There  was  the  additional  fact 
that  the  sight  of  their  own  pilots  attacking  the  enemy 
greatly  stimulated  the  advancing  troops.  On  the  repre- 
sentations of  Major-General  Trenchard,  therefore,  a 
circular  letter  was  sent  to  all  Armies  by  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  drawing  attention  to  the  need  for  closer  co- 
operation between  the  fighting  squadrons  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  and  the  assaulting  formations  of  the  infantry 
when  offensive  operations  on  a  large  scale  were  being 
planned.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  it  was  stated,  was  of 
the  opinion  that  the  procedure  could  be  developed  in 
future  operations  with  good  results.1 

It  will  be  observed  that  these  conclusions  and  recom- 

1  Major-General  Trenchard,  in  a  letter  on  the  same  subject  to  his 
Brigade  Commanders,  quoted  an  extract  from  a  captured  German  docu- 
ment as  follows:  'In  case  of  hostile  attacks,  the  45th  Flight  will  support 
'our  counter-attacks  with  two  or  three  aeroplanes.  These  will  fly  in  front 
'of  the  assaulting  troops,  will  stimulate  the  offensive  spirit  of  the  men  by 
'flying  low,  and  will  weaken  the  enemy's  power  of  resistance  by  dropping 
'bombs  and  opening  machine-gun  fire.' 


1917]  EXPLAINING  THE  AIR-ARM  167 

mendations  have  reference  to  the  employment  of  low-  31 July 
flying  aeroplanes  against  front-line  troops,  and  the  student 
should  consider  them  as  a  stage  in  the  evolution  of  low- 
flying  attacks,  and  not  as  necessarily  putting  forward  a 
sound  doctrine. 

It  was  demonstrated  during  the  advance  on  the  first 
day  that  there  still  existed,  among  army  units,  a  general 
haziness  about  the  work  and  limitations  of  the  air  arm. 
Most  of  the  flying  on  the  31st  of  July  was  done  over  the 
enemy's  back  areas,  out  of  sight  of  the  British  infantry, 
who  might  therefore  be  excused  for  thinking  that  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  was  inactive.  Low-flying  German  aircraft 
got  through  from  time  to  time  to  the  fighting  line  and 
attacked  the  infantry,  with  the  result  that  requests  poured 
into  the  various  Flying  Corps  head-quarters  calling  for  pro- 
tection. These  requests  created  an  impression  that  large 
numbers  of  enemy  aircraft  were  in  action,  but  an  examina- 
tion of  the  reports  showed  that  many  of  them  ran  in  series 
and  referred  to  the  same  aeroplane  flying  over  a  wide  area. 
To  answer  the  calls  for  protection  as  they  came  in  would 
have  meant  a  great  waste  of  effort.  A  paper  was  prepared, 
for  circulation  by  the  General  Staff  among  the  army  units, 
setting  out  the  methods  and  limitations  of  the  air  service. 
In  this  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  aeroplane  was  not  a 
weapon  of  defence,  and  that  even  if  it  was  possible,  with  an 
unlimited  number  of  aircraft,  to  set  up  a  close  barrage 
along  the  whole  front,  it  would  still  be  a  comparatively 
easy  task  for  determined  enemy  pilots  to  get  through.  The 
policy  laid  down  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  for  the 
employment  of  the  fighting  squadrons  of  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  was  a  continual  offensive,  varying  in  scope  from  time 
to  time  according  to  the  resources  available,  but  always 
reaching  its  maximum  effort  when  offensive  operations 
were  undertaken  by  the  other  arms.  'On  July  31st',  the 
memorandum  stated,  'when  weather  conditions  were  most 
unfavourable  .  .  .  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  took  the  offen- 
sive in  co-operation  with  the  other  arms.  All  this  work 
was  carried  out  well  out  of  sight  of  our  own  infantry,  and 
must  have  had  a  demoralizing  effect  on  the  enemy's 
troops  apart  from  the  actual  destructive  results  achieved. 


1 68  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

'On  the  other  hand,  by  employing  our  machines  in  this 
'way  to  the  best  tactical  advantage,  we  sacrificed  to  some 
'extent  the  moral  effect  which  it  is  recognized  results  from 
'the  infantry  seeing  our  own  machines  in  the  air.  It  is  for 
'this  reason  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  desires  the 
'commanders  of  all  formations  to  study  the  summary  of 
'the  work  done  and  to  explain  to  the  troops  under  their 
'command  the  results  which  are  being  achieved,  even  in 
'bad  weather,  by  the  tactics  pursued  in  the  air,  results 
'which  the  troops  cannot  otherwise  be  expected  to  realize.' 
The  second  day  of  the  battle,  the  1st  of  August,  should 
have  brought  a  renewal  of  the  offensive  with  increased 
force,  but  the  weather,  which  had  been  difficult  enough  on 
the  first  day,  became  appreciably  worse.  Rain  set  in  on  the 
1st  and  continued  for  four  days,  but  even  after  the  rain 
ceased  on  the  5th,  the  conditions  for  many  days  remained 
stormy  and  unsettled,  and  the  whole  work  of  aircraft  co- 
operation with  the  artillery  was  thrown  out  of  gear.1  A 
good  start  had  been  made,  but  the  advantage  could  not 
be  pressed.  The  general  effect  is  well  pictured  in  Sir 
Douglas  Haig's  dispatch :  'The  low-lying,  clayey  soil,  torn 
'by  shells  and  sodden  with  rain,  turned  to  a  succession  of 
'vast  muddy  pools.  The  valleys  of  the  choked  and  over- 
'flowing  streams  were  speedily  transformed  into  long 
'stretches  of  bog,  impassable  except  for  a  few  well-defined 
'tracks,  which  became  marks  for  the  enemy's  artillery.  .  .  . 
'To  leave  these  tracks  was  to  risk  death  by  drowning,  and 
'in  the  course  of  subsequent  fighting  on  several  occasions 
'both  men  and  pack  animals  were  lost  in  this  way.  In  these 
'conditions  operations  of  any  magnitude  became  impos- 
'sible,  and  the  resumption  of  our  offensive  was  necessarily 
'postponed  until  a  period  of  fine  weather  should  allow  the 
'ground  to  recover.  As  had  been  the  case  in  the  Arras 
'battle,  this  unavoidable  delay  in  the  development  of  our 
'offensive   was   of  the   greatest   service   to   the   enemy. 

1  'Meanwhile  all  our  counter-battery  work  was  also  made  most  difficult, 
'if  not  impracticable,  by  our  being  largely  deprived  of  the  use  of  our  eyes 
'owing  to  the  bad  weather  interfering  with  flying  and  the  capacity  of  the 
'Air  Service  for  observation.'  The  Fifth  Army,  by  General  Sir  Hubert 
Gough,  p.  203. 


1917]  THE  ATTACK  ON  HILL  70  169 

'Valuable  time  was  lost,  the  troops  opposed  to  us  were  able 
'to  recover  from  the  disorganization  produced  by  our  first 
'attack,  and  the  enemy  was  given  the  opportunity  to  bring 
'up  reinforcements.' 

The  Attack  on  Hill  yo  [Loos] 

[Map,  p.  212] 

The  Ypres  operations  were  resumed  at  Langemarck  on 
the  1 6th  of  August,  but  on  the  previous  day  there  had 
been  a  subsidiary  action  in  the  south  with  the  object  of 
increasing  the  threat  to  Lens  and  so  preventing  the  enemy 
from  unduly  concentrating  his  strength  in  the  Ypres 
salient. 

In  September  1915,  during  the  battle  of  Loos,  Hill  70, 
east  of  the  village,  had  been  taken  and  defended,  but  had 
been  given  up  before  the  end  of  the  battle.  For  nearly  two 
years  since  that  time,  Hill  70,  strongly  fortified,  had  pro- 
vided the  enemy  with  an  observation  post.  Its  capture 
would  not  only  rob  him  of  a  useful  piece  of  high  ground, 
but  would  also  greatly  strengthen  the  British  command 
over  the  defences  of  Lens.  At  4.25  a.m.  on  the  15th  of 
August  1917  troops  of  the  Canadian  Corps  attacked  on  a 
front  of  4,000  yards:  they  took  Hill  70  and  established 
themselves  in  the  mining  suburbs  of  Cite  Ste.  Elisabeth 
and  Cite  St.  Emile.  East  of  Loos  they  captured  the  Bois 
Rase  and  the  western  half  of  Bois  Hugo.  In  this  attack 
of  the  15th  the  Canadians  took  all  their  allotted  objectives, 
except  a  short  length  of  German  trench  west  of  Cite  St. 
Auguste,  which,  however,  fell  next  afternoon. 

This  well-executed  minor  operation  at  Lens  was  notable 
for  the  success  of  the  carefully  organized  work  of  the 
Flying  Corps  squadrons.  During  the  night  of  the  13th/ 
14th  of  August  No.  10  ( Armstrong- Whitworth)  Squad- 
ron bombed  railway  junctions  and  billets  east  of  the  Lens 
front,  notably  Carvin,  Berclau,  and  Oignies.  At  Oignies  a 
fire  was  started,  and  the  pilot  whose  bombs  caused  the 
blaze  went  down  to  500  feet,  and  finding  that  a  number  of 
men  had  gathered,  dispersed  them  with  his  machine-gun. 
Oignies  was  attacked  again  on  the  14th  by  day-bombers 


170  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

(D.H.4's)  of  No.  25  Squadron  who  dropped  twenty-eight 
20-lb.  bombs  on  the  village.  The  same  squadron,  late 
in  the  evening,  attacked  the  German  aerodrome  at  Do- 
rignies,  north  of  Douai,  with  forty  20-lb.  bombs.  Another 
aerodrome  from  which  aircraft  worked  over  the  Lens 
sector — namely,  Phalempin  on  the  Douai-Lille  railway — 
was  bombed  on  the  14th  by  Martinsydes  of  No.  27 
Squadron  (four  112-lb.  and  thirty-two  20-lb.  bombs). 

In  the  dark  hours  before  zero  on  the  15th  the  bombing 
objectives  allotted  to  No.  10  Squadron  were  head-quarters 
and  rest  billets  of  the  German  divisions  which  were  to  be 
attacked.  Fifty-one  light-weight  bombs  were  dropped 
by  the  squadron  on  Annay,  Courrieres,  Oignies,  Carvin, 
Epinoy,  and  Pont-a-Vendin. 
15  August  In  conjunction  with  the  actual  attack,  comprehensive 
arrangements  were  made  to  keep  the  front  clear  of  enemy 
aircraft  and  to  deal  with  possible  counter-attacks.  No.  43 
(Sopwith  two-seater)  Squadron  was  employed  all  day  from 
an  advanced  aerodrome,  in  groups  of  three  aeroplanes  at  a 
time,  watching  a  zone  from  1,500  to  2,500  yards  from  the 
original  front-line,  and  about  7,000  yards  wide.  Through 
this  zone  the  German  troops  had  to  pass  to  counter-attack, 
and  the  task  of  the  Sopwiths  was  to  report  all  indications  of 
movement,  and  to  attack,  with  machine-gun  fire,  bodies  of 
enemy  infantry — particularly  when  passing  through  wire 
and  other  obstacles  making  for  congestion — to  engage 
enemy  artillery,  in  action  or  on  the  move,  and,  finally,  to 
attack  any  German  aeroplanes  which  appeared  over  the 
battle.  'These  tasks',  said  a  First  Army  report  of  the 
operation,  'were  most  effectively  carried  out  by  the  pilots 
'and  observers  of  No.  43  Squadron,  who  engaged  a  large 
'number  of  targets  of  all  descriptions  with  machine-gun 
'fire,  and  kept  the  Corps  head-quarters  and  Corps  Heavy 
'Artillery  constantly  informed  (by  telephone  from  their 
'advanced  landing-ground  at  Petit  Sains)  of  hostile  con- 
centrations for  counter-attack.  The  casualties  were  slight 
'in  comparison  with  the  value  of  the  work  done  by  the 
'squadron.  Two  pilots  and  one  observer  were  wounded 
'and  two  machines  were  missing,  but  other  machines  were 
'frequently  hit .  .  .  .'  One  enemy  two-seater  aeroplane  was 


1917]       WORK  OF  THE  AIR  SQUADRONS        171 

destroyed  in  combat,  and  one  single-seater  driven  down  15  August 
out  of  control.  Eighteen  flights,  at  1,000  feet  or  under, 
were  made  by  pilots  of  this  squadron  and  a  total  of  5,000 
rounds  of  ammunition  were  fired.  An  example  of  the 
frustration  of  an  attempted  German  counter-attack, 
through  the  intervention  of  the  squadron,  may  be  given. 
Sixteen  hundred  men  were  seen  massing  for  attack  soon 
after  10  a.m.  in  a  corner  of  the  Bois  de  Dix  Huit.  The 
Sopwith  pilot  flew  low  over  the  wood  and  fired  at  the 
enemy  troops  with  his  machine-gun,  after  which  he  flew 
back  to  his  aerodrome  to  enable  his  observer  to  report. 
Three  more  Sopwiths  were  sent  out  at  once  and,  at  the 
same  time,  the  Corps  Heavy  Artillery  was  informed.  The 
three  Sopwith  pilots  found  and  fired  at  the  enemy  con- 
centration, which  was  finally  dispersed  by  two  groups  of 
heavy  artillery. 

Six  Nieuport  single-seaters  of  No.  40  Squadron  had 
been  sent  to  an  advanced  landing-ground  at  Mazingarbe. 
Their  orders  were  to  go  up  in  pursuit  of  low-flying 
German  aircraft  when  wireless  messages  were  received 
from  an  advanced  anti-aircraft  observation  station  which 
was  specially  set  up  on  high  ground  west  of  Loos.  The 
observer  at  the  transmitting  station  was  an  anti-aircraft 
officer,  and  the  messages  received  from  him  proved  re- 
markably accurate.  Thirty  flights  were  made  by  pilots  of 
No.  40  Squadron,  in  answer  to  these  messages,  and  in  the 
majority  of  instances  the  enemy  aircraft  were  found  at  the 
height  and  in  the  place  indicated  by  the  anti-aircraft 
observer.  As  a  result,  two  German  aircraft  were  destroyed 
— one  in  flames — three  were  shot  down  out  of  control,  and 
many  others,  some  of  them  damaged,  were  driven  off. 

As  a  result  of  the  activities  of  Nos.  40  and  43  Squadrons, 
the  artillery  aeroplanes  were  able  to  work  unmolested 
throughout  the  day.  The  Corps  squadron  chiefly  con- 
cerned was  No.  16  (R.E.8)  attached  to  the  Canadian 
Corps  which  (said  a  First  Army  report)  'carried  out,  most 
'effectually,  their  tasks  of  engaging  hostile  batteries  and 
'concentrations  of  enemy  infantry'.  In  a  general  report 
covering  the  preliminary  preparations  and  the  attack,  the 
G.O.C.  1st  Canadian  Division,  referring  to  the  work  of 


172  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

No.  1 6  Squadron,  said:  'Despite  the  unfavourable  weather 
'conditions  we  were  kept  well  supplied  with  absolutely  up- 
'to-date  photographs  of  the  enemy's  lines.  This  was  of 
'extreme  value,  particularly  to  the  artillery.  During  opera  - 
'tions  the  contact-patrol  work  was  done  most  successfully 
'by  this  squadron.  Perfect  liaison  was  maintained  and  we 
'were  instantly  informed  of  the  situation.' 

While  the  attack  was  in  progress  on  the  15th  No.  25 
Squadron  again  bombed  Dorignies  aerodrome  and  La 
Bassee  and  Douvrin,  while  No.  27  Squadron  attacked  Don 
railway  station.  To  counter  threatened  enemy  air  activity 
near  Lens  in  the  afternoon  Sopwith  triplanes  of  No.  8 
(Naval)  Squadron  patrolled  the  area. 

The  Battle  of  Langemarck,  i6th-i8th  August 
16  August  The  weather  on  the  16th  of  August,  when  the  second 
attack  was  launched  east  and  north  of  Ypres,  was  less 
favourable  than  on  the  previous  day  when  the  Flying 
Corps  had,  without  hitch,  been  able  to  play  their  allotted 
part  in  the  successful  minor  operation  at  Lens.  A  misty 
atmosphere  and  cloud  patches  on  the  morning  of  the  16th 
made  air  observation  uncertain,  and,  although  the  condi- 
tions improved  later  in  the  day,  the  wind  spread  the  smoke 
of  the  battle-field  over  the  German  back  areas  and  helped 
to  screen  enemy  movements. 

At  4.45  a.m.  on  the  16th  the  Fifth  Army  moved  for- 
ward along  a  front  extending  from  the  north-west  corner 
of  Inverness  Copse  to  the  junction  with  the  French  south 
of  St.  Janshoek.  The  French  First  Army,  on  the  left,  had 
the  task  of  clearing  up  the  remainder  of  the  Bixschoote 
peninsula.  The  two  left  divisions  in  the  British  attack 
captured  the  hamlet  of  Weidendreft  and  pushed  on  to 
Langemarck.  They  were  checked  in  the  outskirts  for  a 
time,  but,  by  8  a.m.,  the  village  had  been  taken.  An  hour 
later  they  had  won  their  final  objective,  part  of  the 
German  third  line  system  half  a  mile  farther  north.  The 
attack  of  the  French  First  Army  had  a  similar  success. 
Overcoming  the  resistance  of  isolated  fortified  farms,  the 
French  cleared  the  whole  of  the  peninsula  and  also  secured 
the  bridgehead  of  Drie  Grachten. 


i9i7]  BATTLE  OF  LANGEMARCK  173 

In  the  British  centre,  however,  the  enemy  resistance  16  August 
was  formidable.  Here,  especially  north  and  north-east  of 
St.  Julien,  the  attacking  troops  came  up  against  the  strong- 
points,  built  of  reinforced  concrete,  known  as  'pill-boxes'. 
They  were  distributed  in  depth,  and,  although  some  were 
overcome  as  the  troops  advanced,  many  held  out  stub- 
bornly and  made  it  impossible  for  supports  to  get  through 
to  those  parts  of  the  front  where  the  attacking  troops  had 
made  progress.  On  the  British  right,  also,  such  progress  as 
was  made  could  not  be  maintained  in  the  face  of  deter- 
mined German  counter-attacks.  At  the  end  of  a  day  of 
bitter  fighting  the  situation  south  of  St.  Julien  remained 
unchanged  except  for  small  gains  of  ground  on  the  western 
edge  of  Glencorse  Wood  and  north  of  Westhoek. 

Despite  the  gains  in  the  north,  that  is,  on  the  left  of  the 
Fifth  Army  front  and  the  right  of  the  French  First  Army, 
the  day's  attack  had  been  a  serious  failure.  Apart  from  the 
effectiveness  of  the  new  tactical  device  of  the  'pill-box',  for 
which  as  yet  we  had  no  answer,  the  German  counter- 
attacks developed  without  warning,  so  that  the  British 
infantry  obtained  little  or  no  artillery  help  against  them. 

The  duties  of  the  Corps  squadrons  were  defined  as 
artillery  co-operation,  and  contact  and  counter-attack 
patrols.1  So  that  the  pilots  and  observers  of  these  co- 
operating squadrons  should  be  fully  aware  beforehand  of 
the  plan  of  operations,  and  of  the  timing  of  the  advance, 
the  Fifth  Army  Commander  had  arranged  for  a  general 
staff  officer  and  an  artillery  staff  officer  from  each  Corps  to 
visit  each  Corps  squadron  to  disclose  and  explain  all  details 
to  the  flying  officers. 

Low  clouds,  mist,  and  smoke  drifting  over  the  battle-field 
on  the  1 6th,  especially  in  the  morning,  made  observation 
difficult  and  the  counter-attack  concentrations,  except 
in  rare  instances,  escaped  the  notice  of  the  air  observers. 
The  positions  of  many  new  German  guns,  however,  were 
discovered  from  their  flashes,  and,  when  the  infantry 
answered  calls  for  the  lighting  of  flares,  the  air  observers 
had  little  difficulty  in  plotting  the  progress  of  the  attack. 

1  One  R.E.8  was  to  patrol  each  Corps  front,  from  dawn  to  dusk,  to  report 
counter-attacks. 


174  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

j6  August  In  specific  instances,  when  the  aeroplanes  were  in  position 
to  follow  the  advancing  troops,  the  pilot  could,  by  flying 
close  above  them,  enable  his  observer  to  report  the  advance 
irrespective  of  any  lighting  of  flares.  Thus  the  capture  of 
the  intermediate  line  by  the  two  left  divisions,  and  the 
subsequent  check  in  the  outskirts  of  Langemarck,  were 
reported  by  contact-patrol  observers  of  No.  9  Squadron;1 
No.  7  Squadron  reported  much  of  the  progress — as  in- 
dicated by  flares — of  the  divisions  of  the  centre  (XVIII) 
Corps;  and  Nos.  21  and  4  Squadrons  similarly  told  of  the 
fortunes  of  the  XIX  and  II  Corps  on  the  right.  These 
various  reports,  with  explanatory  maps,  were  dropped  by 
the  observers  in  message-bags  at  the  prearranged  report  - 
ing-centres  of  the  division  and  Corps  commands.  No.  4 
Squadron  also  had  some  success  in  breaking  up  a  counter- 
attack. During  a  contact  patrol  in  the  afternoon  an 
observer  saw  four  parties  of  German  infantry  approaching 
the  front  in  artillery  formation.  The  pilot  dived  and 
attacked  them  with  machine-gun  fire,  and  the  observer 
called  up  the  heavy  artillery.  A  9/2-inch  battery  made 
good  shooting,  and  dropped  one  of  its  first  shells  in  the 
middle  of  one  of  the  German  infantry  groups  before  the 
men  had  time  to  scatter.  Another  observer  of  this 
squadron  was  about  to  send  back  news,  by  wireless,  of  an 
infantry  concentration  he  had  discovered,  when  a  shell 
struck  the  aeroplane  and  shattered  some  of  the  controls 
together  with  the  transmitting  set.  The  observer  scribbled 
a  message,  and  his  pilot  succeeded  in  getting  the  aeroplane 
to  the  divisional  head-quarters  where  the  message-bag  was 
dropped:  there  is  no  evidence  to  show  what  action  was 
taken  as  a  result  of  this  message. 

1  A  report,  of  general  interest,  is  available  of  the  artillery  observation 
work  of  No.  9  Squadron.  When  the  ground  in  the  Langemarck  area  had 
been  captured,  the  G.O.C.  Royal  Artillery  of  the  XIV  Corps  inspected  the 
German  battery  positions  which  had  been  targets  for  counter-battery  fire 
with  the  help  of  No.  9  Squadron's  observers.  He  made  a  detailed  examina- 
tion of  thirty- three  gun  positions  to  check  the  air  reports.  He  found  that  the 
state  of  four  targets  (12  per  cent.)  more  than  confirmed  the  air  reports;  that 
eighteen  (55  per  cent.)  completely  confirmed  them;  that  for  nine  (27  per 
cent.)  the  air  reports  were  approximately  correct;  and  that  for  two  only  was 
the  air  observation  bad. 


1917]  THE  V  BRIGADE  175 

Twenty- two  combats  in  the  air  were  reported  by  the  16  August 
pilots  of  the  four  Corps  squadrons  engaged  in  the  battle. 
An  R.E.8  of  No.  7  Squadron  was  over  Poelcappelle  en- 
gaged on  photography  when  two  Albatros  fighters  attacked. 
As  one  of  the  enemy  aeroplanes  flattened  from  a  dive  just 
above  the  British  two-seater,  it  was  hit  by  a  burst  of 
machine-gun  fire  from  the  observer's  gun  and  fell  out  of 
control:  what  appeared  to  be  the  wreckage  of  the  German 
fighter  was  later  seen  burning  on  the  ground.  The  second 
Albatros  pilot,  meanwhile,  dived  away.  An  Albatros  for- 
mation of  eight  had  no  better  luck  when  they  attacked 
one  of  No.  7  Squadron's  R.E.8's  at  a  low  height  later  in  the 
afternoon.  The  observer  got  a  burst  of  sixty  rounds  into 
one  of  the  German  fighters  at  close  range  and  it  went 
straight  down  and  crashed :  the  remaining  enemy  aircraft 
flew  off  without  pressing  the  attack.  An  R.E.8  of  No.  21 
Squadron  also  gave  a  good  account  of  itself.  It  was  on 
artillery  patrol  over  Bellewaarde  Lake  when  a  formation  of 
nine  Albatros  Scouts  attacked.  The  observer  in  the  R.E.8 
was  able,  from  thirty  yards'  range,  to  get  a  burst  of  fire 
into  the  nearest  Albatros  which  stalled  and  fell,  apparently 
out  of  control.  Before  a  second  attacking  Albatros  could 
be  engaged,  the  R.E.8  was  hit  and  thrown  out  of  control 
by  an  anti-aircraft  shell,  but  the  pilot  was  able,  eventually, 
to  make  a  successful  forced  landing. 

The  detailed  orders  for  the  employment,  on  the  16th  of 
August,  of  the  army  squadrons  of  the  II  and  V  Royal 
Flying  Corps  Brigades,  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing, 
of  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  units  at  Dunkirk,  and  of  the 
aviation  units  attached  to  the  French  First  Army,  pro- 
vided for  machine-gun  and  bombing  attacks  (by  night  and 
day)  on  German  aerodromes,  for  machine-gun  attacks  on 
troops  and  transport,  and  for  a  series  of  offensive  patrols. 
Owing  to  the  weather  conditions  the  orders  could  be  ex- 
ecuted only  in  part.  It  will  be  instructive  to  consider  the 
orders  issued  for  the  V  Brigade,  which  was  chiefly  con- 
cerned. The  main  feature  was  the  attempt  to  co-ordinate 
the  low-flying  activities  of  the  squadrons  with  the  infantry 
advance.  Two  D.H.5's  were  allotted  to  each  divisional 
front  for  co-operation  with  the  forward  infantry  in  the 


176  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

16  August  attack  on  their  final  objective.  The  pilots  were  to  patrol  at 
a  low  height  short  of  the  barrage,  and  were  to  attack  any 
enemy  strong-points  which  appeared  to  hold  up  the  in- 
fantry advance.    In  addition,  two  patrols,  each  of  four 
single-seaters,  were  to  cover  the  whole  Fifth  Army  front, 
at  a  low  height  on  the  enemy  side  of  the  final  objective,  for 
six  hours  after  the  attack  began.   Their  main  task  was  to 
help  to  break  up,  with  machine-gun  fire,  any  attempted 
counter-attack  movements.  A  secondary  duty  was  to  pre- 
vent German  contact-patrol  aeroplanes  from  working.  At 
the  expiry  of  the  six  hours  the  patrols  were  to  be  pushed 
out  farther  east  to  search  for  and  attack,  with  bomb  and 
machine-gun,  any  troop  concentrations.    In  particular, 
they  were  to  watch  the  roads  Langemarck-Staden-Menin- 
Houthem.   Apart  from  this  direct  co-operation  of  single- 
seaters  with  the  assaulting  troops,  aeroplanes  of  both  the 
Corps  and  Army  Wings  of  the  brigade  were  to  maintain 
a  rigorous  offensive  against  all  favourable  ground  targets 
west  of  the  line  Staden-Dadizeele.    East  of  this  line  the 
fighter  squadrons  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing  would, 
it  was  stated,  be  similarly  occupied.    The  German  aero- 
dromes allotted  to  the  brigade  by  Royal  Flying  Corps 
head-quarters,  as  targets  for  low-flying  machine-gun  attack 
by  single-seater  fighters,  were  Beveren,  Rumbeke,  Abeele, 
and  Ingelmunster.  The  operation  orders  of  the  V  Brigade 
allowed  for  one  aeroplane  to  attack  each  aerodrome  as  soon 
as  the  light  permitted  of  accurate  shooting.    Thereafter, 
throughout  the  day,  the  German  aerodromes  and  'de- 
bussing'  points  were  to  be  bombed,  and  the  enemy  balloons 
attacked  as  opportunity  offered,     Inner  offensive  patrols 
to  protect  the  Corps   artillery  aeroplanes,1    and    outer 
patrols,  in  the  area  Langemarck-Roulers-Courtrai-Wer- 
vicq,  were  to  be  maintained  all  day. 

The  German  aerodromes  at  Beveren  and  Ingelmunster 
were  duly  attacked  by  Spad  pilots  of  No.  23  Squadron. 

1  One  of  these  inner  patrols  was  of  a  special  kind.  To  counter  enemy 
low-flying  two-seaters,  a  so-called  'ground  patrol'  of  two  fighters  had  been 
instituted  on  the  6th  of  August.  Their  duty  was  to  patrol  the  British  front 
line  at  3,000  feet  or  under  and  drive  off  all  enemy  aeroplanes  which 
approached. 


1917]  LOW-FLYING  ATTACKS  177 

The  pilot  who  flew  to  Beveren,  north  of  Roulers,  left  at  16  August 
4.35  a.m.,  and  first  dropped  two  25-lb.  bombs  on  his 
target,  hitting  an  aerodrome  building  with  one  of  them. 
He  went  on  beyond  the  aerodrome  for  a  distance,  and 
when  he  again  approached  it,  he  found  a  German  two- 
seater  taking  off.  This  he  attacked  and  shot  down  from  a 
height  of  100  feet,  and  he  gave  the  aeroplane  another  burst 
of  fire  as  it  lay  on  its  nose  on  the  landing-ground.  On  his 
homeward,  journey  the  pilot  saw  a  German  battery  in 
action,  and  he  flew  along  the  line  of  guns  at  200  feet,  raking 
them  with  fire  from  his  Vickers  gun.  A  little  later  he  found 
and  attacked  a  kite  balloon,  from  which  the  observer 
jumped  with  his  parachute  just  before  the  balloon  went 
down  in  flames.  The  pilot  who  flew  to  Ingelmunster,  at 
about  the  same  time,  narrowly  missed  the  hangars  with  his 
two  bombs,  and  then  attacked  the  aerodrome  buildings 
with  his  machine-gun  from  fifty  feet.  On  the  homeward 
journey  he  fired  into  bodies  of  troops  on  the  Roulers- 
Menin  road,  on  an  active  battery,  and  on  a  moving  train. 
The  attack  on  Rumbeke  was  foiled  by  German  two-seaters, 
and  the  pilot  who  set  out  for  Abeele  failed  to  find  the 
aerodrome  and  attacked  buildings  in  the  town. 

Owing  to  the  confused  state  of  the  fighting  on  the 
ground  on  the  16th,  especially  in  the  centre  and  on  the 
right,  the  low-flying  aircraft  of  the  V  Brigade  could  only 
partly  co-ordinate  their  attacks  with  the  advance  of  the  in- 
fantry. D.H.5  pilots  of  No.  32  Squadron  made  a  few  attacks 
on  strong-points  and  on  troops  in  trenches  and  shell-holes, 
but  the  main  ground-target  offensive  was  made  by  Nieu- 
port  pilots  of  No.  29  Squadron,  who  made  many  attacks 
on  the  fronts  of  the  XIV  and  XVIII  Corps.  German  in- 
fantry in  trenches  and  shell-holes  in  the  front  and  support 
lines,  on  the  march  close  behind  the  front,  and  bivouacked 
in  copses,  were  assailed  with  machine-gun  fire  from  low 
heights,  usually  200-600  feet.  Ground  targets  on  the 
roads  leading  to  the  battle  were  also  attacked  by  Spad 
pilots  of  No.  19  Squadron,  which  had  been  transferred  to 
the  V  Brigade  from  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing  two 
days  before. 

The  D.H.4's  of  the  day-bombing  squadron,  No.  57,  of 


178  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

16  August  the  V  Brigade,  dropped  3,600  lb.  of  bombs  on  railway  junc- 
tions and  sidings,  notably  at  Ingelmunster  and  Courtrai, 
and  on  the  aerodromes  at  Heule  and  Reckem;  they  also 
took  photographs  of  the  bombing  objectives  and  of  a  part 
of  the  counter-battery  area. 

Two  hundred  and  thirty  hours'  flying  were  done  by  the 
five  effective  squadrons  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing.1 
Nos.  66  (Sopwith  Tup'),  70  (Sopwith  'Camel'),  and  56 
(S.E.5)  Squadrons  provided  offensive  patrols  for  the  battle 
area  continuously  from  dawn.  Owing  to  the  difficult 
weather  conditions  not  much  of  the  air  fighting  was 
decisive,  but  three  German  aeroplanes  were  destroyed. 
Pilots  of  the  first  two  squadrons  also  attacked,  with  four 
25-lb.  bombs  each,  and  with  machine-gun  fire,  German 
aerodromes  (Bisseghem,  Rumbeke,  Marcke,  and  Chateau 
du  Sart),  railway  trains,  and  sidings  in  which  were  troop 
trains.  Bisseghem  aerodrome  was  also  twice  attacked  by 
the  Martinsyde  bombers  of  No.  27  Squadron  with  a  total 
of  three  230-lb.  and  twenty-one  25-lb.  bombs;  Heule 
aerodrome  received  two  230-lb.,  two  112-lb.,  and  twenty 
25-lb.  bombs  from  No.  55  Squadron's  D.H.4's;  and  both 
squadrons  attacked  the  railway  stations  and  sidings  at 
Seclin  and  Courtrai.  One  of  three  heavy  bombs,  dropped 
on  the  former  place  by  No.  55  Squadron,  blew  up  part  of 
the  track.2 

The  night-bombing  F.E.2b's  of  No.  100  Squadron  went 
out  in  force  in  the  dark  hours  preceding  and  following 
the  infantry  attacks.  During  the  first  night,  the  I5th/i6th 
of  August,  bombs  were  dropped  on  Roulers  station,  on 
Lichtervelde,  Wervicq,  and  Houthem,  and  on  the  goods 
station  in  Lille.  At  the  last-named  station,  which  was 
well  lighted  and  full  of  traffic,  a  machine-gun  attack  was 
made  after  the  bombs  had  exploded.  On  the  night  of  the 
l6th/i7th,  in  three  separate  attacks,  the  squadron  dropped 
about  four  and  a  half  tons  of  bombs  on  Mouveaux  aero- 

1  No.  22  Squadron,  transferred  from  the  III  Brigade  to  take  the  place  of 
No.  19  Squadron  on  the  14th  of  August,  took  no  part  in  the  air  operations 
on  the  1 6th. 

2  Low-flying  attacks  by  two  fighter  pilots  of  the  Second  Army  were  made 
on  Mouveaux  aerodrome. 


1917]  MINOR  OPERATIONS  179 

drome,  and  on  Menin,  Courtrai,  Comines,  and  Roulers 
stations.1 

On  the  17th  and  18th  of  August  there  was  local  fighting 
as  a  result  of  minor  adjustments  of  the  line,  and  this 
brought  the  action  known  as  the  battle  of  Langemarck  to 
a  conclusion. 

Minor  Operations 

To  the  end  of  August  low  clouds  and  rain  continued, 
the  ground  in  the  Ypres  area  was  a  morass,  and  such 
attacks  as  there  were  on  this  front  were  of  a  local  nature. 
To  keep  the  enemy  alert,  minor  operations  were  under- 
taken on  other  fronts.  Some  of  these,  on  the  front  of  the 
Third  Army,  provided  an  opportunity  for  the  direct  co- 
operation of  aircraft  with  the  infantry.  The  air  squadrons 
attached  to  this  Army  had  been  successful  in  a  similar 
undertaking  just  before  the  Langemarck  battle  was  fought. 
On  the  9th  of  August  the  12th  Division  had  attacked 
opposite  Boiry  Notre  Dame :  the  infantry  assault  had  been 
made  at  7.45  p.m.,  and  fifteen  minutes  before  that  hour, 
seven  aeroplanes  had  assembled  behind  the  lines  in  readi- 
ness. Just  before  'zero'  hour,  three  of  them,  D.H.5's  of 
No.  41  Squadron,  crossed  the  barrage  and  dived  to  the 
attack  of  the  German  infantry.  At  'zero'  hour  promptly, 
the  remaining  four,  F.E.2b's  of  No.  18  Squadron,  passed 
over  the  heads  of  the  advancing  infantry  at  500  feet,  and 
poured  their  machine-gun  fire  into  trenches,  trench- 
mortar  positions,  and  machine-gun  emplacements.  This 
minor  action,  well  co-ordinated,  had  been  highly  success- 
ful. When,  therefore,  the  III  Corps  began  a  series  of 
small  attacks  on  the  19th  of  August,  south  of  Vendhuille, 
the  air  tactics  were  repeated.  The  first  attack  was  made  on 
Gillemont  Farm  and  high  ground  to  the  east.  The  day- 
bombing  squadrons  of  the  III  Brigade  concentrated  their 
attention  on  the  German  group  head-quarters  at  Bohain, 
and  on  billeting  villages  immediately  behind  the  area  of 
the  attack.  When  the  infantry  advanced,  five  D.H.5's  of 
No.  41  Squadron,  nine  of  No.  24  Squadron,  four  F.E.2b's 

1  During  this  night,  also,  over  nine  tons  of  bombs  were  dropped  by  Naval 
Handley  Pages  on  the  Thourout  railway  system.   See  p.  96. 


180  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

of  No.  1 8  Squadron,  and  five  S.E.5's  of  No.  60  Squadron, 
went  ahead  of  the  troops  at  a  low  height  and  fired  a  total 
of  9,000  rounds  of  ammunition  into  enemy  troops  and 
strong-points.  On  the  26th  of  August  the  infantry  attack 
was  resumed  on  a  point  called  Cologne  Farm  Hill,  and, 
once  again,  twelve  D.H.5's  of  Nos.  24  and  41  Squadrons 
attacked  German  infantry  and  transport.  In  these  various 
actions  the  progress  of  the  British  infantry  was  well  re- 
ported by  contact-patrol  observers,  enemy  aircraft  were 
kept  at  a  distance  at  the  vital  time  by  strong  patrols  of 
fighting  aircraft,  and  the  artillery  aeroplane  and  balloon 
observers  co-operated  by  reporting  active  German  bat- 
teries and  by  observing  for  fire  on  them. 

The  Battle  of  the  Menin  Road  Ridge,  20th-2$th  September 

At  the  beginning  of  September  the  weather  improved 
and  the  ground  began  to  dry.  Preparations  went  ahead  for 
the  resumption  of  the  Ypres  offensive,  but  as  the  ground 
would  require  some  time  to  recover  from  the  rains  of 
August,  the  new  attack  was  not  timed  to  begin  until  the 
20th  of  September. 

Meanwhile,  early  in  September,  the  extension  north- 
wards of  General  Sir  Herbert  Plumer's  Second  Army, 
which  involved  the  transfer  of  the  II  Corps  from  the  Fifth 
Army,  had  been  completed.1  The  attack  was  to  be  made 
by  all  but  the  northernmost  (Guards)  division  of  the  Fifth 
Army  and  by  the  Second  Army  with  the  exception  of  the 
three  southernmost  divisions.  It  was  planned  to  extend 
from  the  Ypres-Comines  canal  in  the  south  to  the  Ypres- 
Staden  railway  in  the  north,  a  distance,  along  the  line  then 
held,  of  just  over  eight  miles.  The  average  depth  of  the 
objectives  was  1,000  yards,  except  near  the  Menin  road, 
where  it  was  a  mile. 

The  scheme  for  the  employment  of  the  air  service, 

1  The  II  Corps  was  relieved  by  the  I  Anzac  Corps.  When  the  battle 
opened  the  Fifth  Army,  from  Bixschoote  to  just  south  of  the  Ypres-Roulers 
railway,  included  the  XIV  Corps  (No.  9  Squadron,  Royal  Flying  Corps), 
the  XVIII  (No.  7),  and  the  V  (No.  21).  The  Second  Army,  on  its  right  to 
south  of  Frelinghien,  had  the  I  Anzac  Corps  (No.  4  Squadron),  the  X  Corps 
(No.  6),  the  IX  Corps  (No.  53)  and  the  VIII  Corps  (No.  42). 


1917]  MENIN  ROAD  RIDGE  181 

apart  from  the  normal  close  co-operation  with  the  attack- 
ing Corps,  aimed  at  the  destruction  of  rest  billets  housing 
reserve  troops  behind  the  immediate  battle  area,  the  dis- 
location of  railway  communications  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Thourout,  the  weakening  of  the  German  air  service 
through  day-bombing  attacks  on  aerodromes,  and,  particu- 
larly, at  hampering  German  counter-attack  movements. 
Twenty-six  squadrons  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  were 
directly  concerned.1  The  two  night-bombing  squadrons, 
Nos.  ioo  and  101,  had  for  objectives  rest  billets  at  Hooglede, 
Rumbeke,  Ledeghem,  and  Menin,  while  the  bombing  of 
Thourout  railway  junction  was  allotted  to  Naval  Handley 
Pages  from  Coudekerque.2  These  attacks  were  to  be  made 
during  the  night  preceding  the  infantry  assault.  On  the 
day  of  the  battle  the  bombing  was  to  be  concentrated  on 
the  German  aerodromes,  by  low-flying  fighter  formations 
of  three  or  four  aeroplanes  at  dawn,  and,  throughout  the 
rest  of  the  day,  by  day-bomber  formations  from  high 
altitudes.3  All  formations  were  instructed  to  keep  a  special 
watch  for  and  to  report  counter-attack  movements,  but, 
specifically,  areas  were  allotted  to  the  II  and  V  Brigades 
and  to  the  Ninth  Wing,  and  maps  were  supplied  showing 
enemy  assembly  and  debussing  points,  &c,  in  each  area, 
and  the  roads  most  likely  to  be  used  for  bringing  up  re- 
serves.4 The  II  Brigade  area,  opposite  the  Second  Army 

1  i.e.  seven  Corps  squadrons  (9, 7, 2 1 ;  4, 6,  5  3,  and  42) ;  two  fighter-recon- 
naissance squadrons  (20,  II  Brigade,  and  22,  Ninth  Wing,  both  Bristol 
Fighters);  twelve  single-seater  fighter  squadrons  (II  Brigade,  I,  19,  45,  60, 
and  1  Naval;  V  Brigade,  23,  29,  32,  70,  and  10  Naval;  and  Ninth  Wing,  56 
and  66) ;  three  day-bomber  squadrons  (V  Brigade,  57,  D.H.4;  Ninth  Wing, 
27  Martinsyde,  and  55  D.H.4);  an<^  two  night-bomber  F.E.2b  squadrons 
(Ninth  Wing,  100  and  101 — No.  101  Squadron  had  arrived  in  France  from 
England  on  the  26th  of  July  1917).  2  See  p.  97. 

3  The  aerodromes  allotted  for  low-flying  attacks  to  the  II  Brigade  were 
Marcke,  Bisseghem,  and  Heule;  to  the  V  Brigade,  Rumbeke,  Abeele,  and 
Ingelmunster;  to  the  Ninth  Wing,  Cuerne,  Harlebeke,  and  Abeelhoek; 
and  to  Dunkirk  Naval  fighters  Sparappelhoek,  Snelleghem,  and  Varssenaere. 
The  targets  for  the  day-bomber  squadrons  were  :  V  Brigade,  Rumbeke, 
and  Hooglede;  Ninth  Wing,  Marcke,  Bisseghem,  Heule,  Abeelhoek,  and 
Abeele;  I  Brigade,  Herseaux  and  Chateau  du  Sart;  and  Dunkirk,  Sparap- 
pelhoek and  Aertrycke. 

4  These  Hostile  Tactical  Maps,  issued  a  few  days  before  the  attack, 


1 82  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

front,  extended  east  of  the  barrage  line  as  far  as  the  Roulers- 
Menin  railway.  This  was  divided  into  three  sectors,  each 
of  which  was  to  be  patrolled,  continuously,  for  eight  hours 
beginning  at  'zero',  by  pairs  of  fighters,  each  pair  being 
relieved  at  two-hour  intervals.  The  instructions  to  the 
fighter  pilots  were  to  fly  at  heights  under  500  feet  on  the 
watch  for  all  counter-attack  movements.  They  were  to 
pay  particular  attention  to  the  assembly  points  and  routes 
as  shown  on  the  special  tactical  maps,  and  were  to  make 
machine-gun  attacks  on  any  parties  of  infantry,  transport, 
or  moving  batteries,  discovered.  On  their  return  they  were 
to  report,  by  telephone  to  the  Second  Army  Report  Centre 
at  Locre,  all  enemy  movements  in  their  patrol  area. 
These  fighter  pilots  had  the  additional  duty  of  engaging 
German  contact-patrol  or  other  low-flying  aeroplanes. 

On  the  Fifth  Army  front,  only  the  right  of  which  was 
directly  involved  in  the  attack,  No.  57  (D.H.4)  Squadron 
was  made  responsible  for  watching,  throughout  the  day, 
movements  of  enemy  reserves  along  the  roads  indicated  on 
the  tactical  maps,  and  was  to  report,  chiefly  by  dropped 
messages,  to  the  Army  Report  Centre.  On  this  army 
front  no  fighter  formations  were  sent  out  specially  to 
attack  ground  targets,  but  the  instructions  were  that  each 
offensive  patrol  formation  was  to  come  down  from  its 
patrol  height  of  6,000-8,000  feet  fifteen  minutes  before 
it  was  due  to  return,  and  search  for  and  attack  reinforce- 
ments, reporting  all  enemy  movements  on  their  return. 
In  addition  to  these  offensive  formations  a  low-flying  patrol 
of  six  fighters  was  to  be  maintained  on  the  Fifth  Army 
right,  from  two  hours  after  the  attack  began,  to  deal  with 
German  contact-patrol  or  other  low-flying  aircraft,  and 
to  protect  the  Corps  squadrons'  aeroplanes.  East  of  the 
areas  covered  by  the  squadrons  of  these  two  brigades,  that 
is  to  say,  east  of  the  line  Zarren-Oostnieuwkerke-Menin, 
fighters  of  the  Ninth  Wing  were  to  rove  at  low  heights, 
from  four  hours  after  'zero',  to  locate  and  attack  reinforce- 
ments.   Finally,  all  Corps  squadrons  were  to  maintain  the 

were  compiled  from  air  photographs,  prisoners'  statements,  captured 
documents,  and  from  the  experience  gained  in  the  August  fighting  in 
this  locality. 


1917]        EMPLOYMENT  OF  SQUADRONS  183 

usual  counter-attack  patrols  on  their  Corps  fronts.  Their  20  Sept. 
duty  was  to  call  for  immediate  artillery  fire,  if  and  when 
counter-attacks  developed,  and  to  warn  the  front-line  in- 
fantry by  special  smoke  signal.  Although  these  various 
instructions  could  not  be  strictly  executed,  owing  to  ad- 
verse weather  conditions,  they  are  given  in  some  detail  to 
show  the  tactical  method  of  employment  of  the  air  arm  at 
this  period. 

On  the  eve  of  the  battle  rain  set  in  and  continued 
through  the  night.  At  dawn  on  the  20th  it  ceased,  but 
a  wet  mist  obscured  the  battle-field.  The  assault  was 
launched  at  5.40  a.m.  under  weather  conditions  that  pro- 
mised an  early  improvement.  Good  progress  was  made 
from  the  start,  and,  by  nightfall,  except  for  a  few 
points  of  minor  importance,  all  the  objectives  had  been 
won.  The  high  ground  crossed  by  the  Menin  Road,  so 
stubbornly  fought  for  and  so  fiercely  defended  in  previous 
attacks,  passed  into  our  possession.  The  enemy  knew  the 
value,  for  the  development  of  future  operations,  of  the 
ground  which  he  had  lost,  and,  during  the  afternoon  and 
evening  of  the  20th,  delivered  eleven  counter-attacks: 
many  others  which  were  attempted  were  broken  up  by 
artillery  fire  before  they  could  be  launched.  Up  to  the 
25th  of  September  powerful  counter-attacks  were  con- 
tinued and  led  to  bitter  fighting,  but  they  made  no 
appreciable  impression  on  the  line. 

As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see  the  ground  on  the 
20th,  the  aeroplanes  were  over  the  lines,  but  not  much 
could  be  accomplished  until  about  8  a.m.  when  the  mist 
cleared.  Single-seater  fighters  from  the  two  armies  and 
from  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing  went  out  as  ordered 
from  6  a.m.  onwards,  and  flew  over  the  German  positions  at 
a  height  of  a  hundred  feet  or  less.  Sixty-seven  25-lb.  bombs 
were  dropped,  and  more  than  28,000  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion fired  at  ground  targets  during  the  day.  The  targets 
included  troops  drilling  and  on  the  march  behind  the 
battle-front,  motor-cars,  barges  on  the  canals,  active 
batteries  and  machine-guns,  kite-balloons,  &c,  as  well  as 
front-line  troops.  Three  examples  of  the  many  dozens  of 
attacks  of  this  kind  may  be  quoted.    One  pilot  of  No.  1 


1 84  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

20  Sept.  (Naval)  Squadron,  in  a  Sopwith  triplane,  saw  German 
infantry  concentrated  in  a  strung-out  line  of  shell-holes 
towards  which  Second  Army  troops  were  advancing.  He 
dived  within  a  few  feet  of  the  ground  and  attacked  the 
enemy  troops,  and  he  kept  up  his  attack  as  the  men  rushed 
in  panic  from  hole  to  hole.  This  action  stimulated  the 
British  infantry  who  waved  to  the  pilot  and  then  went  on 
and  captured  their  objective.  A  Nieuport  pilot  of  No.  29 
Squadron,  on  the  Fifth  Army  front,  saw  two  machine- 
guns  in  action.  He  dived  and  attacked  the  gunners,  who 
ran  for  cover  to  neighbouring  shell-holes,  knocking  over 
their  guns  as  they  went.  The  pilot  also  attacked  men  con- 
centrated in  a  line  of  trenches.  A  'Camel'  pilot  of  No.  70 
Squadron  discovered  a  column  of  horse  transport  on  the 
way  to  the  front.  He  swept  the  column  with  his  twin 
machine-guns:  the  drivers  jumped  and  ran,  the  horses, 
some  of  them  hit,  became  unmanageable,  and  when  the 
pilot  had  finished,  the  column  was  entirely  disorganized. 

When  the  mist  cleared  on  the  20th  of  September, 
although  the  clouds  still  remained  low,  the  contact-patrol 
and  artillery  observers  came  into  close  touch  with  the  battle. 
From  that  time  onwards  throughout  the  day  a  stream  of 
wireless  messages  came  from  the  observers  in  the  seven 
R.E.8  squadrons  engaged  on  Corps  work,  telling  of  im- 
portant enemy  targets.  Three  hundred  and  ninety-four 
such  messages  were  sent  out  by  'zone-call',  and  about 
one-third  led  to  immediate  artillery  fire.  Fire  for  destruc- 
tion was  directed  by  the  aeroplane  observers  against 
thirty-two  German  batteries,  and,  for  neutralization, 
against  forty-eight  others.  As  a  result,  three  gun-pits 
were  blown  up,  and  thirteen  set  on  fire.  This  artillery 
co-operation  was  supplemented  by  the  balloons,  whose 
observers  reported  the  positions  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty-eight  active  German  batteries,  and  helped  to 
direct  the  fire  of  artillery  on  forty-eight  targets. 

The  contact  and  counter-attack  patrol  observers 
watched  the  battle  through  most  of  the  day.  Flares  were 
plentifully  lighted  when  called  for  along  the  greater  part 
of  the  front,  and  the  advance  was  consequently  well  re- 
ported. Undoubtedly  the  most  important  air  work  of  the 


1917]        COUNTER-ATTACK  WARNINGS  185 

whole  day  was  the  warning  given  of  German  counter-  20  Sept. 
attacks.  It  will  be  recalled  that  in  the  battle  fought  at 
Langemarck  on  the  16th  of  August,  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  observers  were  prevented  by  the  weather  from  dis- 
covering German  counter-attack  concentrations,  with  the 
result  that  the  British  infantry,  when  the  attacks  came, 
received  little  artillery  support  and  were  compelled  to 
fall  back.  On  the  20th  of  September  the  air  observers 
were  able  to  give  this  essential  help  to  the  infantry. 
Early  in  the  day  air  reports  revealed  that  two  German 
counter-attack  divisions  had  been  put  in  motion  from 
the  Dadizeele  line.  As  the  divisions  moved  up  to 
the  battle-front,  where  they  appeared  in  the  after- 
noon, artillery  fire  was  directed  on  them,  and  they 
were  subjected  to  low-flying  attacks.  There  were  eight 
specific  instances  on  the  front  of  the  Second  Army  of  the 
breaking-up,  by  the  artillery,  of  attempted  counter- 
attacks, as  a  result  of  information  sent  down  from  the  air. 
These  air  reports  referred  to  concentrations  near  Zonne- 
beke  at  8.30  a.m.,  south  of  Droogenbroodhoek  at  9.45  a.m., 
at  Polygon  Wood  at  10.20  a.m.,  north  of  Zandvoorde  at 
12.40  p.m.,  east  of  Zandvoorde  between  2  and  2.30  p.m., 
against  Polygon  Wood  at  3.40  p.m.,  east  of  Zandvoorde 
once  more  at  5  p.m.,  and,  finally,  north  of  Tenbrielen  at 
6  p.m.  These  facts  may  appear  colourless  in  comparison 
with  other  forms  of  air  activity,  but  they  represent, 
nevertheless,  a  substantial  contribution  by  the  air  service 
towards  the  success  of  the  battle.1  It  may  also  be  remarked 
that  many  of  the  low-flying  attacks  on  the  reinforcing 
divisions  were  delivered  before  the  enemy  troops  came 
within  range  of  the  British  artillery. 

The  Corps  aeroplanes  were  little  troubled  in  their 
work  by  enemy  aircraft.  On  the  front  over  which  the 
pilots  of  the  II  Brigade  flew,  there  were  seventy-two 

1  'It  is  significant  that,  although  the  enemy  was  well  aware  of  our  inten- 
sion to  attack,  his  counter-attacks  did  not  develop  yesterday  with  any- 
thing like  their  previous  intensity.  It  is  evident  that  our  information  as  to 
'their  assembly  places  and  the  careful  co-operation  between  the  Royal 
'Flying  Corps  and  artillery  resulted  in  hostile  attempts  being  broken  up  at 
'the  outset.'  (Second  Army  Intelligence  Summary,  September  21st,  191 7.) 


186  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

20  Sept.  combats  on  the  20th,  but  six  only  of  these  involved  Corps 
aircraft.  On  the  V  Brigade  front  there  were  four  combats 
by  Corps  aeroplanes  as  compared  with  thirty-six  by  fighters 
of  the  Army  Wing.  Ten  British  aeroplanes,  chiefly  en- 
gaged on  low-flying,  failed  to  return,  one  contact-patrol 
aeroplane  was  destroyed  by  a  shell,  a  pilot  was  killed,  and 
nine  pilots  and  observers  were  wounded.  Six  German  air- 
craft were  destroyed  in  combat  and  one  by  infantry  fire. 
That  the  German  airmen  were  kept  away  from  the  front  was 
of  direct  help  to  the  British  infantry,  apart  from  the  fact  that 
the  co-operating  Royal  Flying  Corps  pilots  and  observers 
were  able  to  give  their  full  attention  to  the  task  of  harassing 
the  enemy  batteries  and  troops.  The  compass  stations  of 
the  Second  Army,  for  instance,  were  able  to  report  at  the 
end  of  the  day  that  they  had  failed  to  detect  the  presence 
of  any  German  aeroplanes  working  in  co-operation  with 
the  enemy  artillery.1 

Owing  to  the  early  morning  mist,  the  dawn  low-flying 
attacks  by  fighting  aircraft  on  German  aerodromes  could 
not  be  made,  although  some  were  attempted.  When 
the  mist  cleared,  clouds  remained  low  and  the  day- 
bombers  of  No.  27  (Martinsyde)  Squadron  were  sent  out 
individually  or  in  pairs,  instead  of  in  formation,  to  bomb 
their  allotted  aerodromes.  Those  attacked  were  at  Bis- 
seghem,  Marcke,  Abeele,  and  Heule.2  Two  pilots  of  the 
squadron  also  attacked  Wervicq  and  Aelbeke. 

Before  dawn  on  the  20th  the  night-bombers  of  Nos.  100 
and  101  Squadrons  had  attacked  billets  at  Rumbeke, 
and  Hooglede,  and  the  town  of  Menin.  Prisoners  taken 
in  the  morning  stated  that  German  reserve  troops  would 
detrain   at    Ledeghem    railhead    and    that    considerable 

1  'The  enemy's  onslaught  on  the  20th  was  successful,  which  proved  the 
'superiority  of  the  attack  over  the  defence.  .  .  .  The  power  of  the  attack 
'lay  in  the  artillery  and  in  the  fact  that  ours  did  not  do  enough  damage  to 
'the  hostile  infantry  as  they  were  assembling,  and  above  all,  at  the  actual 
'time  of  the  assault.'   (Ludendorff,  My  War  Memories,  p.  488.) 

2  No.  25  Squadron  of  the  I  Brigade  dropped  fifty  25-lb.  bombs  on  the 
aerodrome  at  Chateau  du  Sart  (near  Lille),  and  forty-six  25-lb.  bombs  on 
Herseaux  aerodrome.  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron  dropped  two  65-lb.,  two 
50-lb.,  and  sixteen  16-lb.  bombs  on  the  aerodrome  at  Aertrycke,  and 
fifteen  65-lb.  and  sixty-five  16-lb.  bombs  on  that  at  Sparappelhoek. 


1917]  BOMBING  OPERATIONS  187 

ammunition  had  already  been  dumped  there.  Air  recon- 
naissance reports  confirmed  that  there  was  great  activity 
at  Ledeghem  station  and,  in  the  afternoon,  therefore, 
under  improved  weather  conditions,  eleven  D.H.4's  of 
No.  55  Squadron,  in  two  formations,  attacked  the  station 
from  15,000  feet  with  twelve  112-lb.  and  fifty-six  25-lb. 
bombs.   Six  bombs  were  seen  to  hit  the  station  buildings. 

For  four  days  after  the  advance  on  the  20th  the  enemy 
made  determined  efforts  to  regain  the  more  important 
sectors  of  the  line  that  had  been  lost.  These  attacks  were 
particularly  fierce  north-east  of  St.  Julien,  and  on  the 
front  between  Tower  Hamlets  and  Polygon  Wood. 

During  the  night  of  the  20th/2ist  of  September  Nos.  100 
and  101  Squadrons  bombed  Menin  and  other  detraining 
centres.  The  two  squadrons  dropped  thirteen  230-lb., 
twenty  112-lb.,  and  forty- two  light-weight  bombs  on 
Menin  station,  Wervicq,  Ledeghem,  Seclin,  and  Roulers, 
and  fired  a  total  of  4,000  rounds  of  ammunition  at  various 
ground  targets.  Seventeen  of  the  bombs  were  reported  to 
have  made  hits  on  trains  in  Menin  station.1 

On  the  morning  of  the  21st  of  September,  air  reconnais- 
sance reports,  made  between  7  a.m.  and  9.15  a.m.,  left  no 
doubt  that  considerable  reinforcements  were  arriving  at 
Roulers  and  Menin  stations.  No.  55  Squadron  was  there- 
upon ordered  to  attack  the  station  at  Roulers  where  most 
activity  had  been  reported.  The  squadron  dropped  twenty 
112-lb.  bombs  on  the  target,  and  many  of  them  were 
seen  to  hit:  a  fire  was  started  in  one  of  the  station 
sheds.  In  the  evening  of  the  21st  air  reconnaissances  re- 
ported that  troops  were  pouring  in,  by  rail,  to  Menin  and 
were  being  transported  thence,  by  motor-bus,  to  the 
front.  Nos.  100  and  101  Squadrons  were  thereupon 
ordered  to  attack  the  town,  and  other  detraining  centres, 
as  well  as  the  roads  along  which  the  movement  of  troops 
had  been  reported.  The  pilots  of  the  two  squadrons  began 
their  attacks  as  soon  as  it  was  dark  and  kept  them  up 
throughout  the  night.  By  the  light  of  parachute  flares, 
dropped  from  the  aeroplanes  from  time  to  time,  it  was 

1  For  day  and  night  bombing,  in  co-operation  with  the  offensive,  by 
naval  squadrons  from  Dunkirk,  see  pp.  97-8. 


188  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

seen  that  the  Menin-Ypres  road  was  crowded  with  troops 
and  vehicles.  The  information  was  passed  back  to  the 
British  artillery  which  fired  on  the  routes  all  night.  The 
pilots  of  No.  ioo  Squadron  dropped  fourteen  230-lb.  and 
sixty-eight  25 -lb.  bombs  on  the  endless  targets  along  the 
road,  and  then,  from  low  heights,  attacked  the  troops  with 
their  machine-guns.  Other  bombs  dropped  by  this 
squadron  were  on  Menin  (nine  230-lb.,  two  112-lb.,  and 
thirty-three  25-lb.),  on  Ledeghem  (five  230-lb.  and 
twelve  25-lb.),  on  Wervicq  (one  230-lb.,  one  40-lb.  phos- 
phorous bomb,  and  one  25-lb.),  and  on  the  village  of 
Gheluwe.  No.  10 1  Squadron  pilots  dropped  their 
bombs  on  Roulers  station  (five  230-lb.  and  twelve 
112-lb.)  and  on  Menin  (two  230-lb.).  On  the  night  of  the 
22nd/23rd  of  September  the  same  two  squadrons  again 
attacked  the  German  reinforcement  centres.  The  targets 
were  Wervicq  town  and  station  (seven  230-lb.  and  six 
40-lb.  phosphorous  bombs),  Menin  town  and  station  (six 
230-lb.  and  thirteen  25-lb.),  Gheluwe  (one  230-lb.,  one 
40-lb.,  and  three  25-lb.),  and  Roulers  station  (five  230-lb. 
and  eleven  112-lb.  bombs).  In  addition,  one  40-lb.  phos- 
phorous bomb  and  twenty-five  25-lb.  bombs  were  dropped 
on  transport  on  the  Gheluvelt-Menin  and  Gheluvelt- 
Wervicq  roads. 

In  the  evening  of  the  23rd  Captain  J.  T.  B.  McCudden, 
of  No.  56  Squadron,  had  just  attacked  and  destroyed  an 
enemy  two-seater  aeroplane  when  he  saw  another  S.E.5 
pilot  in  combat  with  a  Fokker  triplane.  With  other 
members  of  his  squadron  he  joined  in  the  fight,  and  it  soon 
became  apparent  that  the  German  pilot  had  exceptional 
skill  and  courage.  He  fought  seven  opponents  for  some 
time,  single-handed,  but  was  later  joined  by  a  red-nosed 
Albatros  fighter.  Later  still,  formations  of  other  Albatros 
fighters  arrived,  with  a  group  of  British  Spads  close  behind 
them.  For  some  time  the  fight  was  waged  fiercely,  with 
the  Fokker  triplane  dazzlingly  elusive.  Then,  at  last, 
Second  Lieutenant  A.  P.  F.  Rhys-Davids,  of  No.  56 
Squadron,  got  into  a  favourable  firing  position.  What 
happened  next  is  told  in  an  extract  from  his  combat  report : 
'.  .  .  The  red-nosed  Albatros  and  the  triplane  fought 


1917]  WERNER  VOSS  189 

'magnificently.  I  got  in  several  good  bursts  at  the  triplane, 
'without  apparent  effect,  and  twice  placed  a  new  Lewis 
'drum  on  my  gun.  Eventually  I  got  east  and  slightly  above 
'the  triplane  and  made  for  it,  getting  in  a  whole  Lewis 
'drum  and  a  corresponding  number  of  Vickers  into  him. 
'He  made  no  attempt  to  turn,  until  I  was  so  close  to  him 
'I  was  certain  we  would  collide.  He  passed  my  right-hand 
'wing  by  inches  and  went  down.  I  zoomed.  I  saw  him 
'next  with  his  engine  apparently  off,  gliding  west.  I  dived 
'again  and  got  one  shot  out  of  my  Vickers ;  however,  I  re- 
loaded and  kept  in  the  dive.  I  got  in  another  good  burst 
'and  the  triplane  did  a  slight  right-hand  turn,  still  going 
'down.  I  had  now  overshot  him  (this  was  at  1,000  feet), 
'zoomed,  but  never  saw  him  again.  Immediately  after- 
'wards  I  met  the  red-nosed  scout,  who  was  a  very  short 
'way  south-east  of  me.  I  started  firing  at  100  yards.  The 
'E.A.  [enemy  aircraft]  then  turned  and  fired  at  me.  At 
'30  yards  range  I  finished  a  Lewis  drum  and  my  Vickers 
'stopped,  so  I  dived  underneath  him  and  zoomed.  When 
'I  looked  again,  I  saw  the  E.A.  spiralling  down  steeply  out 
'of  control.' 

Captain  McCudden  watched  the  triplane  dive  into  the 
ground  on  the  British  side  of  the  lines  where  it  seemed  to 
'disappear  into  a  thousand  fragments'.  When  the  remains 
of  the  German  pilot  were  examined,  he  was  identified  as 
Fliegerleutnant  Werner  Voss,  who  was,  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  second  on  the  list  of  successful  German  fighting 
pilots  with  forty-nine  Allied  aeroplanes  to  his  credit. 
Voss,  one  of  a  family  of  fighting  sons  of  a  dye-works  pro- 
prietor of  Crefeld,  was  twenty  years  old  at  the  time  of  his 
death.  He  had  been  attached  to  the  German  air  service, 
from  a  Hussar  regiment,  in  August  191 5.  He  became  a 
non-commissioned  officer  pilot  in  May  191 6,  but  was  pro- 
moted to  commissioned  rank  in  September  of  the  same 
year.  He  shot  his  first  aircraft  down  in  November  191 6 
and  his  subsequent  rise  to  prominence  was  rapid.  His 
name  appeared  repeatedly  in  the  German  communiques — 
especially  in  the  spring  of  191 7  when  he  contributed  much 
to  the  temporary  dominance  of  the  German  air  service — 
and  he  had  been  decorated  with  the  order  Pour  le  Merite. 


190  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

In  his  career  and  in  his  character  he  had  much  in  common 
with  McCudden,  who  wrote :  'As  long  as  I  live  I  shall  never 
'forget  my  admiration  for  that  German  pilot,  who,  single- 
'handed,  fought  seven  of  us  for  ten  minutes,  and  also  put 
'some  bullets  through  all  of  our  machines.  His  flying  was 
'wonderful,  his  courage  magnificent,  and,  in  my  opinion, 
'he  was  the  bravest  German  airman  whom  it  has  been  my 
'privilege  to  see  fight.'1 

The  bomb  raids  on  the  24th  and  25th  of  September 
were  directed  chiefly  against  the  German  aerodromes  and 
against  railway  junctions.  The  main  aerodrome  targets 
were  Marcke  (four  230-lb.  and  four  112-lb.  bombs), 
Abeele  (five  230-lb.,  thirty-six  25-lb.),  and  Lichtervelde 
(two  230-lb.,  twenty-eight  25-lb.).  No.  27  Squadron 
attacked  Ath  station  on  the  24th  (six  230-lb.,  three 
112-lb.)  and  No.  55  Squadron  bombed  Melle  sidings 
(three  230-lb.,  four  112-lb.)  and  the  Gontrode  airship 
shed2  on  the  25th.  On  both  these  days  the  bombing 
activities  of  No.  57  Squadron  were  confined  to  the  billet- 
ing village  of  Hooglede  on  which  a  total  of  seven  230-lb. 
and  eight  112-lb.  bombs  was  dropped.  The  photographic 
reconnaissances  were  numerous  on  both  days  and  about 
2,500  plates  were  exposed  over  the  enemy  positions.  On 
the  25th,  particularly,  German  airmen  were  active,  but 
the  air  combats  mostly  terminated  in  favour  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps.  Nineteen  out  of  thirty-two  German  aero- 
planes driven  down  on  this  day  were  seen  to  crash,  while 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps  casualties  were  one  aeroplane 
missing,  two  pilots  and  one  observer  killed,  and  three 
officers  wounded.3 

The  Battle  of  Polygon  Wood,  26th  Septembersrd  October 

The  heavy  fighting  resulting  from  the  German  counter- 
attacks on  and  after  the  20th  of  September  was  not 
allowed  to  interfere  with  the  preparations  for  the  renewal 

1  Five  Tears  in  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  by  J.  T.  B.  McCudden,  p.  242. 

2  See  p.  197. 

3  The  total  battle  casualties  of  the  twenty-six  squadrons  in  the  battle  of 
Menin  Road  Ridge  were  sixty-two  pilots  and  observers  killed,  wounded, 
or  missing. 


1917]  POLYGON  WOOD  191 

of  the  advance,  to  be  made  by  the  Second  Army  with  the 
support  of  the  right  Corps  of  the  Fifth  Army.  This  began 
on  the  morning  of  the  26th  from  south  of  the  Menin  road 
to  a  point  north-east  of  St.  Julien,  a  distance  of  rather  less 
than  six  miles.  On  the  right  a  short  advance  only  was 
needed  to  capture  the  high  ground  which  covered  the 
German  local  movements  from  all  except  air  observation, 
but  north  of  the  Menin  road  a  deeper  bite  into  the  enemy 
position  was  planned  with  the  object  of  securing  a  jump- 
ing-off  place  for  a  direct  attack  on  the  main  Passchendaele 
ridge. 

Duringthe  night,  while  the  infantry  were  awaiting  'zero' 
hour,  the  bombing  aircraft  of  Nos.  100  and  101  Squadrons 
went  to  and  from  the  enemy  billeting  and  railway  centres 
on  which  they  dropped  a  total  of  nearly  five  tons  of  bombs.1 
Seven  thousand  rounds  of  machine-gun  ammunition  were 
fired,  in  addition,  at  ground  targets,  particularly  troops 
and  transport  on  the  roads,  and  70  one-pounder  pom- 
pom shells  were  fired  at  transport  by  an  F.E.2b  pilot  of 
No.  100  Squadron.  A  local  fog,  which  came  up  without 
warning  while  some  of  the  aircraft  were  away  bombing, 
led  to  five  crashes  in  forced  landings  with  consequent 
injury  to  one  pilot  and  two  observers.  The  fog  also 
curtailed  the  bombing  activities  of  No.  101  Squadron. 

As  the  infantry  clambered  from  their  trenches  at  26  Sept. 
5.50  a.m.  on  the  26th,  the  clouds  were  low  and  made 
difficult  the  work  of  the  co-operating  aircraft.  Neverthe- 
less, the  contact-patrol  and  artillery  observers  were  able 
to  report  the  progress  of  the  battle,  while  the  low-flying 
fighting  pilots,    from    an    average   height    of  300   feet, 

1  No.  100  Squadron  dropped  twenty-three  230-lb.,  four  1 12-lb.,  and  one 
hundred  and  forty-eight  25-lb.  bombs :  on  Wervicq  (eight  230-lb.,  twenty- 
six  25-lb.),  Menin  (six  230-lb.,  two  1 12-lb.,  thirty-two  25-lb.),  Gheluwe 
village  (one  230-lb.,  three  25-lb.),  Wervicq-Gheluvelt  and  Wervicq- 
Zandvoorde  roads  (six  230-lb.,  seventy  25-lb.),  Becelaere  village  (three 
25-lb.),  Menin-Gheluvelt  road  (six  25-lb.),  billeting  huts  at  Tenbrielen 
(eight  25-lb.),  at  Kruiseik  (two  1 12-lb.),  and  on  Zandvoorde  village 
(two  230-lb.  bombs).  No.  101  Squadron  bombed  Menin  (one  230-lb.,  four 
25-lb.),  Oostnieuwkerke  (four  1 12-lb.)  and  Hooglede  (two  1 12-lb.). 
During  this  same  night  Naval  Handley  Pages  dropped  9J  tons  of  bombs  on 
the  Thourout-Cortemarck-Lichtervelde  triangle  (see  p.  98). 


i92  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

26  Sept.  attacked  troops  and  batteries.  During  the  day  193  active 
German  batteries  were  reported  to  the  artillery  by  zone 
call,  while  thirty-nine  other  batteries  were  engaged,  with 
aeroplane  observation,  for  destruction,  and  twenty-eight 
for  neutralization. 

Once  again  the  infantry  achieved  a  tactical  success. 
Australian  troops  carried  the  remainder  of  Polygon  Wood 
with  the  German  trench  line  to  the  east  of  it,  and  estab- 
lished themselves  along  their  objectives  beyond  the  Bece- 
laere-Zonnebeke  road.  On  the  left  of  the  Australians 
English  troops  captured  a  long  line  of  strong-points. 
South  of  Polygon  Wood  the  struggle  was  long  and  fierce, 
but  most  of  the  fortified  farms  and  other  strong-points 
were  taken,  although  the  line  of  objectives  in  this  locality 
was  not  completely  won  until  the  evening  of  the  next  day. 

The  feature  of  the  day's  fighting  was  the  defeat  of  the 
numerous  enemy  counter-attacks,  due,  in  part,  to  the 
warnings  given  by  the  air  observers.  An  appreciation  of 
the  attack  compiled  by  the  General  Staff  of  the  Second 
Army  recorded :  'As  to  the  employment  of  his  supports 
:and  reserves,  the  enemy  again  followed  the  same  tactics 
:as  before.  His  local  reserves,  especially  north  of  Polygon 
Wood,  were  employed  in  small  counter-attacks  by  9  a.m., 
'while  his  larger  forces  comprised  in  his  Counter-Attack 
'Divisions  were  not  brought  in  until  noon  or  afternoon  as 
'was  anticipated.  It  is  now  evident  that  the  prompt  loca- 
tion of  these  by  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  and  the  very 
'effectual  way  in  which  they  were  dealt  with  by  our 
:artillery  caused  tremendous  casualties  to  the  enemy  and 
'prevented  their  developing  counter-attacks  at  close 
'quarters;  there  is  evidence  that  a  large  counter-attack, 
'involving  several  battalions,  was  ordered  for  5  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  against  our  positions  north  of  Polygon 
'Wood  but  did  not  materialize.' 

The  battle  of  Menin  road  on  the  20th  had  disclosed  that 
the  enemy  attached  great  importance  to  the  Tower  Ham- 
lets ridge.  The  air  reports  throughout  the  26th  of 
September  revealed  intense  activity  on  the  roads  south- 
east of  Zandvoorde,  and  heavy  concentrations  of  artillery 
behind  Tenbrielen,  from  which  the  Second  Army  Staff 


1917]       COUNTER-ATTACKS  DEFEATED         193 

concluded  that  strong  counter-attacks  against  the  Tower  26  Sept. 
Hamlets  ridge  must  again  be  expected  on  the  evening 
of  the  26th.  On  the  air  information,  annihilating  artil- 
lery fire  was  brought  to  bear  on  the  enemy  troops, 
assembled  and  deploying,  with  the  result  that  the  attack, 
launched  about  7.30  p.m.,  was  so  disconcerted  that  few 
elements  got  to  close  range.  'The  26th',  says  General 
Ludendorff,  'proved  a  day  of  heavy  fighting,  accompanied 
'by  every  circumstance  that  could  cause  us  loss.  We 
'might  be  able  to  stand  the  loss  of  ground,  but  the 
'reduction  of  our  fighting  strength  was  again  all  the 
'heavier.  .  .  .  The  depth  of  penetration  was  limited  so 
'as  to  secure  immunity  from  our  counter-attacks,  and  the 
'latter  were  then  broken  up  by  the  massed  fire  of  artillery.'1 

A  study  of  the  reports  of  the  low-flying  fighting  pilots 
makes  it  clear,  also,  that  the  German  troops  brought  up  for 
counter-attack  suffered  casualties  before  they  had  to  meet 
the  British  artillery  fire.  As  was  done  for  the  attack  on 
the  20th,  tactical  maps  were  supplied  showing  the  enemy 
assembly  points  and  routes  of  approach,  and  the  area  was 
divided  into  sections  which  were  specifically  allotted  for 
the  special  attention  of  the  low-flying  patrol  pilots.  Many 
parties  of  German  infantry  marching  behind  the  battle- 
front  were  found  and  scattered  with  light-weight  bombs 
and  machine-gun  fire.  Other  targets  included  active 
batteries  and  machine-guns,  and  troops  entrenched  or 
holding  strong-points  in  the  forward  areas. 

The  enemy  also  attempted  low-flying  attacks,  with 
intermittent  success,  on  the  advancing  British  infantry. 
On  the  front  of  the  Second  Army  five  of  the  low-flying 
German  aeroplanes  were  shot  down  by  machine-gun  fire 
from  the  ground.  In  air  fighting  six  aeroplanes  were 
destroyed  by  Flying  Corps  and  naval  pilots,  all  in  the 
battle  area. 

Bombing  attacks,  owing  to  the  low  clouds,  could  not 
be  made  according  to  programme.  Low-flying  attacks  had 
been  ordered  against  the  main  German  aerodromes  (Rum- 
beke,  Abeele,  Ingelmunster,  Heule,  Marcke,  Cuerne, 
Abeelhoek,  Bisseghem,  and  Harlebeke),  each  to  be  attacked 

1  My  War  Memories,  pp.  488-9. 

2504-4  n 


i94  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

26  Sept.  by  one  fighter  pilot.  Only  three  of  these  aerodromes  were 
attacked,  namely,  Abeele,  Abeelhoek,  and  Rumbeke.  The 
head-quarters  day-bombing  squadrons  (Nos.  55  and  27) 
were  to  attack  Heule,  Abeelhoek,  Bisseghem,  and  Abeele 
aerodromes,  and  the  day-bombing  squadron  of  the  V 
Brigade  (No.  57)  had  for  target  billets  near  Moorslede. 
No.  57  Squadron,  despite  the  unfavourable  conditions, 
successfully  bombed  Moorslede,  and  No.  27  Squadron 
attacked  Bisseghem  aerodrome.  Other  pilots  of  the 
squadron  attacked  Tronchiennes  station,  near  Ghent, 
and  the  aerodrome  at  Gontrode.1 

An  offensive  patrol  formation  of  No.  56  Squadron 
attacked  a  group  of  enemy  bombers,  escorted  by  eight 
fighters,  as  they  were  about  to  cross  the  lines.  The  S.E.5 
pilots  attacked  so  strongly  that  the  German  two-seaters 
were  induced  to  drop  their  load  of  bombs  on  their  own  side 
of  the  lines.  The  enemy  aircraft  were  eventually  driven  off 
without  any  apparent  casualties. 

The  operation  orders  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  had 
instructed  the  two  night-bombing  squadrons,  Nos.  100 
and  101,  to  pay  'special  attention  to  the  attack  of  troops', 
during  the  night  following  the  first  day's  fighting,  on  the 
Menin-Gheluvelt,  Wervicq-Gheluvelt  roads,  and  on 
roads  in  the  Roulers,  Hooglede,  and  Passchendaele  areas. 
The  squadrons  were  also  to  attack  railway  stations  and 
trains.2  The  pilots  of  the  two  squadrons  spread  their 
attacks  over  most  of  the  night,  and  dropped  three  230-lb. 
and  seven  25-lb.  bombs  on  Wervicq  town  and  station,  and 
five  230-lb.,  sixteen  112-lb.,  and  sixteen  25-lb.  bombs  on 
troops  and  transport  on  roads  in  the  specified  areas. 

Up  to  the  30th  of  September,  by  which  time  the  enemy 
had  made  some  recovery  from  the  disorganization  caused 
by  his  defeat  of  the  26th,  there  was  relative  quiet  along  the 
front.  The  enemy  air  activity,  during  this  brief  interlude, 
was  below  normal,  but  there  was  no  slackening  of  effort  by 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons.  The  routine  of  artillery 

1  See  p.  197. 

2  No.  100  Squadron  in  the  area  Wervicq-HaUuin-Courtrai-Ledeghem, 
and  No.  101  Squadron  in  the  area  Hooglede,  Westroosebeke,  Passchendaele- 
Rolleghemcappelle. 


i9i7]  AIR  FIGHTING  195 

co-operation,  and  of  reconnaissance  and  photography,  was 
maintained.  During  the  night  of  the  27th/28th  there  were 
widespread  bombing  attacks,  in  which  many  of  the  Corps 
squadrons  took  part,  on  the  enemy  road  and  railway  com- 
munications, and  on  billeting  centres,  and  during  the  28th, 
which  was  a  fine  day,  twenty  separate  bombing  attacks 
were  made  in  strength. 

There  were  a  few  concentrated  air  fights  by  formations 
on  the  28th  and  in  these  the  German  airmen  suffered 
severely.  The  Bristol  Fighter  and  the  S.E.5  had  the 
measure  of  the  best  of  the  enemy's  fighters.  In  one  en- 
counter, on  the  28th,  south  of  the  main  battle  area, 
between  a  formation  of  nine  Albatros  Scouts  and  four 
Bristol  Fighters  of  No.  1 1  Squadron,  together  with  eight 
D.H.5's  of  No.  41  Squadron,  the  German  pilots,  although 
they  fought  with  courage,  were  routed  and  apparently  one 
only  survived.  Three  were  destroyed  in  the  air  and  five 
sent  down  out  of  control.  On  the  same  day  a  formation  of 
S.E.5's,  led  by  Captain  J.  T.  B.  McCudden,  attacked  a 
group  of  hostile  fighters  in  the  Ypres  area  and  destroyed 
five  of  them,  without  loss  to  the  S.E.5's.  One  of  the 
German  aeroplanes  shot  down  by  McCudden  broke  up  in 
the  air,  the  pilot  falling  from  the  wreckage  from  a  height 
of  8,000  feet.1 

On  the  30th  of  September  the  enemy  resumed  his 
counter-attacks,  with  the  aid  of  Flammenwerfer,  north  of 
the  Menin  road,  and  these  were  followed  by  five  other 
attacks  in  the  same  area  on  the  1st  of  October,  and  by  a 
sixth  attack  on  the  same  day  south  of  the  Ypres-Roulers 
railway.  Except  for  the  temporary  loss  of  two  advanced 
posts  south-east  of  Polygon  Wood,  the  attacks  were  re- 
pulsed by  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire.  On  the  3rd  of 
October  the  final  German  attack  of  this  series,  again  made 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Menin  road,  met  a  similar 
fate.  The  mornings  on  which  these  various  enemy  attacks 
were  made  were  misty,  but,  except  on  the  3rd  of  October, 
the  weather  cleared  towards  noon,  and  a  great  amount  of 

1  Captain  McCudden  had,  on  the  previous  day,  while  testing  his  engine 
in  the  air,  shot  down  an  enemy  two-seater,  his  first  victim  to  fall  in  the 
British  lines. 


196  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

air  work — particularly  observation  of  artillery  fire,  and 
photography — was  accomplished. 

Development  of  Night  Flying 

September  191 7  was  notable  for  an  extension  of  night 
flying.  Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  bombing 
operations  of  Nos.  100  and  101  Squadrons,  but  night 
attacks  were  not  confined  to  these  two  squadrons.  While 
the  Corps  squadrons  in  the  battle  area  were  fully  occupied 
with  their  day-time  co-operation  with  the  artillery  and 
infantry,  those  elsewhere  along  the  front,  in  the  I  and 
III  Brigades,  had  the  opportunity  to  develop  night-bomb- 
ing attacks  calculated  to  help  the  main  offensive.  R.E.8's 
and  Armstrong- Whitworths  of  these  Corps  squadrons 
began  their  raids  on  the  5th/6th  of  September,  and  gradu- 
ally, as  the  month  wore  on,  widened  the  scope  of  their 
efforts  to  include  machine-gun  attacks  on  road  traffic. 
The  German  air  service  also  expanded  its  night-bombing 
activities,  and  attacks  on  the  British  lines  of  communica- 
tion, particularly  at  St.  Omer  and  its  neighbourhood,  were 
made  with  increasing  frequency. 

For  a  time  the  bombers  had  only  to  reckon  with  anti- 
aircraft gun-fire,  because  it  was  believed  that  the  unstable 
single-seater  fighter  could  not  operate  at  night  with  safety 
or  success.  But  this  view  was  shown  to  be  ill-founded,  and 
the  discovery  was  made  simultaneously  in  the  field  and  at 
home.  When  the  German  night-bombing  squadron, 
operating  from  Belgium,  began  a  series  of  attacks  on 
England  on  the  2nd  of  September  the  defences  were  un- 
prepared, but  when  the  bombers  appeared  again  on  the 
following  night,  three  'Camel'  pilots  of  one  of  the  home 
defence  squadrons  sought  and  obtained  permission  to 
intercept  the  raiders.  In  this  they  failed,  but  they  demon- 
strated that  the  'Camel'  could  safely  be  flown  in  the  dark, 
a  fact  which  was  also  made  clear  during  the  same  night  in 
France  by  two  'Camel'  pilots  of  No.  70  Squadron  who 
tried,  unsuccessfully,  to  attack  German  aircraft  which 
bombed  St.  Omer.  About  this  time  also,  No.  48  Squadron, 
in  the  Dunkirk  area,  began  to  send  up  Bristol  Fighters  at 
night  to  intercept  the  German  bombing  aeroplanes  which 


1917]  NIGHT  FLYING  197 

raided  Dunkirk.  A  scheme  of  defence  against  night-bomb- 
ing aircraft  was  thereupon  worked  out,  both  in  the  field 
and  in  England,  by  which  the  activities  of  searchlight  and 
gun-crews  were  carefully  co-ordinated  with  those  of  the 
fighting  pilots. 

Meanwhile,  other  measures  were  taken  to  combat  the 
German  raiders.  The  German  night-bombing  squadron — 
No.  3 — responsible  for  the  attacks  on  England,  was  housed 
at  the  former  airship  station  at  Gontrode  (head-quarters 
and  four  Flights)  and  at  St.  Denis  Westrem  (two  Flights),1 
and  it  was  decided  to  make  a  series  of  intensive  attacks 
on  these  aerodromes.  The  Royal  Naval  Air  Service 
units  at  Dunkirk  were  allotted  St.  Denis  Westrem  as 
objective,  and  the  Flying  Corps  bombing  squadrons  were 
given  the  target  of  Gontrode.  On  the  25th  of  September 
five  D.H.4's  of  No.  55  Squadron  dropped  two  230-lb. 
and  six  112-lb.  bombs  on  Gontrode,  and,  next  day,  No. 
27  Squadron  dropped  two  112-lb.  bombs  on  the  same 
target.  On  the  27th,  in  two  attacks,  ten  112-lb.,  forty- 
four  25 -lb.,  and  three  hundred  and  ninety-seven  Ranken 
darts  were  dropped  by  No.  55  Squadron,  and,  during 
the  night  of  the  27th/28th,  three  pilots  of  No.  101 
Squadron  added  two  230-lb.,  two  112-lb.,  and  four 
25-lb.  bombs.  Next  day,  the  28th,  the  pilots  of  No.  55 
Squadron  were  over  the  target  again  and  dropped  six 
more  112-lb.,  twelve  25-lb.,  and  one  hundred  and  ninety- 
nine  Ranken  darts.  In  the  same  period  two  attacks  were 
made  on  St.  Denis  Westrem  to  supplement  the  efforts  of 
the  Naval  Air  Service  units :  by  No.  27  Squadron  on  the 
27th  of  September,  and  by  No.  100  Squadron  during  the 
night  of  the  28th/29th.  During  the  29th/30th  Gontrode 
was  attacked  again  by  Nos.  100  and  101  Squadrons  with 
bombs  and  pom-pom  shells,  and,  in  two  daylight  raids  on 
the  30th,  by  No.  55  Squadron  (twelve  112-lb.,  forty-eight 
25-lb.,  and  three  hundred  and  ninety-eight  Ranken 
darts).  Next  night  the  F.E.2b  pilots  went  again,  and,  on 
the  1st  of  October,  the  de  Havilland  pilots  of  No.  55 
Squadron  paid  their  last  visit  of  this  series  to  Gontrode. 

1  This  squadron  had  been  increased  from  three  Flights  (of  six  aeroplanes 
each)  to  four  in  June  191 7  and  to  six  in  July. 


198  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

One  of  the  results  of  this  intensive  day  and  night  bombing, 
which  gave  the  enemy  little  chance  to  repair  the  moral  and 
material  damage  inflicted,  was  the  transfer  of  two  of  the 
four  Flights  from  Gontrode  to  a  new  aerodrome  north- 
east of  Ghent,  and  of  the  two  Flights  from  St.  Denis 
Westrem  to  another  aerodrome  at  Mariakerke.1 

At  the  beginning  of  October  night  bombing  became 
an  added  duty  of  the  single-seater  fighters.  As  an  experi- 
ment Sopwith  Tups'  of  No.  66  Squadron,  carrying  25-lb. 
bombs,  were  sent,  at  dusk,  to  attack  German  aerodromes. 
The  first  attempt,  on  the  1st  of  October,  was  made 
abortive  by  a  thick  mist,  but,  next  evening,  three  Tup' 
pilots  reached  the  aerodromes  at  Cruyshautem  and 
Waereghem,  north-east  of  Courtrai,  and  successfully 
bombed  them  from  a  low  height :  at  the  latter  aerodrome 
a  hangar  was  hit  and  set  on  fire.  This  success  followed  on 
another  achieved  by  two  'Camel'  pilots  of  No.  8  (Naval) 
Squadron,  working  in  the  I  Brigade  area.  They  had  set  out 
at  9.45  p.m.  on  the  29th  of  September,  one  to  attack  a 
balloon  shed  near  Quiery-la-Motte,  and  the  other  to 
attack  the  German  aerodrome  at  Douai.  The  first  pilot 
found  his  objective  and  put  a  burst  of  a  hundred  rounds 
from  his  two  Vickers  guns  into  the  shed  from  thirty  feet. 
The  balloon  or  balloons  which  it  housed  were  set  on  fire 
and  masses  of  flame  lit  up  the  surrounding  countryside. 
The  second  pilot,  who  failed  to  find  the  Douai  aerodrome 
turned  back,  attracted  by  the  fire,  and  by  its  light  dived 
repeatedly  and  attacked  the  balloon  personnel  who  had 
rushed  from  their  quarters. 

In  an  encounter  on  the  30th  of  September  a  patrol  of 
No.  56  Squadron  routed  a  formation  of  German  fighters 

1  The  British  counter-measures  now  took  a  wider  form.  On  the  nth  of 
October  191 7  the  Forty-First  Wing  was  formed  with  the  special  object  of 
bombing  targets  of  military  importance  in  German  territory.  The  head- 
quarters of  the  Wing  were  at  Bainville-sur-Madon,  south-west  of  Nancy, 
and  the  commanding  officer  was  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  L.  N.  Newall. 
The  Wing  began  with  two  bombing  squadrons  transferred  from  the  Ninth 
Wing — Nos.  55  and  100 — and  with  Naval  'A'  Squadron  (afterwards  No.  16 
Naval  Squadron)  of  Handley  Pages :  the  aerodrome  was  at  Ochey.  Such 
was  the  beginning  of  the  Independent  Force. 


1917]  NO.  56  SQUADRON  199 

after  destroying  two  of  them.  This  success  brought  the 
total  number  of  enemy  aeroplanes  accounted  for  by  No.  56 
Squadron,  since  its  arrival  in  France  in  April  191 7,  to  two 
hundred  (destroyed  and  out  of  control).  It  so  happened 
that  when  the  squadron  first  appeared  on  the  Western 
front  the  Richthofen  'Circus'  was  at  the  height  of  its 
achievement.  The  coming  of  this  new  squadron  led  the 
enemy  to  believe,  erroneously,  that  No.  56  had  been 
specifically  formed,  from  selected  prominent  pilots,  as 
an  'Anti-Richthofen-Circus',  and  this  belief  persisted 
throughout  the  war.  The  formation  and  early  record  of 
the  squadron,  therefore,  deserve  brief  examination. 

The  reader  will  recall  that  towards  the  end  of  the  Somme 
battles  in  191 6  there  had  appeared  on  the  Western  front  a 
new  type  of  German  single-seater  fighter,  a  Halberstadt 
fitted  with  twin  Spandau  guns  built  into  the  fuselage  to 
fire  through  the  propeller.  The  effect  of  these  fighters  on 
the  air  situation  had  been  immediate.  Up  to  the  spring  of 
1 91 7  the  single-seater  fighters  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps, 
and  of  the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  units  in  France,  were 
armed  with  one  fixed  machine-gun  only.  Thus  handi- 
capped they  had,  especially  in  April  191 7  during  the  Arras 
battles,  suffered  severely.  The  first  British  fighter  to  arrive 
in  the  field  with  twin  side-by-side  fixed  Vickers  guns  was 
the  Sopwith  'Camel'  (130  horse-power  Clerget  engine), 
and  No.  70  Squadron,  the  first  Royal  Flying  Corps  unit  to 
be  re-equipped  with  'Camels',  had  received  its  comple- 
ment of  new  aeroplanes  by  the  end  of  July  191 7,  by  which 
time,  also,  the  re-equipment  of  No.  45  Squadron  with  the 
same  type  was  nearly  complete.1  Pending  the  arrival  in 
France  of  the  'Camel',  the  S.E.5  constituted  the  British 
answer  to  the  German  twin  machine-gun  fighters.  The 
S.E.5  was  armed  with  one  built-in  Vickers  gun  for  fire 
through  the  propeller,  and  one  Lewis  gun  capable  of 

1  An  improved  type  of  Spad,  fitted  with  a  200  horse-power  Hispano- 
Suiza  engine,  and  armed  with  twin  side-by-side  fixed  Vickers  machine- 
guns,  was  taken  into  service  by  the  Flying  Corps  in  France  about  the  same 
time.  No.  19  Squadron  received  the  first  of  the  type  in  June  1917,  but  it 
was  not  until  November  1917  that  any  considerable  numbers  of  this  type 
were  brought  into  use  in  France. 


200  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

forward  fire  from  a  modified  Foster  mounting  above  the 
centre  section.  No.  56  Squadron,  the  first  to  be  equipped 
with  the  S.E.5,1  arrived  in  France  on  the  7th  of  April 
191 7.  The  squadron  had  been  formed  under  the  parent- 
age of  No.  28  Squadron  at  Gosport  in  June  1916,  and  had 
moved  to  London  Colney  in  the  following  month.  During 
its  months  of  preparation  for  overseas,  the  squadron  had 
a  shifting  personnel  of  officers  and  was  equipped  with 
various  types  of  aeroplane.  Early  in  February  191 7  the 
command  was  taken  over  by  Major  R.  G.  Blomfield,  and, 
on  the  13th  of  March,  the  squadron  received  the  first  of  its 
S.E.5's.  Others  arrived  daily  and,  at  the  end  of  the  month, 
No.  56  was  ordered  to  mobilize.  One  of  the  Flight  Com- 
manders, posted  to  the  squadron  on  the  26th  of  February 
191 7,  was  Captain  Albert  Ball,  the  foremost  fighting  pilot 
of  his  time  in  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  and  some  other 
pilots  of  the  squadron  had  likewise  already  achieved  dis- 
tinction in  France.  No.  56  Squadron  made  its  first  active 
service  patrol — with  orders  not  to  cross  the  lines — on  the 
22nd  of  April.  The  next  day  the  first  offensive  patrol  by 
pilots  of  the  squadron  was  made  under  the  leadership  of 
Captain  Ball,  who,  during  a  subsequent  fight  with  a 
German  formation,  drove  one  enemy  aeroplane  down  in 
flames  and  another  to  crash  on  the  ground.  Thereafter  the 
pilots  of  No.  56  Squadron,  except  for  a  brief  spell  of  home 
defence  duty  in  England,  were  in  the  thick  of  the  fighting 
in  France.  While  the  squadron  was  on  temporary  duty  in 
England,  Captain  McCudden,  at  that  time  instructing  at 
home,  but  already  known  for  his  exploits  as  a  fighting 
pilot,  visited  its  aerodrome.  'There  was  a  wonderful 
'spirit  in  this  squadron',  he  says,  'which  was  entirely 
'different  from  any  squadron  with  which  I  had  yet  come 
'in  contact.  .  .  .'2  Major  Blomfield  applied  for  the  services 
of  McCudden,  who  was  posted  to  the  squadron  as  a  Flight- 
Commander  in  August  191 7. 

1  Early  in  June  1917  No.  56  Squadron  received  the  first  of  an  improved 
type  of  S.E.5  with  which  it  was  completely  re-equipped  in  August.  This 
was  the  S.E.5a,  the  modification  being  a  200  horse-power  Hispano-Suiza 
engine  in  place  of  the  150  horse-power  model. 

2  Five  Tears  in  the  Royal  Flying  Corp,  p.  191. 


1917]  THE  QUESTION  OF  PUBLICITY       201 

While  it  is  just  to  point  out  some  of  the  advantages  of 
No.  56  Squadron  and  to  praise  its  achievement,  it  would  be 
wrong  to  imply  that  other  squadrons  were  inferior,  except, 
possibly,  in  opportunity.  The  Royal  Flying  Corps  differed 
from  other  air  services,  both  Allied  and  enemy,  in  that  it 
was  not  British  policy  to  extol  the  achievements  of  in- 
dividuals or  of  specific  units.  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  in  for- 
warding a  summary  of  the  work  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
during  the  Ypres  battles  for  the  month  of  September  191 7, 
had  something  to  say  on  the  subject,  previously  raised  by 
the  authorities  in  London,  of  publishing  in  the  news- 
papers the  names  of  pilots  who  did  specially  good  work. 
'The  matter  has  had  careful  consideration  in  France  for  a 
'long  time',  he  wrote  to  Sir  William  Robertson,  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff,  'as  a  result  of  which  the 
'General  Officer  Commanding  Royal  Flying  Corps,  with 
'my  full  approval,  is  entirely  averse  to  any  such  publica- 
tion. ...  I  am  strongly  of  opinion  that  it  would  be  both 
'unwise  policy  and  unfair  to  other  branches  of  the  Service 
'to  differentiate  the  treatment  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
'in  this,  manner  from  that  which  applies  to  the  Army 
'generally.  Any  such  special  treatment  would  be  in- 
'vidious  and  likely  to  cause  justifiable  jealousy,  both  inside 
'and  outside  the  Flying  Corps.  The  fact  that  it  is  done  in 
'the  case  of  certain  other  armies  would  not  justify  a  de- 
parture from  the  well-established  customs  of  the  British 
'Army,  and  I  feel  sure  that  the  best  opinion  in  the  Royal 
'Flying  Corps  itself  would  not  be  in  favour  of  a  system 
'which  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  the 
'British  Army  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  officers  of  the 
'Royal  Flying  Corps  are  proud  of  being  anonymous  like 
'their  comrades  in  other  branches  of  the  Service.  I  may 
'add  that  the  work  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  is  now  carried 
'out  so  much  in  formations  rather  than  individually  that  it 
'would  frequently  be  impossible  to  select  special  in- 
'dividuals  for  particular  mention.  .  .  .' 

The  memorandum  which  accompanied  the  letter,  sum- 
marizing the  work  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  gives  some 
interesting  statistics  for  the  month  of  September  191 7. 
These  show  that  in  226  bombing  attacks  by  day  and  night, 


202  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

7,886  bombs  of  a  total  weight  of  135  tons,  were  dropped  on 
enemy  targets.  This  compares  with  969  bombs  dropped 
by  German  airmen  in  the  same  period  on  targets  within 
the  British  lines.  Royal  Flying  Corps  pilots  and  observers 
helped  to  range  the  British  artillery  on  9,539  targets, 
chiefly  German  batteries.  The  number  of  German 
batteries  ranged  during  September,  with  the  help  of 
aircraft  wireless  observation,  was  743.  In  connexion  with 
their  work  for  the  Army,  Royal  Flying  Corps  squad- 
rons exposed  14,678  photographic  plates  and  distributed 
346,999  prints.  The  two  large  aircraft  depots  feeding  the 
squadrons  in  the  line,  working  day  and  night,  standardized 
and  issued  930  aeroplanes,  in  the  same  brief  period,  recon- 
structed 116  (a  process  requiring  2-4  weeks'  work)  and 
erected  113.  'At  the  beginning  of  September',  states  the 
memorandum,  by  way  of  comment  on  the  value  of  the  air 
offensive,  'the  Germans  concentrated  in  great  force  on  our 
'front  and  were  active  over  our  lines,  and  their  low-flying 
'machines  were  fairly  numerous.  But,  towards  the  end  of 
'the  month,  the  majority  of  the  German  machines  were 
'found  much  further  back  behind  their  lines,  although  a 
'number  came  over  the  line.  Most  important  of  all,  thanks 
'to  the  offensive  action  of  the  fighting  patrols,  the  artillery 
'machines  were  able  to  carry  out  their  work  of  ranging  un- 
'molested  by  the  enemy  during  the  battles  of  the  20th  and 
'26th  September.  .  .  .' 

Broodseinde  and  Poelcafpelle — 4th  and  gth  October 
October  On  the  4th  of  October  the  spell  of  comparatively  fine 
weather  ended,  but  the  operation,  planned  for  the  morn- 
ing of  this  day  against  the  main  line  of  the  ridge  opposite 
Zonnebeke,  was  duly  made.  The  front  of  attack  extended 
about  seven  miles  from  the  Menin  road  to  the  Ypres- 
Staden  railway,  with  a  minor  attack  on  a  short  front 
south  of  the  Menin  road  to  capture  certain  strong-points. 
Under  conditions  of  weather  and  ground  which  inflicted 
great  hardship,  the  infantry  pushed  forward  with  success. 
It  so  happened  that  three  fresh  German  divisions  had  been 
brought  into  the  line  for  an  attack  timed  to  take  place  at 
6.10  a.m.,  ten  minutes  after  the  British  'zero'  hour.  The 


1917]  BROODSEINDE  203 

result  was  that  the  artillery  barrage  caught  the  German  4  October 
infantry  when  they  were  forming  for  the  assault,  and,  be- 
fore they  could  recover  from  their  confusion,  the  British 
infantry  were  on  them.  By  midday,  after  determined 
fighting,  in  which  the  enemy  casualties  were  heavy,  all  the 
main  objectives  had  been  captured,  and  they  were  held 
against  counter-attacks  made  in  the  afternoon  and  evening.1 

High  winds,  rain,  and  clouds  down  to  within  400  feet  of 
the  ground,  made  distant  air  work  impossible  on  the  4th, 
and  greatly  restricted  what  could  be  done  immediately 
above  the  battle  area.  The  artillery  aeroplane  observers 
sent  down  a  total  of  forty-nine  zone  calls  for  fire  on  enemy 
targets,  and,  by  prearrangement,  helped  to  engage 
twenty-six  targets  for  destruction.  Five  battle-field  re- 
connaissances were  made  and  there  were  ten  successful 
contact  patrols  and  two  counter-attack  patrols  during  the 
day.  Not  much,  but  representative  of  a  determined  effort 
to  give  a  measure  of  support  to  the  infantry  under  condi- 
tions of  extreme  difficulty. 

The  Broodseinde  success  marked  a  turning-point  in  the 
Flanders  operations.  The  British  line  had  now  been 
advanced  along  the  main  ridge  for  9,000  yards  from 
the  starting-point  near  Mount  Sorrel,  and  the  capture  of 
the  Gravenstafel  spur  ensured  a  good  defensive  flank.  The 
year  was  already  far  spent  and  the  prospect  of  driving  the 
enemy  from  the  Belgian  coast  had  long  since  disappeared. 
The  continuous  delays  in  the  advance  as  a  result  of  the 
weather  and  its  effect  on  the  state  of  the  ground,  had  given 
the  enemy  time,  after  each  attack,  to  bring  up  reinforce- 
ments and  to  reorganize  his  defences.  Although  General 
Head-quarters  now  recognized  that  the  major  objectives  of 
the  Flanders  operations  were  impossible  of  attainment, 
they  were  still  anxious  to  continue  the  operations  with  a 
view  to  the  capture  of  the  remainder  of  the  Passchendaele 
ridge  before  winter  set  in. 

1  'The  infantry  battle  commenced  on  the  morning  of  the  4th.  It  was 
'extraordinarily  severe,  and  again  we  only  came  through  it  with  enormous 
'loss.  It  was  evident  that  the  idea  of  holding  the  front-line  more  densely, 
'adopted  at  my  last  visit  to  the  front  in  September,  was  not  the  remedy.' 
(Ludendorff,  My  War  Memories,  p.  490.) 


2o4  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

The  weather  was  entirely  unfavourable,  but  there  were 
hopes  that  it  would  improve,  hopes  based  on  the  somewhat 
slender   foundation   that   the   abnormal   rainfall   of  the 
summer  presaged  a  normal,  perhaps  even  a  dry,  autumn. 
And  if  the  weather  played  its  assigned  part  there  were 
many  reasons  why  the  offensive  should  not  be  stopped.  The 
capture  of  the  whole  of  the  Passchendaele  ridge  would 
secure  the  British  position  for  the  winter  and  make  more 
difficult  the  position  of  the  enemy.    Furthermore,  the 
French  armies,  not  yet  fully  recovered  from  the  internal 
disturbances  resulting  from  the  Nivelle  failure  of  the 
spring,  were  planning  an  attack  on  the  Aisne  heights  for 
the  23rd  of  October.    After  weighing  these  and  all  the 
other  considerations,  Sir  Douglas  Haig  judged  that  he 
must  continue  the  offensive  with  the  double  object  of 
capturing  Passchendaele  and  of  attracting  the  German 
reserves  to  the  British  front. 
9  October      The  decision  having  been  made,  the  operations  went 
ahead  although  the  weather  did  its  worst.  At  5.20  a.m.  on 
the  9th  of  October,  after  two  days  of  continuous  heavy 
rain,  the  attack  was  renewed  on  a  six-mile  front  from  a 
point  east  of  Zonnebeke  to  the  junction  with  the  French 
north-west    of  Langemarck.      On   the    British   left    the 
French  prolonged  the  front  of  attack  to  a  point  opposite 
Draaibank,  while,  on  the  right  of  the  main  attack,  minor 
operations  were  undertaken  east  and  south-east  of  Polygon 
Wood.    The  infantry  captured  and  held  their  objectives 
and  put  themselves  within  striking  distance  of  the  higher 
ground  running  north  from  the  Ypres-Roulers  railway 
through  Passchendaele  and  Westroosebeke.    In  the  sub- 
sidiary attack,  east  of  Polygon  Wood,  the  recapture  of  the 
village  of  Reutel,  part  of  which  had  already  twice  changed 
hands,  was  completed. 

Except  on  the  actual  battle-front  little  flying  was 
attempted.  Over  the  advancing  infantry  every  risk  was 
taken  by  the  pilots  and  observers  of  the  II  and  V  Brigades. 
As  a  result  of  fifteen  contact  patrols  and  seventeen  counter- 
attack patrols,  made  at  low  heights,  the  progress  of  the 
infantry  was  reported  with  general,  and  sometimes  de- 
tailed, accuracy,  and  artillery  fire  was  brought  to  bear  on 


i9i7]  NO.  i  SQUADRON  205 

a  great  number  of  active  batteries  and  parties  of  German  9  October 
troops.  By  the  observers  in  these  aeroplanes  and  those  in 
the  artillery  aeroplanes,  three  hundred  and  fifty-four  zone 
calls  were  sent  by  wireless  to  the  artillery  indicating  im- 
portant targets.  In  addition,  twenty-one  German  batteries 
were  successfully  engaged  for  destruction  with  air  observa- 
tion, and  thirty-three  for  neutralization,  and  there  were, 
in  consequence,  eighteen  explosions  and  sixteen  fires  in  the 
German  gun-pits.  The  work  of  No.  9  Squadron  was 
outstanding:  in  their  determination  to  report  the  pro- 
gress of  the  infantry  of  the  XIV  Corps  with  which  the 
squadron  co-operated,  and  to  keep  watch  on  the  German 
counter-attack  movements,  the  pilots  flew  with  great 
persistence  in  and  through  the  barrage.  They  and  their 
observers  gave  invaluable  information  at  a  cost  of  two 
officers  killed,  two  missing,  and  one  wounded.  While  the 
Corps  aeroplanes  were  working  over  the  battle-field, 
pilots  and  observers  of  No.  57  (D.H.4)  Squadron  made 
seven  reconnaissances  well  back  into  the  German  lines, 
and  paid  visits,  with  bombs,  to  the  village  of  Staden 
on  which  a  total  of  six  230-lb.  and  fourteen  112-lb. 
bombs  were  dropped:  one  bomb  caused  a  fire  which 
burned  for  some  hours. 

What  little  air  fighting  there  was  on  the  9th  chiefly  in- 
volved No.  1  (Nieuport  Scout)  Squadron.  One  patrol  of 
this  squadron,  in  an  encounter  with  nine  enemy  fighters, 
destroyed  one  and  sent  down  another  out  of  control. 
Another  patrol,  in  a  fight  with  five  German  aircraft,  de- 
stroyed two  in  flames,  from  which  the  pilots  jumped  or  fell 
out,  and  shot  down  another,  which  was  last  seen  falling 
out  of  control  into  the  clouds.  These  successes,  for  which 
the  squadron  paid  with  one  pilot  missing  and  another 
wounded,  brought  the  total  of  German  aircraft,  destroyed 
or  sent  down  out  of  control  by  No.  1  Squadron  since  the 
15th  of  February  1917,  the  day  on  which  it  began  work  as 
a  fighter  squadron,  to  two  hundred. 

The  best  that  could  be  said  of  the  conditions  for  a 
further  infantry  advance  was  that  they  were  not  yet  im- 
possible. The  next  attack  was  planned  for  the  morning  of 


206  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

12  October  the  1 2th  of  October,  but  throughout  the  previous  night 
there  was  unceasing  rain,  and  this  continued,  except  for 
a  brief  interval,  all  day  on  the  12th.  The  attack  was 
launched  to  time  at  5.25  a.m.  between  the  Ypres-Roulers 
railway  and  Houthulst  Forest,  and  some  progress  was  made 
on  the  higher  ground,  but  the  flooded  valleys  westward  of 
the  main  ridge  proved  impassable  and  the  further  advance 
was  cancelled.  While  the  infantry  were  floundering  in  the 
mud,  the  pilots  and  observers  did  what  they  could  to  help. 
No  fewer  than  forty-one  pilots,  representing  ten  squadrons, 
added  to  the  misery  of  the  defending  German  troops  by 
their  low-altitude  machine-gun  and  bombing  attacks. 
There  were  twenty-seven  contact  and  counter-attack 
patrols,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  zone  calls  to  the 
artillery  for  fire  on  active  batteries,  troops,  transport,  and 
machine-gun  posts.  'The  very  active  movement',  says  a 
Second  Army  Intelligence  Summary  of  the  attack,  'of 
'troops  and  transport  about  the  areas  known  to  be  occupied 
'by  counter-attack  divisions  was  particularly  noticeable 
'quite  early  in  the  day,  and  notwithstanding  the  diffkul- 
'ties  of  aerial  observation,  this  movement  appears  to  have 
'been  greater  than  that  observed  in  any  of  the  recent 
'operations.'  Concentrations  of  German  troops  in  shell- 
holes  east  and  south-east  of  Passchendaele  were  also  re- 
ported by  air  reconnaissance  at  1.20  p.m.  and  were  severely 
shelled  by  the  British  artillery.  In  spite  of  these  definite 
indications  that  strong  counter-attacks  might  be  expected, 
none  of  importance  developed.  The  enemy  troops  were 
heavily  fired  upon,  and  the  inference  is  that  as  the  British 
made  little  progress,  the  enemy  was  unwilling  to  court 
further  severe  casualties  in  the  attempt  to  wrest  from  us 
what  little  we  had  gained.  Had  the  British  advance  been 
continued  in  the  afternoon,  no  doubt  the  German 
counter-attack  troops  would  have  been  ordered  to  attack. 
With  the  help  of  the  air  observers,  twenty-six  hostile 
batteries  were  engaged  for  destruction,  and  thirty-seven 
for  neutralization,  as  a  result  of  which  explosions  were 
caused  in  twenty-two  German  gun-pits  and  fires  in  five 
others.  There  were  four  bomb  raids  on  rest  camps  and 
railway  centres  (notably,  Ledeghem  station — eight  112-lb. 


1917]  THE  BOMBING  OF  RUMBEKE  207 

bombs),  eight  reconnaissances,  and  a  dozen  or  so  combats. 
Although  there  was  no  great  opposition  by  enemy  airmen, 
the  casualties,  in  these  various  attempts  to  co-operate  in 
the  attack  under  weather  conditions  bordering  on  the  im- 
possible, were  high.  Fourteen  officers  were  missing  at  the 
end  of  the  day,  and  five  others  had  been  wounded. 

Sir  Douglas  Haig  now  relinquished  hope  that  the  ground 
would  recover  sufficiently  to  allow  of  the  whole  of  the  main 
ridge  being  captured  before  the  end  of  the  year.  He  did, 
however,  deem  it  necessary  to  maintain  the  pressure,  on  a 
limited  scale,  in  intervals  of  better  weather,  both  to  help 
the  forthcoming  operations  by  the  French  and  to  cloak  his 
own  intentions  to  strike  an  unexpected  blow  at  Cambrai. 

On  the  22nd  of  October,  after  a  few  days  of  slightly  im- 
proved weather,  there  were  two  successful  operations  by 
which  important  ground  east  of  Poelcappelle  and  within 
the  southern  edge  of  Houthulst  Forest  was  gained.  On  the 
previous  days  there  had  been  a  great  amount  of  air  photo- 
graphy, and  of  artillery  co-operation,  and  there  had  been 
intermittent  bombing,  particularly  of  the  German  aero- 
dromes. One  such  attack,  against  the  aerodrome  at  Rum- 
beke,  made  on  the  20th  of  October,  deserves  detailed 
consideration. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  F.  V.  Holt,  commanding  the 
Twenty-second  (Army)  Wing,  had,  in  consultation  with 
his  squadron  commanders,  devised  a  scheme  earlier  in  the 
year  for  the  periodical  employment  of  the  maximum  fight- 
ing strength  of  the  Wing  in  'drives'  over  the  German  back 
areas.  The  idea  was  to  'net'  as  many  enemy  airmen  as 
possible,  and  the  scheme  was,  therefore,  only  to  be  put  into 
force  if  and  when  the  German  air  service  was  sufficiently 
active  to  warrant  an  operation  on  such  a  scale.  The  scheme 
was  not  put  into  effect,  but  many  of  its  features  were 
embodied  in  the  attack  on  the  Rumbeke  aerodrome  on 
the  20th  of  October.  Forty-five  aeroplanes  took  part 
in  the  operation,  namely,  eleven  'Camels'  of  No.  70 
Squadron  (each  carrying  two  25-lb.  bombs),  with  eight 
'Camels'  of  the  same  squadron  in  close  escort;  nine- 
teen 'Camels'  of  No.  28  Squadron1  which  were  to  come 

1  No.  28  Squadron  arrived  in  France  from  England  on  the  8th  of 


208  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

in  from  the  rear  to  attack  German  aircraft  which  left 
the  ground;  and  seven  Spads  of  No.  23  Squadron  to  act  as 
a  high  offensive  patrol  to  cover  the  whole  operation.  The 
attack  met  with  considerable  success.  Twenty-two  bombs 
were  dropped  from  a  height  of  four  hundred  feet :  some  of 
them  fell  among  aeroplanes  lined  up  on  the  landing- 
ground,  and  blew  one  of  them  to  pieces ;  another  bomb 
burst  inside  a  hangar,  but  the  remainder  fell  just  by 
the  hangars  and  sheds.  The  bombing  pilots  then  flew 
about  the  aerodrome  firing  at  the  personnel  and  into 
the  hangars  and  buildings.  This  machine-gun  attack  was 
made  at  an  average  height  of  about  twenty  feet,  and 
the  undercarriages  of  two  of  the  aeroplanes  actually- 
touched  the  ground.  Meanwhile,  the  escorting  pilots  of 
No.  70  Squadron  and  the  patrol  of  No.  28  Squadron  were 
having  many  combats  within  sight  of  the  aerodrome. 
Four  German  single-seaters  were  shot  down  out  of  control 
by  the  former  and  three  by  the  latter.  The  operation  was 
rounded  off  by  machine-gun  attacks,  on  the  homeward 
journey,  on  troops  playing  games,  on  horse-transport,  and 
on  a  troop  train,  into  the  windows  of  which  a  pilot  of  No. 
70  Squadron  fired  from  a  height  of  fifty  feet.  Two  aero- 
planes of  No.  70  Squadron  were  missing,  but  there  were 
no  other  British  casualties  as  a  result  of  the  raid. 

On  October  the  21st,  a  day  of  fair  weather,  much  air 
work  was  done  in  preparation  for  the  infantry  attack  on 
the  following  day.  This  included  the  taking  of  1 , 304  photo- 
graphs, observation  for  destructive  fire  on  sixty-seven 
German  batteries,  and  bombing  attacks  on  various  targets, 
chiefly  aerodromes.  During  the  night  of  the  20th/2ist  No. 
101  Squadron  dropped  three  230-lb.,  eight  112-lb.,  and 
four  25-lb.  bombs  on  Ingelmunster  station  and  aerodrome, 
and  No.  102  Squadron1  dropped  four  112-lb.  bombs  on 
Bisseghem  aerodrome  where  an  aeroplane  on  the  ground 
was  destroyed  and  a  petrol  store  set  on  fire.    On  transport 

October.  This  was  its  first  operation  over  the  enemy  lines.  The  squadron 
was  transferred  to  Italy  on  the  9th  of  November  1917. 

1  No.  102  Squadron  arrived  in  France  from  England  on  the  24th  of 
September  191 7.  The  squadron  was  equipped  in  the  field  with  F.E.2b's 
(160  horse-power  Beardmore  engines). 


1917]  RAIN  209 

showing  lights  the  same  squadron  dropped  one  230-lb. 
and  two  112-lb.  bombs.  By  day  on  the  21st  Abeele  and 
Heule  aerodromes  were  attacked,  the  former  by  No.  57 
Squadron  and  the  latter  by  No.  25  Squadron.  There 
was  a  considerable  amount  of  air  fighting  and  the 
Flying  Corps  casualties  were  one  officer  killed,  nine 
wounded,  and  nine  officers,  one  non-commissioned  officer 
and  three  mechanics  missing:  the  enemy  casualties  were 
ten  aeroplanes  destroyed. 

During  the  night  of  the  21st /22nd  of  October  the  tar- 
gets for  the  head-quarters  bombing  squadrons  were  again 
enemy  aerodromes  and  railway  stations.  No.  101  Squadron 
attacked  Abeele  and  Ingelmunster  aerodromes  and  Lich- 
tervelde  station.  One  of  the  bombs  on  Ingelmunster 
exploded  among  aeroplanes  lined  up  to  leave  the  ground. 
No.  102  Squadron  attacked  the  aerodromes  at  Marcke, 
Bisseghem,  and  Moorseele,  but  the  chief  raid  was  made 
against  Roulers  station. 

The  infantry  assault  on  the  22nd  again  coincided  with 
heavy  rain,  and  flying  was  difficult  until  the  afternoon 
when  the  weather  improved.  Nevertheless,  the  progress  of 
the  infantry  was  well  plotted  by  the  contact-patrol 
observers,  while  the  fighter  pilots,  particularly  in  the  after- 
noon and  evening,  made  many  low-flying  attacks  on 
German  infantry  in  trenches  and  shell-holes,  on  the  roads 
and  in  villages,  and  on  active  machine-guns  and  batteries. 
A  notable  attack  was  one  made  on  two  battalions  of  Ger- 
man infantry  on  the  Staden-Houthulst  road  by  two 
'Camel'  pilots  of  No.  45  Squadron:  the  enemy  troops  were 
eventually  scattered.  No.  57  Squadron  again  made  a  big 
attack  on  the  billeting  village  of  Hooglede. 

On  the  25th  a  strong  west  wind  dried  the  ground  a 
little,  and  it  was  decided  to  go  ahead  with  the  operations 
planned  for  the  next  day.  During  the  night  of  the  25th/ 
26th  German  aerodromes  were  again  attacked :  Rumbeke 
and  Abeele  by  No.  101  Squadron,  and  Bisseghem  and 
Marcke  by  No.  102  Squadron,  which  also  dropped  bombs 
on  Menin  station.  Some  hours  before  the  infantry 
assault  was  timed  to  begin,  rain  set  in  once  more,  but 
the  troops  were  duly  assembled  and,  at  5.45  a.m.  on 

2504.4  » 


210  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

the  26th,  attacked  from  the  Ypres-Roulers  railway  to 
beyond  Poelcappelle  village.  In  co-operation  with  this 
advance  French  and  Belgian  troops  on  the  British  left 
attacked  and  captured  the  Merckem  peninsula.  Through 
the  heavy  rain  of  the  26th  the  pilots  and  observers  of  the 
Corps  squadrons  persisted  in  their  duty  of  artillery  co- 
operation, and  of  contact  and  counter-attack  patrol, 
while  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  and  naval  fighting  pilots  de- 
voted their  time  almost  exclusively  to  low-flying  attacks 
on  German  troops.  By  the  evening  of  the  26th  the  British 
had  captured  their  objectives,  except  at  Gheluvelt,  where, 
in  a  subsidiary  attack,  troops  had  reached  the  ruins  of  the 
village,  but  had  had  to  withdraw  because  they  could  not 
fire  their  mud-choked  rifles  to  stem  a  German  counter- 
attack. 

The  27th  of  October  was  a  fine  day  and,  although  there 
was  comparative  quiet  on  the  ground,  air  activity  was  in- 
tense, and  a  full  day's  work  was  done  in  co-operation  with 
the  artillery.  Ninety-five  German  batteries  were  engaged 
for  destruction  and  twenty-one  for  neutralization  with 
the  help  of  the  aeroplane  and  balloon  observers,  and  in 
addition,  over  two  hundred  targets  were  reported  to  the 
artillery  by  zone  call.  There  was  considerable  photography 
of  the  enemy  positions,  over  two  hundred  and  fifty  bombs 
of  25-lb.  weight,  and  twenty-three  of  112-lb.,  were 
dropped  on  various  targets,1  and  6,000  odd  rounds  of 
ammunition  were  fired  by  low-flying  pilots  at  troops  and 
at  gun  emplacements.  The  enemy  pilots  made  many  de- 
termined attempts  to  harass  the  British  forward  troops  and 
batteries,  which  they  attacked  with  bomb  and  machine- 
gun  fire.  The  offensive  patrols  maintained  throughout 
the  day  had  many  encounters  with  German  fighters,  of 
which  nine  were  destroyed.  The  British  casualties  were 
one  officer  killed,  nine  missing,  and  nine  officers  and 
one  mechanic  wounded:  the  missing  included  Second 
Lieutenant  A.  P.  F.  Rhys-Davids  of  No.  56  Squadron, 
the  pilot  who,  in  combat  a  month  earlier,  had  killed  the 
German  fighting  pilot  Werner  Voss:  it  was  learned  sub- 

1  Chiefly  Roulers  (seventeen  112-lb.  and  twelve  25-lb.  bombs  by  Nos.  57 
and  25  Squadrons)  and  Abeele  aerodrome  (six  112-lb.  by  No.  25  Squadron). 


1917]  PASSCHENDAELE  211 

sequently  that  Second  Lieutenant  Rhys-Davids  had  been 
shot  down  and  killed  in  a  fight  during  the  morning. 

During  the  night  of  the  27th/28th  Nos.  101  and  102 
Squadrons  continued  the  bombing  attacks  against  the 
German  aerodromes  and  railway  junctions,  on  which 
thirteen  230-lb.,  fifty-eight  112-lb.,  and  ten  25-lb.  bombs 
were  distributed.1  The28thwasstillfine,butthe  lines  were 
fog-enshrouded  most  of  the  day  and  little  air  work  was 
possible.  During  the  night  the  bombing  attacks  were 
continued. 

Passchendaele 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th  of  October  the  infantry 
advance  was  resumed  against  Passchendaele  itself.  At 
ten  minutes  to  six,  when  the  troops  began  their  attack, 
the  air  was  clear,  but  at  10  a.m.  rain  set  in.  On  the  high 
ground  the  Canadians  advanced,  and,  after  strenuous 
righting,  reached  the  outskirts  of  Passchendaele,  but 
farther  north,  in  an  area  of  swamp,  little  movement 
was  possible.  Enemy  aircraft  took  small  interest  in  the 
day's  fighting  and  the  hundred  or  so  offensive  patrols 
made  by  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  met  with  little  opposition. 
Nor  were  there  any  attempts  to  molest  the  artillery  and 
contact-patrol  pilots  and  observers,  who,  particularly  in 
the  morning  before  the  weather  broke,  gave  effective  help 
in  the  battle. 

Some  days  of  dry  weather  followed,  but  mist  hampered 
the  work  of  aircraft.  On  the  6th  of  November,  when  the 
Canadians  renewed  their  attack  and  captured  Passchen- 
daele together  with  the  high  ground  north  and  north-west 
of  the  village,  the  weather  was  again  bad  and  the  chief 

1  By  No.  101  Squadron:  Aerodromes:  Gontrode  (one  230-lb.),  Rumbeke 
(six  112-lb.,  four  25-lb.),  Moorseele  (four  112-lb.),  Abeele  (two  112-lb.), 
and  Bisseghem  (two  112-lb.).  Also  Ingelmunster  station  (twelve  112-lb., 
two  230-lb.),  Iseghem  station  (four  25-lb.)  and  various  trains  (one  230-lb. 
and  twelve  112-lb.). 

By  No.  102  Squadron:  Aerodromes:  Bisseghem  (one  230-lb.,  four  112-lb.), 
Marcke  (three  112-lb.  and  one  25-lb.),  and  Harlebeke  (one  230-lb.):  also 
Courtrai  station  (three  230-lb.,  five  112-lb.,  and  one  25-lb.),  trains  (three 
230-lb.,  five  112-lb.),  road  targets  (one  230-lb.),  anti-aircraft  guns  (two 
112-lb.),  and  camp  (one  112-lb.). 


212  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

work  of  aircraft  was  the  attack  of  ground  targets  with 
machine-gun  fire.  Upwards  of  1 1,000  rounds  were  fired  at 
German  infantry  and  active  guns  by  the  fighting  pilots. 
The  pilots  who  had  to  rove  about  the  lines,  following  no 
definite  course,  found  the  mist  and  low  clouds  disconcert- 
ing and  often  had  difficulty  in  deciding  where  they  were. 
Second  Lieutenant  E.  Olivier,  a  Spad  pilot  of  No.  19 
Squadron,  while  flying  low  in  search  of  targets  suitable  for 
attack,  got  lost  in  the  clouds.  He  steered  a  course  for  home, 
but  realized  after  a  time  that  his  compass  was  misdirecting 
him  and  he  decided  to  land.  He  came  to  rest  on  a  common 
and  hailed  a  labourer  from  whom  he  inquired  whether 
there  were  any  French  or  English  about.  The  answer  was 
'No,  only  Germans',  so  he  opened  his  throttle  and  took  to 
the  air  again.  For  some  time  he  flew  in  what  he  judged  to 
be  a  westerly  direction,  going  down,  when  he  found  a 
patch  of  clear  air,  to  examine  the  colour  of  the  uniforms 
worn  by  such  troops  as  he  could  find :  he  eventually  crossed 
the  lines  near  Armentieres.  On  the  same  day  four  'Camel' 
pilots  of  No.  3  Squadron,  after  a  varied  patrol  made  diffi- 
cult by  the  high  westerly  wind  and  the  bad  visibility, 
became  aware  that  they  were  flying  north  a  long  way  in- 
side enemy  territory,  but  had  no  clear  idea  of  their  position. 
After  fruitless  attempts  to  pick  up  his  bearings  the  leader 
decided  to  land.  He  chose  a  suitable  piece  of  ground  and 
all  four  pilots  alighted  safely,  but  subsequent  inquiries 
from  civilians  indicated  that  the  patrol  had  strayed  far 
over  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Namur.  Engine  trouble 
kept  one  of  the  'Camels'  where  it  had  landed,  but  the  re- 
maining three  got  away  without  mishap.  Luck,  however, 
was  against  them.  The  weather  conditions  had  become 
worse  and,  after  a  further  hundred  mile  flight,  the  three 
pilots  had  to  land  through  petrol  shortage.  They  then 
learned,  after  being  made  prisoners,  that  they  had  come 
down  near  Rheims.  Meanwhile,  the  pilot  who  had  been 
left  behind  near  Namur  had  burned  his  aeroplane  and  had 
then  mingled  with  civilians  attracted  to  the  spot.  Among 
these  was  a  young  Belgian  peasant,  with  whom  the  pilot 
made  a  verbal  contract.  The  youth  promised  to  conceal 
and  guide  the  pilot,  and  the  latter  to  pool  his  supply  of 


BATTLES  of  YPRES,   1917. 

DISPOSITION  OF  ROYAL  NAVAL  AIR   SERVICE  and   ROYAL  FLYING  CORPS    SQUADRONS 
31st.  JULY,  1917. 


1917]  END  OF  THE  BATTLES  213 

French  francs  and  help  the  boy  to  join  a  brother  who  was 
fighting  with  the  Belgian  Army.1 

Four  days  after  the  capture  of  Passchendaele,  in  a  down- 
pour of  rain,  British  and  Canadian  troops  attacked  north- 
wards from  the  village  and  extended  their  gains  on  the 
main  ridge.  The  fighting,  of  intense  bitterness,  for  these 
additional  acres  of  ground  lasted  until  the  late  after- 
noon, and  then,  as  the  light  faded  from  the  most  sombre 
and  bloodiest  of  all  the  battle-fields  of  the  war,  the  last 
shots  of  the  Battles  of  Ypres  1917  were  fired. 

Developments  in  Artillery  Co-operation,  igiy 

A  serious  effect  of  the  great  increase  in  the  British 
artillery  units  in  France,  which  took  place  in  the  spring 
and  summer  of  191 7,  and  of  the  frequent  transfers  of 
batteries  from  one  command  to  another,  was  a  weakening 
of  the  liaison  between  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  artillery 
squadrons  and  the  gunners.  The  time  was  past  when  pilots 
and  observers  of  Corps  squadrons  could  pay  frequent  visits, 
for  professional  discussion,  to  the  batteries  with  which  they 
worked.  This  was  the  more  unfortunate  because  it  was 
found  that  some  artillery  officers  came  to  France  from 
England  without  practical  experience  of  co-operation  with 
aircraft  and  with  little  theoretical  knowledge  of  the 
methods  by  which  it  was  attained.  Brigadier-General 
P.  W.  Game,  the  senior  staff  officer  at  Royal  Flying  Corps 
head-quarters  and  himself  an  officer  of  the  Royal  Artillery, 
had,  in  April  191 7,  investigated  a  specific  complaint  that 
a  prearranged  'shoot'  had  failed,  and  he  had  found  that  no 
wireless  station  had  been  erected  by  the  battery,  the  com- 
mander having  previously  ordered  the  ground  wireless 
operator  to  leave  his  apparatus  on  the  roadside.  He  also 
investigated  other  complaints  and  found  that  the  failures 
had  been  caused  because  the  battery  officers  did  not  under- 
stand the  'zone  call'  method  of  co-operation.  In  a  personal 
letter  to  the  artillery  staff  at  General  Head-quarters,  he 
pointed  out  how  necessary  it  was  that  battery  commanders, 
newly  arrived  in  France,  should  be  made  conversant  with 

1  The  initial  plans  miscarried,  but  the  pilot  eventually  escaped  into 
Holland.   See  Missing,  by  Talbot  Baines  Bruce. 


2i4  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

the  latest  methods  of  co-operation  between  aeroplanes  and 
artillery.  For  a  long  time  senior  Flying  Corps  officers,  he 
said,  had  paid  visits  to  the  batteries  to  explain  these 
methods,  but  with  the  great  increase  in  the  number  of 
batteries  in  the  field  and,  also,  in  the  amount  of  work  re- 
quired to  be  done  by  the  Corps  wing  commanders,  this 
personal  liaison  was  no  longer  possible. 

In  June  191 7  the  General  Staff,  at  the  request  of 
Major-General  Trenchard,  had  endeavoured  to  overcome 
this  lack  of  understanding  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  new 
battery  officers,  by  the  issue  of  a  set  of  notes  summarizing 
the  accepted  principles  for  air  and  artillery  co-operation  as 
laid  down  in  the  official  publications.  In  truth,  the  battery 
commanders  had  cause  for  complaint.  They,  on  their 
part,  had  sometimes  to  contend  with  newly-arrived  pilots 
or  observers  who  were  not  fully  trained  in  the  work  of 
co-operation,  and,  further,  they  came  to  realize,  as 
they  moved  from  one  command  to  another,  that  the 
methods  in  use  in  the  various  Corps  squadrons  of  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  differed  considerably  in  points  of  detail. 
According  to  the  individual  experience  of  the  squadron 
officers,  or  of  the  artillery  officers  with  whom  they  had 
worked,  modifications  by  way  of  improvement  had  been 
introduced.  The  battery  commander  who  was  shifted 
from  one  command  to  another  was  apt  to  find  that  the 
methods  of  co-operation  which  he  had  previously  practised 
had  to  be  modified  in  essential  particulars.  Such  a  state  of 
affairs  led  to  annoyance,  misunderstanding,  and  ineffi- 
ciency. In  the  middle  of  August  Lieutenant-Colonel 
E.  R.  Ludlow-Hewitt,  commanding  the  Third  (Corps) 
Wing,  put  forward  a  memorandum  which  outlined,  with 
force  and  lucidity,  the  case  for  standardization  of  the 
methods  of  ranging  for  the  artillery.  'In  the  early  days 
'of  co-operation  between  aeroplanes  and  Royal  Artillery 
'batteries',  he  said,  'every  observer  and  every  battery  com- 
'mander  had  his  own  pet  theories  and  methods.  This  fact 
'necessitated  elaborate  arrangements  between  the  observer 
'and  the  battery  commander  before  each  shoot  could  be 
'carried  out.  At  that  time,  these  arrangements  presented 
'no  great  difficulty  because  limited  time  and  pressure  of 


1917]  ARTILLERY  CO-OPERATION  215 

'work  were  scarcely  serious  considerations.  The  observer 
'was  able  to  visit  the  battery  commander  before  a  shoot, 
'and  discuss  with  him,  or  was  able  to  ring  him  up  and 
'arrange  things  on  telephone  lines  which  were  not  over- 
'congested  with  traffic.  They  were  further  simplified  by 
'the  comparatively  small  number  of  batteries  which  worked 
'with  aeroplane  observation,  which  allowed  one  observer 
'in  the  squadron  to  observe  permanently  for  one  battery. 
'It  was,  in  fact,  almost  impossible  for  him  to  observe  for 
'more  than  one  battery,  unless  he  was  an  expert  and 
'familiar  with  all  the  different  methods  in  use.  The  result 
'of  this  lack  of  system  was  that  shoots  were,  for  the  most 
'part,  very  slow,  and  it  was  considered  a  good  flight  when 
'some  20  rounds  had  been  fired  and  observed.  Further, 
'the  number  of  methods  in  use  rendered  it  quite  impossible 
'to  teach  a  new  observer  all  of  them,  and,  if  he  was  trained 
'in  only  one,  the  chances  were  that  he  would  be  asked  to 
'work  on  another  when  he  came  to  carry  out  his  first  shoot. 
'Consequently,  artillery  work  was  confined  to  quite  a  few 
'expert  observers  in  each  squadron.  As  work  increased  the 
'three  or  four  experts  in  the  squadron  found  it  impossible 
'to  compete  with  it  all,  and  it  became  more  and  more 
'necessary  to  train  every  available  observer  in  artillery 
'work.  Increase  in  work,  too,  began  to  interfere  with 
'liaison  between  individual  observers  and  battery  com- 
'manders.  These  considerations,  combined  with  the  desira- 
'bility  of  simplifying  and  improving  co-operation,  called 
'for  the  introduction  of  simple  standard  methods  by 
'squadrons  within  the  Corps  with  whom  they  worked. 
'Later  again,  active  operations  on  a  larger  scale  involving 
'complete  armies  soon  showed  that  standardization  within 
'armies  was  both  desirable  and  necessary,  not  only  to 
'facilitate  the  training  of  observers  in  a  Wing  and  to 
'eliminate  methods  which  experience  and  comparison  be- 
'tween  Corps  began  to  prove  to  be  faulty,  but  also  to  avoid 
'a  large  number  of  failures  which  occurred  through  the 
'transfer  of  batteries  or  groups  from  Corps  to  Corps  within 
'the  Army,  due  to  slight  readjustments  of  the  front  or  to 
'the  requirements  of  special  operations.  Standardization 
'of  methods  of  ranging  within  an  Army  soon  began  to  show 


216  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

'the  best  results  in  increased  efficiency  of  observers  and 
'batteries,  and  a  corresponding  improvement  in  the  speed 
'and  effect  of  the  shooting.  These  improvements  were  at 
'least  very  clearly  demonstrated  on  the  front  of  the  Fourth 
'Army  during  last  winter  and  spring,  when  the  observation 
'of  upwards  of  200  rounds  in  the  course  of  a  single  flight 
'became  as  common  as  the  so-called  successful  shoot  of  70 
'or  80  observed  rounds  of  a  few  months  earlier.  The  ad- 
vantages of  working  on  a  standard  method  did  not  only 
'show  themselves  in  the  increased  speed  and  destructive 
'effect  of  bombardment  with  aerial  observation,  but  also 
'allowed  each  squadron  to  double  the  amount  of  work  they 
'had  previously  been  capable  of.  This  was  the  natural  out- 
'come  of  simplifying  and  reducing  the  number  of  methods 
'to  be  taught,  so  that  observers  could  be  made  use  of  much 
'earlier  than  heretofore. 

'The  time  has  now  arrived  when  by  natural  develop- 
'ment  standardization  should  extend  beyond  the  confines 
'of  individual  Armies,  and  one  system  should  become 
'general  for  the  whole  of  the  British  Armies  in  the  field. 
'The  desirability  of  further  standardization  is  shown  in 
'recent  operations  on  the  Fourth  Army  front  when  a  con- 
centration of  batteries  collected  from  all  parts  of  the 
'fighting  line  introduced,  as  far  as  the  artillery  were  con- 
'cerned,  a  large  number  of  different  systems,  all  of  which 
'had  to  be  unlearned  before  serious  and  successful  work 
Could  commence.  The  case  would,  of  course,  have  been 
'exactly  the  same  had  the  concentration  been  of  Flying 
'Corps  squadrons  instead  of  batteries.  It  is  not  intended 
'to  suggest  that  the  standard  system  used  during  the  past 
'winter  in  Fourth  Army  is  by  any  means  the  best  system, 
'but  the  contention  is  that  the  introduction  of  any 
'standard  system  will  necessarily  result,  and  has  resulted, 
'in  reducing  complications,  preventing  frequent  changes, 
'and  making  co-operation  very  much  easier  for  all  con- 
'cerned.  An  aerial  observer  should  not  be  considered  as 
'being  in  a  similar  position  to  a  ground  observer  in  an 
'observation  post.  In  the  air,  the  observer  is  surrounded 
'with  distractions  and  confused  with  uncertainties.  He  is 
'thinking  how  he  can  best  avoid  the  shells  bursting  around 


i9i7]  STANDARDIZATION  217 

'him,  wondering  whether  yonder  hostile  machine  is  going 
'to  take  an  interest  in  him,  dodging  clouds  and  other 
'machines,  and  is  the  victim  of  a  dozen  other  preoccupa- 
tions. He  feels  very  remote  and  cut  off  from  the  ground 
'to  which,  indeed,  he  is  only  connected  by  the  delicate 
'thread  of  his  wireless  signals.  As  soon  as  any  check  or 
'difficulty  arises  in  the  even  course  of  his  shoot  he  becomes 
'a  prey  to  doubt  and  uncertainty.  Is  the  battery  receiving 
'his  signals — is  there  some  misunderstanding,  or  why  have 
'they  stopped?  He  can  only  succeed  in  the  face  of  these 
'distractions  if  he  is  in  the  first  place  familiar  with  his 
'wireless  key,  and  if  the  methods  employed  are  well  under- 
'stood  and  so  simple  that  he  can  carry  on  almost  instinc- 
'tively  with  a  minimum  of  thought  and  concentration. 
'Secondly,  stoppages  and  checks  in  shoots  must  be  avoided, 
'and  if  they  occur  the  answer  to  his  appeal  for  information 
'must  be  prompt  and  clear.  Rhythm  enters  into  it.  One 
'should  avoid  introducing  intervals  and  pauses  of  unequal 
'length.  The  study  of  the  record  of  any  good  shoot  will 
'show  with  what  remarkable  regularity  the  signals  follow 
'each  other  until  the  steady  pulse  of  the  shoot  is  brought 
'up  with  a  jerk  by  some  temporary  stoppage  which  throws 
'the  whole  machinery  out  of  gear  and  upsets  the  rhythmical 
'speed  for  some  little  time  .  .  . 

'The  far-reaching  effects  which  standardization  of  rang- 
'ing  methods  may  have  is  best  shown  in  the  consideration 
'of  its  influence  on  the  instruction  and  turning  out  of 
'observers.  The  amount  of  aerial  observation  work  re- 
'quired  by  a  Corps  during  and  previous  to  active  operations 
'is  often  beyond  the  powers  of  a  Corps  squadron  on  the 
'present  establishment.  The  difficulties  of  organization 
'and  supply  of  personnel  and  material  limit  the  size  and 
'number  of  squadrons  which  can  be  attached  to  each 
'Corps,  and,  therefore,  any  increase  in  the  working  value  of 
'a  squadron  must  depend  on  extracting  the  full  measure  of 
'work  out  of  each  observer.  There  is  no  room  in  a  modern 
'squadron  for  untrained  observers,  and  no  time  to  train 
'them.  Casualties  and  the  strain  of  war  flying  render  con- 
'tinual  replacement  necessary,  and,  although  each  casualty 
'is  immediately  replaced,  the  working  value  of  the  squadron 


218  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

'still  suffers  a  dead  loss  temporarily  while  the  new  man  is 
'learning  methods  of  work  which  he  cannot  at  present 
'learn  at  home.  This  means  that  a  squadron  at  present 
'can  never  be  working  at  full  strength.  There  are  in 
'England  several  schools  of  instruction  in  observation  for 
'pilots  and  observers,  but  they  are  heavily  handicapped  by 
'being  unable  to  teach  more  than  the  elements  and  first 
'principles  of  observation  duties  owing  to :  (a)  the  number 
'of  systems  in  use  out  here,  and  (b)  the  frequent  changes  in 
'systems  which  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  keep  up  to 
'date.  Standardization,  besides  increasing  the  confidence 
'of  instructors,  will  render  it  possible  to  turn  out  observers 
'of  such  efficiency  that  they  can  commence  useful  work 
'immediately  on  posting  to  a  squadron.  ...  As  the 
'strength  of  the  artillery  and  the  Flying  Corps  increases, 
'liaison  must  continue  to  weaken,  and  the  only  substitute 
'for  the  old  understanding  obtained  by  personal  contact 
'is  the  mechanical  understanding  induced  by  observer  and 
'battery  commander  working  on  the  same  formula  and 
'controlled  by  the  same  hand.  The  high-water  mark  of 
'mutual  understanding  can  now  only  be  reached  by  perfect 
'drill,  whereby  the  battery  and  the  aeroplane  will  work  in 
'one  piece.  .  .  .  The  introduction  of  one  method  only  to 
'all  parts  of  the  front  will  result  in  a  reduction  of  signals 
'and  a  general  clean  up  of  unnecessary  litter.  .  .  .' 

As  a  result  of  this  memorandum  a  circular  letter  was  sent 
to  all  Corps  wing  commanders  asking  for  a  full  statement  of 
the  methods  of  co-operation  in  use.  The  answers  received 
formed  a  basis  of  discussion  with  the  artillery  authorities 
at  General  Head-quarters,  and,  after  a  process  of  elimina- 
tion, were  incorporated  as  modifications  in  a  revised 
edition  of  the  printed  pamphlet,  Co-operation  of  Aircraft 
with  Artillery  (S.S.131),  which  was  issued  in  December, 
191 7  to  supersede  the  edition  of  twelve  months  earlier. 

The  same  pamphlet  also  modified  some  of  the  principles 
governing  the  work  of  balloon  observers.  It  had  been  found 
that  where  the  balloon  observer  had  a  fair  view  of  a  target 
which  it  was  desired  to  engage  for  destruction  with  artillery 
fire,  the  preliminary  ranging  could  be  completed  with 
balloon  observation  before  the  arrival  of  the  aeroplane. 


1917]  KITE  BALLOONS  219 

The  aeroplane  observer  could  then,  after  satisfying  him- 
self that  the  ranging  was  accurate,  proceed  at  once  to 
observe  for  fire  effect.  In  many  instances  the  reverse  pro- 
cess had  been  successful  not  only  by  prearrangement,  but 
often  when  the  aeroplane  observer,  through  petrol-short- 
age, engine  failure,  or  other  cause,  had  been  compelled  to 
cease  work.  The  wireless  call  K.B.C.I.  ('Kite  Balloon,  I 
am  returning  to  landing-ground')  enabled  the  balloon 
observer,  in  a  position  to  co-operate  with  the  particular 
battery  concerned,  to  take  over  and  complete  the  shoot 
Another  extension  of  kite-balloon  work  for  the  artillery 
was  the  co-ordination  of  night-observation  whereby  bear- 
ings were  taken,  by  widely  placed  balloon  observers,  on  the 
flashes  of  active  German  batteries.  By  the  various  inter- 
sections thus  obtained,  many  new  gun  positions  had  been 
revealed,  for  daylight  registration  or  destruction,  but 
where  activity  was  shown  to  be  coming  from  known 
German  batteries,  effective  counter-fire  by  the  British 
artillery  could  usually  be  brought  to  bear  at  once. 

Propaganda  by  Air 

An  incident  in  October  191 7  raised  important  questions 
about  the  legality  of  using  aeroplanes  for  dropping 
propaganda  pamphlets.  On  the  17th  of  October  a  recon- 
naissance and  photographic  patrol  of  Bristol  Fighters  of 
No.  11  Squadron  became  involved  in  a  fight  with  ten 
enemy  aircraft  over  Cambrai.  Two  of  the  Bristols  were 
shot  down,  and  the  enemy  discovered  in  one  of  them, 
piloted  by  Second  Lieutenant  E.  Scholtz  with  Second 
Lieutenant  H.  C.  Wookey  as  his  observer,  military  propa- 
ganda documents,  printed  in  German,  descriptive  of  the 
happy  lot  of  a  German  prisoner  in  British  hands  and  de- 
signed to  create  a  'will  to  desert'.  The  two  officers  were 
taken  to  the  German  Second  Army  head-quarters  at  Le 
Cateau  and  there  informed  that  the  German  Government 
had  notified  the  Allies  in  April  191 7  that  the  dropping  of 
pamphlets  was  considered  illegal  and  that  airmen  found 
guilty  of  the  practice  would  be  liable  to  the  death 
penalty. 

The  officers  were  tried  by  a  German  Court  Martial  on 


220  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

the  1st  of  December  1917.  The  prosecutor  asked  for  the 
death  penalty  for  Second  Lieutenant  Wookey  and  for  ten 
years'  hard  labour  for  Second  Lieutenant  Scholtz.  The 
officers  were  found  guilty,  and  each  sentenced  to  ten  years' 
penal  servitude,  the  sentences  being  announced  by  Ger- 
man wireless  on  the  27th  of  January  191 8  when  it  was 
stated  that  they  had  been  passed  con  account  of  dropping 
'enemy  proclamations,  in  accordance  with  orders  issued 
'based  on  para.  58,  sub.  para.  9  and  with  para.  160  of  the 
'Militdrstrafgesetzbuch  [Manual  of  Military  Law]'.1 

The  British  Government,  on  the  4th  of  February  191 8, 
telegraphed  to  the  British  Minister  at  the  Hague,  for 
communication  to  the  German  Government,  a  strong 
protest  saying:  'His  Majesty's  Government  do  not  regard 
such  action  as  contrary  to  international  law  and  no 
justification  has  been  produced  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment in  support  of  their  contention  that  such  action  is 
outside  the  scope  of  the  laws  of  war.  Similar  action  has 
moreover  been  frequently  taken  by  German  airmen  on 
the  various  fronts,  and  His  Majesty's  Government  are  in 
possession  of  a  number  of  inflammatory  pamphlets  which 
have  been  so  distributed.  Failing  the  release  of  these  two 
officers,  His  Majesty's  Government  give  notice  (in  ac- 
cordance with  paragraph  20  of  the  Hague  Agreement  as 
modified  by  Foreign  Office  memorandum  of  October  9th) 
that  reprisals  will  be  taken  at  the  expiration  of  one  month 
from  the  date  on  which  this  notice  is  communicated  to 
the  German  Government.' 

Before  we  consider  the  outcome  of  the  Scholtz-Wookey 
case,  it  will  be  useful  to  trace  briefly  the  development 
of  pamphlet-dropping  from  aeroplanes.  It  was  begun  in 
August  1 914  by  both  the  French  and  German  air  services 
and  was  continued  intermittently  throughout  the  war  on 

1  Para.  58  read:  'He  will  be  punished  with  death  for  treason  who,  with 
'the  intention  to  give  aid  to  a  foreign  power  or  to  prejudice  the  German  or 
'Allied  troops . .  .' — and  Sub.  para.  9:  'Spreads  hostile  appeals  or  proclama- 
tions in  the  Army.' 

Para.  160  said:  'A  foreigner  or  German  who  makes  himself  guilty  of  one 
'of  the  Acts  mentioned  in  paragraphs  57-59  and  134  during  a  war  against 
'the  German  Empire,  will  be  punished  in  accordance  with  the  sentences 
'mentioned  in  these  paragraphs.' 


1914-18]  PROPAGANDA  BY  AIR  221 

all  fronts.1  A  notable  instance  occurred  in  November  1914 
when  proclamations,  inciting  Indian  troops  in  France  to 
rise  against  the  British,  were  showered  from  a  German  aero- 
plane which  was  afterwards  brought  down  and  captured. 
Propaganda  leaflets  were  first  dropped  by  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  in  October  191 4.  They  had  been  prepared  by  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel E.  D.  Swinton,  the  official  'Eye- Witness' 
at  British  General  Head-quarters,  and  had  been  printed 
by  the  Paris  Daily  Mail.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Swinton, 
however,  could  not  find  any  one  at  head-quarters  to  share 
his  belief  in  the  value  of  propaganda  and  nothing  further 
was  done  until  the  beginning  of  191 6  when  Major-General 
G.  M.  W.  Macdonogh  became  Director  of  Military  Intel- 
ligence at  the  War  Office  and  set  up  a  propaganda  branch 
in  his  department.  In  the  spring  of  19 16  a  sub-section 
of  the  branch  began  the  preparation  of  leaflets,  written 
in  German,  for  distribution  among  enemy  troops,  and 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps  was  called  upon  to  drop  them 
over  the  enemy  lines.  There  was  also  produced  a  news- 
sheet,  the  Voix  du  Pays  (and  later,  Le  Courier  de  FAir), 
written  in  French  and  addressed  to  the  inhabitants  of 
occupied  territory,  giving  them  news  of  the  progress  of  the 
war  from  the  Allied  point  of  view.  As  bundles  of  propa- 
ganda pamphlets  were  received  in  France  they  were  carried 
over  the  lines,  whenever  convenient,  in  aeroplanes  engaged 
on  routine  duties:  no  special  flights  for  the  purpose  of 
dropping  leaflets  were  permitted. 

So  long  as  the  German  command  was  unperturbed  by 
the  effect  of  the  propaganda,  the  question  of  the  legality  of 
using  aircraft  for  its  distribution  seems  not  to  have  been 
raised.  But  in  the  spring  of  191 7  there  was  a  change  of 
temper,  and  it  must  be  assumed  that  this  change  came 
about  because  it  was  recognized  that  the  propaganda  was 
beginning  to  have  some  effect  on  the  morale  of  the  Ger- 
man troops. 

On  the  26th  of  April  1917  two  F.E.2b's  of  No.  22 
Squadron,  of  an  escorted  bombing  formation,  were  shot 
down  and  their  officers  made  prisoners.    From  each  of 

1  Many  instances  are  quoted  in  Air  Power  and  War  Rights,  by  J.  M. 
Spaight,  Ch.  XIII. 


222  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

these  aeroplanes  leaflets,  addressed  to  German  soldiers, 
had  been  dropped.  No  intimation  was  given  that  action 
would  be  taken  against  these  officers,  but  on  the  6th  of 
June  the  British  Government  received,  through  the  Swiss 
Minister,  a  copy  of  a  German  Foreign  Office  note  of  the 
22nd  of  May  which  stated  that  Allied  airmen  on  the 
Western  front  had  recently  dropped  'inflammatory 
'writings,  some  in  particular  directed  against  His  Majesty 
'the  German  Emperor',  that  such  acts  were,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  German  Government,  outside  the  scope  of 
acts  of  war,  and  that  instructions  had  been  issued  that 
airmen  on  whom  such  writings  were  found,  or  who  had 
been  guilty  of  scattering  them,  would  be  tried  by  Court 
Martial. 

No  protest  against  this  statement  of  the  German  inten- 
tions appears  to  have  been  made  by  the  British  Government. 
Then  in  October  191 7  a  report  was  received  from  the 
Netherland  Legation  (British  Section)  in  Berlin,  of  the 
trial  by  Court  Martial,  on  the  17th  of  October  191 7,  of 
the  four  officers  of  No.  22  Squadron  for  'having  in  April 
'191 7  distributed  (by  dropping  them  from  aeroplanes) 
'pamphlets,  which  contained  insults  against  the*  German 
'Army  and  Government,  amongst  the  German  Army 
'fighting  in  the  Western  theatre  of  war'.  The  report 
showed  that  the  accused  officers  had  been  prosecuted  under 
the  paragraphs  of  the  Militarstrafgesetzbuch  already  quoted, 
but  although  the  prosecuting  counsel  argued  that  they  had. 
committed  a  breach  of  international  law,  he  stated  that 
the  fact  that  the  accused  belonged  to  a  hostile  armed  power 
should  be  taken  into  account  in  mitigation  of  their  offence, 
and  he  asked  for  a  sentence  of  ten  years'  penal  servitude, 
the  minimum  penalty  for  their  offence.  The  charges 
against  two  of  the  officers  were  found  not  proven  and  the 
officers  were  accordingly  acquitted.  Against  the  other  two 
the  Court  found  there  was  a  prima  facie  case,  but  was  not 
satisfied  that  the  act  committed  was  against  international 
law.  Even  allowing  that  to  be  so,  the  Court  was  of  the 
opinion  that  the  accused  officers  were  unaware  of  the 
illegality  of  their  action  in  the  eyes  of  international  law 
and  that  they  must,  therefore,  also  be  acquitted.   At  the 


1917-18]       THE  SCHOLTZ-WOOKEY  CASE         223 

end  of  the  pleading,  the  presiding  judge  read  out  a  declara- 
tion from  the  German  High  Command  to  the  effect  that 
the  dropping  of  inflammatory  pamphlets  was  regarded  by 
the  German  authorities  as  being  contrary  to  international 
law  and  that  this  view  had  been  made  known  to  the  Allied 
powers. 

It  was  on  the  day  these  officers  were  tried  and  acquitted 
that  Second  Lieutenants  Scholtz  and  Wookey  were  shot 
down,  and  it  is  clear  that  the  German  High  Command  was 
anxious  to  take  full  advantage  of  this  further  opportunity 
to  get  a  legal  pronouncement  in  condemnation  of  pamphlet 
dropping.  But,  we  have  seen,  the  British  Government 
lodged  a  protest  and  threatened  reprisals.  The  German 
Government  countered  with  allegations  that  two  German 
flying  officers  had  been  tried  and  condemned  to  death  for 
the  same  type  of  offence  in  March  19 15,  and  that  France 
had  announced  her  intention  to  try  by  Court  Martial  any 
captured  German  airmen  who  had  dropped  leaflets.  The 
sentences  on  Scholtz  and  Wookey,  therefore,  were  by  way 
of  reprisal.  The  British  reply,  sent  on  the  2nd  of  March 
191 8,  showed  these  allegations  to  be  unfounded.  On  the  9th 
of  March  the  German  Government  said  that  the  Scholtz- 
Wookey  case  was  under  consideration  and  presumed  that 
the  reprisals  threatened  by  the  British  Government  would 
not  be  promptly  carried  into  effect,  but  that  the  reply  of 
the  German  Army  administration  would  be  awaited.  Two 
days  later  a  telegram  from  the  Hague  announced  that 
Scholtz  and  Wookey  had  been  released  from  prison  and 
sent  to  a  prisoners-of-war  camp,  although  the  sentence 
passed  on  them  could  not  be  altered.  The  British  reply 
stated  that  'as  Scholtz  and  Wookey  are  to  be  released  our 
'reprisals  will  be  suspended.  It  should,  however,  be  made 
'clear  that  His  Majesty's  Government  in  no  way  admit 
'that  the  alleged  action  for  which  these  officers  were  con- 
'demned  is  one  that  justifies  any  sentence  and  consequently 
'any  pardon'. 

Meanwhile,  it  was  learned  that  four  other  members  of 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  brought  down  in  November  and 
December  191 7,  were  in  prison  awaiting  trial  on  charges 
similar  to  those  made  against  Scholtz  and  Wookey.  On  the 


224  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [ch.  v 

21st  of  March  191 8,  therefore,  a  demand  was  sent  to  Berlin, 
through  the  Netherland  Minister,  for  an  assurance  from 
the  German  Government  that  the  Flying  Corps  officers 
awaiting  trial,  as  well  as  Second  Lieutenants  Scholtz  and 
Wookey,  had  been  released  from  prison  and  sent  to  a  camp 
befitting  prisoners  of  war,  and  that  there  would  be  no 
further  proceedings  against  them :  if  these  demands  were 
not  conceded  reprisals  were  again  threatened.  On  the 
19th  of  April  the  British  Government  were  informed  that 
the  four  officers  had  been  tried  and  acquitted. 

In  a  note  dated  the  30th  of  April  the  German  Govern- 
ment suggested  that  the  British  Government  should  ex- 
pressly forbid  their  airmen  to  carry  or  distribute  provoca- 
tive literature,  and  stated  that  the  German  Government 
would,  in  their  turn,  reaffirm  the  existing  prohibition  of 
any  such  acts  by  German  airmen.  If  this  was  agreed  to, 
steps  would  be  taken  to  get  a  free  pardon  for  Second  Lieu- 
tenants Scholtz  and  Wookey.  The  British  Government,  in 
reply,  repeated  their  refusal  to  recognize  the  legality  of 
the  German  view. 

The  legal  debate  continued  throughout  the  greater  part 
of  191 8,  but,  although  the  British  Government  did  not 
modify  their  views,  the  German  action  in  sentencing  Second 
Lieutenants  Scholtz  and  Wookey  was,  in  fact,  effective. 
Immediately  the  trial  and  sentences  were  announced,  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  in  France  ruled  that  there  was 
to  be  no  distribution  of  propaganda  literature  from  aero- 
planes under  any  circumstances  whatever;  that  all  future 
distribution  must  be  made  by  balloon.  Cards  were 
printed,  to  be  carried  in  British  aeroplanes  on  the  Western 
front,  as  follows:  'No  printed  or  written  matter  for  air 
'distribution  is  to  be  carried  in  this  machine.  H.  A. 
'Lawrence,  Lieutenant-General,  Chief  of  the  General 
'Staff,  British  Armies  in  France.' 

There  is  no  record  that  the  Government  were  informed 
of  this  action  in  the  field  which  was  not  consistent  with 
the  uncompromising  attitude  which  they  maintained  in 
their  various  communications  to  the  German  Government. 
It  might  be  argued,  with  reason,  that  the  printed  card, 
carried  by  the  flying  officers,  constituted  a  tacit  admission 


1914-18]  THE  LEGAL  POSITION  225 

that  the  German  point  of  view  had  some  basis  in  inter- 
national law,  and  it  may  therefore  be  assumed  that  had 
the  British  Government  known  of  the  order  under  which 
the  cards  were  carried,  they  would  have  called  for  its 
cancellation.  They  could  not,  in  truth,  have  acted 
otherwise. 

The  Government  kept  the  question  alive,  by  protest  to 
the  German  authorities  from  time  to  time,  but  it  was  not 
until  towards  the  end  of  the  war  that  it  was  settled.  The 
Government  were  notified  by  telegram  from  The  Hague, 
on  the  23  rd  of  October  191 8,  that  the  German  Government 
had  withdrawn  the  order  that  airmen  captured  with  inflam- 
matory pamphlets  in  their  possession  must  be  brought  to 
trial.  Meanwhile,  on  the  14th  of  October,  Major-General 
J.  M.  Salmond,  in  reply  to  an  Air  Ministry  inquiry,  had 
stated  that,  if  it  was  considered  necessary,  propaganda 
literature  could  be  dropped  from  aircraft  without  loss  of 
efficiency,  but  suggested  that,  as  the  enemy  was  then  in 
full  retreat,  and  'in  an  extremely  tractable  state  of  mind, 
'it  will  be  a  great  deal  more  efficacious  to  concentrate  our 
'efforts  on  killing  him  than  on  educating  him'.1  Eventu- 
ally the  Air  Ministry  decided  that  the  Royal  Air  Force 
should  undertake  the  dropping  of  propaganda  literature 
and  this  decision  was  conveyed  to  Head-quarters,  Royal 
Air  Force,  in  France  on  the  10th  of  November  191 8. 
To  sum  up,  it  may  be  stated  definitely  that  the  practice 
established  in  the  war  1914-18,  by  the  Central  Powers  as 
well  as  by  the  Allies,  leaves  no  doubt  that  the  dissemination 
of  propaganda  by  aeroplanes  is  a  legitimate  act  of  war. 

During  the  time  when  the  carrying  of  inflammatory 
literature  in  British  aeroplanes  was  banned  by  G.H.Q.,  that 

1  Cf.  Hindenburg  on  propaganda  {Out  of  My  Life,  p.  314):  'The  enemy 
'intensified  the  process  of  demoralization,  not  only  by  his  blockade  and  the 
'semi-starvation  it  involved,  but,  by  another  method,  known  as  "Propa- 
'ganda  in  the  Enemy's  Camp  ".  This  was  a  new  weapon  or  rather  a  weapon 
'which  had  never  been  employed  on  such  a  scale  and  so  ruthlessly  in  the 
'past.  ...  It  is  the  result  of  the  adversary's  conviction  that  he  is  no  longer 
'strong  enough  to  defeat  his  enemy  in  open  and  honourable  fight  and 
'conquer  his  moral  resolution  merely  by  the  victory  of  his  triumphant 
'sword.' 

2504-4  o 


226  THE  BATTLES  OF  YPRES  [1918 

is,  from  February  1918  to  November  1918,  great  use  was 
made  of  special  balloons  made  of  doped  paper  and  manu- 
factured at  the  rate  of  2,000  a  week.1  The  load  was  500- 
1,000  leaflets  which  were  released  in  batches  by  a  fuse- 
burning  device.  Cotton-wick,  which  burned  evenly  at  the 
rate  of  five  minutes  to  the  inch,  was  threaded  to  a  wire 
attached  to  the  neck  of  the  balloon.  The  load  of  leaflets  was 
strung  in  small  packets  by  cotton  threads  along  the  length  of 
the  fuse,  which  was  lighted  as  the  balloon  set  off.  As  the  fuse 
burned  the  packets  of  literature  were  successively  released, 
and,  incidentally,  had  the  effect  of  a  discharge  of  ballast  to 
counteract  the  loss  of  gas  from  the  balloon.  The  prevailing 
westerly  winds  of  northern  France — so  much  a  drawback 
to  the  British  aeroplanes — supplied  almost  continuously 
favourable  conditions  for  the  launching  of  the  propaganda 
balloons.  The  length  of  their  track  varied  with  the 
strength  of  the  wind,  but,  in  general,  the  leaflets  were 
scattered  over  an  area  from  ten  to  fifty  miles  behind  the 
German  front-line  trenches. 

1  See  Secrets  of  Crewe  House,  by  Sir  Campbell  Stuart,  K.B.E.,  pp.  55-60. 


BATTLE   of  CAMBRAI. 

20tb  NOVEMBER-  7th  DECF.MBFR.  1917. 


PREPARED  IN  We  HISTORICAL  SECTION  OF  THE  COMMITTEE   OF  IMPERIAL   DEFENCE 


Ordnance  Survey  1933 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI 

20  th  November-^  th  December  igiy 
[Maps,  facing,  and  p.  244] 

The  battle  of  Cambrai  achieved  little,  yet  it  was  one  of 
the  most  remarkable  operations  of  the  war,  one  which 
threatened  disaster  first  to  one  side  and  then  to  the  other. 
It  has  this  in  common  with  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres, 
that  a  new  weapon  of  war  and  surprise  tactics  led  to  an 
initial  success  greater  than  the  high  command  had  ex- 
pected. At  Ypres  the  German  gas  attack  opened  a  way  to 
the  Channel  ports,  but  the  attack  had  been  planned  by  the 
enemy  as  a  minor  operation  and,  through  lack  of  foresight 
and  preparation,  he  was  unable  to  exploit  a  situation  of 
tremendous  possibilities.  At  Cambrai  the  surprise  tactics 
of  omission  of  artillery  preparation,  and  the  employment 
of  tanks  for  the  first  time  as  a  major  weapon  of  attack, 
created  such  confusion  as  to  seem  to  threaten  the  German 
armies  with  catastrophe.  The  operation,  however,  had 
been  planned  on  a  limited  scale.  The  initial  success,  great 
as  it  was,  fell  short  of  what  was  necessary  to  allow  of  pro- 
gressive exploitation,  but  the  bulge  it  created  in  the 
German  line  offered  the  enemy  a  tempting  opportunity, 
of  which  he  was  quick  to  take  advantage,  for  a  spectacular 
counter-offensive. 

The  long  and  costly  battles  of  Ypres  in  191 7  had  taxed 
the  strength  of  the  British  armies,  and  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
could  not  consider  another  major  offensive.  But  there 
were  many  reasons  which  prompted  him  to  sanction  just 
such  a  plan  as  was  put  into  operation  at  Cambrai.  The 
Flanders  offensive  and  other  attacks  elsewhere  by  the 
Allies  had  compelled  the  enemy  to  reduce  the  garrisons 
in  the  quieter  sectors  of  the  line.  A  surprise  operation 
on  one  of  these  weakened  sectors,  made  before  the  German 
concentrations  in  Flanders  had  been  broken  up  and  redis- 
tributed, might  be  expected  to  yield  an  important  local 
success  which  would  carry  the  lesson  that  to  weaken  any 
part  of  the  line  was  to  incur  grave  risks.    Furthermore, 


228  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

another  attack,  immediately  following  the  Flanders  offen- 
sive, would  tend  to  create  a  feeling  of  uncertainty  and  so 
make  the  enemy  uneasy  throughout  the  winter.  He  would 
realize  the  danger  of  withdrawing  too  many  troops  to  back 
areas  for  rest  and  training.  The  blow  must  be  struck 
quickly  because  no  similarly  favourable  opportunity  might 
occur  again  for  many  months.  Already  large  German 
forces  had  been  brought  across  to  the  Western  front  from 
Russia,  and  it  was  certain  that  the  westward  flow  would 
increase  through  the  winter.  Finally,  the  desperate  plight 
of  the  Italian  armies  added  force  to  the  argument  for  an 
immediate  diversion  in  France. 

The  nature  and  area  of  the  attack  was  conditioned,  in 
great  measure,  by  the  forceful  enthusiasm  of  the  Tank 
Corps.  The  most  suitable  ground  in  the  British  area  for 
tank  operations  was  the  open  undulating  country  in  front 
of  Cambrai,  held  by  General  the  Hon.  Sir  Julian  H.  G. 
Byng's  Third  Army,  and  plans  for  the  attack  were  worked 
out  by  the  Third  Army  Commander  and  his  staff  in  co- 
operation with  Brigadier-General  H.  J.  Elles  of  the  Tank 
Corps.  The  plans  received  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  sanction  to- 
wards the  end  of  October.  They  were  of  a  novel  kind. 
There  was  to  be  no  preliminary  bombardment  and  no  . 
painstaking  registration  of  the  German  batteries  and  other 
positions.  'Zero'  hour  would  come  unheralded  with  the 
tanks  going  over  the  top  ahead  of  the  infantry  to  cut  lanes 
through  the  enemy  wire,  to  crush  machine-gun  opposi- 
tion, and  to  create  general  alarm.  Only  when  the  advance 
began  was  the  British  artillery  to  come  into  action  with  a 
sudden  overwhelming  crash. 

The  front  of  attack  extended  roughly  six  miles  between 
Gonnelieu  and  Havrincourt,  and  the  object  was  to  break 
through  all  the  enemy  defences  in  one  day  and,  if  this 
were  accomplished,  to  pass  the  cavalry  through  to  raid 
the  German  lines  of  communication.  If,  after  breaking 
through,  Bourlon  Wood  could  be  seized  and  a  strong  flank 
established  towards  Cambrai,  the  way  was  open  for  a 
general  northward  movement  to  roll  up  the  German 
defences  south  of  the  Sensee  river.  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
arranged  with  the   French  Commander-in-Chief  for  a 


1917]  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS  229 

strong  French  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  to  be  in 
readiness,  if  the  event  should  turn  out  as  planned,  to  go 
through  the  gap  and  swing  away  to  the  right  in  rear  of  the 
German  defences. 

The  German  defence  system  which  was  to  be  breached 
was  formidable,  and  comprised  three  main  sections.  The 
first,  constituting  part  of  the  Hindenburg  Line,  was  a 
length  of  six  miles  between  the  Canal  de  l'Escaut  at 
Banteux  and  Havrincourt.  About  a  mile  behind  this  was 
the  so-called  Hindenburg  Support  Line,  while  farther  east 
again,  at  an  average  distance  of  four  miles,  was  the  third 
system  known  as  the  Beaurevoir-Masnieres-Marcoing  Line. 
The  whole  system  was  further  strengthened  by  a  series 
of  forward  positions,  in  advance  of  the  Hindenburg  Line, 
including  la  Vacquerie  and  a  corner  of  Havrincourt  Wood. 
The  trenches  of  the  Hindenburg  Line  were  specially  wide, 
in  some  places  wide  enough  to  swallow  the  Mark  IV  tank. 

It  was  calculated  that  if  the  operation  was  kept  secret  to 
the  last  moment,  no  considerable  German  reinforcements 
could  reach  the  front  until  forty-eight  hours  had  elapsed 
from  the  opening  of  the  attack.  In  other  words,  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  would  have  two  days  in  which  to  carry  the 
German  positions  and  establish  himself  on  the  dominating 
Bourlon  ridge,  and  to  secure  his  right  flank.  Thereafter  it 
would  require  time  to  exploit  the  situation,  but  if  the 
cavalry  got  through  to  cut  communications  and  hamper 
the  bringing  forward  of  troops,  the  prospects  of  gaining 
the  necessary  time  seemed  reasonable. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  Commander-in-Chief's  out- 
line of  his  expectations  is  in  conflict  with  his  declaration 
that  the  attack  was  a  limited  one  which  aimed  only  at  a 
local  success.  The  possibilities  were,  in  fact,  inherent  in 
the  original  plans,  but  the  troops  were  not  available,  nor 
were  the  preparations  adequate,  for  an  operation  on  such  a 
scale.  As  will  be  told  the  initial  expectations  were  not 
quite  realized,  but  had  they  been,  and  had  the  more 
ambitious  project  been  put  in  hand,  the  incalculable 
chances  of  war  would  again  have  had  play.  They  would 
have  brought  the  enemy,  no  less  than  the  Allies,  scope  for 
a  blow  of  some  magnitude. 


230  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

The  air  co-operation  in  the  battle  involved  not  only  the 
squadrons  of  the  III  Brigade  attached  to  the  Third  Army, 
but  also  part  of  the  fighting  and  bombing  strength  of  the 
I  Brigade1  and  the  bombing  and  reconnaissance  squadrons 
of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing.  The  I  Brigade  was 
to  bomb  Somain  and  Dechy  railway  stations,  maintain 
offensive  patrols  between  Douai  and  the  Sensed  river,  make 
low-flying  attacks  on  suitable  ground  targets  as  far  east  as 
the  line  Somain-Denain,  and  to  be  responsible  for  con- 
tinuous reconnaissance  of  rail  and  road  movements,  from 
io  a.m.  to  dark,  of  the  area  north  of  the  Sensee  river  as  far 
east  as  Denain.  Twelve  Corps  aeroplanes  of  the  Brigade 
were  to  be  kept  ready  for  bombing  and  machine-gun 
attacks  if  considerable  enemy  movements  were  reported. 
The  Ninth  Wing  squadrons  were  to  bomb  Busigny,  Valen- 
ciennes, Denain,  and  Douai  railway  stations,  and  keep 
observation  for  movements  in  the  area  south  of  the  Sensee 
river,  eastwards  of  Cambrai,  and  southwards  again  to  the 
Masnieres-Marcoing  bridges.  During  the  night  following 
the  opening  of  the  battle,  Douai  and  Somain  stations  were 
to  be  bombed.2 

The  III  Brigade,  reinforced  for  the  battle,  comprised 
six  Corps  squadrons,  seven  fighter  squadrons,  one  fighter- 
reconnaissance  squadron,  and  part  of  a  day-bombing 
squadron  (two  D.H.4  Flights  of  No.  49  Squadron  which 
had  arrived  from  England  on  the  12th  of  November  191 7). 
These  squadrons,  on  the  eve  of  the  battle,  possessed  a 
total  of  289  aeroplanes,3  whereas  the  whole  German 
Second  Army,  whose  right  flank  only  was  in  the  Cambrai 

1  A  General  Head-quarter's  instruction  to  the  First  Army  commander 
stated  that  the  fighting  and  bombing  squadrons  of  the  I  Brigade  would  be 
drawn  on  by  General  Head-quarters  to  reinforce  the  battle-front.  As  the 
missions  they  would  be  required  to  make  would  depend  on  the  progress  of 
the  battle,  authority,  it  was  stated,  would  be  delegated  by  General  Head- 
quarters to  the  G.O.C.  Royal  Flying  Corps  to  issue  orders  to  the  I  Brigade 
direct.  This  procedure  was  put  in  force  at  4  p.m.  on  the  19th  November 
and  ended  on  the  evening  of  the  25th. 

2  For  the  scheme  of  co-operation  of  the  I  Brigade  and  Ninth  Wing,  see 
Appendix  IX. 

3  One  hundred  and  twenty-five  for  Corps  work,  1 34  single-seater  fighters, 
eighteen  Bristol  Fighters,  and  twelve  D.H.4's.  See  Order  of  Battle, 
Appendix  X. 


1917]  AIR  CONCENTRATION  231 

sector,  could  count  upon  no  more  than  seventy-eight  aero- 
planes of  which  twelve  were  fighters.  Thus,  at  the  opening 
of  the  battle,  the  III  Brigade  alone  outnumbered  the 
opposing  enemy  air  service  by  about  four  to  one  generally, 
and,  in  fighting  aircraft,  by  ten  to  one.  The  addition  of 
the  Ninth  Wing  squadrons  and  the  part  of  the  I  Brigade 
involved,  makes  the  initial  air  concentration  truly  over- 
whelming. The  kite  balloons,  of  which  six  sections  were 
available  for  work  with  the  various  Corps  of  the  Third 
Army,  were  to  be  specially  used  for  reporting  movements 
of  German  troops  to  the  artillery. 

As  there  was  no  preliminary  registration  or  bombard- 
ment of  German  targets,  arrangements  of  a  special  kind 
had  to  be  made  for  air  co-operation  on  the  day  of  the 
attack.1  There  would  be  no  time  for  the  deliberate 
observation  of  fire  of  the  British  artillery.  What  was 
essential  was  that  the  positions  of  active  German  batteries 
should  be  comprehensively  notified  and  that,  to  save  time, 
air  observation  should  be  confined  to  general  corrections  of 
fire  for  neutralization.  Equally  important  was  the  prompt 
reporting  to  the  gunners  of  concentrations  of  hostile 
troops.  To  supplement  the  effect  of  the  artillery  fire  four 
fighting  squadrons  were  set  aside  for  attacks,  with  bombs 
and  machine-guns,  against  ground  targets,  notably  active 
batteries,  machine-gun  emplacements,  and  troops.  There 
were  to  be  low-flying  attacks  also  by  four  Sopwith  'Camels' 
on  each  of  six  aerodromes.  To  facilitate  the  work  of  these 
fighting  squadrons  a  forward  aerodrome  was  organized  at 
Bapaume  and  plentifully  stocked  with  petrol,  ammunition, 
bombs,  and  spare  parts.  The  attacks  by  fighters  on  German 
batteries  were  not  to  be  haphazard.  By  long  and  careful 
observation,  lists  had  been  compiled  of  the  known  German 
guns  expected  to  be  most  troublesome.  These  were  divided 
into  three  groups,  and  systematic  attacks  by  the  fighting 
pilots  were  planned  against  each  group.  The  attacks  on 
troops  and  transport  were  to  begin  forty-five  minutes  after 
the  infantry  assault,  and  for  an  hour  and  a  quarter  were  to  be 
made  along  an  extended  front  from  Fontaine-lez-Croisilles 

1  The  Operation  Order  of  the  III  Brigade  is  given  as  Appendix  XI. 
This  should  be  studied  with  the  tactical  map,  p.  244. 


232  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

to  Bellicourt  with  the  object  of  deceiving  the  enemy 
about  the  main  point  of  attack.  Thereafter  the  low- 
flying  fighters  were  to  concentrate  on  the  main  battle 
front  and  were  to  give  special  attention  to  the  lines  of 
approach  of  the  German  resting  battalions,  as  indicated 
on  tactical  maps  issued  to  the  pilots. 

As  secrecy  was  the  essence  of  the  whole  operation,  it  was 
absolutely  necessary  to  deny  the  enemy  any  view  of  the 
concentrations  for  the  battle,  especially  of  the  tanks.  All 
major  movements  were  made  under  cover  of  darkness  and 
elaborate  precautions  were  taken  for  the  daylight  conceal- 
ment of  concentrations  in  back  areas.  The  forest  of 
Havrincourt  in  particular  offered  cover  for  great  numbers 
of  tanks  and  troops.  Nevertheless,  daylight  reconnaissance 
by  enemy  aeroplane  observers  must  have  led,  at  least,  to 
the  arousing  of  suspicion.  A  series  of  discreet  and  un- 
obtrusive fighter  patrols  was  therefore  arranged,  chiefly  to 
cover  the  area  of  the  British  lines.1 

In  the  event  this  precaution  was  unnecessary.  The 
weather  for  once  favoured  the  British  plans,  and  the 
November  days  of  mist  and  low  cloud  made  air  observa- 
tion almost  impossible.2  The  surprise  indeed  was  not 
complete,  but  it  was  effective  enough.  On  the  eve  of  the 
battle  the  questioning  of  British  prisoners  led  the  enemy 
to  expect  an  attack  on  the  following  morning,  but  he  had 
little  idea  of  its  nature,  nor  was  there  time  to  do  more  than 
warn  the  troops  actually  in  position.  The  officer  com- 
manding the  only  German  fighter  Flight  on  this  front 
(Jagdstaffel  5  at  Estourmel)  tells  how  the  telephone  at  his 
bedside  rang  at  11  p.m.  on  the  19th  of  November.3  He 
was  told  that  the  British  were  expected  to  make  a  big  attack 
next  morning  west  of  Cambrai  and  he  was  ordered  to  be 

1  Occasional  distant  sweeps  were  also  made  by  large  formations  of  Bristol 
Fighters,  Sopwith  'Pups'  and  D.H.5's,  disposed  in  stepped  layers,  the 
'Pups'  about  15,000  feet,  the  Bristols  3,000  feet  lower,  and  the  D.H-5's 
3,000  feet  lower  again.  The  formations  were  planned  so  that  each  type  of 
aeroplane  was  used  at  the  altitude  to  which  it  was  best  suited  with  each  type 
complementary  to  the  other. 

2  'The  preparations  for  the  English  offensive  at  Cambrai  completely 
'escaped  the  notice  of  the  air  service.'  (Hoeppner,  Deutschlands  Krieg  in 
der  Luft,  p.  123.)  3  Neumann,  In  der  Luft  unbesiegt,  pp.  96-100. 


1917]        'CAMELS'  OF  NO.  3  SQUADRON  233 

ready  to  take  the  air  from  7  a.m.  onwards.  He  was  not 
unduly  disturbed.  He  had  often  been  similarly  warned 
before  and  nothing  had  happened,  nor,  if  the  attack  came, 
was  there  much  prospect  of  flying.  For  a  fortnight  his 
aeroplanes  had  not  left  their  sheds  and  the  weather 
promised  no  early  improvement.  So  with  quiet  mind  he 
went  to  sleep  again. 

He  was  awakened,  while  it  was  still  dark,  by  the  rattling  20  Nov. 
of  his  window  panes  and  by  the  crash  of  artillery.    His 
officers  and  men  assembled  in  excitement  on  the  landing- 
ground,  but  dawn  brought  a  grey  haze  and  a  drizzle  of 
rain.    To  fly,  he  decided,  would  be  madness.    The  tele- 
phone went  continuously  telling  him  of  British  tanks  and 
aeroplanes  swarming  over  the  front.    Soon  came  a  sum- 
mons to  the  telephone  from  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the 
Army  Corps,  who  demanded:  Why  are  you  not  flying?' 
I  endeavoured  to  explain',  records  the  flying  officer,  'that, 
at  the  moment,  it  was  impossible  to  reach  the  front ;  im- 
mediately after  the  start  we  would  get  into  dense  fog,  the 
pilots  would  get  lost,  and  the  aeroplanes  of  the  only  fighter 
Flight  of  the  Army  would  be  damaged  in  making  forced 
landings.   My  views  were  not  accepted.   English  aircraft 
were  over  the  front  and  I  was  to  start  at  once.  I  was  even 
threatened  with  Court  Martial.  But  what  cannot  be  done, 
cannot  be  done.  .  .  .' 

Half  an  hour  later  the  twelve  German  pilots  were  sitting 
in  their  aeroplanes  ready  to  take  the  air  when  anti-aircraft 
fire  warned  them  of  the  approach  of  British  aeroplanes. 
As  these  appeared  from  out  of  the  mist,  two  of  the 
German  fighters  left  the  ground.  The  Royal  Flying  Corps 
raiders  were  three  of  nine  'Camel'  pilots  of  No.  3  Squadron1 
who  had  set  out  to  attack  the  German  aerodromes.  They 
dropped  their  bombs  on  the  landing-ground  and  fired 
their  machine-guns,  but  without  apparent  material  effect : 
one  of  them  was  shot  down  by  one  of  the  two  German 
fighters  which  had  left  the  ground  on  the  approach  of  the 
'Camels';  the  other  two,  on  the  homeward  journey, 
collided  with  trees  in  the  mist  and  were  killed.    'Not 

1  No.  3  Squadron,  formerly  a  Corps  squadron,  had  been  re-equipped 
as  an  Army  squadron  on  the  6th  of  October  191 7. 


234  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

20  Nov.  'without  justice',  says  the  German  flying  officer,  'did  the 
'Chaplain  express  an  enemy's  admiration  for  the  dead 
'flyers.'  The  six  remaining  'Camels'  of  No.  3  Squadron 
attacked  their  allotted  objectives — the  aerodromes  at 
Carnieres  and  Caudry,  the  pilots  dropping  their  25 -lb. 
bombs  from  100  feet  or  under.  One  of  these  'Camels' 
failed  to  return  and  another  was  so  much  shot  about  that 
it  had  to  be  rebuilt.  Eleven  Sopwith  'Pups'  of  No.  46 
Squadron  set  out  for  the  aerodromes  at  Awoingt,  Proville, 
and  Avesnes-le-Sec,  but,  owing  to  the  mist,  only  the  first- 
named  objective  was  found  and  on  this  eleven  25-lb.  bombs 
were  dropped. 

The  mist,  which  made  difficult  the  way  of  the  aeroplane 
pilots,  helped  the  advancing  tanks  and  infantry.  At  ten 
minutes  past  six,  on  the  morning  of  November  the  20th, 
the  long  line  of  tanks,  with  the  infantry  close  at  hand,  had 
left  their  assembly  positions  and,  ten  minutes  later,  under 
cover  of  artillery,  smoke,  and  machine-gun  barrages,  and 
with  aeroplanes  overhead,  had  moved  forward  to  the  Hinde- 
burg  Line.  As  the  tanks  loomed  upon  them,  crushing  lanes 
through  the  wire — nowhere  less  than  fifty  yards  deep — the 
German  troops  were  seized  with  panic.  The  outer  de- 
fences and  the  Hindenburg  Line  were  rapidly  overrun  and 
the  tanks  and  infantry  moved  slowly  forward,  according  to 
programme,  to  the  next  line  of  defence.  By  10.30  a.m.  this 
line  had  fallen,  except  at  Flesquieres  and  Lateau  Wood, 
and  the  infantry,  with  cavalry  in  support,  were  advancing 
through  open  country  towards  their  final  objectives. 

Lateau  Wood,  which  offered  cover  to  many  German 
batteries,  was  taken  in  the  morning  after  bitter  fighting, 
but  Flesquieres  village,  although  the  British  troops  passed 
on  either  flank  far  to  rearward  of  the  position,  remained 
uncaptured  throughout  the  day.  The  tanks  at  Flesquieres 
came  under  fire,  at  short  range,  from  field  guns  beyond  the 
crest  of  the  hill  and  suffered  heavy  casualties.  These  guns 
had  been  pulled  out  of  their  pits  and  had  been  placed  in 
the  open.  With  the  tanks  out  of  action,  the  infantry,  who 
had  been  following  too  far  behind,  were  firmly  held  by 
uncut  wire  and  by  machine-guns.1   By  the  late  afternoon 

1  'As  the  tanks  topped  the  crest  they  came  under  direct  artillery  fire  at 


i9i7]        THE  CHECK  AT  FLESQUIERES  235 

the   final    German   line,    covering   Cambrai,    had    been  20  Nov. 
breached,  but  it  was  judged  too  dark  to  allow  the  cavalry 
to  pass  through,  nor  had  the  vital  Bourlon  ridge  been 
captured,  and  both  these  disappointments  were  chiefly  due 
to  the  check  at  Flesquieres. 

A  second  check,  which  also  had  wide  effects,  was  at 
Masnieres,  where  the  bridge  over  the  canal  de  l'Escaut, 
although  not  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  had  been  so 
weakened  that  it  collapsed  under  the  first  tank  that  tried  to 
cross,  with  the  result  that  tanks  could  not  go  forward  to 
help  in  the  attack  on  part  of  the  enemy's  third  and  final  line 
of  defence.  Nor  was  the  way  open  for  the  passage  of  the 
cavalry  who  might  otherwise  have  pushed  on  to  Cambrai, 
for  there  was  little  to  prevent  them  at  that  time.  A  tem- 
porary bridge  was,  after  vital  delay,  built  south  of  Mas- 
nieres and  a  squadron  of  Canadian  cavalry  crossed  and  did 
good  work  until  most  of  the  horses  were  killed  or  wounded, 
but  this  brief  action  was  no  more  than  a  brilliant  local 
skirmish. 

It  has  already  been  told  that  the  fighting  pilots  of  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  had  been  given,  among  other  objec- 
tives, three  separate  groups  of  German  batteries  which 
they  were  to  attack  with  bombs  and  machine-guns.  From 
these  groups  most  trouble  had  been  expected,  and  how 
well-founded  were  these  expectations  is  clear  from  the 
fact  that  one  group  set  down  for  Flying  Corps  attention 
was  at  Flesquieres  and  another  at  Lateau  Wood.  The 
third  group  was  at  Vaucelles  Wood.  Four  D.H.5's  of 
No.  64  Squadron1  arrived  over  Flesquieres  at  7  a.m.  and 
found  the  German  batteries  fully  active,  the  guns  being 
still  in  their  pits.   The  pilots  bombed  the  gun-pits,  with 

'short  range  and  suffered  heavy  casualties.  This  loss  would  have  mattered 
'little  had  the  infantry  been  close  up,  but,  being  some  distance  off,  directly 
'the  tanks  were  knocked  out,  the  German  machine-gunners,  ensconced 
'among  the  ruins  of  the  houses,  came  to  life  and  delayed  their  advance  until 
'nightfall.'  Tanks  in  the  Great  War,  by  Brevet-Colonel  J.  F.  C.  Fuller, 
p.  149. 

1  No.  64  (D.H.5)  Squadron  had  arrived  in  France  on  the  14th  of  October 
1917.  The  pilots  had  been  practised  in  England  in  low-flying  across 
country.  On  arrival  in  France  this  low-flying  practice  was  continued  in 
formation. 


236  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

20  Nov.  their  25-lb.  bombs,  scoring  at  least  one  direct  hit,  and 
expended  their  ammunition  against  the  gun-detachments. 
One  group  of  gunners,  who  ran  for  shelter  to  a  house,  got 
jammed  in  the  doorway  and,  immovable,  were  riddled  by 
the  bullets  of  the  leader  of  the  D.H.5's.  One  of  the  pilots 
had  a  stoppage  in  his  machine-gun  and  had  flown  some 
distance  eastwards  before  he  had  rectified  the  stoppage. 
He  turned  back  towards  Flesquieres,  but  when  he  came 
over  the  German  battery  positions  again  at  7.45  a.m. 
he  could  find  no  activity  of  guns  or  personnel.  Several 
corpses  of  men  were  lying  near  the  pits,  and  dead  horses 
and  a  limber  were  on  the  road.  It  is  possible  that  in  the 
interim  the  guns  had  been  pulled  out  and  that  the  earlier 
low-flying  attacks  had  caused  or  accelerated  this  pre- 
caution. The  guns  could  be  more  easily  dealt  with  in  their 
known  pits,  which  were  in  fact  marked  targets  for  the 
British  artillery,  than  in  unknown  open  positions,  mist 
obscured,  on  the  reverse  slope  of  the  crest.  While  these 
attacks  were  being  made  on  the  Flesquieres  batteries,  nine 
Sopwith  'Camel'  pilots  of  Nos.  3  and  46  Squadrons  were 
making  similar  attacks  on  the  batteries  in  Lateau  and 
Vaucelles  Woods. 

Writing  after  the  war,  Squadron  Leader  A.  S.  G.  Lee, 
who  was  one  of  the  'Camel'  pilots  of  No.  46  Squadron  in 
the  Cambrai  attack,  said :  'On  the  morning  of  the  20th  we 
'started,  on  the  first  faint  flush  of  light,  for  our  objectives, 
'which  ranged  from  selected  batteries  and  other  targets  in 
'the  forward  area  to  aerodromes  and  other  objectives 
'farther  behind.  Low  clouds  and  misty  weather  made 
'flying  difficult,  but  on  the  whole  were  not  unfavourable  to 
'the  work.  In  the  battle  area  the  smoke  rose  to  the  mist 
'and  formed  a  barrier  not  very  pleasant  to  penetrate  at  so 
'low  an  altitude.  A  few  casualties  occurred  through  pilots 
'flying  into  the  ground,  but  the  majority  were  from  ground 
'fire.  Those  of  us  who  survived  did  so,  I  consider,  because 
'we  flew  very  close  to  the  ground  until  our  objective  was 
'reached.  I  recollect,  on  our  first  "show"  on  the  morning 
'of  the  20th,  having  to  rise  to  pass  over  tanks  moving 
'through  the  thick  haze  of  smoke  towards  the  German 
'defences.    One  retains  vivid  pictures  of  little  groups  of 


i9i7]  PERSONAL  IMPRESSIONS  237 

'infantry  behind  each  tank,  trudging  forward  with  ciga-  20  Nov. 
'rettes  alight,  of  flames  leaping  from  disabled  tanks  with 
'small  helpless  groups  of  infantry  standing  around,  of  the 
'ludicrous  expressions  of  amazement  on  the  upturned  faces 
'of  German  troops  as  we  passed  a  few  feet  above  their 
'trenches.  ;We  reached  and  passed  them  before  they  had 
'time  to  locate  our  direction  of  approach.  As  soon  as  the 
'objective  was  reached  it  became  necessary  to  rise  in  order 
'to  attack,  and  then  of  course  one's  risks  from  ground  fire 
'became  normal.  [Owing  to  the  low  clouds  it  was  not  easy 
'to  retain  one's  bearings  especially  after  a  few  startled 
'turns  to  avoid  collision  with  one's  companions.  Actually, 
'on  this  first  task  we  became  separated  and  I  lost  my  way; 
'after  flying  by  compass  towards  what  I  thought  was  the 
'west,  and  passing  over  what  appeared  to  be  a  slice  of  the 
'battle,  I  landed  in  a  field  to  discover  my  bearings  and 
'found  I  was  some  miles  east  of  Cambrai.  The  road  nearby 
'was  full  of  German  troops  and  I  had  to  make  a  hurried 
'take-off  .  .  .' 

Throughout  the  remainder  of  the  day  no  further  special 
attention  seems  to  have  been  given  to  the  Flesquieres  area 
by  fighting  aircraft.  The  pilots  of  the  Nos.  3  and  46  Squad- 
rons, as  of  the  other  fighting  squadrons,  returned  time  and 
again  to  the  advanced  landing-ground,  reloaded  with 
bombs,  petrol,  and  ammunition,  and  disappeared  into  the 
mist  to  spread  their  attacks  over  German  troops,  transport, 
and  other  targets  of  a  general  nature.  This  was  in  accord- 
ance with  the  original  operation  orders  which  specified 
that  forty-five  minutes  after  the  infantry  assault,  the  low- 
flying  attacks  were  to  be  general.1  The  officer  command- 
ing No.  64  Squadron,  Major  B.  E.  Smythies,  has  recorded 
that  among  his  impressions,  noted  while  the  battle  was  in 
progress,  was  that  the  squadron  commander  in  an  Army 
Wing  had  very  little  idea  of  what  was  happening  on  the 
ground.  'He  can',  he  said,  'ascertain  roughly  where  the 
'line  is  and  what  attacks  are  in  progress  over  a  limited 
'front,  but  the  ground  tactics,  proposed  counter-attacks, 
'and  subsequent  objectives  are  almost  a  sealed  book.  He  is 
'in  any  case  very  fully  occupied  with  other  things.  The 
1  See  Para.  2c,  Appendix  XL 


238  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

20  Nov.  'flying  officer  neither  knows  nor  cares  more  than  is  of 
'interest  to  him  to  carry  out  his  specific  object.' 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  fighting  pilot  was  con- 
cerned chiefly  with  fighting  other  aircraft,  andhe  was  seldom 
qualified  to  appreciate  the  tactical  flow  of  a  battle.  It  is 
not  difficult  to  look  back  and  isolate  the  great  importance 
of  the  hold-up  at  Flesquieres,  but,  in  the  misty  and  smoke- 
obscured  confusion  of  the  battle,  the  significance  of  that 
check  might  easily  be  missed.  Even  had  the  fighting  pilots 
known  of  it  and  realized  its  importance,  it  would  be  idle 
to  claim  that  their  attacks  could  have  been  made  powerful 
enough  to  wipe  out  the  German  resistance.  All  they  could 
be  expected  to  do,  especially  in  the  circumstances  of  the 
weather,  was  to  harass  the  enemy  and  sap  his  morale. 
They  might  have  put  a  gun  here  and  there  out  of  action. 
All  this  would  have  made  easier  the  task  of  the  tanks  and 
infantry,  but  so  long  as  the  German  guns  remained  intact 
and  the  gun-detachments  determined,  the  power  for  resis- 
tance was  little  impaired.  The  truth  is,  and  the  reason  is 
not  far  to  seek,  that  low-flying  attacks  were  more  effective 
against  infantry  than  against  batteries.  Bullets,  and  even 
light-weight  bombs,  could  not,  except  by  chance,  do  much 
harm  to  a  gun.  Furthermore,  the  target  was  small  and  the 
detachment  usually  had  some  measure  of  shelter.  But  that 
infantry  feel  their  helplessness  in  face  of  attack  from  the  air 
there  is  ample  evidence.  Psychology  enters  into  it.  The 
gun-detachment  probably  feel  that  what  matters  is  the 
gun.  That  is  the  chief  target  for  attack,  while  they  them- 
selves are  subsidiary,  and  if  one  or  two  of  them  become 
casualties,  there  will  still  be  some  one  to  serve  the  guns. 
The  infantryman,  however,  cannot  shield  himself  behind 
any  such  reasoning.  If  an  aeroplane  dives  at  him  he  has  no 
doubt  that  he  is  the  target.  Any  one  who  has  suffered  such 
attacks  will  bear  witness  to  an  impression  of  magnified 
isolation.  The  man  attacked  has  the  feeling  that  he  stands 
out  clear  cut  and  as  obvious  to  the  pilot  in  the  aeroplane 
as  the  aeroplane  itself  is  to  him.  This  feeling  is  not  lessened 
if  he  is  one  of  a  group.  Rather  is  it  enhanced  because  it 
means  that  the  target,  of  which  he  is  the  centre,  is  more 
sharply  defined. 


1917]  LOW-FLYING  CASUALTIES  239 

Through  most  of  the  morning  the  D.H.5's  of  No.  64. 20  Nov. 
Squadron  and  of  No.  68  (Australian)  Squadron,1  and 
'Camels'  of  No.  46  Squadron  kept  diving  out  of  the  mist 
to  attack  troops  and  transport,  and  their  activities,  as  is 
clear  from  prisoners'  statements  and  other  evidence,  ex- 
tended the  panic  created  by  the  tanks.  The  casualties 
among  the  low-flying  aircraft  were  high:  nine  of  them 
failed  to  return,  four  were  wrecked,  and  thirteen  were  so 
badly  damaged  by  fire  from  the  ground  or  in  accidents  due 
to  the  mist  that  they  had  to  be  sent  to  the  depot  for  re- 
construction. These  casualties  represented  35  per  cent,  of 
the  aeroplanes  used  on  this  type  of  duty.2 

The  original  orders  given  to  the  low-flying  fighting 
pilots  had  directed  special  attention  to  the  enemy  batteries 
at  Flesquieres,  but  the  artillery  aircraft  observers  were 
not  told  to  keep  particular  watch  on  any  one  section 
of  their  Corps  fronts.  Their  general  orders  were  to  con- 
centrate their  attention  on  finding  and  reporting  active 
hostile  batteries  and  bodies  of  troops,  but  they  had  been 
instructed  also  to  keep  a  look-out  for  any  guns,  in  the  for- 
ward areas,  in  use  as  'anti-tank'  weapons.  It  is  a  fact  that 
the  air  observation  for  the  artillery  failed.  There  is  no 
record  of  a  single  active  German  gun  being  reported,  along 
the  actual  battle-front,  either  by  the  aeroplane  observers, 
or  by  any  other  source.  The  German  artillery  on  this  front 
was  admittedly  weak  and,  after  the  advance  began,  many 
guns  were  captured  or  hurriedly  withdrawn.  There  was 
not,  therefore,  much  firing.  Furthermore,  unless  an  aero- 
plane happened  to  be  immediately  over  or  near  a  gun  at 

1  Three  Australian  Squadrons  served  in  France.  Originally  numbered 
68,  69,  and  71  Squadrons  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  they  became,  in 
January  1918,  Nos.  2,  3,  and  4  Squadrons  of  the  Australian  Flying  Corps. 
They  will  find  frequent  mention  in  this  history,  but  their  story  is  told 
in  detail  in  The  Australian  Flying  Corps,  by  F.  M.  Cutlack,  which  is 
Volume  VIII  of  the  Official  History  of  Australia  in  the  War  of  1914-18. 

2  The  losses  in  low-flying  aircraft  averaged  30  per  cent,  on  the  days  when 
they  were  employed  for  organized  attacks  throughout  the  battle.  It  was 
difficult,  at  this  time,  to  replace  the  pilot  casualties  owing  to  the  special 
nature  of  the  work  which  called  for  considerable  skill  and  experience. 
There  had  not,  at  that  time,  been  much  opportunity  to  give  selected  pilots 
the  necessary  training  in  low-flying. 


240  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

jo  Nov.  the  exact  moment  when  it  fired,  the  air  observer  had  small 
chance  of  seeing  the  flash.  What  was  happening  a  few 
hundred  feet  away  from  the  aeroplane  was  completely 
obscured  by  the  mist.  The  contact-patrol  observers,  in 
various  parts  of  the  battle-field,  reported  the  progress  of 
the  infantry,  but  the  position  at  Flesquieres  was  never 
made  clear  to  the  various  staffs  behind  the  front.  Had  it 
been  properly  realized,  an  immediate  artillery  concentra- 
tion would  have  been  ordered.1  The  German  batteries 
could  have  been  overcome,  fresh  tanks  could  have  been 
sent  forward,  and  the  wire  could  have  been  cut,  but  the 
staff  for  a  long  time  acted  under  the  impression  that 
Flesquieres  had  fallen.  A  pilot  who  had  passed  low  over 
the  village  at  10.15  a.m.  had  seen  troops  marching  east 
and,  apparently  deceived  by  the  poor  visibility,  had 
thought  they  were  British.  His  report  led  the  staff  to 
believe  the  position  had  been  captured  and  this  informa- 
tion seemed  to  be  confirmed  by  subsequent  messages  from 
the  5 1st  Division  that  they  had  got  the  whole  of  Flesquieres 
and  that  the  way  was  open  for  the  cavalry.2  The  cavalry 
was  ordered  to  go  through,  but  reported  at  noon  that  the 
infantry  were  still  fighting  desperately  at  Flesquieres. 
When  the  51st  Divisional  staff  realized  what  the  position 
at  Flesquieres  was,  tanks  were  collected  and  sent  forward 
and  plans  were  hurriedly  made  for  a  comprehensive  attack 
to  outflank  the  village  and  ridge,  but  the  light  failed  before 
this  operation  could  be  begun.  Meanwhile,  a  further  series 
of  direct  attacks,  made  in  the  late  afternoon  with  the  help 
of  six  tanks,  proved  abortive.  About  3  p.m.  rain  had  set  in 
and  the  conditions  were  such  that  aircraft  co-operation 
was  impossible. 

Many  of  the  bombing  attacks,  as  ordered  for  the  head- 
quarters Ninth  Wing  squadrons  against  distant  enemy 
communications,  were  attempted,  but,  except  for  two 

1  Artillery  orders  allowed  for  'concentration  of  all  available  guns  and 
'howitzers,  field,  heavy  and  siege,  for  five  to  ten  minutes,  on  any  hostile 
'battery  reported  active.' 

2  The  G.O.C.  51st  Division  reported  by  telephone  about  11  a.m.  to 
IV  Corps  head-quarters  that  Flesquieres  was  in  our  possession  and  that  the 
road  from  Trescault  to  Flesquieres  was  fit  for  cavalry. 


i9i7]  BOURLON  WOOD  241 

bombs  on  Brebieres  station,  south-west  of  Douai,  were 
foiled  by  the  mist.  Nor  could  the  squadrons  of  the 
I  Brigade,  which  were  to  co-operate  north  of  the  Sensee 
river,  fulfil  their  duties.  There  was  no  flying  in  the 
morning,  but  at  1.30  p.m.,  when  the  visibility  improved 
temporarily,  single-seater  fighters  set  out  to  reconnoitre 
for  enemy  movements.  Twelve  pilots  flew  over  the 
allotted  areas,  but  saw  little  or  no  movement  in  progress. 
Other  long-distant  reconnaissances  and  bombing  raids  by 
D.H.4's  were  attempted,  but  all  pilots  were  forced  to 
return  on  account  of  the  weather.  The  bombing  ordered 
for  the  night  of  the  20th/2ist  had  also  to  be  abandoned. 
Despite  the  checks  already  referred  to,  the  first  day  had 
brought  a  remarkable  success,  and  Sir  Douglas  Haig  still 
had  twenty-four  hours  before,  according  to  his  calcula- 
tions, important  reinforcements  could  arrive  to  stiffen  the 
enemy  defence.  He  was  helped  by  the  evacuation  of 
Flesquieres  which  took  place  during  the  night  of  the 
20th/2ist.  At  daybreak  on  the  21st  a  British  patrol  found 
the  place  empty  and  at  once  the  advance  became  general. 
The  vital  point  now  was  the  lofty  Bourlon  Wood.  Pro- 
gress was  steady  although  the  enemy  was  showing  more 
resistance,  especially  at  Cantaing.  This  position,  however, 
fell  in  the  early  afternoon,  and  later  in  the  afternoon  the 
important  village  of  Fontaine-Notre  Dame,  astride 
the  Bapaume  road  between  Bourlon  and  Cambrai,  was 
captured.  But  Bourlon  Wood  itself,  a  nest  of  machine- 
guns,  held  out  despite  the  fact  that  a  few  tanks  crashed 
their  way  some  distance  inside.  Rain  and  low  clouds  again 
hampered  the  co-operating  air  observers,  but  the  mist  was 
less  pronounced,  and  they  were  able,  by  persistent  low- 
flying,  to  follow  and  report  in  some  detail  the  movements 
of  the  infantry,  tanks,  and  cavalry.  German  aircraft  also 
made  many  swift  low-flying  attacks  which  greatly  harassed 
the  troops  as  they  advanced  towards  Bourlon  Wood.1  The 

1  The  62nd  Division  reported  that  German  low-flying  aeroplanes  had 
given  'considerable  trouble'  at  Bourlon  in  the  morning,  and  the  III 
Brigade  was  asked  to  take  action  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  these  attacks  next 
day.  On  the  22nd,  therefore,  four  S.E.5a's  were  specially  allotted  to  attack 
low-flying  German  aircraft  at  Bourlon. 

2504.4  n 


242  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

low  clouds  prevented  any  of  the  bombing  on  the  German 
railway  junctions  from  being  made.1 

By  the  evening  of  the  2 1st  the  forty-eight  hours  which 
must  elapse  before  the  enemy  could  appreciably  strengthen 
his  defences  had  expired,  and  the  situation  had  many  ele- 
ments making  for  disquiet.  It  was  impossible  to  stand  still. 
The  Bourlon  ridge  commanded  all  the  newly  won  positions 
north  of  Flesquieres,  and  it  was  imperative  either  to  go  on 
and  capture  Bourlon  or  else  to  retire,  at  once,  and  con- 
solidate the  Flesquieres  line.  The  arguments  for  a  limited 
withdrawal  were  ponderable.  A  substantial  tactical  success 
had  been  gained  and  considerable  numbers  of  prisoners  and 
guns  captured.  The  days  of  continuous  marching  and 
lighting  had  put  a  severe  strain  on  the  endurance  of  the 
troops,  and  they  would  require  rest  before  they  could  be 
expected  to  make  the  attack  on  the  formidable  Bourlon 
ridge.  Furthermore,  the  British  onslaught  had  been  so 
overwhelming  that  German  counter-measures  of  unusual 
energy  and  decision  must  be  anticipated.  It  was  a  matter 
of  common  sense  that  the  alarm  created  by  the  first  day's 
advance  would  induce  the  German  High  Command  to  rush 
adequate  forces  of  first-class  fighting  capacity  to  the  danger 
area.  A  withdrawal  to  the  Flesquieres  line  would  have  put 
the  British  troops  in  a  good  position  to  meet  whatever 
enemy  counter-measures  were  taken.  Nor  would  such  a 
withdrawal  have  detracted  anything  from  the  success  of 
the  battle  because  the  main  objects  for  which  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  fought  the  action  would  still  have  been  achieved. 
The  enemy  would  have  realized  the  danger  of  weakening 
any  part  of  his  front,  he  would  have  cause  for  uneasiness 
throughout  the  winter,  and,  as  a  diversion  to  ease  the 
tension  on  the  Italian  front,  as  much  had  been  done  as  it 
was  possible  to  do.  On  the  other  hand,  the  temptation  to 
go  on  was  great.  Possession  of  the  Bourlon  ridge  would 
give  observation  over  the  lines  of  communication  of  the 
German  defences  south  of  the  Scarpe  and  Sensee  rivers  and 
might  lead  the  enemy  to  abandon  these  positions.  Further- 
more, General  Head-quarters  judged  that  the  German 

1  The  objectives  which  had  been  allotted  for  day  bombing  were  the 
stations  at  Somain,  Dechy,  Douai,  Denain,  Busigny,  and  Le  Cateau. 


i9i7]  GERMAN  REINFORCEMENTS  243 

reinforcements  which  could  arrive  within  a  few  days  would 
do  little  more  than  suffice  to  replace  losses.  In  the  result, 
Sir  Douglas  Haig  decided  to  go  on. 

There  was  quiet  on  the  22nd  of  November  to  rest  the 
tired  troops  and  to  allow  of  reliefs  being  made.  In  the 
Bourlon  sector,  however,  this  quiet  was  interrupted  by 
enemy  counter-attacks  which  led-  to  the  recapture  of 
Fontaine-Notre  Dame.  The  weather  conditions  were 
difficult  for  air  work,  but  there  were  reconnaissances  to 
report  the  movements  of  German  reinforcements,  and  to 
assess  the  probable  strength  of  the  enemy  resistance  on  the 
Bourlon  ridge.  The  air  reports  left  no  doubt  that  Bourlon 
was  strongly  held.  Machine-gun  posts,  it  was  stated,  lined 
the  western  and  south-western  edges  of  the  wood,  and 
German  infantry  activity  in  the  whole  area  was  consider- 
able. Farther  afield  there  was  ample  evidence  of  impor- 
tant movements  towards  Cambrai.  A  congestion  of  trains 
in  Douai  station  and  much  southward  movement  from 
that  rail-head  told  of  reinforcements  coming  from  the 
north.  Columns  of  troops  and  transport  were  reported 
marching  towards  Cambrai  along  the  Douai-Cambrai 
road,  and  other  columns  were  moving  south  of  the 
Lens-Douai  road. 

The  Flying  Corps  pilots  did  not  content  themselves  with 
reporting  these  activities.  From  7  a.m.  onwards  relays  of 
pilots  from  Nos.  3,  46,  and  64  Squadrons,  and  from  No.  68 
(Australian)  Squadron  attacked,  with  light-weight  bombs 
and  machine-gun  fire,  the  troops  and  gun  emplacements  in 
the  area  of  Bourlon  Wood,  while  the  fighting  pilots  who  re- 
ported the  movements  in  the  Douai  area  exhausted  their 
ammunition  against  the  German  columns.  Nineteen  pilots 
were  involved  in  these  various  low-flying  attacks,  and  the 
casualties  were  high:  at  the  end  of  the  day  three  of  the  aero- 
planes were  missing,  three  others  had  been  wrecked  on  the 
British  side  of  the  lines,  and  two  had  been  so  damaged  that 
they  had  to  be  sent  away  to  be  rebuilt.  These  casualties 
were  due,  in  part,  to  enemy  action,  but  chiefly  to  the 
difficulties  associated  with  low-flying  in  the  mist.  The 
presence  of  several  German  aeroplanes  over  the  battle-field 
indicated  that  the  enemy  air  service  had  been  reinforced, 


244  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

and  low-flying  attacks  were  made  from  time  to  time 
against  parties  of  British  infantry  on  their  way  to  the  for- 
ward area.  To  counter  the  German  air  activity  offensive 
patrols  were  attempted  by  pilots  of  Nos.  41  (S.E.5a)  and 
84  (S.E.5a)  Squadrons,  and  there  were  many  fleeting  com- 
bats, in  which  two  enemy  fighters  were  destroyed,  and 
one  was  shot  down  intact  within  the  British  lines.  The 
only  S.E«5a  casualty  due  to  enemy  action  was  one  pilot 
wounded,  but  fog  overtook  some  of  the  pilots,  and  three 
were  killed  in  accidents  (two  by  collision  and  the  third 
through  hitting  a  tree),  and  two  were  injured.  The  same 
railway  objectives  as  for  the  previous  day  had  been  allotted 
to  the  day-bombing  squadrons  for  the  22nd,  but  although 
individual  pilots  made  many  attempts,  little  could  be  done 
because  of  the  low  clouds.  Two  112-lb.  bombs  were 
dropped  on  Douai  station  and  four  of  the  same  weight  on 
Dechy. 
23  Nov.  On  the  morning  of  the  23rd  of  November  the  attack  on 
Bourlon  Wood  and  on  the  village  of  Fontaine-Notre  Dame 
was  made.  On  the  right,  the  51st  Division,  with  tanks  in 
support,  advanced  on  Fontaine,  but  was  unable  to  force 
an  entrance.  In  the  afternoon  a  second  attack  on  the 
village  was  launched,  but  although  a  number  of  tanks  pene- 
trated well  inside  and  inflicted  heavy  casualties,  the  infantry 
were  unable  to  clear  the  place,  and,  by  nightfall,  there  had 
been  no  progress  on  this  part  of  the  front.  A  feature  of  the 
German  defence  at  Fontaine  was  the  effective  use  of  anti- 
aircraft guns,  mounted  on  lorries,  as  anti-tank  weapons.  A 
German  authority  has  claimed  that  these  guns  were 
mainly  responsible  for  the  British  failure  to  break  through 
at  Cambrai.1  This  is  claiming  too  much,  but  that  the  anti- 
aircraft guns  played  an  important,  even  vital,  part  in  hold- 
ing the  British  attacks  at  critical  times,  is  clear.  On  the 
opening  day — the  20th — a  battery  of  light  anti-aircraft 
lorry  guns  had  raced  out  of  Cambrai,  when  the  British 
were  reported  to  be  approaching  the  town,  and,  it  is  said, 
put  three  tanks  out  of  action.  The  battery  had  later  fired, 
at  almost  point-blank  range,  at  a  squadron  of  cavalry  which 

1  Major  Grosskreutz,  in  an  article  entitled  'The  Battle  of  the  Tanks  at 
'Cambrai',  in  Die  Luftwacht,  July  1928. 


BATTLE   of  CAMBRAI. 

SCHEME  OF  EMPLOYMENT OFTHE  ROYAL  FLYING  CORPS. 

20th.  NOVEMBER,   1917. 


REFERENCE 
approximate  british  front  line, 7s6s.  november,  1917.    _____ 
royal  flying  corps :- 

aerodr0mes(corps  squadrons).    #     9li(h-q)rying  squadrons.     % 
advanced  lauding  ground.  ©    m  brigade  army  squadrons.  # 

message  dropping  stations.         ©  -      corps         '•        • 

anti-aircraft  look-out  post.  __     i  brigade  squadrons.  • 

german  aerodromes  to  se attacked.   $     bombing  targets  q 

note:  'zero'(z)  denotes  hour  of  infantry  assault. 
scale:  of  miles. 


Lambri 


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1917]      RICHTHOFEN'S  JAGDSTAFFELN  245 

attempted  to  occupy  Cantaing.  These  successes  led  the  23  Nov. 
German  High  Command  to  bring  up  large  numbers  of 
mobile  anti-aircraft  guns,  and  some  of  these  were  in  action 
on  the  23rd.  At  Fontaine  they  succeeded  in  putting  five 
tanks  out  of  action  and  thereby  contributed  greatly  to  the 
effectiveness  of  the  German  resistance  to  the  attack  on  the 
village.1  While  the  51st  Divibion  was  fighting  at  Fontaine, 
the  40th  Division,  newly  arrived  in  the  IV  Corps  area, 
attacked  and  captured,  after  four  and  a  half  hours  of  hard 
fighting,  the  whole  of  Bourlon  Wood,  and  gained  an 
entry  into  Bourlon  village. 

Although  the  visibility  was  only  fair,  the  weather  during 
the  day  was  otherwise  favourable  for  flying  and  there  was 
great  activity.  The  German  aircraft  reinforcements  now 
included  the  Richthofen  'Circus'  (Jagdstaffeln,  4,  6,  jo, 
and  jj),  hurriedly  brought  down  from  Flanders.  The 
German  leader  took  general  command  of  all  the  air 
fighting  units  which,  in  addition  to  his  own,  included 
No.  5  Jagdstaffel,  the  original  fighting  Flight  in  the  area, 
and  No.  15  Jagdstaffel,  which  had  arrived  on  the  22nd 
from  the  German  Seventh  Army  front  in  the  south. 

The  British  infantry  began  their  attacks  on  the  23rd  at 
10.30  a.m.  and,  from  10  a.m.  to  dusk,  relays  of  fighting 
aircraft  from  Nos.  3,  46,  and  64  Squadrons,  and  from 
No.  68  (Australian)  Squadron  operated,  in  close  touch  with 
the  infantry,  against  the  German  troops  in  Bourlon 
and  Fontaine-Notre  Dame.  A  total  of  fifty  aeroplanes 
of  these  squadrons  were  so  employed  in  formations 
varying  from  four  to  fifteen;  to  make  repeated  attacks 
possible,  the  advanced  landing-ground  was  used  for  re- 
loading and  refuelling.  The  low-flying  pilots  were 
plentifully  supplied  with  targets,  and  they  had  the  satis- 
faction, on  occasion,  of  watching  the  tanks  and  infantry 
profit  from  the  air  attacks.  In  the  morning,  for  example, 
D.H.5's  of  No.  68  (Australian)  Squadron  found  the  attack 
held  up  in  one  corner  of  Bourlon  Wood  by  a  German 

1  After  the  battle  of  Cambrai  many  anti-aircraft  guns  were  detailed, 
by  various  minor  commands,  to  deal  solely  with  tanks.  This  meant  that 
their  proper  duty  was  neglected,  and  the  German  High  Command  had  to 
issue  orders  to  limit  the  use  of  anti-aircraft  guns  as  anti-tank  weapons. 


246  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

23  Nov.  two-gun  battery  which  had  brought  three  tanks  to  a  stand- 
still. Lieutenant  F.  G.  Huxley,  one  of  the  D.H.5  pilots, 
from  a  height  of  100  feet,  dropped  four  25 -lb.  bombs  and 
temporarily  silenced  the  guns,  so  that  the  three  tanks,  with 
three  others  which  came  up  behind  them,  were  able  to 
go  forward  again.  The  same  officer,  by  repeated  diving 
attacks  on  a  nearby  strong-point  that  was  holding  up  the 
infantry,  helped  the  British  troops  to  advance  and  capture 
the  position.  On  the  left  of  Bourlon  Wood  an  enemy 
strong-point  held  up  part  of  the  advance,  particularly  of 
the  10th  Royal  Irish  Rifles,  for  most  of  the  day.  In  the 
afternoon  Lieutenant  A.  Griggs,  a  pilot  of  American  birth 
in  No.  68  (Australian)  Squadron,  was  over  the  Royal  Irish 
Rifles,  and  after  he  had  reconnoitred  the  position,  he  made 
repeated  diving  attacks  and,  from  fifty  feet,  fired  at  the 
German  troops  with  his  machine-guns.  He  was  met  with 
heavy  fire  and  was  ultimately  shot  down  and  killed,  but 
the  gratitude  which  his  action  evoked  endured  long  after 
the  battle  had  ended.1 

The  British  low-flying  attacks  on  the  23rd  had  reached  a 
peak  of  intensity  about  1  p.m.  when  fifteen  aeroplanes  were 
over  the  Bourlon  and  Fontaine  positions.  It  so  happened 
that  Richthofen,  at  the  same  time,  was  making  his  first 
patrol  of  the  area  with  a  formation  of  his  fighters,  and  he 
quickly  added  to  his  list  of  successes.  After  forcing  one  pilot 
to  land  west  of  Bourlon  Wood,  he  attacked  another  who 
was  flying  low  over  Fontaine.  His  first  shots  wounded  the 
pilot,  Lieutenant  J.  A.  V.  Boddy  in  a  D.H.5  °f  No.  64 
Squadron,  in  the  head,  and  the  aeroplane  fell  in  a  corner  of 
the  wood.  Another  D.H.5  pilot,  meanwhile,  while  firing 
on  German  troops  in  retreat  from  the  wood,  was  brought 
down,  ahead  of  the  British  infantry,  by  a  direct  hit  on  his 
aeroplane  from  a  shell.  When  he  had  extricated  himself 
from  the  wreckage  he  saw  Lieutenant  Boddy's  aeroplane 
crashing  into  the  trees;  he  went  across  and  rescued  the 

1  The  following  tribute  appeared  in  the  'In  Memoriam'  column  of  The 
Times  in  1918.  'To  an  UNKNOWN  AIRMAN,  shot  down  23rd 
November  1 91 7,  'whilst  attacking  a  German  strong-point  south-west  of 
'Bourlon  Wood,  in  the  effort  to  help  out  a  Company  of  the  Royal  Irish 
'Rifles,  when  other  help  had  failed.' 


1917]  BOURLON  VILLAGE  247 

pilot  and  the  two  made  their  way  safely  to  a  British  dress-  23  Nov. 
ing  station. 

The  low-flying  attacks  were  maintained  until  dark.  By 
the  end  of  the  day  30  per  cent,  of  the  aeroplanes  engaged 
on  this  work  had  been  wrecked,  but  the  verbal  testimony 
of  the  tank  personnel  and  of  the  infantry  was  that  the 
aeroplane  pilots  often  made  advance  possible  when  the 
attacking  troops  would  otherwise  have  been  pinned  to 
their  ground.  The  visibility,  as  has  been  stated,  was  not 
good  and,  to  minimize  the  danger  of  collisions  between 
the  low-flying  aeroplanes,  some  squadron  commanders 
adopted  the  procedure  of  sending  the  individual  pilots 
out  by  one  route  and  home  by  another.  The  routes 
chosen  made  it  impossible,  or  at  least  extremely  unlikely, 
that  outgoing  and  incoming  pilots  from  the  same  aero- 
drome could  meet. 

The  bombing  of  distant  objectives  was  made  during  the 
day  by  various  Corps  squadrons,  by  No.  18  (D.H.4)  Squad- 
ron of  the  I  Brigade,  and  by  Nos.  25  (D.H.4)  an(^  27 
(Martinsyde)  Squadrons  of  the  Ninth  Wing.  Thirty-six 
112-lb.  bombs  were  dropped  on  Dechy  station  by  No.  18 
Squadron,  and  twenty-four  bombs  of  the  same  weight 
were  distributed  on  Douai,  Somain,  Denain,  and  Dechy, 
by  No.  25  Squadron.  One  pilot  of  No.  27  Squadron 
also  dropped  two  112-lb.  bombs  on  Douai  station. 
Once  again  air  reconnaissances  told  of  southward  move- 
ments of  troops  and  trains  to  and  from  Douai,  and 
left  no  doubt  that  the  flow  of  German  reinforcements  to 
the  Cambrai  front  was  in  full  tide.  During  the  night  of 
the  23rd/24th  ten  pilots  of  No.  102  Squadron  were  sent 
out  to  attack  the  stations  at  Douai  and  Dechy.  The 
weather  again  proved  unfavourable  and  only  five  pilots 
succeeded  in  finding  their  objectives  on  which  they 
dropped  eight  112-lb.  bombs. 

For  the  next  few  days  the  struggle  at  Bourlon  con- 
tinued. In  the  afternoon  of  the  24th  of  November  the 
whole  of  Bourlon  village  was  captured,  but  was  lost  again 
next  evening  as  a  result  of  strong  German  counter-attacks. 
On  the  27th  a  further  attempt  was  made  to  secure  Fontaine- 
Notre  Dame  and  what  still  remained  to  the  enemy  of  the 


248  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

Bourlon  ridge.  The  village  was  taken,  but  in  face  of  heavy 
counter-attacks  the  ground  won  could  not  be  held. 

The  weather  during  these  days  of  local  fighting  at 
Bourlon  was  unfavourable  for  flying,  but  there  was  some 
spasmodic  bombing,  and  there  were  occasional  clashes  with 
German  fighting  formations.  The  main  bombing  objec- 
tives were  the  German  railway  centres,  but  they  could 
seldom  be  reached  owing  to  the  clouds.  On  the  26th  there 
was  a  specific  attempt  to  bomb  the  crossings  and  traffic 
over  the  Sensee  river.  No.  25  Squadron  bombed  Aubigny- 
au-Bac  and  Neuville,  and  No.  27  Squadron  attacked  Pont 
Rade  and  the  bridges  between  Tortequenne  and  Lecluse. 
The  influence  of  the  presence  of  the  Richthofen  'Circus' 
is  to  be  noted  in  the  provision  of  strong  fighter  escorts 
for  some  of  the  bombing  formations.  On  the  26th 
of  November,  for  example,  twelve  D.H.4's  of  No.  49 
Squadron,  on  their  first  attempted  bombing  raid  on  the 
Western  front,  were  given  an  escort  of  fourteen  S.E^a's.1 
Another  example  is  an  increase  in  the  strength  of  the  re- 
connaissance formations.  Up  to  the  time  of  the  arrival  of 
the  reinforcing  Jagdstaffeln  the  orders  for  No.  1 1  Squad- 
ron allowed  for  a  maximum  of  four  Bristol  Fighters  for  one 
reconnaissance,  but,  on  the  23rd,  the  reconnaissance  forma- 
tion was  increased  to  eight,  and,  on  the  28th,  to  twelve. 

The  general  situation  on  the  evening  of  the  27th  had 
many  elements  making  for  uneasiness.  We  held  strong 
positions  on  the  Bourlon  ridge,  but  had  not  yet  gained 
what  was  necessary  to  make  the  position  in  this  important 
sector  secure.  Air  reconnaissances  during  the  day  told, 
once  again,  of  formidable  train  movements  radiating 
southwards  towards  Cambrai  from  Lille,  Douai,  and 
Denain.  For  two  days,  while  the  troops  were  being  rested 
and  relieved,  preparations  were  made  for  a  final  attack  to 
capture  what  was  still  needed  to  make  the  Bourlon  position 
secure. 

During  these  days  of  quiet,  however,  there  were  many 

1  The  raid  was  directed  against  trie  rail-head  at  Rieux,  east  of  Cambrai. 
It  was  only  partly  successful.  Eight  112-lb.  bombs  were  dropped  on  Rieux 
and  six  on  Sailly.  The  S.E.5's  did  not  establish  touch  with  the  bombers. 
The  raid  was  attempted  again  later  in  the  day,  but  was  foiled  by  clouds. 


i9i7]  WARNINGS  OF  A  GERMAN  ATTACK     249 

indications  that  the  enemy  was  preparing  a  counter-attack. 
His  artillery  became  more  active,  not  only  along  the  front 
on  which  the  recent  advance  had  been  made,  but  farther 
south  also  towards  and  beyond  Vendhuille.  There  were 
many  registrations  of  the  British  positions  under  the  direc- 
tion of  German  wireless  fitted  aircraft,  which,  on  the  29th 
particularly,  were  more  active  than  at  any  time  since  the 
battle  began.  The  troop  and  transport  movements  from 
the  north  towards  Cambrai  were  now,  it  appeared  from 
air  reconnaissance  and  other  reports,  spreading  out,  and 
the  indications  were  that  the  enemy  troops  were  moving 
to  their  positions  immediately  behind  the  front.  In  the 
southern  area,  towards  Vendhuille,  some  anxiety  was 
caused  by  the  appearance  of  many  low-flying  German  air- 
craft, among  which  the  coloured  aeroplanes  of  the 
Richthofen  'Circus'  were  said  to  be  conspicuous. 

In  other  words,  it  was  clear  by  the  evening  of  the  29th 
that  there  might  be  an  extensive  enemy  attack  which 
would  be  likely  to  involve  the  front  as  far  south  as  Vend- 
huille. While,  however,  the  British  troops  in  the  south — 
weak  divisions  holding  extended  fronts — were  warned 
to  expect  an  attack,  divisional  reserves  in  the  area  were 
closed  up,  and  additional  machine-gun  posts  placed,  Sir 
Douglas  Haig's  appreciation  of  the  situation  was  that  the 
principal  attack  would  be  made  in  the  Bourlon  sector.1  In 
that  area  he  was  confident  his  dispositions  would  suffice  to 
hold  the  enemy.  A  study  of  the  reports  of  the  German 
preparations  gives  the  impression  that  the  enemy  was  not 
too  particular  about  shielding  his  movements  at  Bourlon 
from  observation,  but  that  his  movements  elsewhere  were 
made  as  secretly  as  possible.  He  could  not,  as  has  been  in- 
dicated, conceal  his  interest  in  the  whole  line  as  far  south 
as  Vendhuille,  but  he  did  succeed,  intentionally  or  other- 
wise, in  attracting  undue  attention  to  the  Bourlon  area. 

The  confidence  of  General  Head-quarters,  that  any 
attempted  local  German  counter-attacks  could  be  defeated, 

1  Reports  of  the  front-line  troops,  of  the  imminence  of  an  attack  on  the 
Third  Army  front,  received  no  special  attention  at  Third  Army  head- 
quarters and  appear  not  to  have  been  communicated  to  General  Head- 
quarters. 


250  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

is  reflected  in  the  orders  given  for  the  cessation  of  special 
bombing  operations.  On  the  26th  of  November  the  squad- 
rons of  the  I  Brigade  had  ceased  to  be  under  the  orders  of 
Royal  Flying  Corps  head-quarters  for  bombing  and  fighting 
operations  in  connexion  with  the  battle,  and  had  reverted 
to  their  routine  work  for  the  First  Army.  On  the  28th  the 
Ninth  Wing  also  was  ordered  to  resume  operations  in 
accordance  with  the  general  programme  laid  down  before 
the  Cambrai  battle  began.  This  programme  gave  a  series 
of  bombing  objectives  and  general  reconnaissance  areas. 
The  bombing  targets  covered  a  wide  front  and  included 
aerodromes,  railway  junctions,  and  ammunition  dumps. 
They  were,  in  effect,  general  strategic  targets  for  a  period 
when  no  special  ground  operations  were  in  progress.  On 
the  28th  and  29th  of  November,  therefore,  Nos.  25  and 
27  Squadrons  were  in  the  north  bombing  the  stations  at 
Courtrai  and  Roulers. 
30  Nov.  The  German  attack  at  Cambrai  opened  between  7  and 
8  a.m.  on  the  30th  of  November.  After  an  intense  but 
brief  preliminary  bombardment,  one  effect  of  which  was 
to  cut  the  communications  between  the  various  head- 
quarters and  the  battalions  of  the  line,  German  infantry, 
closely  supported  by  low-flying  aircraft,  assaulted  from 
Masnieres  to  Vendhuille.  The  weakest  link  in  this  part  of 
the  British  front  was  the  Banteux  ravine  which  was  not 
only  the  junction  between  two  divisions,  but  also  marked 
the  boundary  between  the  VII  and  III  Corps,  and  in  this 
ravine  important  German  forces  assembled  for  attack  un- 
seen. The  German  infantry  began  their  assault  at  7.30  a.m. 
and,  within  half  an  hour,  had  overrun  the  Banteux  ravine, 
taking  the  reserve  battalions  by  surprise,  and  had  captured 
the  villages  of  Gonnelieu  and  Villers-Guislain.  By  9  a.m. 
Gouzeaucourt  had  fallen  and  a  position  of  considerable 
gravity  had  arisen.  Metz-en-Couture,  through  which  ran 
the  only  good  road  to  the  Bourlon  salient,  was  threatened, 
and  the  Third  Army  was  faced  with  possible  disaster.  The 
enemy,  however,  was  robbed  of  the  full  fruits  of  his  initial 
surprise  by  the  stand  made  by  the  29th  Division  at  Mas- 
nieres, and  by  the  desperate  resistance  offered  by  local  re- 
serves outside  Gouzeaucourt.  The  resistance  gave  time  for 


1917]  SURPRISE  251 

a  counter-attack  to  be  organized,  and  this,  made  by  the  30  Nov 
Guards  at  noon,  led  to  the  recapture  of  Gouzeaucourt  and 
to  some  progress  being  made  along  the  Quentin  ridge.  In 
the  afternoon,  tanks,  which  had  been  preparing  to  move 
away  from  the  battle  area  for  refit,  turned  back  to 
Gouzeaucourt  and  helped  to  hold  the  captured  ground. 
The  counter-attacks  were  assisted  by  ten  D.H.5's  of  No.  68 
(Australian)  Squadron  which  attacked,  with  bomb  and 
machine-gun,  German  troops  in  the  open.  By  the  evening, 
the  troops  at  Gouzeaucourt  were  linked  up  with  the 
British  garrison  at  la  Vacquerie,  who  were,  in  turn,  in 
touch  with  the  troops  in  Masnieres,  so  that  the  British  line 
along  this  section  of  the  front  had  been  reconstituted. 

This  southern  attack  of  the  enemy  had  achieved  a 
tactical  surprise.  Although  it  had  been  expected,  it  de- 
veloped so  swiftly  and  with  such  force  that  the  British 
troops  were  overwhelmed  before  they  realized  what  was 
happening.  The  reasons  for  the  surprise  were  three.  The 
assembling  of  the  German  troops  was  covered  from  air 
observation  by  an  early  morning  mist,  the  infantry  assault 
was  preceded  by  intensive  and  widespread  attacks  by  low- 
flying  German  aircraft  which  not  only  bewildered  the  de- 
fending troops,  but  also  forced  them  to  keep  their  heads 
down  so  that  many  of  them  did  not  see  the  approach  of  the 
German  infantry,  and,  finally,  the  German  tactics  were  of 
a  kind  novel  to  the  Western  front.  There  was  no  long  pre- 
liminary bombardment,  followed  by  steadily  advancing 
barrage-fire,  the  usual  forerunners  of  an  infantry  attack. 
Instead,  the  attack  began  at  the  Banteux  ravine  after  only 
a  short  bombardment,  and,  through  the  breach  in  the  line 
that  was  made,  German  troops  were  pushed.  It  was  only 
after  this  spearhead  had  made  its  thrust  that  the  attack 
spread  along  the  rest  of  the  southern  portion  of  the  front. 

Two  British  Corps  aeroplanes  were,  in  fact,  circling  over 
this  front  both  before  and  during  the  initial  German 
advance.  The  observers  found  the  hollows  of  ground  in 
the  German  area  obscured  by  mist  and  the  enemy  con- 
centrations passed  entirely  unnoticed.  When  the  bom- 
bardment began,  the  air  observers  reported  the  positions 
of  some  of  the  active  batteries,  and  they  were  engaged  in 


252  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

30  Nov.  this  work  when  groups  of  enemy  aeroplanes  appeared  be- 
low them  and  began  to  attack  the  British  infantry.  One 
observer  counted  thirty  of  these  low-flying  aircraft  in  his 
immediate  neighbourhood,  and  there  were,  in  addition, 
two-seater  aeroplanes  directly  co-operating  with  the 
German  infantry.  The  two  British  Corps  aeroplanes  were 
soon  involved  in  the  fighting.  About  8  a.m.  two  patrols  of 
'Camels'  of  No.  3  Squadron  appeared  and  a  series  of  sharp, 
but  indecisive,  engagements  took  place.  By  this  time, 
however,  the  main  German  air  activity  in  this  area  was 
over.  The  low-flying  aircraft  had  contributed  their  allotted 
share  towards  the  rupture  of  the  line,  and  most  of  them, 
having  finished  their  ammunition,  had  withdrawn. 

Exactly  what  effect  on  the  battle  their  intervention  had 
had  it  is  impossible  to  say,  but  there  is  some  evidence  that 
it  was  important.  The  general  officer  commanding  one  of 
the  British  infantry  brigades  that  suffered  in  the  attack 
stated:  'the  massing  of  low-flying  aeroplanes  going  im- 
'mediately  in  front  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  caused  many 
'casualties  and  proved  very  demoralizing.'  A  Court  of 
Inquiry  which  assembled  in  January  191 8  to  examine  the 
causes  of  the  success  of  the  German  counter-offensive  on 
the  30th  of  November,  recorded  among  its  findings: 
'These  aeroplanes  came  over  in  considerable  numbers  at 
'the  time  of  the  assault  and  flew  at  altitudes  which  have 
'been  described  by  witnesses  as  being  lower  than  1 00  feet, 
'firing  their  machine-guns  into  our  infantry  both  in  the 
'front-line  trenches  and  in  rearward  positions.  The  moral 
'effect  of  this  was  very  great  and  no  doubt  tended  to 
'facilitate  the  enemy's  success.  Our  men  did  not  seem  to 
'know  what  to  do  to  minimize  the  moral  effect  of  these 
'low-flying  machines.  Witnesses  stated  that  fire  on  them 
'produced  no  result.'1 

1  The  German  low-flying  attacks  were  made,  chiefly,  by  two-seater  aero- 
planes of  the  so-called  'Protection  Flights'  (Scbutzstaffeln).  Their  original 
duty  was  to  protect  artillery  aeroplanes  working  on  the  front,  but  they  had 
been  given  the  additional  duty,  during  the  battle  of  Arras,  of  attacking 
troops  in  trenches  when  they  were  not  required  for  their  protection  duties. 
The  Scbutzstaffeln,  as  a  result  of  experience  gained  in  191 7,  ceased  to  have 
protective  duties,  and  became,  in  effect,  battle  squadrons,  to  be  used  as  a 
powerful  weapon  of  attack  at  the  decisive  point,  when  the  German  troops 


1917]  LOW-FLYING  ATTACKS  253 

Meanwhile,  just  before  9  a.m.,  when  the  anxiety  30  Nov. 
aroused  by  the  success  of  the  German  attack  on  the  south 
side  of  the  salient  was  at  its  greatest,  considerable  numbers 
of  enemy  troops  were  seen  massing  on  the  northern  flank  of 
the  salient  between  Bourlon  and  Moeuvres.  Here  there 
was  no  question  of  a  surprise.  The  orthodox  procedure  of 
a  severe  preliminary  bombardment,  followed  by  barrage- 
fire,  duly  gave  way  to  assaults  by  wave  after  wave  of 
infantry.  Once  again,  however,  the  infantry  were  pre- 
ceded by  low-flying  aircraft.  We  have  seen  that  prepara- 
tions had  been  made  in  the  expectation  that  the  main 
German  effort  would  take  place  in  the  area  of  Bourlon. 
The  line  was  strongly  held  by  three  divisions,  and  it  was  to 
this  sector  of  the  front  that  the  chief  attention  of  the  air- 
craft of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  was  directed  throughout 
the  day.  Five  main  German  attacks  were  made  in  this 
area,  but,  after  some  of  the  most  bitter  fighting  of  the  war, 
they  were  beaten  off.  Here  and  there  the  line  was  pushed 
back  a  little  but,  except  along  a  small  stretch  of  front  west 
of  the  Canal  du  Nord,  it  was  restored  again  by  counter- 
attacks. 

The  first  waves  of  German  infantry  came  over  soon  after 
9  a.m.,  but  some  time  before  that  German  and  British  air- 
craft were  in  force  over  the  front.  The  'Camel'  pilots 
of  No.  3  Squadron,  and  the  D.H.5  pilots  of  No.  64 
Squadron  and  of  No.  68  (Australian)  Squadron,  flew  back 
time  and  again  to  the  battle  area  to  drop  their  bombs 
and  fire  their  machine-guns  against  the  assaulting  forma- 
tions of  German  infantry.  The  enemy  low-flying  pilots, 
at  the  same  time,  maintained  a  prolonged  offensive  against 
the  British  infantry.  Their  efforts  were  punctuated  by 
combats  of  flashing  swiftness  with  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 

were  on  the  offensive,  and  to  impede,  or  break-up,  an  enemy  attack,  when 
the  German  troops  were  on  the  defensive.  This  change  of  duties  was 
indicated  by  a  change  of  name  to  Schlachtstaffeln  (Battle  Flights).  They 
were  concentrated,  as  required,  into  squadrons  or  into  Groups  {Schlacht- 
stajfelgruppen).  An  important  German  memorandum  on  the  Employment 
of  Battle  Flights,  dated  20th  February  191 8,  which  incorporates  the  lessons 
learned  from  the  British  low-flying  tactics  during  the  battles  of  Ypres, 
1917,  and  from  the  German  and  British  attacks  at  Cambrai,  is  reprinted  as 
Appendix  XII. 


254  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

30  Nov.  fighters.  Above  the  low-flying  aircraft  were  the  contact 
and  artillery  aeroplanes  of  both  sides,  and  formations 
of  offensive-patrol  aircraft.  A  distant  offensive  patrol  of 
S.E.5a's  of  No.  41  Squadron,  which  had  gone  out  at 
8.30  a.m.,  had  found  no  enemy  aircraft,  and  thereafter  the 
offensive  patrols  were  brought  in  to  the  actual  battle  area. 
Often,  during  the  day,  there  were  fifty  or  more  aeroplanes 
of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  over  the  five-mile  front  from 
Moeuvres  to  Fontaine  and  as  many  of  the  enemy.  'An 
'absolute  melee  of  aircraft  around  Bourlon  Wood',  says 
one  pilot's  report,  and  'the  air  was  thick  with  D.H.5's, 
'some  S.E.5's,  R.E.8's,  and  Bristol  Fighters',  says  another. 
This  concentration  led  to  almost  continuous  fighting 
and  the  co-operating  aircraft  on  both  sides  found  their 
work  of  helping  the  infantry  and  artillery  much  impeded. 
The  low-flying  pilots,  however,  were  more  difficult  to 
engage,  and  both  the  German  and  British  infantry  were 
subjected  to  heavy  attacks.1  It  is  easier  to  give  specific 
evidence  of  the  effect  of  the  German  attacks  on  British 
troops,  than  the  opposite,  but  it  may  be  assumed  that  the 
parallel  of  any  example  from  the  records  of  one  side  can  be 
produced  from  those  of  the  other.  Soon  after  2  p.m., 
when  a  fierce  enemy  attack  was  made  on  the  position  held 
by  the  140th  Infantry  Brigade  on  Bourlon  Hill,  eight 
German  aeroplanes  first  appeared  at  a  low  height  and 
fired  on  the  British  front-line  infantry.  The  closely  follow- 
ing enemy  troops  forced  their  way  into  the  British  line, 
and  the  German  supporting  aircraft  then  turned  their 
attention  to  the  British  reserves.  They  did  particular 
damage  to  a  reserve  company  as  it  was  assembling  for  a 
counter-attack  behind  a  sunken  road.  Shortly  afterwards 
another  group  of  six  German  aeroplanes  appeared,  and  the 
two  groups  fiercely  and  repeatedly  dived  to  the  attack  of 
the  British  reserves  as  they  moved  forward  to  counter- 
attack the  German  infantry.  'The  enemy  aeroplanes',  says 
a  report  of  the  divisional  commander,  'were  handled  with 
'considerable  skill  and  daring,  and  the  effect  of  the  aerial 
'fire  on  troops  already  heavily  engaged  was  very  harassing. 

1  Royal  Flying  Corps  aeroplanes  dropped  one  hundred  and  eleven  25-lb. 
bombs  and  fired  20,000  rounds  of  ammunition  against  ground  targets. 


i9i7]       ATTACK  AND  COUNTER-ATTACK     255 

'It  was  noticed  that  when  the  first  counter-attacks  were 
'delivered,  the  aeroplanes  concentrated  their  fire  on  the 
'ground  in  front  of  and  over  which  the  troops  advanced.' 
A  subsidiary,  but  important,  effect  was  that  some  of  the 
infantry  Lewis  gunners  expended  most  of  their  ammuni- 
tion against  the  low-flying  German  aeroplanes  before  the 
enemy  troops  came  over,  and  the  defence  in  parts  of  the 
line  was  thereby  weakened. 

As  a  result  of  the  day's  air  fighting,  eleven  German 
aeroplanes  were  destroyed,  seven  British  pilots  were  re- 
ported missing,  and  five  flying  officers  were  killed  and  four 
were  wounded. 

On  the  night  of  the  30th  November/ 1st  December 
Nos.  101  and  102  Squadrons  once  again  gave  their  atten- 
tion to  the  Cambrai  battle  area.  Their  main  targets  were 
the  stations  at  Douai,  Dechy,  and  Marquion. 

On  the  1st  of  December  the  battle  on  the  ground  con- 
tinued fiercely.  The  Guards,  with  the  help  of  tanks,  com- 
pleted the  capture  of  the  Quentin  ridge  and  entered 
Gonnelieu.  Farther  south,  Gauche  Wood  was  taken,  but 
attacks  on  Villers-Guislain  failed.  There  was  heavy  fighting 
at  Bourlon  and  Marcoing  and  at  Masnieres,  where  nine 
German  attacks  were  beaten  off  by  the  29th  Division.  The 
position  of  the  troops  at  Masnieres,  however,  was  pre- 
carious and,  during  the  night,  the  British  line  was  with- 
drawn west  of  the  village. 

Mist  and  low  clouds  made  the  day  unfavourable  for 
flying  and  the  German  air  service  was  inactive.  Many  low- 
flying  attacks,  however,  were  made  by  Royal  Flying  Corps 
pilots  on  the  German  infantry  and,  at  the  same  time,  the 
pilots  followed  and  reported  much  of  the  progress  of  the 
British  infantry  and  tanks,  particularly  east  of  Gouzeau- 
court.  Close  reconnaissances  and  contact  patrols,  made  by 
aeroplanes  of  the  Corps  squadrons,  Nos.  15  and  59,  yielded 
fairly  comprehensive  reports  of  the  day's  fighting,  while 
wider  reconnaissances  by  the  Bristol  Fighters  of  No.  11 
Squadron  showed  that  abnormal  movements  behind  the 
German  lines  had  ceased.  There  were  no  more  than  five 
combats  during  the  day,  as  a  result  of  which  three  German 
aeroplanes  crashed.    One  British  aeroplane  was  missing, 


256  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

and  four  officers  were  wounded.    Two  British  balloons 
were  shot  down,  one  of  them  in  flames. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  2nd  of  December  strong  Ger- 
man attacks  gained  ground  at  la  Vacquerie  and  west  of 
Gonnelieu.  Next  day  the  attacks  were  resumed  and  la 
Vacquerie  fell,  thus  making  the  British  position  beyond 
the  Canal  de  L'Escaut  precarious:  during  the  night, 
therefore,  the  troops  were  brought  in  to  the  west  bank  of 
the  canal.  For  two  days  there  was  local  fighting  at  la 
Vacquerie,  but  elsewhere  the  battle-front  quietened.  The 
general  British  position,  however,  was  extremely  unsatis- 
factory. With  the  enemy  in  possession  of  the  Bonavis  ridge, 
the  troops  in  the  salient  north  of  Flesquieres  must  remain 
endangered.  The  recapture  of  the  ridge  would  entail  a 
major  engagement  for  which  the  necessary  troops  were 
not  available,  and  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  therefore,  with  great 
reluctance,  decided  that  he  must  abandon  the  Bourlon 
position,  so  stubbornly  won  and  defended,  and  withdraw 
to  the  Flesquieres  ridge.  This  difficult  operation  was  begun 
on  the  night  of  the  4th  of  December  and  completed  by  the 
morning  of  the  7th,  thus  ending  the  battle  of  Cambrai. 

During  these  days  of  local  fighting  and  readjustment  of 
the  line,  the  air  activity  on  both  sides  lessened.  Low- 
bombing  and  machine-gun  attacks  on  the  German  troops 
were  maintained,  but  on  a  minor  scale,  and  there  was  a 
fair  amount  of  air  photography.  In  the  five  days,  from  the 
2nd  to  the  6th  of  December,  no  more  than  three  German 
aeroplanes  were  shot  down  (two  of  them  in  the  British 
lines  by  Captain  J.  T.  B.  McCudden),  while  three  British 
aeroplanes  were  destroyed  and  two  were  missing. 

The  battle  of  Cambrai,  although  it  achieved  little,  is 
one  of  the  most  interesting  operations  of  the  war.  All  the 
German  accounts  of  the  battle  talk  of  the  possibility  of  a 
catastrophe  as  a  result  of  the  British  opening  success,  and 
express  wonder  at  the  failure  to  exploit  the  situation. 
'Exploitation',  it  has  been  said,  'was  the  chief  idea  of  the 
'battle',1  but  although  more  might  have  been  done,  the 
fact  remains  that  the  action  was  of  limited  scope,  and  that 

1  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  Command,  igi5-igi8,  by  G.  A.  B.  Dewar  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  H.  Boraston,  vol.  i,  p.  397. 


1917]  SOME  COMMENTS  257 

reserves  were  not  available  for  extensive  operations.  There 
was  some  similarity  between  the  German  counter-offensive 
on  the  30th  of  November  and  the  original  British  attack. 
The  enemy  took  a  weak  section  of  the  British  line  by  sur- 
prise and  achieved  an  initial  success  which  he  failed  to 
exploit  fully.  Had  some  of  the  troops  who  were  thrown, 
wave  after  wave,  into  the  abortive  Bourlon  attacks,  been 
kept  available  for  rapid  action  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
line,  once  this  had  been  breached,  the  Bourlon  positions 
would  most  likely  have  been  made  untenable  without  any 
costly  frontal  attacks,  and  worse  might  have  befallen. 
Even  as  it  was,  however,  the  Germans  were  able  to 
advertise  a  victory  which  they  sorely  needed  to  reconcile 
the  civilian  population  to  a  winter  of  great  self-sacrifice, 
and  the  German  High  Command  had  learned  some  lessons 
from  which  they  were  to  profit  in  191 8. l 

The  feature  of  the  battle  so  far  as  concerns  the  air 
services  was  the  development  of  low-flying  attacks  on  the 
infantry,  and  an  extension  of  this  activity,  in  future  battles, 
was  foreshadowed.  That  the  intervention  of  the  low- 
flying  aircraft  had  an  influence  on  the  battle  is  beyond  dis- 
pute, but  the  lessons  of  that  intervention  deserve  close 
examination.  The  casualties  to  the  low-flying  aircraft 
were  high,  averaging,  as  has  been  told,  30  per  cent,  for  each 
day  on  which  aeroplanes  were  used  on  this  duty.  That  is  to 
say,  a  squadron  of  highly  skilled  and  experienced  pilots, 
flying  first-class  fighting  aircraft,  would,  so  long  as  it  was 
employed  on  concentrated  low-flying  attacks  on  front-line 
troops  in  prepared  defensive  positions,  require  to  be 
replaced  about  every  four  days.  Only  if  the  ground 
operations  were  of  a  decisive  kind  calling  for  the  immediate 
and  full  weight  of  every  arm,  or  else  in  extreme  emergency, 
would  such  a  rate  of  wastage  be  justified.  The  pilots 
could  not  easily  be  replaced,  and  persistent  low-flying 
attacks,  with  consequent  heavy  casualties  among  the 
fighting  pilots,  would  have  greatly  restricted  the  ability  of 

1  'It  was  a  good  ending  to  the  extremely  heavy  fighting  of  1917.  Our 
'action  had  given  us  valuable  hints  for  an  offensive  battle  in  the  west,  if  we 
'wished  to  undertake  one  in  191 8.'  (Ludendorff,  My  War  Memories, 
vol.  ii,  p.  497.) 

2504-4  » 


258  THE  BATTLE  OF  CAMBRAI         [ch.  vi 

the  Royal  Flying  Corps  to  maintain  its  offensive  patrol 
policy  on  which  the  whole  of  the  air  co-operation  with  the 
army  depended.  The  low-flying  attacks  at  Cambrai  did, 
in  fact,  have  some  effect  in  disorganizing  the  offensive 
patrol  system  with  trie  consequence  that,  when  the  rein- 
forcements of  German  fighting  aircraft  began  to  make 
their  presence  felt,  some  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  bomb- 
ing formations  were,  as  a  temporary  measure,  given  strong 
escorts  of  single-seater  fighters,  and  the  fighter  recon- 
naissance formations  were  increased  in  size. 

The  German  air  service  deserves  full  credit  for  the 
rapidity  with  which  its  concentration  was  made  once  the 
danger  had  been  revealed,  for  the  clarity  of  vision  which 
enabled  the  command  to  judge  the  essentials  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  for  the  vigour  and  precision  with  which  that 
judgement  was  implemented.  The  German  view  was  that 
their  counter-offensive  could  best  be  helped  by  the  use  of 
the  maximum  strength  of  aircraft,  as  weapons  of  attack,  at 
a  decisive  time  and  place.  The  enemy  low-flying  attacks 
were  very  closely  co-ordinated  with  the  movements  of  the 
German  infantry.  They  played  a  part  in  the  success  of  the 
German  counter-attack  at  Cambrai,  but  it  should  be 
pointed  out  that  this  form  of  low-flying  attack  was,  at  least 
in  its  scope,  new  to  the  British  infantry  so  that  part  of  its 
effect  was  due  to  the  advantage  of  surprise.  Nevertheless, 
the  enemy  command  was  deeply  impressed,  not  only  by  the 
results  of  the  German  low-flying  attacks  in  the  Cambrai 
counter-attack,  but  also  by  the  many  occasions  through- 
out 191 7,  at  Arras,  Messines,  Ypres,  and  Cambrai,  when 
the  German  infantry  had  had  to  suffer  similar  attacks  from 
Royal  Flying  Corps  pilots.  It  may  be  assumed  that  much 
of  the  material,  on  which  the  German  staff  memorandum 
of  February  191 8  (Appendix  XII)  was  based,  was  provided 
by  the  experiences  of  the  German  troops  who  had  suffered 
low-flying  attacks.  The  development  of  low-flying  tactics 
throughout  the  war,  and  the  lessons  applicable  to 
this  form  of  air  activity,  will  be  reviewed  in  the  final 
volume.  Meanwhile,  an  extract  from  the  German  memo- 
randum deserves  repetition  here  because  of  its  general 
interest.    'The  employment  of  low-flying  aeroplanes  on 


1917]    GERMAN  VIEWS  ON  LOW-FLYING        259 

'the  battle-field,'  we  read,  'and  their  co-operation  in  the 
'fighting  on  the  ground,  by  opening  machine-gun  fire  or 
'attacking  with  bombs  and  hand  grenades,  is  particularly 
'effective  from  the  point  of  view  of  moral,  both  on  our  own 
'and  the  enemy's  troops.  The  systematic  participation  in 
'the  battle  of  massed  flying  formations  (battle  flights) 
'against  ground  targets  is  of  extreme  importance.  In  the 
'attack,  battle  aeroplanes  fly  ahead  of  and  carry  the 
'infantry  along  with  them,  keeping  down  the  fire  of  the 
'enemy's  infantry  and  barrage  batteries.  In  the  defence, 
'the  appearance  of  battle  aeroplanes  affords  visible  proof  to 
'heavily  engaged  troops  that  the  higher  command  is  in 
'close  touch  with  the  front,  and  is  employing  every 
'possible  means  to  support  the  fighting  troops.  Confidence 
'in  a  successful  defence  is  thereby  strengthened.  The 
'object  of  the  battle  flights  is  to  shatter  the  enemy's  nerve 
'by  repeated  attacks  in  close  formation  and  thus  to 
'obtain  a  decisive  influence  on  the  course  of  the  fighting. 
'They  cause  confusion  to  a  considerable  distance  behind 
'the  enemy's  front  line,  dislocate  traffic  and  inflict  appreci- 
able losses  on  reinforcements  hastening  up  to  the  battle- 
'field.  ...  In  the  battle  flights,  the  higher  command 
'possesses  a  powerful  weapon  which  should  be  employed 
'at  the  decisive  point  of  the  attack.  .  .  .' 

During  the  Cambrai  operations  the  importance  of  the 
part  played  in  modern  battles  by  air  observation  was  well 
illustrated.  On  the  opening  day  the  mist  just  sufficed 
to  obscure  from  the  air  observers  the  cause  of  the  hold-up 
at  Flesquieres,  and  this  check,  we  have  seen,  was  a  major 
reason  why  the  Bourlon  ridge  was  not  overrun  before 
nightfall.  Had  the  visibility  been  better  the  cause  of  the 
trouble  at  Flesquieres  would  probably  have  been  made 
clear  and  artillery  fire  could  have  overcome  the  German 
resistance.  Again,  on  the  day  of  the  German  counter- 
offensive,  mist  played  a  part  and,  although  British  aero- 
planes were  flying  over  the  German  troops  while  they  were 
assembling  for  the  attack  in  the  south,  the  observers  saw 
and  reported  nothing,  and  the  enemy  surprise  was  com- 
plete, with  results  that,  for  a  time,  gravely  threatened  the 
whole  of  the  Third  Army. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE,  1918 

The  First  Battles  of  the  Somme,  March  2ist-April  5th 
[Maps,  pp.  267  and  364] 

The  battle  of  Cambrai,  although  it  has  been  described 
as  a  raid  on  a  grand  scale,  had  deep  significance.  The 
British  advance  on  the  20th  of  November  191 7  had 
shown  that  new  tactics,  with  the  help  of  surprise,  might 
shatter  the  line  in  the  west,  and  the  German  counter- 
stroke  on  the  30th  had  not  only  indicated  a  new  enemy 
strength  and  temper,  but  had  also,  for  those  who  could 
read  the  lessons,  foreshadowed  some  of  the  possibilities  of 
the  German  campaign  of  the  spring  of  191 8.  The  British 
defence  at  Cambrai,  especially  along  that  part  of  the  line 
which  had  been  in  our  possession  since  the  beginning  of 
191 7,  had  been  carefully  organized  on  the  elastic  system 
which  the  enemy  had  used  with  marked  success.  The  line 
was  held  with  the  minimum  of  troops,  but  the  strong- 
points,  of  considerable  strength  and  depth,  were  so  placed 
that  they  could  support  one  another  and  cover  the  whole 
front.  On  the  30th  of  November,  after  a  brief  bombard- 
ment, mainly  with  smoke  and  gas  shells,  the  troops  holding 
many  of  the  advanced  posts  had  suddenly  found  them- 
selves taken  in  flank  and  rear.  Their  resistance  had  de- 
pended on  a  clear  field  of  fire  which  would  enable  them  to 
break  up  the  attacks,  but  their  view  had  been  restricted  by 
a  morning  mist,  and  the  German  troops  had  poured  through 
the  gaps  thus  created  in  the  defence.  British  General 
Head-quarters  was  inclined  to  the  belief  that  the  weakness 
had  not  been  in  the  method  of  defence,  but  in  the  inability 
of  the  troops,  through  lack  of  training,  to  practise  it  with 
the  required  faith  and  skill.  The  General  Staff  therefore 
decided  that  the  troops,  through  the  winter,  should  be 
carefully  instructed  in  the  tactics  of  elastic  defence,  that 
the  defence  systems  must  be  overhauled  and  brought  up  to 
date,  and  that  every  possible  precaution  must  be  taken  to 
provide  against  surprise  attacks. 

The  general  situation  was,  for  the  Allied  commands, 


1917-18]  SCHEMES  FOR  DEFENCE  261 

full  of  disquiet.  Russia  had  ceased  to  fight,  and  the  bulk  of 
the  German  and  Austrian  troops  on  the  Eastern  front  had 
become  available  for  transfer  to  the  west.  Ludendorff  had 
additionally  at  his  disposal  at  least  four  thousand  guns 
taken  from  the  Russians  and  two  thousand  from  the 
Italians,  as  well  as  great  stores  of  captured  war  material  of 
all  kinds.  The  French  armies  were  still  suffering  from  the 
effect  of  the  191 7  spring  offensive  and  the  British  had 
been  greatly  weakened  by  the  losses  sustained  in  the  costly 
battles  that  had  been  fought  almost  continuously  through- 
out the  year. 

The  change  in  the  outlook  on  the  Western  front  is 
revealed  by  the  preoccupations  of  the  opposing  head- 
quarters' staffs  during  the  winter  of  191 7-1 8.  For  years  the 
British  mind  had  been  dominated  by  problems  of  attack, 
for  which  the  troops  had  been  trained  almost  exclusively, 
but  after  Cambrai  the  offensive  ceased  to  be  a  subject  for 
debate.  Instead  there  was  a  comprehensive  and  searching 
examination  of  the  defensive  role  of  every  arm  and,  on  the 
14th  of  December  191 7,  a  General  Head-quarters  paper, 
Memorandum  on  Defensive  Measures,  advertised  the  change 
in  policy  to  the  armies  and  defined  the  principles  which 
must  be  followed.  Three  zones  of  defence  were  to  be  pre- 
pared, each  organized  in  depth  with  several  successive 
lines,  either  continuous  trenches,  or  groups  of  trenches, 
strong-points  and  machine-gun  emplacements,  with 
switches  to  connect  their  principal  lines.  The  'Forward 
Zone'  was  to  coincide  generally  with  the  existing  front 
system ;  the  'Battle  Zone'  was  to  be  elaborated  on  the  best 
ground  available  for  fighting  behind  the  Forward  Zone  (in 
fact,  usually  a  mile  to  two  miles  distant) ;  while  the  'Rear 
Zone'  was  to  constitute  a  line  on  which  the  defence  could 
fall  back,  if  necessary,  about  four  to  eight  miles  behind  the 
Battle  Zone.  Owing  to  shortage  of  labour,  however,  the 
Rear  Zone  was  at  first  only  to  be  reconnoitred,  then 
marked  out,  and,  afterwards,  as  opportunity  offered, 
wired  and  constructed.  The  defence  schemes  were  ela- 
borately thought  out,  but  they  failed  to  make  provision 
for  one  important  element — the  weather.  While  the 
British   eyes   were   thus   fixed   on   the   ground   in   their 


262  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vi. 

possession,  the  German  staffs  were  looking  far  afield — to 
the  Channel  ports,  to  Paris,  to  a  dictated  peace.  The  la- 
boriously compiled  memoranda  dealing  with  defence  were 
pushed  aside:  every  thought  was  directed  to  the  details  of 
the  great  offensive,  and,  on  the  1st  of  January  191 8,  a 
manual,  The  Attack  in  Position  Warfare^  signed  by 
Ludendorff,  was  issued  to  the  German  armies.1 

Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  no  illusions  about  the  task  ahead 
of  him.  He  made  powerful  and  repeated  requests  for  re- 
inforcements. It  was  not  only  essential,  he  urged,  that  his 
depleted  divisions  should  be  brought  up  to  full  strength, 
but  the  troops  must  arrive  early  so  that  they  could  be 
trained  in  the  latest  methods  of  conducting  defensive 
battles  before  the  ordeal  came  upon  them.  The  Govern- 
ment, however,  gravely  perturbed  by  the  prodigality,  as  it 
seemed  to  them,  with  which  men  and  material  had  been 
thrown  into  the  191 7  battles,  mindful  that  the  last  reserves 
of  British  man-power  were  in  question,  and  inspired  by  the 
hope  that  American  troops  would  arrive  early  in  191 8  in 
sufficient  numbers  to  restore  the  balance  in  the  west,  held 
back.  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  Prime  Minister,  says  Mr. 
Winston  Churchill,  'did  not  feel  that,  if  the  troops  were 
'once  in  France,  he  would  be  strong  enough  to  resist  those 
'military  pressures  for  an  offensive  which  had  so  often  over- 
'borne  the  wiser  judgement  of  Statesmen.  He  therefore 
'held,  with  all  his  potent  influence,  to  a  different  policy. 
'He  sanctioned  only  a  moderate  reinforcement  of  the 
'army,  while  at  the  same  time  gathering  in  England  the 
'largest  possible  numbers  of  reserves.  In  this  way  he  be- 
'lieved  he  would  be  able  alike  to  prevent  a  British  offensive 
'and  to  feed  the  armies  during  the  whole  course  of  the  fear- 
'ful  year  which  was  approaching.  This  was  in  fact  achieved. 
'But  I  held,  and  hold  still,  that  the  War  Cabinet  should 
'have  been  resolute,  as  I  believe  it  would  have  been  found 
'strong  enough,  at  once  to  support  and  to  restrain  the 
'High  Command  in  France.'2 

The  weakened  British  divisions  in  France  were  re- 
organized, under  instructions  from  the  Army  Council, 

1  A  translation  of  Section  VI  of  this  manual,  outlining  the  role  of  the  air 
forces,  is  reprinted  as  Appendix  XIII.     2  The  World  Crisis,  Part  II,  p.  378. 


1917-18]  AIR  SERVICE  IN  DEFENCE  263 

from  a  twelve  battalion  to  a  nine  battalion  basis,  a  change, 
completed  during  February  1918,  which  not  only  reduced 
their  fighting  strength,  but  had  also,  owing  to  the  con- 
sequent introduction  of  new  tactical  methods,  some  effect 
on  their  fighting  efficiency.1  The  problems  confronting 
Sir  Douglas  Haig  were  made  more  serious  by  a  British 
Government  decision  of  September  191 7  that  the  British 
line  in  France  must  be  extended  to  include  a  considerable 
stretch  then  held  by  the  French.  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had 
laid  down  as  a  condition  of  successful  defence,  in  a  memo- 
randum to  the  Cabinet,  'No  further  extension',  but  he  was 
overruled  and,  after  much  discussion,  he  agreed  with 
General  Petain  to  extend  the  British  right  to  Barisis,  south 
of  the  river  Oise,  which  would  make  him  responsible  for  an 
additional  twenty-eight  miles:  this  extension  was  com- 
pleted by  the  end  of  January  1918.2 

Towards  the  end  of  December  191 7  Major-General 
Trenchard  had  submitted  to  General  Head-quarters  a 
memorandum  outlining  his  views  on  the  employment  of  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  if  the  enemy  began  an  offensive  on  a  big 
scale.  This  document,  after  discussion  and  minor  emenda- 
tion, was  issued  by  General  Head-quarters  to  all  armies  on 
the  16th  of  January  191 8. 3  It  was  made  clear  that, 
although  the  army  was  on  the  defensive,  the  air  offensive 
must  be  maintained.  The  first  and  most  important  duty 
of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps,  it  was  stated,  was  to  watch  for 
symptoms  of  attack  and  to  use  every  means  to  obtain 
and  transmit  information  which  might  assist  responsible 

1  The  decision  to  reorganize  the  divisions  in  France  on  a  reduced 
establishment  is  closely  bound  up  with  the  difficult  question  of  the  alloca- 
tion of  man-power.  This  question  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  air  services  will 
be  briefly  dealt  with  in  a  later  volume.  But  it  may  be  mentioned  here 
that  a  Government  Committee  had,  in  December  1917,  adopted  the 
following  order  of  priority  for  the  distribution  of  man-power:  first, 
the  fighting  requirements  of  the  Navy  and  the  air  services,  second,  ship- 
building with,  but  after  it,  the  construction  of  aeroplanes  and  tanks,  and 
third,  food  production,  timber  felling,  and  the  provision  of  food  storage 
accommodation. 

2  When  Monsieur  Clemenceau  came  into  power  in  November  191 7  he 
had  pressed  for  an  extension  of  the  British  line  to  Berry-au-Bac.  The 
Supreme  War  Council  actually  decided  on  an  extension  to  the  river  Ailette. 

3  The  Employment  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  in  Defence.  Appendix  XIV. 


264  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  to 

commanders  to  know  when,  where,  and  in  what  force, 
an  attack  might  be  expected. 

When  the  extension  of  the  British  line  was  completed, 
the  right  was  held  by  the  Fifth  Army  commanded  by 
General  Sir  Hubert  De  la  P.  Gough,  its  front  extending 
from  north  of  Gouzeaucourt,  where  it  joined  the  Third 
Army,  to  the  junction  with  the  French  at  Barisis.  Mean- 
while, although  there  was  no  question  that  a  large-scale 
German  offensive  must  be  expected,  there  was  consider- 
able speculation  about  where  the  blow  or  blows  would  fall. 
The  German  preparations,  in  fact,  were  widespread,  but, 
by  the  beginning  of  February  1918,  the  Fifth  Army  Com- 
mander was  convinced  that  the  main  enemy  attack  would 
be  made  against  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies  with  Amiens 
as  the  objective,  and,  at  a  conference  held  at  Fifth  Army 
head-quarters  on  the  3rd  of  February,  General  Gough 
outlined  his  appreciation  of  the  general  situation  to  his 
subordinate  commanders.1 

The  conclusions  of  the  Fifth  Army  Commander  were 
influenced  by  the  reports  of  the  air  observers.  The  weather 
throughout  the  month  of  January  hindered  observation, 
but  the  air  reports,  and,  more  particularly  the  air  photo- 
graphs, gave  many  clues  to  the  German  intentions. 
Opposite  the  fronts  of  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies  new 

1  The  German  plans  will  be  fully  dealt  with  by  the  military  historian 
in  Military  Operations  1918,  vol.  i.  Various  plans  had  been  prepared. 
The  one  eventually  adopted  was  called  the  Michael  Attack,  on  both  sides 
of  St.  Quentin.  Among  others  for  which  preparations  were  made  were 
Mars,  near  Arras,  and  George,  near  Armentieres.  The  final  decision  for 
Michael  was  given  by  Ludendorff  on  the  21st  of  January  191 8.  The  plans 
are  also  discussed  in  LudendorfT's  My  War  Memories,  pp.  589-93,  and 
Hindenburg's  Out  oj  My  Life,  pp.  344-6.  At  the  outset  the  main  offensive 
was  against  the  Third  Army  with  the  object  of  smashing  the  Arras 
bastion  and  striking  towards  the  coast.  Such  action  would  separate 
the  bulk  of  the  British  Army  from  the  French  and  crowd  it  up  with 
its  back  to  the  sea.  'It  was  decided  to  strike  between  Croisilles,  south- 
east of  Arras  and  Moeuvres,  and,  omitting  the  Cambrai  re-entrant, 
'between  Villers-Guislain  and  the  Oise  south  of  St.  Quentin.  It  was  to  be 
'supported  on  its  left  by  a  subsidiary  attack  from  La  Fere.'  (Ludendorff, 
p.  591.)  The  main  direction  of  attack  was  changed  after  a  few  days  largely 
as  a  result  of  the  resistance  of  part  of  the  British  Third  Army  and  the 
depth  of  the  German  advance  against  the  Fifth  Army.  Amiens  then 
became  the  main  objective. 


i9i8]  GENERAL  VON  HUTIER  265 

aerodromes,  dumps,  railway  sidings,  and  hospital  encamp- 
ments were  discovered.  By  the  end  of  January,  for 
example,  fourteen  new  aerodromes  had  been  found  east  of 
the  forest  of  St.  Gobain,  opposite  the  right  of  the  Fifth 
Army.  Widespread  and  abnormal  railway  movements  were 
reported  from  time  to  time.  On  either  flank  of  the  line 
held  by  the  Fifth  Army,  it  was  made  clear,  the  Germans 
were  showing  great  activity  in  their  forward  areas. 

General  Gough  has  recorded  that  some  time  in  January 
191 8  he  learned  that  General  von  Hutier  had  appeared 
opposite  his  front  in  command  of  the  German  Eighteenth 
Army.1  This  commander,  he  knew,  had  served  almost  con- 
tinuously on  the  Russian  front ,  where  he  had  been  responsible 
for  successful  large-scale  attacks,  notably  at  Riga.  The  Fifth 
Army  Commander  obtained  from  French  general  head- 
quarters a  pamphlet,  prepared  by  the  French  General 
Staff,  in  which  the  German  preparations  and  tactics  at 
Riga,  as  well  as  those  at  Caporetto,  were  closely  analysed. 
He  was  thus  able,  at  the  conference  on  the  3rd  of  February, 
to  outline  to  his  commanders  something  of  what  they 
might  expect.  Hutier,  he  told  them,  had,  at  Riga,  relied 
on  surprise.  He  had  kept  the  troops,  who  were  to  make  the 
attack,  seventy  miles  away  from  the  front  until  a  few  days 
before  the  offensive  when  they  were  assembled  in  the  for- 
ward area.  The  battle  had  not  been  preceded  by  any  tell- 
tale registration  of  the  Russian  gun  and  trench  positions, 
and  the  bombardment  before  the  infantry  assault  had 
lasted  no  longer  than  five  hours.  Sir  Hubert  Gough  went 
on  to  define  the  principles  on  which  the  Fifth  Army  would 
fight  a  defensive  battle.2 

1  See  The  Fifth  Army,  pp.  227-8.  Sir  Hubert  Gough  says  he  discovered 
this  from  a  letter  published  in  a  Baden  newspaper,  signed  Hutier,  which 
had  been  sent  to  the  mother  of  a  German  airman  shot  down  on  the  Fifth 
Army  front.  The  combat  cannot  be  traced  among  official  records.  A 
General  Head-quarters  Summary  of  Information,  dated  the  5  th  of  January 
191 8,  gave  a  report  that  Hutier  had  taken  over  part  of  the  line  in  the 
St.  Quentin  area.  A  later  summary,  on  the  14th  of  January,  offered  con- 
firmation. An  obituary,  it  was  said,  of  a  divisional  commander,  known  to 
have  been  at  St.  Quentin,  had  appeared  in  a  German  publication  over  the 
signature  of  General  von  Hutier. 

2  A  General  Head-quarters  memorandum,  laying  down  the  'Principles 


266  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

Throughout  the  month  of  February  indications  of  the 
impending  offensive  accumulated.  On  the  2nd  of  Feb- 
ruary Major-General  J.  M.  Salmond1  stated  that  it  was 
desired  that  the  head-quarters  reconnaissance  squadron — 
No.  25 — should  concentrate  its  observation  on  the  country 
behind  the  Fifth  Army  reconnaissance  area.  He  also  took 
measures  to  expand  the  Fifth  Army's  Bristol  Fighter 
Squadron — No.  48 — by  eight  aeroplanes  so  that  closer 
attention  could  be  given  to  the  area  within  the  recon- 
naissance boundaries  of  the  Fifth  Army  front.  There 
came  almost  daily  air  reports  of  increasing  train  move- 
ments behind  the  Third  and  Fifth  Army  fronts,  and  of 
further  new  dumps,  aerodromes,  and  emplacements. 

Although  the  signs  had  multiplied  and  left  little  doubt 
in  the  mind  of  the  army  commanders  immediately  con- 
cerned, General  Head-quarters  were  naturally  slower  in 
coming  to  a  definite  conclusion.  At  a  conference  of  his 
army  commanders  held  at  Doullens  on  the  16th  of 
February,  Sir  Douglas  Haig  outlined  his  appreciation  of 
the  situation.  He  gave  his  view  that  the  Germans  would 
launch  a  great  offensive  in  the  west  and  that  the  economic 
position  in  Germany  might  force  the  enemy  to  begin  his 
attacks  in  March  or  before.  The  British  must  be  prepared 
to  be  attacked  on  a  wide  front,  possibly  from  Lens  to  the 
Oise,  but  the  main  blow,  if  the  Germans  attacked  early, 
would  probably  be  made,  he  thought,  against  the  French. 
'Indications  from  the  British  front  are  that  no  attack  in 
'strength  in  Flanders  is  possible  at  the  moment,  and  that 
'there  are  at  present  no  signs  of  any  big  offensive  being 
'imminent  on  the  rest  of  the  British  front.  The  possibility 
'of  a  small  attack  on  our  First  Army  front  is  indicated  by 
'artillery  registration  and  forward  gun  positions.  It  would 
'be  unwise  to  disregard  the  tempting  objective  formed  by 
'our  transport  deficiencies  in  the  devastated  area.'2 

of  Defence  on  the  Fifth  Army  Front',  was  received  by  General  Gough  on 
the  4th  of  February  191 8. 

1  Major-General  J.  M.  Salmond  succeeded  Major-General  Trenchard 
in  command  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  in  France  on  the  1 8th  of  January 
191 8.  Major-General  Trenchard  returned  to  England  to  take  up  the 
appointment  of  Chief  of  the  Air  Staff  in  the  newly  created  Air  Ministry. 

2  Extract  from  the  statement  given  at  the  conference  as  circulated  by  the 


i 


GERMAN    OFFENSIVE    ON  THE    SOMME.      MARCH,  1918. 


REFERENCE 


i9i8]      INDICATIONS  OF  GERMAN  PLAN       267 

If  General  Head-quarters,  watching  the  whole  field  of 
operations  and  the  German  preparations  along  a  great  part 
of  the  Western  front,  and  mindful  of  the  French  view 
that  the  German  attack  would  have  Paris  for  its  objective, 
was  reluctant  to  dwell  unduly  on  the  enemy  activity  in  the 
Cambrai-St.  Quentin  area,  it  was  not  long  before  new  facts 
helped  them  to  come  to  a  conclusion. 

It  was  stated  at  another  General  Head-quarters  con- 
ference, on  the  2 1  st  of  February,  that  instructions,  dated 
February  the  15  th,  had  been  found  in  the  pockets  of  a  dead 
German  aviator  cancelling  all  previous  photographic 
orders,  and  directing  that  photographs  be  taken  of  the 
front  between  Croisilles  and  Havrincourt  with  oblique 
photographs  of  the  British  front  line.  Photographic  recon- 
naissances were  also  ordered  inside  the  German  lines  from 
Bullecourt  along  the  Sensee  river  to  Wavrechain  and  back 
to  the  front  through  Raillencourt  and  Graincourt.  This 
instruction  appeared  to  British  head-quarters  to  indicate 
German  anxiety  about  how  far  the  preparations  in  this 
area  were  visible  from  air.  It  was  known  also  that  German 
bombing  aircraft  had  received  orders  to  attack  on  the 
Croisilles-Havrincourt  front  to  a  depth  of  seven  miles. 

A  week  after  the  Doullens  conference,  on  the  24th  of 
February,  Major-General  J.  M.  Salmond,  at  a  meeting 
with  the  commanders  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  brigades, 
explained  that  everything  pointed  to  an  impending  attack 
between  the  Sensee  river  and  St.  Quentin.1  He  emphasized 
the  importance  of  systematic  and  detailed  air  reconnais- 
sances of  this  area  as  an  aid  to  defining  the  time  of  the 
attack.  He  explained  also  that  there  were  indications  that 
the  Germans  were  holding  back  a  great  part  of  their  air 
units,  possibly  for  training  in  co-operation  with  the 
formations  which  were  to  make  the  attack.  Every  effort, 
he  said,  should  be  made  to  confirm  this :  a  release  of  such 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  on  the  17th  of  February  1918.  The  devastated 
area  was  that  laid  waste  when  the  Germans  retired  to  the  Hindenburg 
Line  in  February  1917.  It  included  the  area  of  the  Fifth  Army  and  part 
of  the  Third. 

1  A  General  Head-quarters  Summary  of  Intelligence,  dated  the  same 
day,  stated  that  wireless  evidence  seemed  to  point  to  a  possible  offensive 
between  the  Scarpe  and  Bellicourt. 


268  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE         [ch.  vii 

air  units  for  work  over  the  front  might  be  a  pointer  to  the 
imminence  of  the  offensive. 

Towards  the  end  of  February  the  air  reports  and  photo- 
graphs revealed  a  marked  increase  in  German  rail  and  road 
movements  in  the  threatened  area,  and  showed  a  further 
accumulation  of  dumps,  light-railways  and  aerodromes.1 
At  a  conference  of  army  commanders  held  at  Doullens  on 
the  2nd  of  March,  it  was  stated  that  the  indications  were 
strong  'that  the  enemy  intends  to  attack  on  the  Third  and 
'Fifth  Army  fronts  with  the  object  of  cutting  off  the 
'Cambrai  salient  and  drawing  in  our  reserves'.  The  Royal 
Flying  Corps  must  be  prepared,  it  was  ordered,  to  meet  a 
concentration  of  enemy  air  forces  on  the  threatened  front, 
and  also  to  concentrate  its  bombing  efforts  on  the  enemy's 
areas  in  rear  of  that  front.  It  is  clear  that  General  Head- 
quarters were  still  not  anticipating  a  general  attack  on  the 
Fifth  Army.  What  they  had  in  mind  was  an  offensive  de- 
signed to  cut  off  the  Cambrai  salient  and  an  operation  of 
this  nature  would  not  involve  the  whole  of  the  Fifth 
Army,  but  only  its  left.2  It  was  discovered,  from  air- 
photographs,  about  this  time,  that  the  enemy  had  drained 
an  important  section  of  the  St.  Quentin  Canal,  between 
Honnecourt  and  Banteux,  while,  farther  north,  he  had 
built  new  roads  and  bridges  across  the  Canal  du  Nord. 

Statements  issued  by  the  Fifth  Army  head-quarters  staff 
on  the  9th  of  March  said  the  indications  were  that  the 
attack  would  come  'in  the  near  future',  while  the  Third 
Army,  two  days  later,  spoke  of  'the  immediate  future'. 
Each  day  the  reconnaissance  reports  and  air  photographs 
added  something.  Particularly  noticeable  was  a  daily 
extension  of  the  network  of  light-railways  behind  the 

1  General  Head-quarters  knew,  also,  by  the  25th  of  February  that 
General  Otto  von  Below,  who  had  fought  the  battle  of  Caporetto,  was 
holding  the  front  north  of  the  Cambrai-Bapaume  road.  He  was  described 
in  a  General  Head-quarters  Summary  of  Information,  dated  the  26th  of 
February,  as  'probably  the  best  Army  Commander  in  the  German  Army', 
and  his  appearance  opposite  the  British  was  stated  to  be  'the  greatest  com- 
pliment the  Germans  can  pay  the  British  Army'. 

2  On  the  8th  of  March,  at  another  General  Head-quarters  conference, 
it  was  stated  that  there  were  no  indications  of  an  enemy  attack  south  of 
St.  Quentin. 


i9i8]  WARNINGS  SENT  OUT  269 

German  lines,  a  growing  concentration  of  German  air  units, 
and  an  abnormal  number  of  lights  in  enemy  back  areas 
reported  by  night-flying  pilots.  On  the  Third  Army  front 
there  was  a  notable  example  of  the  value  of  air  photo- 
graphy. Some  small  white  objects  were  revealed  on  photo- 
graphs of  the  Bullecourt  area  and  a  9/2-inch  howitzer  was 
ranged  on  them.  Explosions  which  followed  showed  that 
the  objects  were  boxes  of  ammunition,  and  a  general 
bombardment  was  thereupon  ordered  with  the  result  that 
over  one  hundred  explosions  were  counted. 

As  the  day  for  the  attack  drew  near,  clouds  thickened 
over  the  whole  area  and  rain  set  in.  For  four  days,  from 
the  17th  to  the  20th  of  March  inclusive,  early  morning  air 
reconnaissance  was  impossible.  But  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 8th  ground  observers  reported  abnormal  road  movements 
in  the  forward  area,  and  many  staff  cars,  and  that  German 
officers  had  been  seen  studying  the  British  line  along  a 
great  part  of  the  Fifth  Army  front.  On  the  same  day  a 
German  non-commissioned  officer  pilot  was  brought  down 
and  he  revealed  that  the  German  attack  would  be  made  on 
the  20th  or  2 1  st  of  March.  Large  air  formations,  he  said, 
had  been  assembled  opposite  the  front  south  of  St. 
Quentin,  but  they  had  been  used  sparingly  and  would  not 
disclose  their  full  strength  until  the  battle  began.  Next 
morning,  the  19th,  various  German  prisoners  confirmed 
that  the  preparations  were  complete  and  the  attack 
about  to  begin.  Before  dusk  on  the  evening  of  the  20th, 
reports  from  air  observers  showed  that  troops  in  the  front 
line  in  both  the  Third  and  Fifth  Army  fronts  were  being 
relieved.  That  night,  the  warning  was  conveyed  to  the 
various  Corps  that  the  attack  could  be  expected  next 
morning,  March  the  21st.  The  matters  which  remained 
in  doubt  were  whether  the  first  attack  would  be  the  main 
effort  or  merely  preparatory,  and  whether  the  French 
would  be  attacked  at  the  same  time. 

The  information  supplied  by  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
about  the  German  preparations  before  the  battle  opened 
formed  a  part  only  of  the  great  mass  of  evidence  accumu- 
lated and  sifted  by  the  various  intelligence  staffs.  But,  in 
truth,  the  air  reconnaissance  reports  and  air  photographs, 


27o  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

taken  alone,  give  an  impressive  picture  of  the  marshalling 
of  men  and  material  and  of  the  preparation  of  the  ground 
for  the  great  attack.  General  Ludendorff,  writing  after 
the  war,  said :  'On  the  20th  of  March,  along  the  whole 
'front  of  the  attack,  the  guns  and  trench  mortars,  with 
'their  ammunition,  were  in  position  behind,  in,  and  in 
'places  even  in  front  of,  the  foremost  trenches.  .  .  .  The 
'divisions  had  at  first  been  distributed  behind  the  front  of 
'attack,  but  were  now  crowded  together  in  anti-aircraft 
'shelters,  behind  the  jumping-off  places  in  our  foremost 
'lines.  This  concentration  of  40  or  50  divisions  had  not 
'been  observed  by  the  enemy,  nor  had  it  been  reported  to 
'him  by  his  highly  developed  secret  service.  The  marches 
'took  place  at  night,  but  the  troops  sang  as  they  passed 
'through  the  villages.  Such  masses  cannot  be  concealed. 
'But  no  more  did  the  airmen  discover  the  railway  trans- 
port that  had  been  taking  place  behind  the  front  of  attack 
'since  February.  It  was  heavy  behind  the  whole  Front, 
'but  the  bulk  of  it  was  unmistakably  going  on  behind  the 
'line  Arras-La  Fere,  as  was  told  us  by  German  airmen  sent 
'up  to  report.  Nor  did  the  enemy  discover  anything  by 
'other  means.  I  must  assume  this:  otherwise  his  defensive 
'measures  would  have  been  more  effective,  and  his  reserves 
'would  have  arrived  more  quickly.  In  spite  of  all  efforts  to 
'the  contrary,  the  essence  of  war  is  uncertainty;  that  is  our 
'experience,  and  the  enemy's  too.'1 

It  is  clear  that  had  General  Ludendorff  had  access  to  the 
British  intelligence  files  before  the  battle  he  would  have 
found  much  that  was  revealing.  He  has  made  reference, 
in  the  extract  quoted  above,  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  the 
British  defensive  measures.  This  is  no  place  to  analyse 
the  British  Commander-in-Chief's  dispositions  to  meet  the 
German  onslaught.  Briefly  his  view  was  that  he  could 
afford  to  give  ground  in  front  of  Amiens,  as  he  could 
afford  to  give  it  nowhere  else.  In  the  Somme  area  there 
was  room  for  manoeuvre.  The  enemy  might  advance  an 
appreciable  distance  before  objectives  vital  to  the  main- 
tenance of  the  British  army  were  uncovered.  In  the 
north,  however,  only  some  fifty  miles  from  the  German 
1  My  War  Memories,  p.  596. 


i9i8]  SIR  DOUGLAS  HAIG  271 

jumping-ofT  places,  were  the  Channel  ports,  objectives 
of  glittering  and  perhaps  decisive  importance.  In  that 
congested  area  no  risks  could  be  taken.  Sir  Douglas  Haig, 
therefore,  kept  his  main  strength  and  reserves  in  the 
north.  But  although  ground  might  be  given  on  the  British 
right,  there  were  elements  of  grave  danger.  The  enemy 
must  be  made  to  pay  dearly  for  the  ground  won.  He  must 
not  be  allowed  to  come  on  too  quickly,  nor  bite  too  deeply. 
His  advance  must  be  halted  before  it  endangered  the 
lateral  communications  between  the  British  and  French 
armies,  or,  indeed,  threatened  to  divide  those  armies 
altogether.  The  responsibilities  which  Sir  Douglas  Haig, 
and  he  alone,  had  to  bear  were  onerous  in  the  extreme. 
He  must  make  his  right  wing,  that  is,  the  Fifth  Army, 
strong  enough  to  do  what  his  strategic  conception  of  the 
situation  demanded,  but  he  could  not  do  this  at  the  ex- 
pense of  weakening  his  hold  in  the  north.  In  the  event, 
only  by  the  thinnest  of  margins  was  disaster  in  front  of 
Amiens  averted. 

Air  concentrations  for  the  battle 
[Map,  p.  364] 

On  the  19th  of  February,  while  there  was  still  un- 
certainty about  the  front  on  which  the  enemy  would  make 
his  attack,  a  memorandum  issued  by  Royal  Flying  Corps 
head-quarters  had  laid  down  three  schemes  of  aircraft  con- 
centration to  meet  a  German  offensive  against  any  two  of 
the  four  British  armies,  that  is,  the  Second  and  First 
Armies  in  the  north,  the  First  and  Third  Armies  in  the 
centre,  or  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies  in  the  south.  Fol- 
lowing the  conference  at  Doullens  on  the  2nd  of  March  at 
which  the  probability  of  an  attack  on  the  Third  and  Fifth 
Army  fronts  was  accepted,  the  scheme  for  the  air  con- 
centration in  the  southern  area  was  put  into  operation. 
By  the  7th  of  March  the  three  single-seater  fighter  squad- 
rons of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing,  namely,  No.  73 
('Camel'),  No.  79  ('Dolphin'),  and  No.  80  ('Camel'),  one 
fighter  reconnaissance  squadron,  No.  62  (Bristol  Fighter), 
and  two  day-bomber  squadrons,  Nos.  25  and  27  (D.H.4's), 
had  moved  to  aerodromes  behind  the  Fifth  Army  front. 


272  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

One  of  the  night-bombing  squadrons  of  the  wing,  No.  101 
(F.E.2b),  was  already  working  from  the  Fifth  Army  area;1 
and  another,  No.  102  (F.E.2b),  moved  to  the  Third  Army 
area  on  the  5th  of  March.  On  the  6th  of  March  No.  83 
(F.E.2b)  Squadron  arrived  in  France  to  reinforce  the 
head-quarters  night-bombing  strength.  This  squadron, 
however,  went  to  Auchel,  in  the  First  Army  area,  and,  to- 
gether with  the  remaining  Ninth  Wing  F.E.2b  Squadron 
— No.  58,  in  the  Second  Army  area — was  employed,  for 
the  time  being,  for  night  attacks  on  the  German  aero- 
dromes in  the  north  from  which  formations  set  out  to 
bomb  English  towns.2 

It  is  of  interest  that,  throughout  the  winter,  instruction 
in  the  technique  of  co-operation  between  aircraft  and 
other  arms,  and  in  the  general  capabilities  and  limitations 
of  aeroplanes,  had  been  given  to  commanders  of  infantry 
brigades  and  battalions,  of  divisional  artilleries  and  of 
artillery  brigades,  and  to  general  staff  officers.  After  the 
battle  of  Cambrai,  No.  6  Squadron  at  Bertangles,  com- 
manded by  Major  A.  W.  H.  James,  had  had  its  observers 
dispersed  to  other  squadrons,  and  had  begun  a  series  of 
four-day  courses  for  twenty-four  officers  at  a  time  from 
each  army.3  The  officers  did  a  number  of  hours  flying  (not 
over  the  lines)  to  study  the  appearance  of  the  ground  from 
various  heights,  the  effect  of  atmospheric  conditions  on  the 
visibility  of  objects,  &c,  and  they  watched,  from  the  air, 
practical  demonstrations  in  aircraft  and  infantry  co-opera- 
tion by  means  of  flares  and  other  signalling  devices.  There 

1  No.  101  Squadron  had  been  moved  to  the  Fifth  Army  area  on  the 
16th  of  February  1918,  to  make  attacks  on  the  German  aerodromes, 
notably  at  Etreux,  which  housed  night-bombing  squadrons  active  against 
the  Third  and  Fifth  Army  areas  and  against  Paris. 

2  On  the  6th  of  March  the  head-quarters  squadrons  were  grouped  to 
form  the  IX  Brigade,  made  up  of  two  Wings,  the  Ninth  (Day)  and  the 
Fifty-Fourth  (Night).  The  Ninth  Wing  included  Nos.  73,  79,  80,  62,  25, 
and  27  Squadrons,  and  the  Fifty-Fourth  Wing,  Nos.  58,  83,  101,  and  102 
Squadrons.  Until  the  26th  of  March,  however,  the  Ninth  Wing  operated 
under  the  direct  orders  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  head-quarters. 

3  No.  6  Squadron  had  moved  to  Bertangles  from  the  Ypres  area  on  the 
1 6th  of  November  191 7  for  attachment  to  the  V  Corps,  then  in  reserve. 
The  task  allotted  to  this  Corps  was  the  exploitation  of  a  break-through,  but 
the  Corps  did  not  come  into  action. 


i9i8]  AIR  CONCENTRATIONS  273 

were  also  lectures  by  which  the  army  officers  who  attended 
the  course  were  given  a  good  general  idea  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  organization,  and  specific  information  about 
the  possibilities  of  co-operation  with  their  own  particular 
arm.  These  courses  of  instruction  continued  up  to  the 
time  of  the  opening  of  the  German  offensive. 

On  the  2 1  st  of  March,  when  the  offensive  opened,  the 
order  of  battle  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  was  as  shown  in 
Appendix  XV.  Excluding  the  two  head-quarters  night- 
bombing  squadrons  detached  north  of  the  battle  area, 
there  were  thirty-one  squadrons  in  the  area  of  the  Third 
and  Fifth  Armies,  with  a  total  of  5  79  serviceable  aeroplanes1 
of  which  261  were  single-seater  fighters.  Opposed  to  these 
two  British  armies  were  the  German  Seventeenth, 
Second,  and  Eighteenth  Armies,  with  squadrons  totalling 
730  aeroplanes  of  which  326  were  single-seater  fighters.2 
For  the  first  time  the  German  air  concentration  for  a 
battle  on  the  Western  front  was  greater  than  that  of  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps. 

The  German  air  preparations  for  the  191 8  offensive 
deserve  particular  examination.  After  the  entry  of 
America  into  the  war  in  April  191 7,  newspapers  in  the 
Allied  countries  gave  exaggerated  forecasts  of  the  arrival 
on  the  Western  front  of  great  fleets  of  American  aircraft. 
('According  to  them',  wrote  General  von  Hoeppner, 
'thousands  of  American  aviators  were  going  to  swarm  over 
'Germany  and  force  her  to  sue  for  peace').3  The  German 
air  authorities,  mindful  of  the  fact  that  America  possessed 

1  The  number  of  aeroplanes  on  the  charge  of  the  squadrons,  serviceable 
and  temporarily  unserviceable,  was  618. 

2  For  a  comparative  statement  of  the  British  and  German  air  strengths 
see  Appendix  XVI.  The  figures  for  German  aeroplanes,  supplied  by  the 
President  of  the  Reichsarchiv  for  this  history,  are  approximate  only.  The 
nominal  strength  of  the  German  air  units  was  50  per  cent,  higher  than  the 
figures  quoted  above.  The  Reichsarchiv  have  calculated  the  actual  strength 
as  two-thirds  of  the  nominal  strength.  It  is  of  interest  that  British  Intel- 
ligence summaries,  compiled  at  the  time,  give  figures  for  the  German  air 
strength  which  agree  almost  exactly  with  the  figures  for  nominal  strengths 
as  supplied  by  the  Reichsarchiv. 

3  Deutschlands  Krieg  in  der  Luft,  p.  140. 

2504-4  T 


274  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE         [ch.  vii 

only  a  negligible  aviation  service,  and  that  effective 
military  air  squadrons  could  not  be  organized  in  a  few 
weeks,  were  not  perturbed  by  these  forecasts.  They  did, 
however,  appreciate  the  vast  resources  of  the  United  States 
and  anticipated  that,  under  the  guidance  of  British  and 
French  engineers,  American  industrial  concerns  would  be 
rapidly  adapted  for  aircraft  and  aero-engine  production. 
In  the  summer  of  191 7  the  British  and  French  press  called 
continuously  for  a  strengthening  of  the  air  arm.  The  in- 
sistent advocacy  of  the  London  Daily  Mail,  in  particular, 
seems  to  have  impressed  the  German  authorities.  The 
appointment  of  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  as  Minister  of 
Munitions  in  July  191 7  had  prompted  the  enemy  to  expect 
strenuous  efforts  of  production  which  would  lead  to  a  great 
increase  in  the  manufacture  of  aircraft.1  The  agitation  in 
England,  powerful  and  insistent,  for  the  formation  of  a 
separate  Ministry  for  Air  also  foreshadowed  a  growth  in 
British  air  strength. 

The  German  air  authorities,  weighing  these  various 
factors,  decided  that  they  must  reckon  with  a  formidable 
growth  of  Allied  air  power  which  would  become  effective 
not  later  than  the  spring  of  191 8,  and  that,  if  this  menace 
was  to  be  met  and  countered,  the  whole  German  system  of 
aircraft  production  must  be  overhauled.  Something 
drastic,  almost  revolutionary,  was  called  for.  Although  an 
expansion  of  the  German  air  service  could  only  be 
achieved  at  the  expense  of  other  arms  and  of  tanks,  the 
German  High  Command  did  not  hesitate.  They  gave 
their  authoritative  support  to  the  requests  formulated  by 
the  General  Officer  Commanding  the  air  service,  and 
made  it  clear  that  those  requests  must  be  given  full  pre- 
cedence. A  programme  of  expansion,  called  the  American 
Programme,  was  drawn  up  at  the  end  of  June  1917.  This 
allowed  for  a  doubling  of  the  number  of  fighter  Flights 
(from  forty  to  eighty),2  for  seventeen  additional  artillery 

1  'The  choice  of  such  an  energetic  personality  as  Churchill  as  Minister  of 
'Munitions,  responsible  among  other  things  for  the  manufacture  of  aero- 
'planes,  portended  an  increase  in  English  aircraft.'  (Dents chlands  Krieg  in 
der  Luft,ip.  139.) 

2  The  nominal  strengths  of  the  enemy  Flights  were:  fighters  14;  recon- 


1917-18]         GERMAN  AIR  EXPANSION  275 

Flights,  and  for  a  corresponding  growth  in  the  home 
training  organization.  The  satisfaction  of  the  programme 
requirements  would  call  for  a  production  of  2,000  aero- 
planes and  2,500  engines  per  month,  and  specialist  technical 
personnel  would  have  to  be  transferred  from  other  work  for 
their  manufacture.  The  American  Programme  was  eventu- 
ally approved  and  its  execution  was  entrusted  to  a  newly 
created  department  (Flugzeugmeisterei) .  The  German  air 
service  was  given  priority  for  all  essential  raw  materials 
and  factory  requirements  immediately  after  the  submarine 
service.  From  the  1st  of  October  1917,  1,500  machine-guns 
per  month  were  reserved  for  aircraft  requirements.  The 
monthly  allotment  of  petrol  was  increased  from  6,000  to 
1 2,000  tons.  For  low-flying  attacks  the  so-called  protection 
Flights  were  reorganized  as  battle  Flights  (Schlachts- 
taffeln).  No  provision  for  an  increase  in  these  seems 
to  have  been  incorporated  in  the  American  Programme, 
possibly  because  eight  were  transferred  from  the  Eastern  to 
the  Western  front.  In  March  191 8  there  were  thirty- 
eight  battle  Flights  on  the  Western  front. 

Owing  to  the  lack  of  raw  material  and  to  other  diffi- 
culties, the  fulfilment  of  the  American  Programme  was 
often  doubtful  throughout  the  winter  of  191 7-1 8  but,  in 
the  event,  it  was  completely  realized  by  the  1st  of  March 
1 91 8.  So  far  as  concerns  fighter  Flights,  it  was,  in  fact, 
slightly  exceeded  as  an  8 1st  Fighter  Flight,  made  up  of 
elements  from  Russia,  was  in  existence  on  that  date. 
The  number  of  new  artillery  Flights  was  reduced  from 
seventeen  to  seven,  but  this  was  a  matter  of  reorganiza- 
tion, not  a  real  reduction.  It  was  found  preferable,  be- 
cause of  the  resultant  economy  in  senior  officer  personnel 
and  in  transport,  to  increase  each  existing  artillery 
Flight  from  six  to  nine  aeroplanes,  and  the  aircraft 
which  would  otherwise  have  gone  to  the  creation  of 
new  Flights  were  so  used.  How  effective  the  German 
efforts  to  speed  up  the  industrial  output  were  may  be  seen 
from  the  figures  for  aeroplane  production.  In  191 5  Ger- 
man manufacturers  had  produced  4,400  aircraft,  in  191 6 

naissance  6;  artillery  9  (increased  from  6);  protection  (or  battle)  6;  bomb- 
ing 6;  photographic  reconnaissance  9;  serio-photographic  4. 


276  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

8,100,  but  in  191 7,  although  the  American  Programme  only 
began  to  take  effect  towards  the  end  of  the  year,  the  figure 
had  jumped  to  19,400. 

Apart  from  this  intense  expansion  activity,  there  was 
continuous  study,  throughout  the  winter  of  191 7-1 8,  of 
the  tactical  employment  of  the  air  arm  in  offensive  opera- 
tions. Experienced  flying  officers  were  called  back  from 
the  front  to  the  German  Air  Service  head-quarters,  from 
time  to  time,  and  worked  out  exercises  in  the  form  of  War 
Games  {Kriegspiele).  Every  possibility,  so  far  as  it  could 
be  foreseen,  was  considered,  and  dispositions  to  meet  it 
were  debated  and  settled.  As  surprise  was  essential,  it  was 
decided  there  must  be  no  preliminary  abnormal  air  activity. 
A  great  increase  of  aerodrome  accommodation  behind  the 
front  chosen  for  the  attack  could  hardly  fail  to  be  discovered 
by  the  British  air  observers  and,  to  overcome  this  difficulty, 
it  was  decided  to  increase  the  number  of  fixed  hangars  evenly 
along  the  whole  German  front,  and  to  erect  additional  port- 
able n  hangars  behind  the  battle-front  only  immediately 
before  the  offensive  was  due  to  begin.  The  Kriegspiele 
exercises  clearly  demonstrated  the  need  for  greater  mobility 
in  the  Flights.  The  stalemate  of  trench  warfare  had  led 
to  Flights  becoming  over-encumbered  with  all  sorts  of 
superfluous  stores.  Once  they  went  on  the  move  there 
would  be  no  transport  to  take  these  superfluities.  The 
organization,  therefore,  was  carefully  examined  and  pre- 
cise instructions  issued  about  what  was  allowable  under 
conditions  of  moving  warfare.  Another  clear  and  definite 
conclusion  was  that  the  fighter  and  battle  Flights  must 
be  used  at  the  point  where  the  higher  command  sought 
a  decision,  and  the  need  for  a  close  liaison  between  these 
Flights  and  the  army  staffs  was  emphasized.  The  Flights 
must  be  kept  continuously  informed,  if  their  intervention 
was  to  have  the  maximum  effect,  of  the  progress  of  the 
battle,  but  could  not  be  expected  to  plan  their  own  opera- 
tions. It  was  the  duty  of  the  army  staffs  concerned  to  give 
the  Flight  commanders  specific  orders  according  to  the 
changing  needs  of  the  battle.1 

1  The  American  Programme  and  the  growth  of  the  German  air  offensive 
plans  are  dealt  with  in  an  important  section  in  Deutschlands  Krieg  in  der 


1917-18]  PRELIMINARY  AIR  WORK  277 

Air  Operations  before  the  battle 

The  memorandum  on  the  employment  of  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps  in  defence,  already  referred  to  (Appendix 
XIV),  stated:  '.  ...  As  soon  as  it  has  been  established  that 
'preparations  for  an  attack  are  in  progress  behind  the 
'enemy's  line,  the  next  duty  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  is 
'to  interfere  with  them.   The  means  available  are : 

{a)  Co-operation  with  our  artillery,  the  activity  of 
which  will  probably  be  increased  at  this  stage. 

(b)  Extensive  bombing  attacks,  to  hinder  the  enemy's 
preparations,  inflict  casualties  upon  his  troops  and 
disturb  their  rest. 

(c)  An  energetic  offensive  against  the  enemy's  aviation 
in  order  to  permit  of  (a)  and  (&).' 

The  fact  that  the  enemy  was  to  attack  on  the  Third  and 
Fifth  Army  fronts  was  accepted,  we  have  seen,  at  the 
beginning  of  March,  and  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  'duty  of 
interference  with  the  enemy  preparations',  began,  there- 
fore, in  the  first  week  of  March.  The  aircraft  co-operation 
with  the  artillery  was  of  the  first  importance.  Schemes  for 
the  employment  of  the  artillery  in  defence  had  been  drawn 
up  at  the  end  of  December  191 7  and  were  afterwards 
elaborated  from  time  to  time.  The  task  of  the  artillery 
before  the  enemy  began  his  attack  was  counter-battery 
work,  harassing  fire  generally,  and  the  registration  of  the 
main  enemy  ammunition  and  supply  rail-heads,  detraining 
stations,  main  and  light-railway  lines,  canal  bridges,  likely 
assembly  points,  and  the  roads  and  paths  to  the  battle 
zones.  Air  photographs,  especially  of  the  counter-battery 
area,  formed  the  basis  for  the  building  up  of  the  artil- 
lery programmes,  and  the  Corps  squadrons  were  almost 

Luft  (Hoeppner,  pp.  139-52).  Information  about  the  allotment  of  aircraft 
to  German  armies,  corps,  and  divisions,  about  the  organization  of  the  air 
units  and  about  their  duties,  &c,  is  given  in  Luftstreitkrdfte,  by  Oberst 
a.  D.  Jochim.  This  is  a  pamphlet  in  the  German  series  on  the  tactical 
experiences  of  1914-18,  and  is  in  the  section,  Grundsdtze  fur  die  Einzel- 
waffen,  of  the  part  dealing  with  the  preparations  for  the  offensive  in 
France  in  the  spring  of  191 8,  Die  V orbereitung  des  deutschen  Heeres  fur 
die  grosse  Schlacht  in  Frankreich  im  Friihjahr  igi8.  The  student  will 
find  this  pamphlet  of  value.   The  publishers  are  Mittler  &  Sohn,  Berlin. 


278  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

exclusively  occupied,  before  the  offensive,  in  helping  the 
artillery.  In  this  work,  also,  the  kite-balloon  sections, 
although  hampered  by  the  weather  conditions,  played  a 
part.  Great  numbers  of  German  batteries  were  engaged 
for  destruction,  and  the  reports  of  the  aeroplane  and 
balloon  observers,  before  the  battle  opened,  make  frequent 
reference  to  fires  and  explosions  in  enemy  gun-pits. 

The  day-to-day  work  of  the  Corps  squadrons  in  their  task 
of  helping  the  artillery  and  of  keeping  a  close  watch  on  the 
German  defence  systems  had  little  in  it  that  was  specta- 
cular. Statistics  of  hours  flown,  of  batteries  engaged  and 
destroyed  or  silenced,  of  wire,  trenches,  strong-points,  and 
dumps,  battered,  of  photographs  taken  and  retaken,  might 
appear  impressive,  but  would  convey  little  idea  to  the 
general  reader  of  the  patient  and  arduous  work,  under  fire 
from  anti-aircraft  guns,  often  from  rifle  and  machine-guns, 
and  not  infrequently  from  more  formidable  fighting  air- 
craft, of  the  pilots  and  observers  of  the  Corps  squadrons. 
Of  all  the  air  service  personnel,  they  were  in  closest  con- 
tinuous touch  with  the  battle-field.  It  has  been  made 
clear  throughout  this  history,  but  may  be  repeated,  that 
air  fighting,  which  became  more  strenuous  and  more  im- 
portant as  the  war  progressed,  was  not  an  end  in  itself.  It 
was  a  struggle  continuously  waged  to  make  it  possible  for 
the  Corps  squadrons,  and  for  the  other  squadrons  engaged 
in  the  duties  of  co-operation  with  the  army,  to  fly  about 
their  allotted  tasks  with  a  measure  of  freedom  from  attack 
by  enemy  fighting  pilots. 

While  his  troops  were  massing  for  the  battle,  the  enemy 
was,  deliberately,  not  very  active  in  the  air,  and,  although 
there  was  much  desultory  fighting  and,  occasionally,  a 
clash  between  large  formations,  many  of  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  offensive  patrols  passed  without  particular  incident. 

The  main  offensive  against  the  enemy  air  service,  there- 
fore, before  the  battle  opened,  took  the  form  of  attacks  on 
the  German  aerodromes.  Coupled  with  these  was  the 
attempt,  by  'extensive  bombing  attacks,  to  hinder  the 
'enemy's  preparations,  inflict  casualties  upon  his  troops 
'and  disturb  their  rest'. 

Instructions  issued  for  guidance  by  the  Chief  of  the 


i9i8]  INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  BOMBING       279 

General  Staff  to  all  Armies  and  to  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
on  the  1 6th  of  February,  stated: 

(i)  Spasmodic  bombing  is  wasteful.  Bombing  should 
be  concentrated  as  regards  time,  though  not  neces- 
sarily as  regards  area.  If,  for  example,  the  policy 
is  to  lower  German  morale,  hutments  or  billets 
should  be  bombed  as  continuously  as  the  weather 
permits,  especially  by  night.  The  effect  on  morale 
of  a  succession  of  bombing  attacks  on  hutments  or 
billets  at  short  intervals  is  much  greater  than  that 
of  the  same  number  of  raids  spread  out  over  a 
longer  interval,  interspersed  with  raids  on  other 
targets, 
(ii)  Attempts  to  interrupt  railway  traffic  should  not 
be  made  until  operations  are  in  progress,  as  the 
effect  of  an  interruption  of  traffic  is  then  much 
greater, 
(iii)  Ammunition  dumps  are  unsatisfactory  targets  ex- 
cept when  they  are  large  and  easily  approached, 
(iv)  Head-quarters  (except  during  a  battle),  supply, 

and  pioneer  dumps  are  unsuitable  targets, 
(v)  Concentrations  of  rolling-stock  and  repair-shops 
are  particularly  suitable  targets,  as  the  Germans 
are  known  to  be  short  both  of  rolling-stock  and 
high-speed  machine-tools, 
(vi)  Army  aviation  parks  are  also  suitable  targets  as 
they  correspond  to  our  aircraft  and  aeroplane 
supply  depots  and  a  great  deal  of  work  is  con- 
centrated in  them, 
(vii)  Large  depot  camps  and  training  centres  are  suit- 
able targets,  but  it  is  understood  that  these  are 
beyond  the  range  of  our  present  night-bombing 
machines, 
(viii)  Factories  are  also  suitable  targets. 
The  main  bombing  began  about  the  7th  of  March  when 
the  air  concentration  in  the  Third  and  Fifth  Army  areas 
took  place.  It  will  be  recalled  that  No.  101  (F.E.2b)  night- 
bombing  Squadron  had  been  moved  to  the  Fifth  Army 
area  on  the  16th  of  February  to  attack  German  aero- 
dromes from  which  pilots  set  out  to  bomb  Paris  and  the 


280  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

lines  of  communication  of  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies. 
Actually  the  squadron  was  given  a  wide  choice  of  objec- 
tives to  meet  different  conditions  of  weather,  but  it  also 
had  orders  that  attacks  were  to  be  concentrated,  that  is, 
attacks  on  a  particular  target,  once  begun,  were  to  be 
continued  for  several  nights.  When  the  weather  was 
favourable,  distant  objectives  were  to  be  bombed.  These 
were  listed  as  of  three  grades  of  importance :  in  the  first 
were  five  aerodromes  and  two  railway  stations  (Hirson  and 
Petit  Maubeuge),  in  the  second,  three  aerodromes  and 
three  stations  (Le  Cateau,  Bavai,  and  Landrecies),  and,  in 
the  third,  eight  billeting  and  depot  villages.  For  nights 
when  the  conditions  were  not  good  enough  for  distant  work, 
objectives  within  the  Fifth  and  Third  Army  reconnais- 
sance areas,  chiefly  rest  billets,  railway  junctions,  and 
dumps,  were  to  be  bombed  in  accordance  with  lists  of 
targets  supplied  by  the  staffs  of  the  two  Armies.1 

The  first  attack  of  No.  ioi  Squadron  from  the  Fifth 
Army  area  was  made  on  the  night  of  the  16th  of  February 
when  the  German  aerodrome  at  Vivaise  was  bombed  by 
four  F.E.2b's.  The  village  of  Bohain  was  the  next  target 
and  was  twice  bombed  in  the  night  of  the  19th.  The 
squadron  was  then  ordered  to  begin  its  attacks  on 
Etreux  aerodrome  which  housed  the  German  night- 
bombing  units  responsible  for  the  raids  on  Paris  and 
on  the  British  lines  of  communication.  The  attacks  were 
ordered  to  take  place  from  the  20th  of  February  to  the 
4th  of  March,  but,  during  this  period,  the  weather  was 
favourable  for  the  operation  on  the  night  of  the  21st  of 
February  only.  At  5.20  p.m.  fifteen  F.E.2b's  of  the  squad- 
ron set  out,  not  in  formation,  but  individually.  All  pilots 
found  the  objective  without  difficulty,  and  reported  that 
it  was  well  protected  by  anti-aircraft  guns.  Thirteen  hits 
on  the  aerodrome  buildings  were  claimed,  mostly  with 
bombs  of  25-lb.  weight :  only  two  bombs  of  heavier  weight 
(112-lb.)  were  carried.  The  same  pilots  returned  to  the 
attack  at  10.35  P-m»  an^>  although  the  visibility  was  not 
good,  again  reported  direct  hits;  they  also  fired  4,400 

1  That  is,  the  Third  and  Fifth.  The  Third  Army  had,  at  the  time,  no 
night-bombing  squadron. 


i9i8]  NIGHT  BOMBING  281 

rounds  of  machine-gun  ammunition  against  hangars  and 
searchlights  on  the  aerodrome.  A  total  of  two  112-lb. 
and  three  hundred  25 -lb.  bombs  were  dropped. 

On  the  24th  of  February  the  squadron  attacked  alterna- 
tive short-distance  objectives  at  Montbrehain,  and,  on  the 
25th,  rest  billets  in  the  woods  east  of  Fontaine-Uterte.1 
The  raid  on  the  rest  billets  was  continuous,  all  pilots 
making  two  or  more  trips,  and  378  bombs  of  25-lb.  with 
twelve  of  40-lb.  weight  were  dropped.  During  the  attack 
on  the  aerodrome  at  Etreux  on  the  night  of  the  21st /22nd 
of  February,  it  was  seen  that  the  aerodrome  at  Seboncourt 
was  lighted  up.  On  the  night  of  the  5th  of  March,  there- 
fore, Seboncourt  was  attacked  by  fourteen  pilots  of  the 
squadron,  but  the  visibility  was  poor  and  the  results  un- 
observed. From  the  6th  of  March  to  the  night  before  the 
German  offensive  opened  on  the  21st,  night-flying  opera- 
tions were  possible  on  seven  nights  when  the  objectives 
were  chiefly  railway  communications  in  the  Le  Cateau- 
Busigny  area  (where  air  reconnaissances  had  reported  great 
train  movements),  and  ammunition  dumps  at  Fresnoy-le- 
Grand,  Brancourt-le-Grand,  and  Premont.  On  the  night 
of  the  1 8th  of  March  the  main  objective  was  Etreux 
aerodrome  which  was  attacked  over  a  period  of  seven  hours 
by  ten  pilots,  each  of  whom  made  two  journeys.  Bombs 
were  also  distributed  on  the  dumps  at  Bohain  and  Fresnoy- 
le-Grand,  and  on  Seboncourt  aerodrome. 

The  Fifth  Army,  unlike  the  other  Armies  along  the 
front,  had  no  day-bombing  squadron  until  the  arrival  of 
No.  5  (Naval)  D.H.4  Squadron  from  Dunkirk  on  the  6th 
of  March.2  The  squadron  began  bombing  operations  next 
day,  the  objective  being  the  German  aerodrome  at  Mont 
d'Origny  which  had    been   reported   active    by   night- 

1  A  document  captured  on  the  19th  of  February  revealed  that  the  rest 
billets  at  Fontaine-Uterte  were  occupied  by  the  352nd  Regiment  from 
the  Russian  front. 

2  In  anticipation  of  the  amalgamation  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  and 
Royal  Naval  Air  Service  into  the  Royal  Air  Force,  which  took  effect  on  the 
1st  of  April  191 8,  the  naval  bombing  squadrons  (except  No.  17)  and  five  of 
the  seven  fighter  squadrons  at  Dunkirk  were  placed  under  the  orders  of 
Sir  Douglas  Haig  on  the  3rd  of  March.  Only  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron, 
however,  was  moved  before  the  German  offensive  began. 


282  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

bombing  pilots  on  the  5th.  Thence  to  the  21st  of  March, 
the  main  objectives  of  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron  were  the 
aerodromes  and  dumps  at  Etreux,  Busigny,  and  Bohain, 
and  other  targets  attacked  were  the  aerodrome  at  Mont 
d'Origny,  the  ammunition  dump  at  Premont,  the  canal 
bridges  at  St.  Quentin,  and  railway  sidings  at  Guise. 

The  bombing  programme  for  No.  102  (F.E.2b)  Squad- 
ron, which  had  arrived  at  Le  Hameau  in  the  Third  Army 
area  on  the  5  th  of  March,  was  supplied  by  Royal  Flying 
Corps  head-quarters  and  was  similar  in  kind  to  that  given 
to  the  Fifth  Army's  night-bombing  squadron.  For  distant 
work,  when  the  weather  was  suitable,  a  list  of  targets  of 
three  grades  of  importance  was  included.  The  chief  were 
the  rolling-stock  and  engine  depots  of  Mons  (where  ammu- 
nition could  usually  be  expected  to  be  lying  in  trucks  in  the 
sidings),  of  Aulnoye  (where  there  was,  in  addition,  a  large 
factory  housing  ammunition  and  other  supplies)  and  of 
Ath  (where  there  were  also  repair-shops  and  an  ammuni- 
tion depot),  and  five  specified  aerodromes.  Of  secondary 
importance  were  the  rolling-stock  and  ammunition  centres 
at  Maubeuge,  Hautmont,  and  Tournai,  an  ammunition 
depot  at  Attre,  and  four  aerodromes.  Of  tertiary  impor- 
tance were  railway  and  ammunition  depots  at  Braine-le- 
Comte  and  Luttre,  ammunition  depots  at  St.  Amand  and 
Le  Maroc,  and  six  aerodromes.  A  list  of  short-distance 
bombing  targets  supplied  by  the  Third  Army  staff,  for 
attention  when  the  weather  conditions  were  against  more 
distant  work,  contained  the  names  of  four  Group  Head- 
quarters, ten  Divisional  Head-quarters,  twenty-three  rest- 
billet  centres,  and  sixteen  railway  junctions  and  dumps. 
Again  it  was  stated  that  a  target,  once  bombed,  was  to  be 
attacked  several  nights  in  succession.  Nos.  101  and  102 
Squadrons  were  to  keep  each  other  informed  daily  of  the 
specific  targets  chosen  for  attack. 

On  the  five  nights  during  which  attacks  were  made  by 
No.  102  Squadron  before  the  battle  opened,  the  bombing 
operations,  except  for  one  raid  on  Emerchicourt  aero- 
drome, were  confined  to  billeting  villages  and  hutments 
opposite  the  Third  Army  front,  a  total  of  1,404  bombs 
of  25 -lb.  weight  being  dropped  over  this  period. 


i9i8]  DAY  BOMBING  283 

The  day-bomber  squadron — No.  49  (D.H.4) — attached 
to  the  Third  Army  was  chiefly  employed  throughout 
February  and  down  to  the  10th  of  March  on  photographic 
reconnaissances  of  specified  areas  opposite  the  Third  Army 
front,  but  from  the  nth  of  March  onwards  bombing 
attacks  were  made  on  most  days  on  billeting  villages  and 
ammunition  dumps,  the  targets  being  some  of  those 
attacked  by  the  Third  Army's  night-bombing  squadron. 

Down  to  the  beginning  of  March  the  two  day-bomber 
squadrons  (Nos.  25  and  27)  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth 
Wing  had  for  objectives  railway  junctions  extending  from 
Roulers  in  the  north  to  Cambrai  in  the  south.  But  when 
the  squadrons  moved  to  the  Fifth  Army  area  on  the  6th  of 
March  they  were  given  a  list  of  targets  of  three  grades  of 
importance,  the  chief  being  Mons,  Aulnoye  (including  the 
Berlaimont  aerodrome),  and  Hirson.  The  day-bombers 
began  operations  on  the  8th  of  March  when  No.  27 
Squadron  attacked  Busigny  railway  junction.  Up  to  the 
10th  of  March  No.  25  Squadron  was  employed  on  photo- 
graphic reconnaissances,  but  on  that  day  opened  its  bomb- 
ing with  an  attack  on  Cambrai  station.  Thence  to  the 
20th  of  March,  except  on  three  days,  there  were  attacks 
on  the  railway  junctions  at  Mons,  Aulnoye,  Hirson, 
Denain,  Busigny,  Somain,  Bohain,  and  Bavai,  on  the  aero- 
dromes at  Etreux  and  at  Saultain  (Valenciennes),  and  on 
the  dump  at  Beaudignies,  seven  miles  south  of  Valen- 
ciennes. 

It  may  be  generally  observed  that  although  spasmodic 
bombing  had  been  declared  to  be  wasteful  of  effort,  and 
squadrons  had  been  ordered  to  concentrate  their  attacks, 
they  were  given  such  a  wide  choice  of  targets  as  to  make 
some  dissipation  of  effort  difficult  to  avoid.  There  was 
some  concentration  against  the  aerodrome  at  Etreux  and 
against  Busigny  railway  junction,  but,  apart  from  this,  the 
bombing  was  distributed  over  a  large  number  of  widely 
separated  objectives.  Also,  there  was  no  attempt  to 
transfer  to  the  threatened  British  front  the  bombing 
squadrons  which  were  operating  from  the  neighbourhood 
of  Nancy.  It  will  be  recalled  that  these  squadrons  had 
been  detached  in  October  191 7,  on  the  orders  of  the 


284  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE         [ch.  vii 

British  Government,  for  attacks  on  German  objectives 
as  a  counter  to  the  raids  by  German  aircraft  on  England. 
While  the  enemy  preparations  for  the  191 8  offensive 
were  being  made,  these  bombing  squadrons  continued 
their  raids  on  such  objectives  as  Mannheim,  Mainz, 
Kaiserslautern,  and  Zweibrucken.  It  is  true  that,  although 
the  probability  of  an  attack  on  the  British  Third  and  Fifth 
Armies  had  been  accepted  early  in  March,  the  magnitude 
of  that  attack,  when  it  was  launched  on  the  21st,  came  as  a 
surprise,  but  even  when  disaster  threatened,  the  inde- 
pendent bombing  squadrons  were  not  moved  to  the 
Amiens  sector.  On  the  28th  of  March,  however,  on  the 
representations  of  General  de  Castelnau,  commanding 
the  French  Eastern  Group  of  Armies,  the  two  night- 
bombing  squadrons  at  Nancy  were  placed  under  his  orders 
for  attacks  on  the  enemy  railway  communications  in 
the  Chalons-sur-Marne  sector  where  a  German  offensive 
seemed  to  threaten.  The  two  squadrons  (Nos.  100  and 
216)  were  transferred  on  the  1st  of  April  to  an  aerodrome 
at  Villeseneux  in  the  French  zone  and  their  objectives  were 
the  stations  and  sidings  at  Juniville,  Chaulnes,  Roye, 
Amagne-Lucquy,  Mohon,  and  Asfeld.1 

Meanwhile,  as  part  of  the  offensive  against  the  German 
air  service  on  the  threatened  front,  there  had  been  or- 
ganized combined  bombing  attacks  on  aerodromes.  The 
first  of  these  took  place  on  the  9th  of  March  when  the 
targets  were  the  aerodromes  at  Busigny,  Bertry,  and 
Escaufourt.  The  operation  had  been  planned  some  time 
before  and  the  pilots  of  the  attacking  squadrons  had  been 
given  practice  in  bomb  dropping  from  low  heights.  About 
1.30  p.m.  on  the  9th  fifty- three  pilots  crossed  the  lines  to 
deliver  their  attack  before  the  German  aircraft  rose  for 
their  afternoon  patrols.  The  squadrons  were  led  by  their 
commanders,  with  the  Wing  Commander  flying  above  the 
combined  formations.  No.  23  Squadron,  supported  by 
No.  24  Squadron,  attacked  Bertry  aerodrome,  while  Nos. 

1  The  squadrons  remained  under  French  orders  in  this  area  until  the 
9th  of  May,  but  owing  to  bad  weather  conditions  made  attacks  during  this 
period  on  six  nights  only,  dropping  eleven  tons  of  bombs  on  their  allotted 
objectives. 


i9i8]  ATTACKS  ON  AERODROMES         285 

48  and  54  Squadrons,  covered  by  the  pilots  of  No.  84 
Squadron,  bombed  Busigny  and  Escaufourt.  A  total  of 
eighty-eight  bombs  were  dropped  and  direct  hits  were 
reported  on  the  hangars  and  buildings  at  each  of  these 
aerodromes.  All  the  aircraft  returned  safely  at  low  heights 
after  making  attacks  with  their  machine-guns  on  various 
targets  on  the  homeward  journey. 

On  the  17th  of  March  a  combined  large-scale  bombing 
operation  was  again  attempted,  but  the  main  object  of  the 
bombing  on  this  occasion  was  to  induce  the  enemy  pilots  to 
take  the  air  where  they  would  be  subject  to  a  surprise 
attack,  down  sun,  by  fighting  formations.  At  10.30  a.m. 
on  the  17th  five  D.H.4  pilots  of  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron 
attacked  Busigny  aerodrome,  dump,  and  railway  station. 
Flying  well  off,  up  sun,  was  a  formation  of  fourteen  S.E.5's 
of  No.  84  Squadron  with  orders  to  dive  in  rear  of  the 
bombers,  immediately  the  D.H.4's  were  clear  of  their 
objective,  and  attack  any  enemy  aircraft  in  the  area.  The 
operation  led  to  heavy  fighting  over  Busigny  as  a  result  of 
which  three  aircraft  of  a  large  German  formation  were 
destroyed.  Next  day,  the  18th,  the  scheme  was  attempted 
again,  but  this  time  the  aerodrome  at  Busigny  was  the  sole 
objective  and  No.  54  ('Camel')  Squadron  was  added  to 
increase  the  fighting  strength.  Nine  D.H.4  pilots  of  No.  5 
(Naval)  Squadron  delivered  their  attack  from  16,000  feet, 
with  No.  84  Squadron,  operating  in  three  Flights,  and  No. 
54  Squadron  in  two  Flights  (a  total  of  twenty-four 
fighters),  coming  up  in  support.  The  two  fighter  squad- 
rons arrived,  as  planned,  just  when  the  enemy  aircraft 
were  converging  to  attack  the  bombers.  It  was  estimated 
that  the  mixed  groups  of  German  triplanes,  Albatros 
D. Ill's,  and  Pfalz  Scouts,  which  took  part  in  the  fight 
numbered  about  fifty,  including  Richthofen's  'Circus'  of 
thirty.  A  series  of  relentless  combats  ensued  which  drifted 
east  of  Busigny  and  ended  at  Le  Cateau  after  taking  many 
of  the  pilots  almost  to  ground  level.  The  casualties  were 
high:  five  'Camels',  two  S.E.5's  and  one  D.H.4  were  shot 
down  in  the  German  lines,  and  one  D.H.4  which  was 
brought  back  by  its  wounded  pilot  was  badly  damaged. 
Four  of  the  German  aircraft  were  seen  to  crash. 


286  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE         [ch.  vii 

The  bombing  was  added  to  generally  by  the  Armstrong- 
Whitworths  and  R.E.8's  of  the  Corps  squadrons  which 
dropped  bombs,  incidentally,  when  engaged  in  their 
normal  routine  of  artillery  co-operation  and  close  recon- 
naissance. There  was,  also,  by  these  squadrons,  a  fair 
amount  of  night  bombing  and  an  occasional  combined 
raid.1  Not  much  of  this  bombing,  however,  could  be  done 
on  the  threatened  fronts  of  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies 
where  the  Corps  squadrons  were  kept  fully  occupied  by 
day  on  their  work  of  co-operation. 

'The  successful  performance  of  the  role  of  the  Royal 
'Flying  Corps  in  defence',  said  the  memorandum  already 
referred  to  (Appendix  XIV),  'must  primarily  depend  on  its 
'ability  to  gain  and  maintain  the  ascendancy  in  the  air. 
'This  can  only  be  done  by  attacking  and  defeating  the 
'enemy's  air  forces.'  There  had,  throughout  the  winter  of 
191 7-1 8,  been  much  discussion  about  the  best  type  of 
fighting  formation.  In  a  memorandum  issued  by  Royal 
Flying  Corps  head-quarters  in  December  1917,2  it  had 
been  suggested  that  a  squadron  formation  made  up  of  three 
sub-formations — each  consisting  of  six  aeroplanes  under 
the  leadership  of  a  flight  commander — might  be  most 
effective.  The  whole  would  be  directly  led  by  the  squad- 
ron commander,  but  this  increased  grouping,  it  was  stated, 
would  not  be  possible  until  the  strength  of  the  fighter 
squadrons  had  been  raised  from  eighteen  to  twenty-four 
aeroplanes  to  allow  for  a  margin  of  temporarily  unservice- 
able aircraft.  It  was  stated  also  to  be  fairly  certain  that 
when  the  number  of  fighter  squadrons  in  the  field  had 
grown,  it  could  be  expected  that  two  or  three  squadron 
formations  would  co-operate  to  form  a  still  greater  striking 
force. 

1  A  letter  addressed  to  armies  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General 
Head-quarters,  on  the  19th  of  January  191 8,  said: '. . .  Until  such  time  as  the 
'number  of  regular  night-bombing  squadrons  is  increased,  Corps  squadrons 
'should  be  employed  as  required  against  suitable  targets  within  their  range, 
'under  arrangements  to  be  made  by  armies.  The  machines  of  Corps 
'squadrons  are  capable  of  carrying  approximately  the  same  weight  of  bombs 
'as  the  regular  night-bombing  machines,  and  are  suitable  for  night  flying. 
'This  means  of  supplementing  our  resources  has  been  adopted  in  certain 
'armies  but  it  is  capable  of  further  development . . .'       2  See  Appendix  XVII. 


1917-18]        THE  FIGHTING  SQUADRON  287 

There  was  much  difference  of  opinion  among  com- 
manders of  fighting  squadrons  about  the  size  of  the  sub- 
formation,  but  there  was  some  agreement  that  six  aero- 
planes were  too  many  for  cohesion  and  close  control  by  one 
leader.  Many  favoured  a  sub-formation  of  three,  and  it 
was  eventually  made  clear  to  the  brigade  commanders 
that  they  had  full  discretion  to  organize  their  patrols  as 
they  thought  best,  except  that  a  sub-formation  must  not 
exceed  the  limit  of  one  Flight.  Actually,  most  of  the 
fighting  squadrons  worked  in  three  sub-formations  of  five 
aeroplanes.  For  the  first  time  in  the  war,  the  commander 
of  the  fighting  squadron  here  emerges  as  a  leader  of  his 
squadron  in  the  air.  His  duties,  hitherto,  had  been  chiefly 
administrative  and  his  influence  on  the  morale  of  the  squad- 
ron had  to  be  exerted  from  his  chair  in  the  squadron  office 
rather  than  from  the  seat  of  an  aeroplane.  It  had  been 
approved,  in  January  191 8,  that,  in  the  fighting  squadrons, 
an  additional  aeroplane  should  be  added  to  the  agreed 
establishment  of  eighteen  for  the  use  of  the  squadron 
commander.  Early  in  February  this  establishment  was 
raised  to  twenty-four  aeroplanes  with  a  consequent  in- 
crease of  pilots  from  twenty  to  twenty-seven.  As  'Camel' 
(Clerget)  aeroplanes  were  immediately  available,  it  was 
decided  to  raise  six  'Camel'  squadrons  to  the  higher 
establishments  at  once,  but  there  ensued  a  little  delay 
because  of  an  insufficiency  of  trained  pilots.  By  the  21st 
of  March  191 8  seven  'Camel'  squadrons  had  been  made 
up  to  an  establishment  of  twenty- four  aeroplanes,  plus  one 
for  the  squadron  commander;  four  of  these  squadrons 
were  along  the  front  of  the  Third  Army,  and  one  was  with 
each  of  the  other  three  armies. 

For  some  weeks  before  the  German  offensive  opened 
air  patrols  were  maintained  opposite  the  Third  and 
Fifth  Army  fronts.  On  the  front  of  the  Third  Army 
'close'  and  'distant'  patrols  were  kept  up  by  the  squadrons 
of  the  Thirteenth  (Army)  Wing  of  the  III  Brigade.  Close 
patrols  were  of  the  area  between  the  front-line  trenches 
and  a  line  running  north  and  south  about  five  miles  on  the 
enemy  side.  Distant  patrols  covered  the  area  between  the 
outer  limit  of  the  close  patrols  and  a  line  about  nine  miles 


288  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

farther  east.  The  squadrons  on  the  distant  patrols  had 
two  Flights  working  at  a  time,  and  when  bombing  opera- 
tions or  photographic  reconnaissances  were  made,  the 
patrols  were  timed  and  positioned  in  close  co-operation 
with  the  bombing  or  photographic  formations.  Up  to  the 
1 6th  of  March  the  'close'  patrols  were  made  by  a  forma- 
tion of  one  Flight,  but  after  that  date  two  Flights  became 
common. 

When  the  Fifth  Army  had  begun  the  extension  south- 
wards by  taking  over  part  of  the  front  of  the  Third  Army 
on  the  1 8th  of  December  191 7,  the  attached  V  Brigade  of 
the  Royal  Flying  Corps  had  only  two  Corps  squadrons  and 
two  Army  squadrons  (48  and  54).  For  a  time  No.  48 
(Bristol  Fighter)  Squadron  did  long  reconnaissance  and 
photographic  work,  usually  by  single  aeroplanes,  and 
inner  offensive  patrols,  usually  by  four  or  five  aeroplanes. 
At  the  end  of  December  191 7  the  Army  Wing  (Twenty- 
second)  was  strengthened  by  Nos.  24  and  84  Squadrons 
which  at  first  sent  out  aeroplanes  to  patrol  in  pairs  to  keep 
the  Fifth  Army  front  clear  of  enemy  aircraft  up  to  the  line 
Lesdain-Villers-Outreaux-Beaurevoir-Ramicourt-Seque- 
hart.  From  the  beginning  of  January  1918,  however,  the 
orders  were  for  all  aircraft  to  operate  by  Flights,  and  the 
patrol  line  for  the  Fifth  Army  fighters  was  extended 
southwards,  first  to  Ribemont,  and  then  to  just  south  of 
Barisis  when  the  taking  over  from  the  French  was  com- 
pleted. Long  reconnaissances  continued  to  be  a  duty  of 
No.  48  Squadron  which  also  provided  offensive  patrols. 

When  the  squadrons  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing 
moved  south  to  the  Fifth  Army  sector  on  the  7th  of  March, 
the  fighters  were  given  an  offensive-patrol  area  stretching 
roughly  from  Cambrai  to  Le  Catelet.  The  boundary  be- 
tween the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies  was  eight  miles  south 
of  Cambrai  and  four  miles  north  of  Le  Catelet  so  that  the 
Ninth  Wing  offensive  patrols  covered  a  part  of  both  army 
fronts.  When  bombing  formations  of  Nos.  25  and  27 
Squadrons  were  operating,  the  times  and  routes  for  the 
fighter  patrols  were  closely  co-ordinated  with  those  fol- 
lowed by  the  bombers. 

Because  they  were  operating  over  the  central  area  of  the 


i9i8]  AIR  COMBATS  289 

line  to  be  attacked  by  the  enemy  on  the  21st  of  March,  the 
offensive-patrol  formations  of  the  head-quarters  fighting 
squadrons,  as  might  be  expected,  had  some  big  encounters, 
more  particularly  with  formations  led  by  Richthofen.  On 
the  1 2th  of  March  nine  Bristol  Fighters  of  No.  62  Squad- 
ron, while  on  offensive  patrol  between  Cambrai  and  Villers- 
Outreaux,  fought  Richthofen's  'Circus'  of  Fokker  triplanes 
and  Albatros  Scouts.  Four  of  the  Bristols  were  shot  down 
(one  by  Richthofen,  his  sixty-fourth  victory),  while  two 
of  the  enemy  fighters  were  destroyed. 

The  same  squadron  was  again  in  action  with  Richthofen 
next  morning.  On  this  occasion  they  were  co-operating 
with  a  bombing  attack  on  Denain  by  Nos.  25  and  27 
Squadrons.  Eleven  Bristols  of  No.  62  had  been  ordered  to 
patrol  the  line  Cambrai-Le  Cateau,  while  two  Flights  of 
'Camels'  of  No.  73  Squadron  were  given  the  line  Cambrai- 
Villers-Outreaux.  Richthofen  was  in  the  air  with  about 
thirty-five  Fokker  triplanes  and  Albatros  Scouts,  and  he 
promptly  took  the  chance  offered  him  to  attack  the  British 
formations  separately.  The  'Camels'  were  attacked  first 
and  two  of  them  were  shot  down,  one  in  flames  by 
Richthofen  himself,  but  in  the  rapid  fight  an  Albatros  and 
a  Fokker  were  also  destroyed.  Richthofen  did  not  pursue 
the  fight  with  the  'Camels'  but  passed  on  and,  within  a 
few  minutes,  met  the  Bristols  of  No.  62  Squadron.  The 
leader  of  the  Bristol  Fighters,  seeing  that  he  was  out- 
numbered, tried  to  avoid  combat,  but  at  the  same  time 
endeavoured  to  entice  Richthofen  from  the  line  of  the 
bombers.  He  did,  in  fact,  lead  the  German  formation 
away  for  a  considerable  distance  and  might  have  got  back 
to  the  lines  without  fighting  except  for  a  misunderstanding. 
A  manoeuvre  by  a  pilot  in  the  lower  Flight  of  Bristols  was 
misread  as  a  signal  for  a  diving  attack  on  a  group  of  Fokker 
triplanes,  and  a  general  dog-fight  ensued.  The  Bristols 
were  well  handled,  and  the  leader,  Captain  G.  F.  Hughes 
(observer  Captain  H.  Claye),  destroyed  two  Fokker  tri- 
planes, while  many  other  enemy  fighters  were  sent  down 
apparently  out  of  control:  two  of  the  Bristol  Fighters  were 
lost.  It  would  seem  that  in  one  or  other  of  these  two  fights, 
the  younger  Richthofen — Lothar — was  one  of  those  shot 


29o  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

down  out  of  control :  he  crashed  badly,  but  recovered  from 
his  injuries  after  several  weeks  in  hospital. 

The  Offensive  begins 
[Maps,  pp.  267  and  364] 

The  specific  duties  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons, 
once  the  German  offensive  opened,  had  been  defined  in  a 
series  of  schemes  which  were  displayed,  with  maps,  in  the 
observer  huts  in  each  squadron.  All  ranks  concerned  had 
orders  to  master  the  various  schemes  and  to  watch  the 
changes  on  the  maps  which  were  kept  up  to  date  as  new 
information  was  revealed  by  air  photography  or  from 
other  sources. 

In  the  Fifth  Army  Area  the  detailed  schemes  had  first 
been   circulated   by  the  V  Brigade  commander  in  the 
middle  of  January.  The  general  instructions  stated: 
{a)  The  Corps  machines  will  not  be  affected  except  that 
surplus   energy  after  the   day  operations  will  be 
directed  towards  night  bombing  behind  the  enemy 
lines  on  a  prepared  plan.1 
(b)  The  duties  of  the  Army  squadrons  in  order  of  im- 
portance are: 
(i)  Preventing     interference     with     our     Corps 

machines, 
(ii)  Attack  of  detraining  points,  debussing  centres, 
active-battery  positions,  and  troops  and  trans- 
port on  roads  with  a  view  to  hampering  the 
enemy's  reinforcements  and  prevent  him  press- 
ing home  the  full  weight  of  his  attacks, 
(iii)  Attack  of  the  enemy  front-line  troops  by  low- 
flying  machines, 
(iv)  Patrols  flying  high  over  the  area  of  operations 
in  order  to  enable  the  Army  machines  to  carry 
out  their  missions. 

1  Corps  squadrons  had  general  orders,  when  the  offensive  began,  to 
concentrate  on:  (i)  counter-battery  work;  (ii)  artillery  patrols;  (iii)  counter- 
attack patrols;  (iv)  counter-battery  photography;  (v)  harassing  of  enemy 
troops  and  transport  with  machine-gun  fire  and  bombs;  and  (vi)  night 
bombing. 


i9i8]  EMPLOYMENT  OF  SQUADRONS       291 

(c)  The  changing  personnel  and  the  varying  state  of 
serviceability  of  machines  in  a  Flight  will  render  it 
impracticable  to  detail  particular  Flights  to  par- 
ticular duties  in  accordance  with  each  scheme;  the 
above,  however,  does  not  apply  to  squadrons  who 
will  be  detailed  beforehand  to  their  particular  role, 
the  Commanding  Officers  being  responsible  for  the 
apportionment  of  the  work  within  their  unit. 

(d)  (i)  The  'Camels'  will  undertake  the  responsibility 

for  ensuring  continuance  of  work  on  the  part  of 

our  Corps  machines, 
(ii)  The   Bristol   Fighters   are  the   most   suitable 

machines  for  the  low-flying  work  in  accordance 

with  sections  (ii)  and  (iii)   of  sub.  para.  (J?) 

above, 
(iii)  The  S.E.5's  will  patrol  the  area  of  operations 

for  the  purpose  of  attacking  hostile  formations. 
Following  these  general  instructions  detailed  orders  had 
been  issued,  on  the  18th  of  January,  by  the  Officer  Com- 
manding the  Twenty-second  Wing.  The  'Camel'  squad- 
ron— No.  54 — by  close  escort  and  inner  protective  patrols, 
was  to  be  responsible  for  the  direct  protection  of  the  Corps 
squadrons;  No.  48  (Bristol  Fighter)  Squadron  was  to  keep 
two  Flights  available  for  attacking  specified  ground  targets, 
and  the  third  Flight  was  to  be  ready  for  long-distance  re- 
connaissance ;  Nos.  24  and  84  Squadrons  were  to  work  by 
Flights,  and  received  the  following  instructions:  'It  is 
'probable  that  enemy  infantry  attacks  will  take  place  at  or 
'just  before  dawn,  and  at  least  one  Flight  per  squadron 
'will  be  ready  to  get  off  immediately  there  is  sufficient 
'light.  It  will  not  be  possible  to  lay  down  the  height  of 
'patrols,  but  they  will  be  told  to  operate  over  the  battle 
'area  and  must  remember  that  their  role  is  purely  offensive, 
'and  the  enemy  must  be  sought  and  destroyed  throughout 
'the  patrol.  It  is  probable  that  most  fighting  will  take 
'place  at  below  2,000  feet  as  the  enemy  will  be  endeavour- 
ing to  co-operate  with  his  own  infantry.  Patrols  will 
'finish  their  flights  normally.  All  pilots  will  carry  one  drum 
'of  Buckingham,  and  all  enemy  balloons  in  the  battle 
'area  must  be  destroyed  or  kept  down.'  A  later  amendment 


292  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

stated  that  Nos.  23  and  24  Squadrons  would  'be  held  as  a 
'reserve  to  reinforce;  they  may  be  employed  on  any  of 
'the  roles  mentioned  therein'. 

The  instructions  to  the  squadrons  operating  with  the 
Third  Army  were  similar  in  kind.  Low-flying  'Camels'  of 
Nos.  3  and  46  Squadrons  were  to  operate  between  the 
Scarpe  and  the  southern  boundary  of  the  army  front ;  close 
offensive  patrols  of  the  Bristol  Fighter  and  S.E.5  Squad- 
tons,  starting  at  dawn,  were  to  work  in  conjunction  with 
the  low-flying  'Camels',  while  distant  offensive  patrols  by 
the  same  two  squadrons,  each  two  Flights  strong,  were 
ordered. 

The  low-flying  pilots  were  fully  informed  of  the  specific 
targets  they  were  to  attack.  The  whole  front  was  parcelled 
out  to  ensure  the  maximum  effect  from  the  limited  aircraft 
available,  and  every  pilot  knew  exactly  what  his  duty  would 
be,  and  was  given  full  opportunity,  before  the  offensive 
opened,  to  become  acquainted  with  the  ground. 

Such  were  the  plans,  comprehensive  and  detailed,  but 
the  weather  made  them  impossible  of  application.  On  the 
19th  of  March,  after  a  long  dry  spell,  there  was  rain,  with 
the  result  that  a  heavy  mist  spread  over  the  battle-field. 
With  the  coming  of  night  on  the  20th  the  mist  thickened 
and  gave  the  illusion  that  it  muffled  sound,  for  the  German 
artillery  fire  had  ceased.  The  unusual  silence  was  oppres- 
sive, and,  with  the  fog,  combined  to  produce  an  atmo- 
sphere of  the  macabre. 
21  March  At  4.45  a.m.  on  the  21st  of  March,  out  of  the  mist,  the 
crash  came.  Forward  and  battle  zones,  battery  positions, 
lines  of  communications,  head-quarters,  and  back  areas  to 
a  depth  of  twenty  miles  or  more,  were  suddenly  deluged 
with  shells,  many  of  them  gas,  and  although  the  bombard- 
ment was  fiercest  about  the  two  centre  Corps  of  the 
Third  Army  and  in  the  Fifth  Army  area,  it  was  heavy 
also  north  of  Arras,  at  Messines  and  Ypres,  and  against 
the  French  at  Rheims.  And  massed  along  the  fifty- four 
miles  of  front  between  the  Sensee  and  the  Oise  rivers, 
ready  and  waiting  to  be  launched  against  the  British, 
were  fifty-six  German  divisions,  with  twelve  more  divisions 
behind  them  to  be  thrown  in  as  the  battle  developed. 


1918]  FOG  293 

Opposed  to  this  vast  array  were  the  four  centre  divisions  21  March 
of  the  Third  Army  with  three  in  reserve,  and  eleven 
divisions  along  the  front  of  the  Fifth  Army  with  three 
other  divisions  and  three  cavalry  divisions  in  reserve. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Germans  attacked  the  whole 
front  of  the  Fifth  Army,  but  only  a  part  of  the  Third 
Army,  which  had  a  total  of  eight  divisions  in  the  line  with 
seven  more  in  reserve.  The  excepted  front  on  the  Third 
Army  was  the  Flesquieres  salient  which  the  enemy  hoped 
to  'pinch  out'  by  attacks  on  either  side. 

The  German  infantry  moved  forward  to  the  assault  at 
different  times  in  different  sectors  from  about  8  a.m.  on- 
wards, but  by  10  a.m.  the  advance  had  become  general. 
As  at  Cambrai  in  November  of  the  previous  year,  the  out- 
post line  of  machine-guns  was  blanketed  by  the  fog,  and 
none  of  the  elaborate  schemes  of  cross-fire,  designed  to 
check  the  advance,  could  be  put  into  operation.  Few  of 
the  outpost  troops,  especially  along  the  Fifth  Army  front, 
knew  what  was  happening  until  the  enemy  infantry  were 
in  their  rear.  Soon  after  the  attack  began  the  German 
troops  were  fighting  in  the  forward  zone,  and,  before  noon, 
they  had  penetrated  to  the  Fifth  Army's  battle  zone.  The 
first  that  many  of  the  battery  detachments  in  the  forward 
area  knew  of  the  attack  was  when  German  infantry  appeared 
suddenly  out  of  the  fog  a  hundred  yards  or  so  away.  Not 
many  of  the  light  signals  which  had  gone  up  along  the  outpost 
and  forward  line  of  the  Fifth  Army  had  been  seen,  telephonic 
communications  had  been  severed  by  the  German  bom- 
bardment, and  there  was  little  coming  down  from  the  air. 

Along  the  greater  part  of  the  front,  the  squadron  flying 
officers,  who  had  gone  out  in  spite  of  the  fog,  could  see 
little  of  what  was  happening.  There  were,  however,  ex- 
ceptions. On  the  Third  Army  front  the  visibility  in  the 
Lagnicourt  area  would  appear  to  have  been  better  in 
the  morning  than  elsewhere,  because  the  pilots  and 
observers  of  No.  59  (R.E.8)  Squadron  reported  much 
of  what  was  happening  there.  One  observer  of  this 
squadron,  who  had  gone  up  to  reconnoitre  at  6.15  a.m., 
was  able  to  follow  the  bombardment  along  the  whole 
front  of  the  IV  Corps,  and  reported  that  the  line  and 


294  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE         [ch.  vii 

21  March  wire  were  heavily  damaged,  particularly  at  Lagnicourt : 
the  flight  was  cut  short  at  7.45  a.m.  by  a  shell  which 
crashed  through  the  fuselage  of  the  aeroplane  and  severed 
some  of  the  controls.    Up  to  noon,  six  other  aeroplanes 
of  this  squadron  made  patrols  over  the  battle  area,  and 
the  observers  sent  down  to  the  British  artillery  many 
wireless  calls,  some  of  which  were  answered,  for  fire  on 
active  German  batteries.   From  one  observer  (Lieutenant 
J.  E.  Hanning;  pilot,  Second  Lieutenant  C.  E.  Williamson- 
Jones)  of  the  squadron  there  came  down,  between  11. 10 
a.m.  and  2.20  p.m.,  a  stream  of  wireless  messages  calling 
for  fire  on  specified  German  batteries  and  on  large  bodies 
of  infantry  massed  in  sunken  roads,  and  pouring  down  the 
roads  from  Queant  and  Pronville,  but  in  no  instance  did 
the  observer  see  an  answer  to  his  calls  from  the  British 
guns:  on  the  homeward  journey  messages  giving  the  posi- 
tions of  the  massed  enemy  troops  were  dropped  on  the 
Corps  head-quarters.     An  air  reconnaissance,  made  by 
Captain  D.  H.   Oliver  and   Second  Lieutenant  W.  H. 
Leighton  between  2.50  p.m.  and  3.50  p.m.,  when  the 
visibility  had  greatly  improved,  followed  the  whole  front 
of  the  German  advance  in  this  area  and  revealed  that  be- 
tween Bullecourt  and  Doignies  a   deep   bite  had   been 
made    into    the  Third  Army  front.    Louveral,   Lagni- 
court, Noreuil,  and  Bullecourt  were  in  enemy  hands,  and 
German  infantry  had  penetrated  to  the  British  trenches 
north-east  of  Vaulx-Vraucourt.   Just  before  this  observa- 
tion was  made,  another  observer  of  No.  59  Squadron  had 
had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  an  immediate  response  to  a 
call  for  fire  on  large  bodies  of  German  infantry  advancing 
in  the  open  west  of  Lagnicourt,  the  British  shells  falling 
among  the  enemy  troops  with  devastating  effect.    The 
last  aeroplane  of  No.  59  Squadron  left  the  lines  soon  after 
7  p.m.,  by  which  time  mist  had  once  again  shrouded  the 
battle-field.   The  squadron's  reports,  obtained  under  con- 
ditions of  much  difficulty,  had  given  a  fairly  comprehensive 
picture  of  the  German  advance,  which,  along  seven  miles 
of  the  front,  between  Doignies  and  Bullecourt,  had  taken 
the  enemy  into  the  British  forward  zone  to  an  average 
depth  of  about  3,000  yards.   The  extent  of  the  German 


i9i8]  THE  GERMAN  ADVANCE  295 

advance  immediately  west  of  Bullecourt  was  followed  from  21  March 
air  reports  by  No.  12  Squadron  (VI  Corps)  which  linked 
up  with  the  reports  made  by  No.  59  Squadron.  North- 
wards from  Bullecourt  and  southwards  from  Doignies  into 
the  Flesquieres  salient,  the  air  reports  showed  that  the  line 
of  the  Third  Army  was  little  changed.  Low-flying 
attacks  on  the  Third  Army  front  had  begun  at  6  a.m., 
when  six  'Camel'  pilots  of  No.  46  Squadron  found  a  group 
of  active  batteries  north  of  Bourlon  Wood  and  attacked 
them  with  25-lb.  bombs  and  with  machine-gun  fire. 
About  11.30  a.m.  five  of  the  same  squadron's  pilots  were 
in  the  air  again  and  saw  German  infantry  advancing  in 
force  near  Lagnicourt  with  the  British  troops  in  retire- 
ment to  the  reserve  line.  The  enemy  troops  were  promptly 
attacked  by  the  'Camels'  and  the  pressure  on  the  retiring 
British  infantry  was  temporarily  eased.  Four  other  low- 
flying  patrols  were  made  during  the  day  by  formations 
of  this  squadron  and  each  time  the  German  troops  and 
batteries  were  attacked. 

Over  much  of  the  front  of  the  Fifth  Army  the  fog  was 
denser  throughout  the  morning  than  it  was  farther  north, 
and,  in  places,  the  air  observers  could  see  nothing.  But 
how  formidable  was  the  German  advance,  at  least  on  the 
right  of  the  Fifth  Army,  was  known  from  an  air  report 
received  by  the  III  Corps  Commander  at  10.40  a.m. — a 
report  which  gave  him  the  first  disquieting  news  of  the 
situation  south  of  St.  Quentin.  The  enemy,  he  learned, 
was  already  into  the  battle  zone  at  the  supposedly  im- 
pregnable section  between  Essigny-le-Grand  and  Benay. 
The  observer  had  seen  German  troops  in  occupation  of 
part  of  Benay,  but  Hinacourt  to  the  south  was  still  in 
British  possession. 

About  1  p.m.  the  fog  lifted  enough  to  make  more  general 
observation  possible,  and  observers  who  went  far  afield 
over  the  German  lines  came  back  with  news  of  great  troop 
concentrations  on  all  roads  feeding  the  battle-front.  Par- 
ticularly were  they  dense  backwards  to  Aubencheul-aux- 
Bois,  behind  the  front  where,  at  Ronssoy,  south  of 
Cambrai,  the  Germans  had,  in  the  morning,  bitten 
deeply  into  the  battle  zone. 


296  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

21  March  Contact-patrol  observers,  in  the  afternoon  and  early 
evening,  were  able  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  situation  along 
much  of  the  Fifth  Army  front.  On  the  right  at  Essigny- 
le-Grand  and  Benay,  little  more  progress  was  made: 
Maissemy,  north-west  of  St.  Quentin,  however,  had 
fallen,  but  Le  Verguier,  in  the  forward  zone  farther 
north,  was  holding  out.  Templeux-le-Guerard  had  gone. 
The  observers  called  for  fire  on  many  of  the  German 
concentrations  and  batteries,  and  their  signals  were  often 
answered.  Their  work  was  punctuated  by  attacks  on 
German  contact-patrol  aeroplanes,  and  by  machine-gun 
and  bomb  attacks  on  German  troops  and  guns. 

Special  low-flying  attacks,  on  the  Fifth  Army  front, 
were  made  in  the  afternoon  by  Nos.  84  (S.E.5),  24  (S.E.5), 
and  23  (Spad)  Squadrons.  The  pilots  carried  bombs  of 
25-lb.  weight  and  attacked  such  suitable  targets  as  they 
found.  The  swiftly  changing  military  situation,  combined 
with  the  poor  visibility,  made  these  attacks  of  a  spasmodic 
kind.  No.  53  (R.E.8)  Squadron,  unattached  to  any  active 
Corps,1  was  employed,  from  1.20  p.m.  onwards,  on  line 
patrols  along  the  whole  Fifth  Army  front,  but  its  chief 
work  was  the  bombing  and  machine-gunning  of  German 
troops. 

The  organized  bombing  was  begun  as  soon  as  the 
weather  made  this  possible  in  the  afternoon.  At  9.30 
a.m.  on  the  21st  of  March  Royal  Flying  Corps  head- 
quarters had  ordered  attacks  on  the  railway  junctions 
at  Le  Cateau,  Busigny,  and  Wassigny.  Wassigny  was 
attacked  at  3.45  p.m.  by  nine  D.H.4?s  of  No.  25  Squad- 
ron: nine  112-lb.  and  forty  25-lb.  bombs  were  dropped 
from  15,000  feet  and  a  few  hits  were  claimed  on  the 
railway.  About  the  same  time  Le  Cateau  was  bombed 
by  seven  D.H.4's  of  No.  27  Squadron  from  14,000  feet 
and,  it  was  claimed,  the  majority  of  the  six  112-lb.  and 
thirty- two  25-lb.  bombs  hit  the  railway  track.  Two 
aircraft   only,  of  the  same   squadron,  attacked    Busigny 

1  No.  53  Squadron  had  moved  to  Villeselve,  near  Noyon,  at  the  end  of 
February,  for  attachment  to  the  IX  Corps  if  and  when  that  Corps  took 
over  a  stretch  of  line  from  the  French  near  Soissons.  The  German  attack 
came  before  the  line  could  be  taken  over. 


i9i8]     BOMBING  ATTACKS  ON  BRIDGES       297 

from  13,500  feet,  but  the  fall  of  the  bombs  was  unobserved  21  March 
owing  to  mist. 

In  the  Fifth  Army  area  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron  twice 
attacked  bridges  over  the  St.  Quentin  Canal,  with  ten 
D.H.4's  about  2.30  p.m.  and  with  eight  at  6  p.m.1  The 
bridges  attacked  were  at  Honnecourt,  Vendhuille,  and  Le 
Catelet.  A  total  of  two  hundred  25-lb.  bombs  were 
dropped,  but  none  of  the  bridges  was  broken :  troops  and 
transport  near  the  bridges  suffered  some  direct  hits.  Once 
again  the  bombing  was  done  from  about  15,000  feet,  the 
usual  height  for  day-bombing  by  the  de  Havilland  4's. 
The  object  of  the  routine  day-bombing  by  D.H.4's  was 
moral  effect  rather  than  destruction,  but,  on  the  21st  of 
March,  what  was  to  be  the  decisive  offensive  of  the  war  had 
begun,  and  the  destruction  of  vital  railway  junctions  or 
bridges  could  only  have  been  achieved,  if  at  all,  by  attacks 
made  from  very  low  heights,  say  under  1,000  feet.  The 
risks  to  the  attacking  aircraft  may  have  been  high,  but 
in  no  other  way  could  the  desired  results  have  been 
looked  for  with  any  certainty,  and,  in  the  circumstances,  it 
might  have  been  expected  that  the  existing  orders  that 
D.H.4's  were  not  to  bomb  at  heights  below  15,000  feet 
would  have  been  suspended.  These  orders  had  been  issued 
in  August  191 7  because  the  rate  of  supply  of  this  impor- 
tant aeroplane  was  slow  and  it  was  essential  to  keep  the 
wastage  as  low  as  possible. 

Air  fighting  throughout  the  afternoon  and  evening  of 
the  2 1  st  of  March  was  intense  and  confused.  Great 
numbers  of  German  aeroplanes  were  flying  low  over  the 
front  on  contact-patrol  work  and  otherwise  co-operating 
with  the  German  infantry,  while  fighting  formations  flew 
about  2,000  feet  with  higher  layers  at  7,000  feet.  The  Army 
squadrons  on  the  front  of  the  Fifth  Army  were  involved  in 

1  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron  were  shelled  out  of  their  aerodrome  at  Mons- 
en-Chaussee  in  the  morning  and  had  to  move  back  hurriedly  to  Champien. 
The  hangars  and  buildings  at  Mons-en-Chaussee  were  burnt.  'The  last 
'message  received  before  the  office  was  hit  by  a  shell  and  the  telephone 
'rendered  useless,'  said  the  Squadron  Commander,  S.  J  Goble,  '. . .  showed 
'how  the  Staff  could  carry  on  under  any  circumstances.  The  message  related 
'to  the  plans  for  providing  vegetables  in  view  of  the  shortage,  and  in- 
'structed  me  to  prepare  frames  at  once  for  the  planting  of  seedlings.' 


298  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

21  March  much  fighting,  chiefly  of  an  indecisive  kind.  Nos.  24  and 
84(S.E.s),  No.  23  (Spad),  No.  48  (Bristol  Fighter)  and  No. 
54  ('Camel')  Squadrons  attacked  ground  targets  from  low- 
heights  and  made  offensive  patrols  along  the  Army  front  at 
about  2,000  feet.  The  patrols,  however,  did  not  prevent 
many  attacks  being  made  on  the  four  Corps  squadrons1 
working  for  the  Fifth  Army,  and  all  suffered  casualties. 
Two  pilots  were  wounded,  one  pilot  and  observer  missing, 
three  aeroplanes  wrecked  after  combat,  and  three  others 
were  so  shot  about  that  they  had  to  be  returned  to  depot 
for  reconstruction.  These  casualties  compare  with  one 
pilot  and  one  observer  wounded  in  the  Army  squadrons, 
two  aircraft  wrecked,  and  one  returned  to  depot.2 

On  the  Third  Army  front  the  air  fighting,  probably 
owing  to  the  better  general  visibility  throughout  the  day, 
was  more  intense.  Offensive  patrols  began  at  10  a.m.  and 
continued  intermittently  till  dusk.  The  biggest  clash  of  the 
day  was  over  Bourlon  Wood  about  1.30  p.m.  and  involved 
two  S.E.5  formations  of  No.  56  Squadron,  two  S.E.5's  of 
No.  64,  and  three  enemy  formations  totalling  twenty-six 
aeroplanes.  Four  hostile  aeroplanes  were  shot  down  out  of 
control,  but  all  other  combats  were  indecisive.  An  offensive 
patrol  of  No.  1 1  Squadron  in  the  afternoon  destroyed  two 
German  two-seater  aeroplanes. 

Special  instructions  issued  to  the  head-quarters  fighting 
squadrons  at  9.3O  a.m.  on  the  morning  of  the  21st  were  for 
offensive  patrols  between  Cambrai  and  Le  Catelet  and  as 
far  south  as  Lesdins  to  give  additional  protection  along  the 
Third  and  Fifth  Army  fronts  and  to  assist  the  bombing 
operations  by  Nos.  25  and  27  Squadrons.  Five  offensive 
patrols  were  made  in  the  afternoon  and  evening,  but  little 
fighting  resulted.  Two  enemy  aeroplanes  of  a  formation 
often  Fokker  triplanes  and  Albatros  Scouts  were  destroyed 
by  Bristol  Fighters  of  No.  62  Squadron,  but  the  only  loss 

1  Nos.  52,  8,  35,  and  82. 

2  On  the  Third  Army  front  the  casualties  to  the  Corps  squadrons  were 
due,  with  one  exception,  to  rifle  or  machine-gun  fire  from  the  ground. 
From  this  cause  one  aeroplane  was  wrecked  and  eight  had  to  be  returned  to 
depot.  The  exception  was  the  aeroplane,  already  referred  to,  which  was 
pierced  by  a  shell. 


i9i8]  GERMAN  EVIDENCE  299 

to  the  squadrons  of  the  Ninth  Wing  was  a  'Camel'  of  21  March 
No.  80  Squadron  shot  down  into  'No-Mans  Land'.  The 
offensive  patrols  of  the  fighting  squadrons  (3  Naval,  2  and 
4  Australian  Flying  Corps,  22,  40,  43,  and  18)  attached  to 
the  First  Army,  were  diverted  to  cover  the  Third  Army 
front  and  had  many  combats  in  which  four  German  aero- 
planes were  destroyed.  These  squadrons  continued  for  the 
remainder  of  the  battle  to  operate  mainly  over  the  front  of 
the  Third  Army. 

Published  histories  of  some  of  the  German  regiments 
engaged  in  the  offensive  make  reference  to  the  work  of 
British  aircraft  on  the  21st  of  March.  The  2nd  Bavarian 
Regiment,  near  Urvillers,  south  of  St.  Quentin,  tells 
how,  'with  improving  visibility  the  airmen  soon  turned 
'up  and  ...  in  the  most  daring  manner  flew  very  low 
'over  the  ground  and  threw  bombs  causing  us  con- 
siderable losses'.  This  regiment  made  progress  south  of 
Urvillers  and,  about  3  p.m.,  the  regimental  staff  arrived 
at  a  sunken  road  where  dug-outs  were  available  for  a  com- 
mand post.  'The  signal  officer,  Lieutenant  Weisz',  says  the 
history,  'had  just  signalled  back  to  Brigade,  and  the 
'Regimental  Adjutant  was  issuing  orders  to  the  sub- 
ordinate members  of  the  staff  who  had  tentatively  taken 
'shelter  in  the  sunken  road,  when  a  deafening  explosion 
'robbed  us  for  some  moments  of  consciousness.  A  hostile 
'airman  had  spotted  the  concentration  and  caused  his 
'blessing  in  bombs  to  rain  upon  us.  The  signal  officer,  the 
'excellent  Weisz,  was  killed  instantaneously.  The  regi- 
'mental  staff  was  decimated.  The  adjutant,  Lieutenant 
'Hans  Zorn,  was  so  badly  wounded  that  he  had  to  be 
'relieved.'1 

The  German  120th  Regiment  was  ordered  forward  to 
Villers-Guislain  when  it  was  learned,  about  1 1  a.m.,  that 
the  German  infantry  were  making  little  progress  in  the 
fighting  between  Gouzeaucourt  and  Epehy.  While  the 
regiment  was  on  the  move  the  sun  came  out.  'To  our 
'sorrow',  says  the  regimental  history,  'British  squadrons  of 

1  Direct  hits  on  troops  packed  in  the  sunken  roads  south  of  Urvillers  were 
claimed  for  three  bombs  dropped  by  a  reconnaissance  aeroplane  of  No.  82 
Squadron.  Two  hundred  machine-gun  rounds  were  also  fired. 


3oo  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

21  March  'aircraft  appeared  on  the  battle-field,  while  ours  were  still 
'as  yet  absent',  and  goes  on  to  tell  how  the  regiment 
suffered  under  heavy  British  artillery  fire  'directed  with 
marvellous  accuracy  by  their  airmen'.1  Another  regiment, 
advancing  from  Honnecourt  in  the  same  area,  passed 
'  'German  artillery  which  had  sixty  horses  killed  by  a  British 
'airman  who  caught  them  on  the  march'. 

The  German  66th  Regiment,  which  attacked  at 
Maissemy,  was  held  up.  British  aeroplanes  flew  over  the 
regiment  and  their  appearance  was  followed  by  heavy  and 
accurate  shelling.  The  airmen  also  bombed  and  attacked 
with  machine-guns  the  German  positions  behind  a  hill — 
which  was  the  regiment's  immediate  objective.  The  sum- 
mit of  the  hill  was  taken  in  the  early  evening,  but  could  not 
be  held  owing  to  violent  artillery  fire.2 

The  German  n6th  Regiment  found  difficulties  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Hargicourt,  south  of  Ronssoy.  The 
ammunition  began  to  run  out  and,  as  there  was  no  German 
artillery  support,  the  regiment  came  more  or  less  to  a  stand- 
still. A  British  aeroplane  then  appeared  and,  within  a  few 
minutes,  the  hollow  in  which  the  regiment  was  assembled 
was  heavily  bombarded,  with  the  result  that  orders  had  to 
be  given  to  fall  back. 

On  the  Third  Army  front,  testimony  to  the  work  of 
No.  46  Squadron  comes  from  the  history  of  the  10th 
Bavarian  Regiment.  While  the  II  and  III  battalions  were 
climbing  the  high  ground  north-west  of  Ecoust-St.  Mein, 
preparatory  to  an  attack,  'They  got  a  rotten  time.  .  .  . 
'About  a  dozen  English  low-flying  battle  aeroplanes 
'whizzed  up,  and  from  an  incredibly  low  height  bombed 
'our  advancing  troops.  This  caused  great  confusion,  and 
'to  make  matters  worse  our  own  artillery  frequently  fired 
'short  so  that  further  advance  became  impossible  .  .  .' 

The  73rd  Regiment  also  suffered  in  the  same  area.  'The 

1  These  troops  were  reported  by  observers  of  No.  8  Squadron. 

2  Pilots  and  observers  of  No.  35  Squadron  made  many  attacks  on  troops 
and  transport  in  the  Maissemy  area  where  they  dropped  a  total  of  one 
hundred  and  sixteen  25-lb.  bombs,  and  fired  hundreds  of  rounds  of 
ammunition.  They  also  called,  by  wireless,  for  fire  on  fleeting  targets  of 
massed  infantry  and  cavalry.  One  such  call,  on  1,500  German  infantry,  was 
immediately  answered  by  fire  which  caused  great  havoc. 


i9i8]  READJUSTING  THE  LINE  301 

'English',  it  is  stated,  'got  valuable  support  from  their  air-  21  March 
'craft  which  attacked  regardless  of  consequences.  The 
'squadrons,  flying  very  low,  found  profitable  targets,  for 
'bomb  and  machine-gun,  in  the  thickly  concentrated 
'masses  of  the  inth  and  2nd  Guards  Reserve  Divisions. 
'Our  own  airmen  were  absent.' 

The  German  advance  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle 
compelled  readjustments  of  the  line,  notably  on  the  Fifth 
Army  right  where  the  German  bite  into  the  battle  zone  of 
the  III  Corps,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Essigny-le-Grand, 
had  created  an  untenable  position.  In  the  afternoon  of  the 
21st  the  III  Corps  Commander,  after  consultation  with 
the  Fifth  Army  Commander,  had  decided  to  withdraw 
during  the  night  to  the  line  of  the  Crozat  Canal.  The 
movement,  which  began  at  midnight,  was  completed  with- 
out enemy  interference,  but  the  German  troops  followed 
closely  and  reached  Jussy,  on  the  Canal,  soon  after  4  a.m. 
on  the  22nd.  This  movement  of  the  III  Corps  compelled 
a  bending  back  of  the  front  of  the  XVIII  Corps  on  its  left 
to  conform.  Meanwhile,  on  the  Third  Army  front,  the 
German  advance  on  the  21st,  particularly  in  the  Louveral 
area,  had  made  hazardous  the  position  of  the  divisions  in 
the  Flesquieres  salient  and,  during  the  night,  a  limited 
withdrawal,  involving  also  the  left  of  the  Fifth  Army, 
had  been  successfully  accomplished. 

It  became  necessary  to  move  back  all  squadrons  with 
the  Fifth  Army,  and  five  squadrons  with  the  Third  Army. 
No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron,  shelled  out  of  its  aerodrome  at 
Mons-en-Chaussee  on  the  21st  had  gone  to  Champien, 
east  of  Roye,  at  once,  but  the  moves  of  the  other  squadrons 
did  not  take  place  until  the  22nd. 

The  fog  was  again  dense  on  the  morning  of  the  22nd  22  March 
from  dawn  to  about  midday.  Fighting  on  the  Third  Army 
front  was  intense  throughout  the  day  in  the  area  of  the 
two  Corps  north  of  the  Flesquieres  salient.  In  the 
morning  German  troops  broke  through  the  line  of 
unfinished  trenches,  known  as  the  Green  Line,  that 
represented  the  third  defensive  system  between  Vaulx- 
Vraucourt  and  Morchies,  but  local  counter-attacks  partly 
restored  the  situation.    In  the  afternoon,  however,  there 


302  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

22  March  came  the  disquieting  news  that  the  enemy  had  penetrated 
to  Vraucourt  village.  A  special  air  reconnaissance  was  sent 
to  clear  up  the  situation  ancj,  meanwhile,  so  threatening 
did  it  appear  that  three  companies  of  tanks  with  infantry 
in  support  were  ordered  to  counter-attack.  The  air  report 
showed  that,  at  3.30  p.m.,  the  enemy  was  along  the 
northern  outskirts  of  Vraucourt  village  which  was  other- 
wise in  British  hands;  elsewhere  the  line  was  closely 
observed  and  noted.  While  the  aeroplane  was  over  the 
position  German  infantry  were  seen  advancing  to  attack 
east  of  Vaulx- Vraucourt :  they  were  at  once  engaged  with 
machine-gun  fire  from  the  aeroplane  at  a  height  of  700 
feet,  and  forced  to  lie  down.  The  counter-attack  of  the 
tanks  and  infantry  was  made  with  great  gallantry,  but  with 
heavy  losses  to  the  tanks.  A  contact-patrol  observer  at 
6.30  p.m.  watched  part  of  the  attack  in  progress  and 
reported  its  success.  The  enemy,  it  was  clear,  was  being 
pushed  back  eastwards  of  Vaulx- Vraucourt,  while  south- 
east of  the  village  the  tanks  were  advancing  across  the 
Vaulx- Vraucourt-Morchies  road.  Elsewhere  on  the  Third 
Army  front  the  German  attacks  were,  for  the  most  part, 
held,  except  at  Croisilles  and  St.  Leger  where  a  bite  was 
made  into  the  line. 

No.  46  Squadron  was  the  only  fighting  squadron  on  the 
Third  Army  front  used  solely  for  low-flying  attacks.  Six 
pilots  went  out  together  at  1.30  p.m.,  five  at  4.20  p.m.,  and 
five  at  5.10  p.m.  On  each  occasion  enemy  aeroplanes  were 
encountered  and  combats  ensued,  but  German  infantry 
and  transport  were  bombed  and  attacked  with  machine- 
gun  fire. 

On  the  front  of  the  Fifth  Army,  where  the  pressure  was 
greatest,  the  enemy  made  formidable  progress.  Observers 
who  flew  over  the  right  of  the  Fifth  Army  in  the  early 
afternoon,  continuously  harassed  by  enemy  airmen,  re- 
ported German  infantry  across  the  Crozat  Canal  and 
Terguier  in  enemy  hands.  At  4.50  p.m.  German  troops 
were  seen  in  shell-holes  at  Dury,  and  the  British  were 
reported  massing  south  of  the  Somme  canal  between 
Sommette  Eaucourt  and  Ollezy.  On  the  front  of  the  XIX 
Corps  great  pressure  was  reported  in  the  afternoon  down 


i9i8]  A  CRITICAL  SITUATION  303 

the  Cologne  valley  with  Roisel  threatened  by  German  22  March 
progress  at  Hervilly  and  Jeancourt.  The  situation  at 
Hervilly  had  been  eased  by  a  spirited  counter-attack  by 
dismounted  cavalry  and  tanks  between  noon  and  I  p.m., 
but  an  air  observer  over  the  position  at  1.10  p.m.  reported 
the  enemy  pressing  forward  again  in  this  area.  By  sheer 
weight  of  numbers  the  line  was  forced  back  from  the  battle 
zone  and  the  troops  retired,  under  orders,  to  the  marked-out 
Green  Line  of  trenches  between  Villeveque  and  Boucly. 
To  the  north,  the  air  reports  showed  little  change  in  the 
line,  but  in  the  late  afternoon  the  troops  were  ordered 
back  to  the  rear  line  of  defence  between  Nurlu  and 
Equancourt. 

There  now  developed  a  critical  situation  opposite  St. 
Quentin.  Stubborn  fighting  had  held  the  enemy  assault 
between  the  Cologne  and  Omignon  valleys,  but,  south  of 
the  Omignon,  a  gap  developed  between  the  right  of  the 
50th  Division  and  the  left  of  the  6 1st  Division,  and 
through  this  gap  enemy  troops  penetrated  the  so-called 
Green  Line  at  Vaux  and  Beauvois.  The  position 
between  the  Cologne  and  Omignon  valleys  was  thus 
turned.  The  last  reserves  available  to  the  Fifth  Army 
Commander  had  already  been  thrown  into  the  battle, 
counter-attacks  to  restore  the  line  south  of  the  Omignon 
were  out  of  the  question,  and  there  was  nothing  to  be  done 
but  order  a  retirement  to  the  partly  prepared  bridgehead 
positions  east  of  the  Somme.  At  10.45  p.m.  it  was  ordered 
that  the  III  Corps  should  stand  fast  at  the  line  of  the 
Crozat  Canal,  the  XVIII  Corps  should  fight  rear-guard 
actions  back  to  the  Ham  defences  of  the  Somme,  that  the 
XIX  Corps  should  hold  the  partly  prepared  Peronne 
bridgehead,  and  that  the  VII  Corps  should  hold  the 
Green  Line. 

On  the  Fifth  Army  front  low-flying  attacks  with  25 -lb. 
bombs  and  with  machine-guns  were  made  by  Nos.  24 
and  84  (S.E.5)  Squadrons,  by  No.  35  (Armstrong- Whit- 
worth)  Squadron,  and,  to  a  less  extent,  by  No.  53  (R.E.8) 
Squadron  which  had  been  given  the  task  of  patrol- 
ling the  front  to  help  protect  the  Corps  aeroplanes.  In 
addition,  all   Corps    squadrons   dropped   bombs   during 


3o4  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

22  March  their  co-operation  flights.  A  total  of  seven  hundred  and 
thirty  25-lb.  bombs  were  dropped  by  these  various  squad- 
rons. There  is  some  evidence,  from  the  German  side,  of 
the  effect  of  these  attacks.  The  regimental  history  of  the 
52nd  Regiment,  which  took  part  in  the  attack  on  Holnon 
Wood,  states  that  the  companies  which  moved  along  the 
south  edge  of  the  wood  were  hit  with  bombs,  and  pays 
tribute  to  'the  way  in  which  these  airmen  came  down  to 
'20  metres  in  order  to  throw  their  bombs'.  Later  in  the 
day,  German  troops  near  the  wood  were  bombed  again,  and, 
according  to  prisoners'  statements,  a  Grenadier  regiment 
suffered  such  casualties  that  it  had  to  be  relieved  next 
day.  It  was  also  affirmed  that  a  battery  of  artillery  was 
destroyed  by  aircraft  bombs  and  that  the  majority  of  the 
gunners,  together  with  twelve  horses,  had  been  killed.1 
On  the  Third  Army  front  an  attack  by  the  German  1 1  ith 
Division  near  Mory  was  held  up.  'Under  the  heavy 
'artillery  and  machine-gun  fire  and  frequent  attacks  by  air 
'squadrons  the  attack  cannot  go  on',  says  the  history  of  the 
German  76th  Regiment. 

Air  reconnaissances  in  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  the 
22nd  of  March  reported  widespread  activity  behind  the 
whole  German  front.  To  hamper  the  enemy  movements 
bombing  raids  were  made  by  the  head-quarters  squadrons 
on  the  same  railway  junctions  as  were  attacked  on  the  21st. 
Eight  D.H.4's  of  No.  25  Squadron  bombed  Wassigny  in 
the  afternoon,  while  ten  of  No.  27  Squadron  attacked 
Le  Cateau  and  Busigny.  On  the  Third  Army  front 
No.  49  (D.H.4)  Squadron  bombed  a  dump  at  Tilloy, 
north  of  Cambrai,  and  on  the  Fifth  Army  front  No.  5 
(Naval)  Squadron,  in  two  attacks,  dropped  one  hundred 
and  seventy-six  25-lb.  and  six  112-lb.  bombs  on  the  St. 
Quentin  Canal  bridges,  and  on  villages  and  railway  sidings 
in  the  vicinity.  To  the  north,  outside  the  battle  area, 
distant  bombing  on  railway  junctions  was  done  by  squad- 
rons of  the  I  and  II  Brigades. 

There  was  a  great  amount  of  desultory  air  fighting 

1  Twelve  S.E.5a's  of  No.  84  Squadron  dropped  forty-five  25-lb.  bombs 
on  troops  and  transport  near  Holnon  about  5  p.m.  and  claimed  many 
direct  hits. 


i9i8]  NINTH  WING  PATROLS  305 

in  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  the  22nd  when  large  22  March 
numbers  of  enemy  aircraft  were  flying  at  all  heights.  Of 
the  German  low-flying  aeroplanes  which  made  attacks  on 
the  British  infantry  toll  was  taken:  two  were  shot  down 
by  anti-aircraft  fire,1  and  one  by  rifle  or  machine-gun  fire 
from  the  ground. 

The  orders  for  the  squadrons  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth 
Wing,  on  the  22nd,  were  for  twelve  'Camels'  of  No.  73 
Squadron  to  patrol  the  Third  Army  front  for  two  hours 
between  Marquion  and  Le  Catelet,  while  twelve  of  No. 
80  Squadron  covered  the  Fifth  Army  front  between 
Magny-la-Fosse  and  Brissy.  The  patrols  were  due  to 
begin  at  7  a.m.  and  to  be  repeated  at  intervals  during 
the  day.  In  addition,  twelve  Bristol  Fighters  of  No.  62 
Squadron  were  to  patrol  for  two  hours  from  9  a.m. 
between  Marquion  and  Le  Catelet,  and  from  1  p.m. 
between  Le  Catelet  and  Itancourt,  while  six  'Dolphins' 
of  No.  79  Squadron  were  to  be  on  the  line  Vaux-Quessy 
for  ij  hours  from  9  a.m.,  n  a.m.,  and  3.15  p.m.  The 
records  of  the  squadrons,  except  No.  73,  are  missing, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  say  how  far  the  above  orders 
were  fulfilled  in  the  afternoon  when  flying  became  pos- 
sible. No.  73  did  one  patrol,  eleven  strong,  in  the  early 
afternoon,  and  had  many  combats.  On  the  outward 
journey,  near  Ham,  the  leaders  of  the  two  'Camel'  for- 
mations, Captains  A.  H.  Orlebar  and  T.  S.  Sharpe,  led 
their  pilots  in  a  dive  on  a  large  German  formation,  and 
each  leader  shot  down  one  Albatros,  both  of  which  were 
seen  to  crash — one  in  flames.  Half  an  hour  later,  the 
'Camels',  north-west  of  St.  Quentin,  attacked  a  formation 
of  eight  Albatros  fighters  which  were  shortly  joined  by 
twenty  others.  In  a  brief,  intense  fight,  one  Albatros  was 
destroyed  and  others  driven  down.  The  'Camels',  without 
loss,  re-formed  and  went  on  to  Roisel,  where  five  two-seaters 
were  found  and  attacked  and  two  of  them  destroyed. 
Captain  Orlebar  received  a  bullet  in  the  leg,  but  this  was 

1  Figures  are  available  of  the  action  of  the  anti-aircraft  defences  on  the 
Fifth  Army  front.  These  show  that  from  the  2 1st  of  March  to  the  31st, 
inclusive,  four  Fifth  Army  anti-aircraft  batteries  destroyed  seventeen 
aeroplanes,  and  hit  and  probably  damaged  twelve  others. 

2504.4  T 


3o6  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

22-23  the  only  casualty  among  the  'Camel'  pilots,  who  returned 
March  to  their  aerodrome  with  a  record  of  six  German  aircraft 
destroyed. 

The  fighter  squadrons  of  the  I,  III  and  V  Brigades  had 
little  respite  throughout  the  day.  Owing  to  the  fact  that 
they  made  many  attacks,  with  bombs,  on  ground  targets, 
much  of  the  fighting  took  place  at  low  heights.  A  total  of 
thirty-one  German  aeroplanes  were  claimed  as  destroyed 
in  combat  along  the  whole  British  front  (chiefly,  however, 
on  the  fronts  of  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies),  while  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  casualties  were  four  aeroplanes  miss- 
ing, fifteen  wrecked,  and  eleven  (temporarily  unservice- 
able after  combat)  burnt  or  abandoned  when  the  squadrons 
moved  back. 

During  the  night  of  the  22nd/23rd  of  March  No.  101 
Squadron  made  many  bombing  expeditions  to  billets, 
&c.,  opposite  the  Fifth  Army  front  between  St.  Gobain 
Wood  and  Bellicourt.  The  pilots  had  roving  commis- 
sions and  were  to  judge  their  targets  by  lights  displayed 
by  the  enemy.  In  all,  four  hundred  and  eighty-four 
25-lb.  and  six  40-lb.  (phosphorous)  bombs  were  dropped, 
and  dumps  near  Travecy  and  Castres  were  set  on  fire. 
For  part  of  the  night,  operations  had  to  be  stopped 
owing  to  bombing  attacks  on  the  aerodrome  by  German 
aircraft.  Although  the  visibility  was  not  good  and 
prevented  a  special  night  reconnaissance  which  had  been 
ordered  to  be  made  with  the  help  of  parachute  flares, 
the  bombing  pilots  and  observers  brought  back  a  fair 
amount  of  useful  information,  notably  that  there  was  a 
great  westward  movement  of  troops  and  transport  on  the 
Mont  d'Origny-St.  Quentin  road.  No.  102  Squadron 
attacked  billeting  areas  and  trains,  throughout  the  night, 
opposite  the  Third  Army  front  and  dropped  three 
hundred  and  twenty-one  25-lb.  bombs.  Other  night- 
bombing,  north  of  the  battle  area,  was  done,  notably  by 
Nos.  58,  83,  2,  16,  and  4  Squadrons. 

The  information  supplied  by  the  night  bombers  of 
No.  101  Squadron,  that  great  numbers  of  enemy  troops 
were  moving  along  the  Mont  d'Origny-St.  Quentin  road, 
reached  the  Fifth  Army  Commander  at  3  a.m.  on  the 


i9i8]  CONTACT  PATROL  REPORTS        307 

23rd.  This  news  of  fresh  masses  moving  towards  the  thin  23  March 
line  of  the  Fifth  Army,  when  considered  with  the  fact  that 
the  enemy  had  already  forced  the  line  of  the  Crozat  Canal 
and  had  also  taken  the  Vaux-Poeuilly  positions,  led  the 
Fifth  Army  Commander  to  alter  his  decision,  conveyed  to 
the  various  Corps  a  few  hours  before,  to  offer  battle  east  of 
the  Somme.  The  XIX  Corps  were  now  ordered  by  tele- 
phone to  withdraw  gradually  west  of  the  Somme  with 
outposts  east  of  the  river.  These  orders  were  confirmed 
on  the  23rd  at  9.30  a.m.  and  the  VII  Corps  were  told 
to  conform  and  take  up  the  general  line  Nurlu-Doingt. 
These  orders  meant  an  abandonment  of  the  main  Peronne 
bridgehead  position,  but  a  battle  east  of  the  river  fought 
by  fresh  and  overwhelming  numbers  of  the  enemy  against 
the  tired  troops  of  the  Fifth  Army  might  have  led  to  a 
decisive  defeat  with  a  consequent  open  road  to  Amiens 
ready  for  immediate  exploitation. 

The  pressure  was  great  along  the  whole  battle-front 
throughout  the  23rd  of  March.  North  of  the  Bapaume- 
Cambrai  road,  the  centre  of  the  Third  Army,  fighting 
relentlessly,  yielded  little  ground.  The  air  reports,  helped 
by  the  good  visibility  after  a  morning  haze,  revealed  the 
strength  of  the  attacks  on  this  front  and  the  stubborn 
resistance  of  the  IV  and  VI  Corps  of  the  Third  Army. 
German  troops  were  reported  from  the  air  moving  to  the 
attack  most  of  the  day,  and  the  sway  of  the  battle,  parti- 
cularly at  Mory,  where  a  break-through  was  threatened, 
and  at  Beugny,  can  be  followed  in  the  contact-patrol  re- 
ports supplied  to  the  defending  commanders  by  the  Corps 
squadrons.  So  serious  was  the  threat  on  this  part  of  the 
Third  Army  front  that  the  squadrons  of  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  were  called  upon  to  extend  their  low-flying  attacks. 
The  orders  were  for  two  Flights  of  No.  3  Squadron  to 
leave  at  dawn  on  the  23rd  for  attacks  on  ground  targets 
and  for  two  Flights  of  No.  46  ('Camel')  Squadron  to  stand 
by  for  similar  work  as  required.  Other  squadrons,  however, 
were  also  used  as  the  magnitude  of  the  German  effort 
became  apparent. 

Some  of  the  records  of  the  fighting  squadrons  are  miss- 
ing, but  their  main  activities  are  clear  enough.    Four 


3o8  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

23  March 'Camels'  of  No.  46  Squadron  which  left  at  2.25  p.m. 
attacked  massed  troops  on  the  outskirts  of  Vaulx- Vrau- 
court.  At  3.20  p.m.  eight  S.E.5a's  of  No.  41  Squadron 
were  sent  out  specially  to  attack  troops  in  trenches  and 
on  roads  in  the  Bapaume-Cambrai  area,  which  they  did 
with  effect.  A  little  later  R.E.8's  of  No.  59  Squadron, 
followed  by  S.E.5a's  of  No.  56,  were  over  Vraucourt 
shooting  at  and  bombing  masses  of  German  infantry  and 
transport.1  At  the  same  time  two  Flights  of  'Camels'  of 
No.  4  (Australian  Flying  Corps)  Squadron,  one  of  the 
fighting  squadrons  of  the  First  Army  which  were  em- 
ployed over  the  Third  Army  area,  flew  one  above  the 
other  and  found  plentiful  targets  in  Vaulx- Vraucourt 
and  on  the  roads  and  fields  east  and  west  of  the  village. 
While  the  Australian  pilots  were  attacking,  German 
fighters  intervened  and  two  of  them  were  shot  down  and 
crashed  by  the  leader  of  the  upper  Flight  of  'Camels'. 
Eight  'Camels'  of  No.  3  (Naval)  Squadron  (also  First 
Army)  went  out  on  low  offensive  patrol  at  4  p.m.,  and 
six  at  4.30  p.m.,  and  both  formations  had  many  combats 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Vaulx- Vraucourt,  as  a  result  of 
which  two  enemy  fighters  were  destroyed.  'Camels'  of 
No.  46  Squadron  were  over  the  battle  area  again  at 
5.10  p.m.  and,  some  time  in  the  afternoon,  fighters  from 
the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing  squadrons  also  took  part 
in  the  low-flying  operations  on  this  front. 

South  of  the  Bapaume-Cambrai  road  the  right  Corps  of 
the  Third  Army,  which  had  held  the  Flesquieres  salient, 
was  compelled  to  fall  back  to  conform  with  the  retirement 
of  the  Fifth  Army.  The  failure  to  evacuate  the  salient  in 
time  gravely  imperilled  the  safety  of  the  garrisons,  and  led 
to  the  Third  Army  losing  touch  with  the  Fifth  in  spite 
of  G.H.Q.  orders  that  it  was  responsible  for  maintain- 
ing touch.  The  retirement  of  the  Fifth  Army  to  the 
Somme  was  made  in  the  face  of  incessant  attacks  by 
superior  numbers  of  comparatively  fresh  German  in- 
fantry. The  enemy  began  by  increasing  his  hold  in 
the    morning   west    of  the  Crozat   Canal,   the  passage 

1  About  3.30  p.m.  five  German  infantry  attacks  were  launched  from  the 
direction  of  Vaulx- Vraucourt  and  five  from  Beaumetz-lez-Cambrai. 


i9i8]  THE  GAP  IN  THE  LINE  309 

of  which  he  forced  at  Jussy  and  Mennessis.  Thence  23  March 
throughout  the  afternoon  there  was  fierce  and  confused 
fighting  in  the  wooded  ground  west  of  the  canal.  Farther 
north,  at  Ham,  which  the  enemy  entered  in  the  morning, 
the  passage  of  the  river  was  forced,  as  it  was  also  at 
Pithon.  But  north  of  Ham,  where  the  XVIII  and  XIX 
Corps  were  in  position  west  of  the  Somme  by  the  after- 
noon, with  the  majority  of  the  bridges  in  front  of  them 
destroyed,  no  Germans  had  crossed  the  river  by  night- 
fall of  the  23rd. 

At  the  junction  of  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies  the  weak- 
ness developed.  During  the  morning  the  VII  Corps — the 
left  Corps  of  the  Fifth  Army — was  ordered  to  withdraw 
from  the  Nurlu  line  to  the  Canal  du  Nord.  Its  rear-guards 
were  driven  back,  and  the  V  Corps — the  right  Corps  of 
the  Third  Army — unwilling  to  evacuate  the  salient  did 
not  retire  sufficiently  far  and  thereafter  touch  between 
the  adjacent  Corps  was  spasmodic.  In  heavy  fighting  in 
the  afternoon,  the  VII  Corps  was  pushed  back  west  of 
Peronne  to  the  high  ground  about  Bouchavesnes  and 
south  of  Sailly-Saillisel  with  the  V  Corps  on  its  left  along 
the  Green  Line  which  extended  northwards  east  of  Ytres. 
There  was,  however,  a  gap  of  three  miles  between  the 
two  Corps. 

The  oncoming  sweep  of  the  German  masses  and  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British  Corps  throughout  the  23rd  was 
reported  in  some  detail  by  the  contact-patrol  observers 
who  had  remarkable  views  of  the  struggle.  There  was  little 
shell-fire  on  either  side,  but  one  great  stretch  of  the  battle 
area  was  obscured  in  the  afternoon  by  smoke  which  spread 
back  as  far  as  Nurlu  from  burning  stores  in  Peronne. 
Many  wireless  calls  from  the  air  for  fire  on  German 
advancing  troops  went  unanswered  owing  to  the  rapidity 
with  which  the  British  batteries  had  to  move  and  to  the 
fact  that  they  could  not,  or  did  not,  erect  their  wireless 
aerials.  There  were,  however,  exceptions,  notably  on  the 
XIX  Corps  front,  where  wireless  calls,  or  dropped  messages, 
brought  fire  to  bear  on  strong  columns  of  German  infantry. 
All  the  Corps  aeroplanes  carried  bombs  and  the  pilots  and 
observers,  who  seldom  flew  above  1,000  feet,  took  full 


3io  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

23  March  advantage  of  the  unique  targets  offered  to  them.  Enemy 
airmen  were  numerous  over  the  front  and  the  Corps  aero- 
planes were  involved  in  many  combats,  but  were  seldom 
prevented  from  fulfilling  their  tasks.  A  typical  example  of 
the  part  played  in  the  battle  by  the  pilots  and  observers  of 
the  Corps  squadrons  may  be  quoted.  Lieutenants  W.  E. 
Joseph  and  G.  W.  Owen  of  No.  35  Squadron  made  two 
contact-patrol  flights  in  front  of  the  XIX  Corps  in  the 
afternoon.  Their  first  began  at  2  p.m.  and  ended  at 
3.35  p.m.   Here  is  their  report: 

'2.25.  Bridge  at  o  15a  7.9.  [map  reference  of  a  bridge  over 
the  Somme  north  of  Eterpigny]  seen  to  be  de- 
stroyed. 

2.35.  Large  numbers  of  enemy  infantry  advancing  in 
o  1 1  a  and  b  [north  of  Le  Mesnil].  300  rounds  fired 
into  these. 

2.40.  Many  infantry  seen  advancing  west  of  Mons-en- 
Chaussee.  Dropped  four  25-lb.  bombs  on  them 
causing  many  casualties  and  scattering  them.  Fired 
150  rounds  into  them. 
3.5.  Mass  of  enemy,  about  2,000,  advancing  west  of 
Mons  in  o.27d  [towards  Brie  on  the  Somme].  Sent 
'LL'  call  which  was  answered  by  field  batteries  [the 
'LL'  signal  called  upon  all  available  batteries  to 
open  fire  on  a  very  favourable  target]. 

3.15.  Attacked  by  7  enemy  aircraft  (Scouts)  at  300  feet 
and  followed  as  far  as  Foucaucourt.    Total  of  700 
rounds  fired  into  enemy  infantry. 
Visibility: — Poor.   Height  800  feet.' 

The  two  officers  went  away  again  at  4.10  p.m.  for  an  hour 
and  ten  minutes  and  reported : 

'4.15.  Bridge  at  Brie  seen  to  have  been  destroyed.  5  tanks 
seen  east  of  Brie  bridge. 

4.30.  Attacked  by  2  enemy  aircraft  which  retreated  but 
returned  directly  with  5  more. 

4.45.  Dropped  message  sending  S.O.S.  to  field  batteries 
on  large  mass  of  enemy  infantry  (about  3,000  yards) 
advancing  in  V2  central  [north-east  of  Athies].  Also 
sent  call  by  wireless  which  was  answered.   4  25-lb. 


i9i8]  BOMBING  OPERATIONS  311 

bombs  dropped  on  enemy  at  V2  central  causing  23  March 
casualties.  350  rounds  fired  at  enemy  infantry. 
Visibility: — Fair.  Height  500  feet.' 
Special  low-flying  attacks  on  the  Fifth  Army  front  on  the 
23rd  were  made  by  No.  24  (S.E.5)  Squadron,  while  No.  84 
(S.E.5a)  and  other  squadrons  combined  low-flying  attacks 
with  offensive-patrol  duties.  No.  24  Squadron  sent  up  four 
aeroplanes  at  intervals  of  two  hours  throughout  the  day 
from  8.50  a.m.  and  their  pilots  found  ample  targets, 
especially  along  the  St.  Quentin-Amiens  road.  Soon  after 
midday,  a  formation  of  twelve  S.E.5a's  of  No.  84  Squad- 
ron, flying  north-west  of  Ham,  saw  two  columns  of 
marching  troops  east  of  Voyennes  and  dived  and  attacked. 
'Large  swarms  of  enemy  troops  were  then  observed 
'advancing  across  fields  near  Viefville',  mostly  in  bodies 
about  300  strong,  and,  for  twenty  minutes,  until  their 
ammunition  gave  out,  the  S.E.5  a  pilots  flew  as  they  liked 
in  a  series  of  relentless  attacks  on  the  German  troops. 
Elsewhere,  by  other  pilots,  500  mules  were  bombed  and 
stampeded,  and  cavalry  were  attacked  and  scattered  (by 
eight  Spad  pilots  of  No.  23  Squadron).  In  the  evening, 
at  6.15  p.m.,  eleven  S.E.5a's  of  No.  84  Squadron,  out 
on  offensive  patrol  with  forty  bombs  slung  under  their 
fuselages,  found  and  attacked  many  targets  of  troops  and 
transport. 

The  day  bombing  squadron — No.  49 — of  the  III 
Brigade  made  two  raids,  one  in  the  morning  against  Oisy 
le  Verger,  north-west  of  Cambrai,  with  eleven  D.H.4's, 
when  many  hits  were  made  on  the  village  and  dump,  and 
one  in  the  afternoon  when  five  D.H.4's  bombed  the  de- 
training centre  at  Queant. 

No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron  made  four  bombing  flights  on 
the  Fifth  Army  front,  mainly  in  an  attempt  to  stem  the 
rush  of  reinforcements  towards  the  Peronne  area.  Villers- 
Faucon,  Roisel,  Templeux-le-Guerard,  Vendelles,  Bernes, 
Marquaix,  Vermand,  Tincourt-Boucly,  and  Tertry,  and 
troops  and  transport  on  the  roads  in  their  neighbourhood, 
were  the  targets  of  this  squadron,  which  dropped  a  total 
of  twenty  112-lb.  and  four  hundred  and  sixty-four  25-lb. 
bombs.  North  of  the  main  battle  area,  Haubourdin,  near 


3i2  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

23  March  Lille,  was  twice  attacked  by  D.H.4's  of  No.  18  Squadron 
(I  Brigade)  and  Lille  station  twice  by  D.H.4's  of  No.  57 
Squadron  (II  Brigade). 

The  objectives  of  the  day  bombers  of  the  head-quarters 
Ninth  Wing  squadrons  on  the  23rd  were  once  again  the 
railway  junctions  at  Wassigny,  Busigny,  and  Le  Cateau.  In 
the  morning  six  D.H.4's  of  No.  27  Squadron  attacked  Le 
Cateau  and  five  Busigny.  Wassigny  was  attacked  twice 
by  No.  25  Squadron,  in  the  morning  by  nine  D.H.4's  and 
in  the  afternoon  by  five  D.H.4's.  In  the  afternoon,  also, 
a  German  camp  south-east  of  Cambrai  was  attacked  by 
No.  27  Squadron.  All  the  day  bombing  by  the  D.H.4's 
was  made  from  heights  between  14,000  and  16,000  feet. 

There  was  more  air  fighting  on  the  23  rd  than  on  the 
first  two  days  of  the  battle,  and  all  combats  took  place  at 
heights  under  10,000  feet.  Fighting  was  most  severe  on 
the  front  of  the  Third  Army  involving  the  fighter  squad- 
rons of  the  Thirteenth  Wing,  and  six  squadrons  from  the 
I  Brigade  (Nos.  2  and  4  Australian,  No.  3  Naval  and  Nos. 
22,  40,  and  43). l  In  addition,  offensive  formations  of  the 
Ninth  Wing  took  part  in  the  fighting  on  the  Third  Army 
front.  Offensive  patrols  as  ordered  for  the  squadrons  of 
this  head-quarters  wing  were  to  cover  at  intervals  the  lines 
between  Havrincourt  Wood  and  Brissy,  south-east  of  St. 
Quentin,  with  other  patrols  between  St.  Simon  and  Roisel 
and  between  St.  Quentin  and  Gonnelieu.  Records  are  not 
available  to  show  how  far  the  patrols  took  place  as  ordered, 
but  there  are  accounts  of  successful  combats  to  show  they 
were  made  at  least  in  part.  An  analysis  of  the  combat 
reports  shows  that  a  total  of  thirty-nine  German  aero- 
planes were  claimed  as  destroyed  along  the  whole  British 
front.  Of  this  number  three  only  were  shot  down  outside 
the  battle  area  (on  the  Second  Army  front),  while  twenty- 
eight  were  accounted  for  on  the  Third  Army  front.2 

1  On  the  23rd  the  III  Brigade  with  the  Third  Army  was  reinforced  by 
No.  60  (S.E.5a)  squadron  from  the  II  Brigade  and  by  Nos.  43  ('Camel') 
and  22  (Bristol  Fighter)  squadrons  from  the  I  Brigade.  These  squadrons 
did  not  operate  under  III  Brigade  orders  until  the  24th. 

2  General  Ludendorff's  son  was  one  of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  victims. 
In  his  book,  My  War  Memories,  p.  602,  General  LudendorfT  says:  'the 


i9i8]  EXPLOITING  A  GAP  313 

The  Royal  Flying  Corps  casualties  were,  in  comparison,  23-24 
not  heavy.    Five  aeroplanes  were  missing,  twenty-eight  March 
wrecked  from  all  causes,  and  five  (temporarily  unservice- 
able) burnt  or  abandoned.   These  losses  occurred  on  the 
Third    and    Fifth   Army   fronts    except    six    aeroplanes 
wrecked  in  the  northern  area. 

During  the  night  of  the  23rd/24th  of  March  No.  101 
Squadron  could  do  no  bombing  because  it  had  to  shift 
quarters  from  its  aerodrome  at  Catigny  to  Fienvillers,  but 
the  F.E.2b's  of  No.  102  Squadron  tried  to  make  up  for  the 
absence  of  No.  101  Squadron.  The  targets  were  German 
billeting  villages  in  the  northern  area  of  the  battle-front 
opposite  the  Third  Army  and,  between  8  p.m.  on  the 
23rd  and  5  a.m.  on  the  24th,  six  hundred  and  sixty- 
three  25-lb.  bombs  were  dropped  on  these  villages,  and 
14,000  rounds  of  ammunition  fired  by  No.  102  Squadron. 
Other  night  bombing  was  done  north  of  the  battle  area  by 
various  squadrons,  notably  by  twelve  F.E.2b's  of  No.  58 
(head-quarters)  Squadron  which  bombed  dumps  at  Bis- 
seghem  and  Iseghem,  starting  a  fire  in  the  latter  place 
which  burned  throughout  the  night. 

On  Sunday  the  24th  of  March  the  situation  between 
Peronne  and  the  Bapaume-Cambrai  road,  that  is,  the  area 
covering  the  junction  between  the  Third  and  Fifth  Armies, 
became  extremely  critical.  At  2.30  a.m.  on  the  24th  the 
V  Corps,  the  right  of  the  Third  Army,  reported  that 
the  enemy  had  penetrated  to  Bus,  though  only  in  small 
numbers,  but  it  was  not  until  about  8  a.m.  that  the 
seriousness  of  the  German  thrust  into  the  southern  part 
of  the  Third  Army  area  was  revealed  to  an  air  observer 
of  No.  15  Squadron.  He  was  over  the  front  at  7.45  a.m. 
and  saw  that  the  enemy  was  in  strength  in  Sailly-Saillisel 
and  was  advancing  north  and  west  of  the  village.  British 
troops  were  seen  to  be  trying  to  extend  their  right 
flank  from  Rocquigny  towards  Sailly-Saillisel.   This  news 

'battle  cost  me  a  great  deal  also.  My  wife's  youngest  son  fell  on  the  23rd. 
'He  was  a  flying  officer  and  was  at  first  reported  missing.  On  the  battle-field 
'we  found  a  grave  with  the  English  inscription:  "Here  rest  two  German 
'flying  officers."  I  had  the  sad  task  of  identifying  my  son.  Now  he  rests  in 
'German  soil.' 


3  H  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

24  March  was  grave.  The  enemy  seemed  to  be  thrusting  a  wedge 
between  the  two  armies  at  a  place  left  vacant  by  the  Third 
Army,  and  was  threatening  to  widen  the  breach  by  push- 
ing the  Third  Army  towards  the  north-west.1  Thereafter 
the  air  reports  revealed  the  development  of  the  threat. 
At  10  a.m.  an  observer  of  No.  8  Squadron  said  that  Clery, 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Somme,  had  fallen,  and,  about 
an  hour  later,  another  aeroplane  was  heavily  engaged  by 
German  anti-aircraft  fire  when  trying  to  make  a  recon- 
naissance of  Combles.  In  the  early  afternoon  it  was  known 
that  Combles  had  fallen  and  that  German  troops  were 
pushing  north  to  Lesboeufs,  which  fell  at  3.45  p.m.  Orders 
now  went  out  to  the  V  and  IV  Corps  Commanders  of  the 
Third  Army  to  retire  and  establish  the  approximate  line 
Bazentin-Martinpuich-le  Sars-Grevillers-Sapignies.  The 
retirement  went  on  under  extreme  difficulties,  and  that 
the  enemy  would  lose  no  time  in  following  up  his  advan- 
tage was  clear  from  air  reports  in  the  late  afternoon.   At 
5.10  p.m.  he  was  reported  from  the  air  on  the  line  Le 
Transloy-Lesboeufs-Ginchy-Combles-Maurepas-Clery- 
sur-Somme,  but  there  was  a  westward  movement  to  Guil- 
lemont  from  Combles  of  3,000  cavalry.  Other  reports  told 
of  an  advance  in  force  from  Combles  towards  Maricourt 
and  from  Lesboeufs  towards  Longueval.  The  Third  Army 
staff,  when  sending  out  the  air  information  by  wire  at 
6.43  p.m.,  stated  that  the  Fifth  Army  had  ordered  cavalry 
to  hold  Maricourt  and  try  to  block  these  two  roads,  that 
the  Tank  Corps  at  Bray-sur-Somme  were  sending  out  all 
the  men  they  could  scrape  together,  with  machine-guns, 
to  hold  the  line  Fricourt-Contalmaison,  and  instructed 
the  V  Corps  to  appoint  an  officer  as  Officer  Commanding 
Albert,  charged  with  the  duty  of  organizing  all  available 

1  A  special  order  of  the  day,  to  all  ranks  of  the  British  Army  in  France 
and  Flanders,  was  issued  by  Sir  Douglas  Haig:  'We  are  again  at  a  crisis  in' 
'the  war.  The  enemy  has  collected  on  this  front  every  available  division 
'and  is  aiming  at  the  destruction  of  the  British  Army.  We  have  already 
'inflicted  on  the  enemy  in  the  course  of  the  last  two  days  very  heavy  loss 
'and  the  French  are  sending  troops  as  quickly  as  possible  to  our  support. 
'I  feel  that  every  one  in  the  army  fully  realizing  how  much  depends  on  the 
'exertion  and  steadfastness  of  each  one  of  us  will  do  his  utmost  to  prevent 
'the  enemy  from  attaining  his  object.' 


i9i8]  LOW-FLYING  ATTACKS  315 

forces  to  delay  the  German  advance.1  Meanwhile,  also,  24  March 
the  36th  Division  was  being  hurried  forward  and  these 
various  troops  came  into  action  and  checked  the  enemy 
advance,  so  that  a  line  was  taken  up  and  held  from  Hem 
to  Trones  Wood  and  Longueval,  and  onwards  through 
Bazentin-High  Wood-Eaucourt  l'Abbaye  and  west  of 
Bapaume. 

Continuous  low-flying  attacks  with  bomb  and  machine- 
gun  were  made  throughout  the  day  on  the  advancing 
German  troops  in  this  area.  The  German  261st  Reserve 
Regiment  passed  through  Morval  at  12.30  p.m.  towards 
Ginchy.  'During  the  hot  hours  of  the  afternoon',  says  the 
regimental  history,  'there  was  a  pause,  especially  as  the 
'very  active  fighting  and  bombing  squadrons  of  the  enemy 
'in  the  clear  air  imposed  a  very  cautious  advance  on  us.' 
Farther  north,  the  52nd  Reserve  Regiment  came  under  air 
attack.  '4  p.m.  Advance  resumed  to  cross  the  Bapaume- 
'Peronne  road.  Hostile  airmen,  flying  low,  delay  the  march 
'with  machine-gun  fire  and  bombs,  especially  on  the 
'Transloy-Lesboeufs  road.' 

South  of  Peronne,  the  Somme  line  as  far  as  Epenancourt 
was  maintained  on  the  24th,  but  at  Pargny  the  enemy 
extended  his  hold  west  of  the  river  and  reached  Morchain, 
while,  farther  south,  strong  attacks  carried  the  German 
front  to  the  Libermont  Canal.  All  along  this  front,  where 
fighting  was  bitter,  enemy  aircraft  were  very  active  all  day, 
but  the  Corps  squadron  observers  reported  the  German 
movements  and,  with  the  fighting  pilots,  continuously 
bombed  the  enemy  troops.  At  Bethencourt,  where  British 
counter-attacks  prevented  the  enemy,  for  some  time,  from 
exploiting  his  crossing  of  the  river,  an  observer  of  No.  35 
Squadron  called  up  the  1 14th  Siege  battery  and  proceeded, 
until  he  was  wounded  by  fire  from  the  ground,  to  direct 
the  guns  on  the  Bethencourt  bridge.  The  battery  kept  up 
its  fire  from  2.30  p.m.  to  5.45  p.m.  and  did  much  to  im- 
pede the  enemy  advance  in  this  sector.   While  this  firing 

1  On  the  23rd  orders  had  been  issued  by  the  Third  Army  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  new  line  of  defence  northwards  from  the  Somme  at  Suzanne. 
All  available  labour  was  concentrated  on  this  work,  including  all  balloon 
companies  (except  No.  28  Section)  with  the  Third  Army. 


316 


THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 


24  March  was  in  progress  another  observer  of  the  same  squadron 
reported  German  troops  massing  for  attacks  at  Bethen- 
court  and  Pargny,  and  low-flying  aeroplanes  were  at  once 
sent  out  to  attack  them.  There  is  some  evidence  from  the 
German  side  of  the  effect  of  the  air  attacks.  The  12th 
Grenadier  Regiment  crossed  at  Pargny  and  Bethencourt 
about  5  p.m.  'During  the  advance',  says  the  regimental 
history,  'one  Company  lost  twelve  killed  and  eight 
'wounded  by  air  bombs.'  A  Bugler  in  the  8th  Grenadier 
Regiment  gives  a  colourful  account  of  the  fortunes  of  his 
company  in  the  advance.  'As  we  were  moving  forward 
'again',  he  says,  'towards  the  firing  line  after  crossing  the 
:Somme,  there  suddenly  appeared  before  us  some  twenty 
;British  aeroplanes  which  dived  to  a  height  of  about  100  to 
:200  metres,  and  then,  continuing  to  within  2-3  metres  of 
:the  ground,  attacked  us  with  their  rnachine-guns.  At 
'first  we  thought  they  intended  to  land;  but  we  speedily 
'saw  the  danger,  and  opened  a  vigorous  fire  upon  them. 
:Several  "Tommies"  flew  so  low  that  the  wheels  of  their 
Aeroplanes  touched  the  ground.  My  company  com- 
mander, Lieutenant  Nocke,  had  to  fling  himself  flat  on 
the  ground,  but  for  all  that  he  was  struck  on  the  back  by 
'the  wheels  of  one  machine,  thus  being  literally  run  over. 
'Not  far  from  me  an  aeroplane  appeared  at  about  one 
:metre  above  the  ground,  making  straight  for  me  and  for 
the  moment  I  did  not  know  in  what  direction  to  throw 
:myself :  the  pilot  appeared  determined  to  run  over  me. 
'At  the  last  moment  I  was  able  to  spring  clear  as  the 
'machine  whizzed  past  me  and  through  the  firing-line.  It 
then  turned,  climbed  a  little,  and  sought  to  repeat  the 
'manoeuvre,  whereupon  it  was  hit  by  one  of  the  companies 
'firing  on  our  left  and  brought  down.  In  all,  five  enemy 
'machines  were  shot  in  our  Battalion's  area.'1 

The  main  bombing  by  the  head-quarters  squadrons  was 
once  again  directed  against  railway  junctions.  Aulnoye 
was  attacked  by  six  D.H.4's  of  No.  25  Squadron,  and 
Landrecies  by  ten  D.H.4's  of  No.  27  Squadron.  The 
formation   of  No.    27   Squadron  was   attacked   on   the 

1  Low-flying  aeroplanes  were  shot  down  in  this  area  as  follows:  No.  35 
Squadron,  3;  No.  48,  1;  No.  54,  i;  No.  62,  i,-and  No.  73,  1. 


i9i8]  AIR  FIGHTING  INCREASES  317 

homeward  journey  by  eleven  enemy  aeroplanes  and  two  24  March 
of  the  D.H.4's  were  damaged  and  a  pilot  and  observer 
wounded.  No.  49  Squadron,  in  the  Third  Army  area, 
made  two  raids,  on  the  railway  at  Aubencheul  (eight 
D.H.4's),  and  on  the  station  at  Que^ant  (eleven  D.H.4's).1 
No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron,  on  the  Fifth  Army  front,  attacked 
the  St.  Quentin  Canal  bridges  between  Bantouzelle  and 
Bellicourt  and  the  railway  station  at  Roisel.2 

Air  fighting  on  the  24th  showed  a  marked  increase,  much 
of  it  taking  place  at  heights  under  5,000  feet.  A  total  of 
forty-two  German  aeroplanes  were  claimed  as  destroyed,  of 
which  twenty-four  were  shot  down  on  the  front  of  the 
Third  Army  and  seventeen  on  the  front  of  the  Fifth  Army. 
The  Royal  Flying  Corps  losses  for  the  whole  front  for  the 
24th  were  eleven  aeroplanes  missing,  forty-six  wrecked, 
and  eight  burnt  or  abandoned.  Of  this  total  thirteen  were 
wrecked  and  one  abandoned  on  the  front  north  of  the 
battle  area. 

A  pilot  of  No.  43  ('Camel')  Squadron,  which  had  newly 
reinforced  the  Third  Army  squadrons,  created  a  record  by 
shooting  down  six  German  aeroplanes  in  one  day.  He  was 
Captain  J.  L.  Trollope  and  the  reports  of  his  combats  read 
as  follows: 

'11  a.m.  Whilst  leading  my  patrol  east  of  Mercatel,  I 
saw  three  D.F.W.'s  some  way  away  trying  to  cross  the 
line.  I  worked  round  east  and  attacked  one,  but  was 
forced  by  gun- jambs  to  break  off.  I  corrected  my  guns 
and  then  attacked  another  D.F.W.  I  fired  about  100 
rounds  at  point-blank  range.  Enemy  aircraft  went  down 
in  a  spin  and  broke  up  about  1,000  feet  below  me.  This 
was  seen  by  Lieutenant  Owen. 

'I  then  attacked  another  D.F.W.  with  Lieutenant  Owen 
and  after  firing  75  rounds,  the  machine  burst  into  flames 
and  fluttered  down  on  fire.  This  was  confirmed  by 
Lieutenant  Owen  who  also  engaged  it.  I  then  saw  an 
Albatros  Scout  coming  down  on  to  one  of  our  formations. 

1  The  total  of  bombs  dropped  on  the  24th  by  all  squadrons  of  the  III 
Brigade  was:  eight  112-lb.  and  one  thousand  and  twenty-two  25-lb. 

2  The  total  for  the  V  Brigade  was:  four  112-lb.  and  five  hundred  and 
twenty-eight  25-lb.  bombs. 


318  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

24-25  'I  dived  on  him  and  fired  about  100  rounds.  Enemy  air- 
March  <craft  fell  completely  out  of  control.  This  was  seen  to 
'crash  by  Captain  Woollett. 

'3.20  p.m.  When  I  was  leading  my  patrol  over  Sailly- 
'Saillisel  at  about  6,000  feet,  I  saw  four  enemy  aircraft 
'two-seaters  trying  to  interfere  with  R.E.8's.  I  dived 
'down  with  my  formation  and  attacked  one  enemy  aircraft. 
'I  fired  a  short  burst  at  close  range  and  the  enemy  machine 
'fell  to  bits  in  the  air.  I  saw  two  of  my  patrol  engaging  the 
'other  three  two-seaters  at  close  range  and  I  saw  two 
'enemy  aircraft  go  down  completely  out  of  control  and 
'crash.  I  gathered  all  my  patrol  and  flew  about  looking  for 
'the  other  enemy  aircraft. 

'I  saw  two  pink  two-seaters  below  me  very  close  to  the 
'ground :  I  attacked  each  in  turn  from  about  20  feet  and 
'they  both  nose-dived  into  the  ground  and  I  saw  both 
'crash.  I  climbed  up  and  saw  the  rest  of  my  patrol  engaged 
'by  a  large  formation  of  enemy  aircraft  scouts.  I  got  into 
'the  scrap  and  was  forced  to  return  through  lack  of 
'ammunition.' 

Bombing  was  continued  along  the  whole  front  during 
the  night  of  the  24^/25  th  of  March.  No.  101  Squadron 
dropped  two  hundred  and  eighty-eight  25-lb.  bombs  on 
Somme  bridges  and  on  roads  to  the  east,  and  claimed  four 
hits  on  the  bridge  at  Bethencourt.  No.  102  Squadron 
attacked  billets  and  transport  on  the  congested  Bapaume- 
Cambrai  road  with  twenty- four  1 12-lb.  and  three  hundred 
and  eighty-eight  25-lb.  bombs.  During  the  night  the 
enemy  bombers  scored  a  success:  between  8.40  p.m.  and 
1  a.m.  an  unknown  number  of  heavy  bombs  fell  on  Amiens 
and  on  Longueau,  the  railway  triangle  to  the  south-east. 
The  main  damage  was  at  Longueau,  where  an  ammunition 
train  of  forty-one  trucks  blew  up  with  consequent  damage 
to  the  railway  track  which  interrupted  traffic  until  II  a.m. 
on  the  25th.1 

At  1 1.20  p.m.  on  the  24th  General  Head-quarters  issued 

1  In  a  memorandum  dated  the  2nd  of  June  1918  General  Plumer  quoted 
this  attack  on  Longueau  as  an  example  of  the  dislocation  which  can  be 
caused  by  bombing  an  important  railway  centre.  'The  attack',  he  said, 
'was  not  continued  long  enough  to  produce  anything  like  decisive  results.' 


1918]  CRISIS  319 

orders  that  the  VII  Corps  together  with  all  troops  of  the  25  March 
Fifth  Army  operating  north  of  the  Somme  (including 
No.  8  Squadron,  Royal  Flying  Corps)  was  to  come,  hence- 
forth, under  the  orders  of  the  Third  Army  Commander. 
The  Cavalry  Corps  was  to  assemble  under  the  Third  Army 
for  the  protection  of  the  right  flank.  The  orders  also 
stated  that  the  French  Commander-in-Chief  had  agreed 
to  take  over  the  front  south  of  Peronne,  and  the  Fifth 
Army,  therefore,  was  to  come  under  the  direction  of 
General  Fayolle,  commanding  the  Group  of  Armies  of 
Reserve.  These  readjustments  of  command  took  effect  on 
the  25th  of  March.1 

The  news  that  came  in  during  the  25th  was  increasingly 
grave.  A  great  bulge  towards  Roye  was  made  into  the  line 
of  the  French  Third  Army  (General  Humbert)  which  had 
taken  over  the  right  of  the  British  Fifth  Army,  and  the 
separation  of  the  British  and  French  armies  was  threatened. 
Even  more  serious  was  the  rapid  exploitation  of  gaps  on 
the  Third  Army  front  which  took  the  enemy  troops 
forward  to  the  Ancre.  The  massing  of  the  enemy  for  the 
determined  attacks  on  the  V  and  IV  Corps  of  the  Third 
Army  had  been  reported  by  No.  59  Squadron.  The  first 
aeroplane  of  this  squadron  left  the  ground  at  5.55  a.m. 
and,  at  7.30  a.m.,  the  observer  reported  great  concentra- 
tions of  German  infantry  on  both  sides  of  the  Cambrai  road 
just  east  of  Bapaume.  He  sent  a  wireless  call  for  fire  by  all 
guns  that  could  be  brought  to  bear,  and  also  dropped  a 
message  giving  the  information  to  the  nearest  British  in- 
fantry with  a  request  that  they  should  pass  on  the  news 
to  batteries  in  the  neighbourhood.  Messages  were  also 
dropped  on  the  corps  and  divisions.  No  fire  was  brought 
to  bear  in  answer  to  these  messages  while  the  observer  was 
still  over  the  area.  By  the  afternoon  the  line  was  crumb- 
ling between  Montauban  and  Ervillers.  Everywhere  great 

1  'The  Fifth  Army  was  thus  cut  off  from  General  Head-quarters  as 
'regards  military  operations,  and  General  Head-quarters  gave  up  all 
'responsibilities  for  the  British  troops  under  my  command  south  of  the 
'Somme. . . .  Placing  the  Fifth  Army  under  Fayolle's  group  of  armies  made 
'no  material  difference.  He  issued  no  orders  to  me,  and  I  only  saw  him 
'once  for  a  few  minutes.'  (The  Fifth  Army,  General  Sir  Hubert  Gough, 
pp.  291-2.) 


32o  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

2$  March  masses  of  enemy  in  this  area  were  reported  by  the  Corps 
squadron  observers.  At  2  p.m.  columns  were  advancing  on 
Achiet-le*-Grand.  At  the  same  hour  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  informed  the  Third  Army  that  there  were  about 
10,000  German  troops  attacking  the  IV  Corps  between 
Bapaume  and  Ervillers.  Eight  wireless  calls  from  air 
observers  on  the  Third  Army  front  were  answered 
throughout  the  day,  and,  as  a  result,  direct  hits  were 
made  on  columns  of  German  infantry  north  of  the 
Bapaume-Cambrai  road. 

It  was  on  this  day,  and  against  the  great  German  effort 
to  break  in  at  the  junction  of  the  VII  and  V  Corps 
of  the  Third  Army,  that  the  maximum  possible  weight 
of  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons  was  diverted  to 
low-flying  attacks.  As  soon  as  the  danger  was  revealed 
Major-General  J.  M.  Salmond,  after  consultation  with  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  sent  a  message  (timed  11.5  a.m.), 
by  hand,  to  the  Officer  Commanding  the  Ninth  Wing  as 
follows :  'I  wish  you  as  soon  as  you  can  after  receipt  of  this 
'to  send  out  your  scout  squadrons  and  those  of  No.  27, 
'No.  25,  and  No.  62  Squadrons  that  are  available  on  to  the 
'line  Grevillers  (just  west  of  Bapaume)-Martinpuich- 
'Maricourt.  These  squadrons  will  bomb  and  shoot  up 
'everything  they  can  see  on  the  enemy  side  of  this  line. 
'Very  low  flying  is  essential.  All  risks  to  be  taken.  Urgent.' 

Furthermore,  ten  squadrons  (including  five  Corps  squad- 
rons)1 from  the  I  Brigade  operating  from  the  First  Army 
area,  and  two  squadrons  from  the  V  Brigade,  made  a  con- 
centrated effort  to  help.  All  this  was  additional  to  the 
operations  of  the  squadrons  of  the  III  Brigade  working 
with  the  Third  Army.  'Camels',  S.E.5's,  Bristol  Fighters, 
R.E.8's,  D.H.4's,  and  Sopwith  'Dolphins'  were  flown  over 
the  enemy  at  low  heights,  and  pilots  fired  all  their  am- 
munition at,  and  dropped  all  their  bombs  on,  the  plentiful 
targets  offered  to  them,  and  then  returned  to  their  landing- 

1  The  Corps  squadrons  were  Nos.  2,  4,  5,  16,  and  42.  Three  pilots  and 
two  observers  were  wounded,  and  one  pilot  and  observer  missing,  all  due  to 
fire  from  the  ground.  The  use  of  Corps  squadron  aeroplanes  for  this  work, 
for  which  they  were  unsuited,  is  eloquent  of  the  grave  emergency  which 
existed. 


i9i8]       LOW-FLYING  CONCENTRATIONS       321 

grounds  to  reload.1  It  is  impossible  to  give  specific  details  25  March 
of  the  effects  of  the  aircraft  attacks,  but  the  targets  were  so 
exceptional  and  the  pilots  fulfilled  their  orders  with  such 
determination  that  their  great  influence  on  the  day's  battle 
cannot  be  disputed.  The  battalions  of  the  German  2nd 
Guards  Reserve  Regiment  reached  camp  south-east  of 
Bapaume  in  the  early  morning.  'The  stay',  says  the  regi- 
mental history,  'in  the  hut  camps  east  of  Bapaume  was 
'not  very  pleasant  because  airmen  bombed  us  causing 
'heavy  losses.'  The  248th  Reserve  Regiment  rested  east  of 
the  Martinpuich-Bazentin-le-Petit  road.  'The  strong 
'activity  of  the  airmen  was  most  unpleasant',  they  record : 
'A  squadron  of  about  fifteen  machines  harassed  us  with 
'bombs  and  machine-gun  fire  against  which  our  machine- 
'gun  fire  was  powerless.'  Says  the  52nd  Reserve  Regiment : 
'6  a.m.  Advance  westwards  continued.  After  only  twenty 
'minutes'  marching  the  first  hostile  airmen  flying  low  'ap- 
'pear  and  seek  to  delay  the  advance  with  machine-gun  fire. 
'There  were  about  25  airmen  over  the  regiment.  There 
'is  only  a  little  cover.'  The  same  regiment  approached 
Thiepval  in  the  afternoon  and  records :  'The  English  ad- 
'vance  from  Thiepval  to  counter-attack.  They  are  re- 
'pulsed.  This  afternoon  the  hostile  airmen  are  present  in 
'crowds.  We  count  more  than  thirty  above  us  at  the  same 
'time.' 

Owing  to  the  diversion  of  the  activities  of  the  day- 
bombing  squadrons  on  the  25th  to  attacks  on  ground 
targets,  little  distant  bombing  was  undertaken.  No.  49 
Squadron,  from  the  III  Brigade,  attacked  the  stations  at 
Cambrai  and  Queant.  On  the  Fifth  Army  front  No.  5 
(Naval)  Squadron  made  a  morning  raid  on  hutments  and 

1  Writing  to  Major-General  Sir  Hugh  Trenchard  on  the  night  of  the 
25th,  Major-General  J.  M.  Salmond  said:  'I  am  out  of  touch  with  the  3rd 
'Brigade  and  9th  Wing.  I  hope  this  connexion  will  be  rectified  in  an  hour 
'or  two.  I  am  out  of  touch  with  the  5  th  Brigade.  This  should  be  connected 
'again  by  to-morrow  morning.  I  can  tell  you  this,  however,  that  we 
'managed  to  concentrate  100  machines  on  the  threatened  line  in  the  3rd 
'Army.  They  had  orders  to  fly  low  and  to  take  every  risk ;  nothing  was  to 
'count  in  carrying  out  their  duties.  I  had  news  from  the  I  Brigade  that  our 
'machines  were  so  thick  over  this  point  that  there  was  every  danger  of 
'collision  in  the  air  .  .  .' 

2504.4  V 


322  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE         [ch.  vii 

25-26  troops  in  the  villages  of  Tertry,  Monchy,  Athies,1  and 

March  Mons-en-Chaussee,  but  in  the  afternoon  the  squadron's 

bombing  was  diverted  to  the  critical  sector  on  the  Third 

Army  front  and  troops  were  attacked  on  the  Peronne- 

Bapaume  road. 

It  was  clear  on  the  evening  of  the  25th  of  March  that 
the  enemy  was  concentrating  his  effort  against  the  VII 
and  V  Corps  on  the  new  Third  Army  front,  and  a 
further  massing  of  troops  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Bapaume  was  reported.  It  was  known  also  that  traffic 
movements  were  centring  on  Peronne.  The  two  night- 
bombing  squadrons,  therefore,  were  ordered  to  con- 
centrate all  their  efforts  during  the  25th/26th  on  these 
towns  and  were  told  to  make  as  many  trips  as  possible. 
The  night  was  stormy,  with  hail  and  snow,  but  pilots  of 
No.  1 01  Squadron  dropped  one  hundred  and  sixty-eight 
25-lb.  bombs  on  Peronne,  while  No.  102  Squadron  attacked 
Bapaume  with  four  112-lb.  and  two  hundred  and  fifteen 
25-lb.  bombs.  No.  83  Squadron,  of  the  IX  Brigade, 
attacked  the  dumps  at  Marquion  on  the  Arras-Cambrai 
road,  with  three  230-lb.  and  twenty-seven  25-lb.  bombs. 
Three  pilots  of  No.  58  Squadron  of  the  same  brigade 
attacked  the  aerodrome  at  Avelin,  south  of  Lille.2 

On  the  26th  of  March  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  activities 
were  again  mainly  concentrated  on  low  bombing  and 
machine-gun  attacks  to  stem  the  advance  against  the  VII 
and  V  Corps.3  The  head-quarters  day-bombing  squadrons 
had  orders,  issued  on  the  evening  of  the  25th,  to  attack 
Bapaume  and  Peronne  from  low  heights  and  as  frequently 

1  The  regimental  history  of  the  100th  Grenadier  Regiment  says:  'Early 
'in  the  day  the  I  and  II/100  were  ordered  to  assemble  near  Athies  and 
'suffered  losses  of  8  officers  and  125  men  in  a  few  seconds  from  air  bombs.' 
The  air  report  of  the  pilot  who  bombed  Athies  says :  'Three  bombs  burst 
'among  troops  and  transport  in  fields  on  the  side  of  the  road.' 

2  Two  Flights  of  No.  58  Squadron  had  been  transferred  to  the  aero- 
drome of  No.  102  Squadron  at  le  Hameau  for  work  on  the  Third  Army 
front,  and  the  third  Flight  to  Auchel,  the  aerodrome  of  No.  83  Squadron. 

3  At  2.20  a.m.  on  the  26th  the  Third  Army  Commander  issued  orders 
'that  every  effort  was  to  be  made  to  check  the  enemy's  advance,  disputing 
'the  ground.  No  retirement  was  to  take  place  unless  the  tactical  situation 
'imperatively  demanded  it.' 


i9i8]  HELP  FOR  THE  THIRD  ARMY         323 

as  possible  with  the  object  of  dislocating  traffic,  and  the  26  March 
head-quarters  fighter  squadrons  were  ordered  to  make  low- 
flying  attacks  against  troops  north  of  the  Somme.  But 
later  in  the  evening  of  the  25th,  when  a  further  massing  of 
German  troops  west  of  Bapaume  was  reported,  all  head- 
quarters squadrons  were  newly  instructed  as  follows:  'A 
'concentration  of  enemy  troops  has  been  located  just  west 
'of  Bapaume.  Every  available  machine  of  the  Ninth  Wing 
'will  leave  the  ground  so  as  to  attack  this  concentration  at 
'dawn  with  bombs  and  small-arms  ammunition  and  break 
'it  up  before  any  attack  develops.'  At  the  same  time  the 
hard-pressed  remnants  of  the  Fifth  Army  were  called 
upon  to  make  a  contribution  to  resist  this  threat  north 
of  the  Somme.  The  General  Officer  Commanding  the 
V  Brigade  received  the  following  message  from  Major- 
General  J.  M.  Salmond.  'A  very  large  concentration  is 
'reported  just  west  of  Bapaume.  The  Chief  of  the  General 
'Staff  is  anxious  that  every  available  machine  exclusive  of 
'those  required  immediately  by  the  Army  concerned 
'should  be  concentrated  on  this  area.  I  have  been  in 
'touch  with  the  22nd  Wing  and  have  ordered  them  to 
'send  every  available  machine  out  at  dawn  to  bomb  and 
'shoot  up  this  area.  Will  you,  therefore,  concentrate  every 
'available  Corps  machine  you  can  at  dawn  on  the  same  area 
'and  keep  it  up  throughout  the  day.' 

All  available  squadrons  of  the  III  Brigade  with  the 
Third  Army — except  No.  13  (Corps)  Squadron  and  six 
fighter  squadrons — were  given  orders  for  low-flying  attacks, 
and  reinforcements  were  drawn  upon  from  the  two 
brigades  to  the  north.  Except  the  Corps  squadrons,1  all 
squadrons  of  the  I  Brigade  from  the  First  Army  area  took 
part  in  the  low-flying  operations  on  the  26th  and  four 
squadrons  (Nos.  1,19,  20,  and  57)  from  the  II  Brigade  with 
the  Second  Army  reinforced  the  I  Brigade  and  took  part 
in  the  low-flying  attacks  on  the  Third  Army  front. 

The  squadrons  from  the  Fifth  Army  which  flew  over  the 
Third  Army  front  in  the  morning  were  three,  Nos.  5 
(Naval),  54  and  84,  and  made  up  a  total  of  twenty-seven 

1  Corps  squadrons  of  the  I  Brigade  did,  in  fact,  drop  seventy-three  20-lb. 
bombs  on  targets  on  the  Third  Army  front  after  4  p.m. 


324  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE         [ch.  vii 

26  March  squadrons  specifically  engaged  on  the  26th  of  March  on 
the  offensive  against  ground  targets  on  the  Third  Army 
front.1  In  addition,  the  Third  Army  had  six  fighter  squad- 
rons (Nos.  22,  41,  43,  56,  60,  and  64)  which  were  engaged 
on  offensive  patrols  over  the  army  front  on  the  26th,  plus 
the  services  of  one  night-bomber  squadron  (No.  102)  and 
the  partial  services  of  two  others  (Nos.  58  and  83).  Thus, 
out  of  a  total  of  sixty  squadrons  with  the  armies  on  the 
Western  front,  the  Third  Army,  on  the  26th  of  March, 
called  on  the  services  of  no  fewer  than  thirty-seven  (in- 
cluding No.  13  Squadron).  This  leaves  out  of  account  a 
certain  amount  of  bombing  on  the  Third  Army  front  by 
the  Corps  squadrons  of  the  First  Army. 

The  three  squadrons  which  flew  up  from  the  Fifth 
Army  front  in  the  morning  did  good  work.  Two  attacks, 
each  by  five  D.H.4's,  were  made  by  No.  5  (Naval)  Squad- 
ron. In  the  second  attack  direct  hits  were  made  on  an 
ammunition  dump  at  Pozieres  and  other  direct  hits  on  a 
convoy  on  the  road  between  Pys  and  le  Sars.  A  German 
officer  of  the  Field  Artillery  records :  'At  Pozieres  station 
'on  our  left  hostile  airmen  had  bombed  and  set  fire  to 
'several  trains  containing  ammunition  and  supplies;  con- 
'tinual  heavy  explosions  could  be  heard  which  destroyed 
'one  wagon  after  another.'  Troops  and  transport  in  the 
Pozieres  area  had  been  attacked  between  6  and  7  a.m.  by 
No.  54  Squadron  and,  at  the  same  time,  eleven  S.E.5  pilots 
from  No.  84  Squadron  were  flying  up  and  down  the 
Bapaume-Albert  road  continuously  attacking  German 
troops.  These  three  squadrons  then  went  back  to  the 
Fifth  Army  area  where  there  was  more  than  enough  work 
to  occupy  their  full  attention. 

The  two  head-quarters  day-bombing  squadrons  (Nos.  25 
and  27)  dropped  a  total  of  forty-six  1 1 2-lb.  and  one  hundred 
and  ninety-three  25 -lb.  bombs  on  Bapaume,  Peronne,  and 
Biefvillers-les-Bapaume ;  the  Third  Army  day-bomber 
squadron  (No.  49)  dropped  fourteen  11 2-lb.  and  fifteen 
25-lb.  bombs  on  Bapaume;  the  Second  Army  day-bomber 

1  III  Brigade,  Nos.  3,  46,  70,  11,  49,  8,  12,  15,  and  59;  I  Brigade,  Nos.  3 
(Naval),  2  (A.F.C.),  4  (A.F.C.),  40,  18;  II  Brigade,  Nos.  1,  19,  20,  57; 
V  Brigade,  Nos.  54,  84,  5  (Naval);  IX  Brigade,  Nos.  62, 73, 79, 80, 25,  and  27. 


i9i8]  THIRD  ARMY  CRISIS  ENDS  325 

squadron  (No.  57)  attacked  the  same  objective  with  twenty-  26  March 
eight  112-lb.  bombs;  and  the  First  Army  day-bomber 
squadron  (No.  18)  dropped  twenty-nine  112-lb.  and  two 
hundred  and  twelve  25-lb.  bombs  on  Bapaume  and  its 
neighbourhood.  In  addition,  some  nine  hundred  light- 
weight bombs  were  dropped  by  the  various  other  squad- 
rons attacking  on  this  front,  and  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
million  rounds  of  machine-gun  ammunition  were  fired 
from  the  air  on  German  troops. 

On  this  day  the  crisis  on  the  Third  Army  front  may 
be  said  to  have  ended.  In  the  morning  the  enemy  had 
poured  through  the  gap  on  the  V  Corps  front  between 
Beaumont-Hameland  Puisieux-au-Mont,  but  the  situation 
was  restored  by  Australian  and  New  Zealand  troops  and  the 
line,  north  of  Albert,  acquired  a  degree  of  stability.  South 
of  Albert,  owing  to  a  misunderstanding,  the  VII  Corps 
retreated  in  the  afternoon  from  the  Bray-sur-Somme- 
Albert  line,  and  before  the  withdrawal  could  be  stopped, 
the  right  of  the  Corps  had  reached  the  Somme  at  Sailly-le- 
Sec  thus  uncovering  the  left  flank  of  the  XIX  Corps  which 
was  at  Proyart  five  miles  up  the  river.1 

The  Fifth  Army,  now  reduced  to  the  XIX  Corps  and 
fragments  of  the  XVIII  and  III,  ordered  to  hold  the 
approaches  to  Amiens  at  all  costs,  was  in  desperate  straits 
throughout  the  26th.  On  the  previous  day  the  Fifth  Army 
Commander  had  begun  to  collect  a  force  made  up  of  strag- 
glers, school  personnel,  engineers,  &c,  together  with  the  6th 
U.S.  (Railway)  Engineer  Regiment  and,  on  the  26th,  under 
the  command  of  Major-General  P.  G.  Grant,  the  Chief 
Engineer  of  the  Fifth  Army,  this  force  prepared  the  old 
line  of  the  Amiens  defences  from  Mezieres  to  the  Somme 
at  Hamel.  Later,  Brigadier-General  G.  G.  S.  Carey,  an 
officer  of  field  artillery  returning  from  leave,  took  charge 
of  this  force  which  he  commanded  in  the  subsequent 
fighting.  These  were  the  only  British  reserves  (strength, 
2,200)  available  to  General  Gough. 

In  the  morning  of  the  26th  the  enemy  began  an 
advance  towards  Roye  with  the  object  of  separating  the 

1  The  withdrawal  of  the  VII  Corps  was  watched  and  reported  by 
observers  of  No.  8  Squadron. 


326  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

26  March  British,  from  the  French  and  with  the  further  object  of 
capturing  Montdidier  and  so  cutting  the  lateral  railway 
communications.  The  seriousness  of  the  threat  at  Roye, 
where  a  gap  was  forced,  was  indicated  in  an  air  report 
received  by  the  Fifth  Army  Commander  at  10.30  a.m. 
This  told  of  great  German  forces  concentrating  on  Roye 
from  north-east,  east,  and  south-east,  and  revealed  that 
the  direction  of  the  French  retirement  was  south-west 
towards  Montdidier  while  the  British  withdrawal  was  in  a 
north-west  direction  towards  Amiens.  Meanwhile,  there 
were  heavy  attacks  also  on  the  XIX  Corps  northwards 
from  Hattencourt  to  the  Somme.  By  the  afternoon  this 
Corps  had  retreated,  fighting  all  the  way,  to  the  line 
Froissy-Proyart-Rosieres-en-Santerre-Rouvroy  -  en  -  San  - 
terre  with  a  four-mile  gap  on  its  right,  south  of  which  the 
XVIII  Corps  was  in  retirement.  The  XIX  Corps  held  its 
ground  despite  the  fact  that  its  left  flank  was  also  in  the  air 
with  the  VII  Corps  five  miles  in  a  straight  line  nearer  Amiens 
north  of  the  river.  It  was  not  until  9  p.m.  on  the  26th  that 
the  XIX  Corps  Commander  became  aware  of  the  full  ex- 
tent of  the  retirement  of  the  VII  Corps  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river,  and  he  thereupon  asked  for  help  to  protect  his 
left  flank.  In  answer  to  his  request  he  was  given  300  men 
of  Carey's  force  and  fifty  machine-gunners. 

The  Royal  Flying  Corps  squadrons  co-operating  with 
the  Fifth  Army  were  three  Corps  squadrons  (35,  52,  and 
82),  five  fighter  squadrons  (23,  24,  48,  84,  and  54),  one 
day-bomber  squadron  (5  Naval),  and  one  night-bomber 
squadron  (101).  Contact  patrols  of  the  three  Corps 
squadrons  with  the  Fifth  Army  followed  the  compli- 
cated ground  movements,  and  continuously  harassed  the 
oncoming  Germans  with  bomb  and  machine-gun.  In 
the  morning,  while  No.  84  Squadron  was  away  north  of 
the  river  attacking  troops  on  the  Bapaume-Albert  road, 
No.  24  (S.E.5)  Squadron  was  similarly  engaged  against 
German  infantry  on  the  northern  part  of  the  Fifth  Army 
front.  Nos.  23  (Spad),  48  (Bristol  Fighter),  and  54 
('Camel')  Squadrons  also  attacked  ground  targets  along 
the  whole  of  the  Fifth  Army  front.  When  it  became  clear 
from  the  air  reports  that  the  enemy  had  forced  a  gap  at 


i9i8]  GENERAL  FOCH  327 

Roye,  all  squadrons  were  called  upon  to  concentrate  their  26  March 
efforts  to  stem  the  German  advance  in  this  area.  One  pilot 
made  a  landing  at  the  old  aerodrome  at  Champien,  east  of 
Roye,  but  got  off  again  quickly  when  a  group  of  German 
staff  officers  galloped  across  the  aerodrome.  Four  German 
infantry  battalions,  reported  from  the  air  to  be  'debussing' 
on  the  Nesle-Roye  road  at  2.25  p.m.,  were  made  a  special 
target  and  suffered  from  an  intensive  bombing  effort,  par- 
ticularly by  D.H.4's  of  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron.  No.  5 
(Naval)  Squadron  also  bombed  the  bridges  over  the  Somme 
east  of  the  Fifth  Army  front. 

Enemy  air  activity  on  the  26th  was  comparatively  slight. 
'There  are  many  British  but  no  German  flying  men  up', 
complains  a  history  of  the  German  2nd  Foot  Guards 
Regiment.  The  III  Royal  Flying  Corps  Brigade  Com- 
mander noted  the  enemy  air  activity  as  'slight  on  the 
'whole',  while  the  V  Brigade  Commander  described  it  as 
'normal'  on  his  front.  On  the  Fifth  Army  front  No.  24 
Squadron  alone  had  decisive  combats,  shooting  down  four 
enemy  aeroplanes  while  on  low-flying  work.  On  the  Third 
Army  front  offensive  patrols,  some  of  them  at  a  low  height 
to  protect  the  low-flying  aircraft,  were  made  by  forma- 
tions of  Nos.  22,  41,  43,  56,  60,  and  64  Squadrons.  The 
only  fighting  throughout  the  day  by  these  patrols  fell  to  a 
formation  of  nine  Bristol  Fighters  of  No.  22  Squadron 
which,  in  the  morning,  found  five  Pfalz  scouts  east  of 
Albert  and  destroyed  three  of  them.  A  contact-patrol 
aeroplane  of  No.  59  Squadron  accounted  for  an  Albatros 
fighter  which  attacked  it,  and  six  other  German  aeroplanes 
were  destroyed  in  the  Bapaume  area  by  pilots  engaged  on 
low-flying  attacks  against  ground  targets.  The  Flying 
Corps  casualties  in  aircraft  for  the  day  on  the  battle-front 
were  thirteen  aeroplanes  missing,  twenty-six  wrecked,  and 
eleven  (unserviceable)  burnt  or  abandoned.  Outside  the 
battle-front  four  aeroplanes  were  wrecked. 

It  was  on  the  26th  of  March  that  General  Ferdinand 
Foch  was  appointed  to  co-ordinate  the  efforts  of  the  Allied 
Armies  on  the  Western  front.  On  the  24th  at  11  p.m.  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  had  met  General  Petain  and  had  explained 
his  plan  of  operations.  The  Third  Army  was  to  fall  back,  if 


328  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

24-26  pressed,  pivoting  on  its  left,  but  all  available  troops  of  the 
March  Yvcst  and  Second  Armies  were  to  be  assembled  near  Arras 
to  counter-attack  southwards  if  the  Germans  got  near 
Amiens.  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  invited  the  French  Com- 
mander-in-Chief to  co-operate  by  concentrating  a  large 
force  astride  the  Somme  near  Amiens.  General  Petain  had 
been  cautious.  While  he  agreed  to  give  General  Fayolle, 
south  of  the  Somme,  all  available  troops,  he  stated  that  he 
had  instructed  him,  if  necessary,  to  fall  back  southwards  on 
Beauvais  to  cover  Paris.  This  was  extremely  grave  news. 
It  could  only  mean  separation  between  the  French  and 
British  armies.  Sir  Douglas  Haig  went  back  at  once  to  his 
advanced  head-quarters  and  telegraphed  to  the  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff  (General  Sir  Henry  H.  Wilson) 
and  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  (Lord  Milner)  to 
come  to  France.  Lord  Milner  had,  in  fact,  left  London 
at  12.50  p.m.  on  the  24th  at  the  request  of  the  Prime 
Minister,  to  find  what  the  position  was  and  to  report  to  the 
Cabinet.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  25th  there  was  a  con- 
ference at  Petain's  head-quarters  at  Compiegne  at  which 
Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  Sir  Henry  Wilson  could  not  be  pre- 
sent. At  noon  next  day,  the  26th  of  March,  a  further  con- 
ference followed  at  Doullens.1  It  was  there  agreed  that 
every  effort  must  be  made  to  save  Amiens  and  it  was 
decided  that  General  Foch  should  be  appointed  to  co- 
ordinate the  action  of  all  the  Allied  Armies  on  the 
Western  front.2 

There  was  a  great  amount  of  night  bombing  on  the 
26th/27th  of  March.  No.  83  Squadron,  and  the  one  Flight 
of  No.  58  Squadron  operating  from  the  same  aerodrome  at 
Auchel  (Lozinghem)  under  orders  to  concentrate  every 
effort  to  impede  the  passage  of  troops  and  transport 

1  Monsieur  Poincare,  President,  in  the  chair.  Present:  M.  Clemenceau, 
M.  Loucheur,  Lord  Milner,  and  Generals  Haig,  Foch,  Weygand,  Petain, 
and  Wilson. 

2  The  formula,  dictated  by  M.  Clemenceau  and  written  by  M.  Loucheur 
read:  'Le  general  Foch  est  charge  par  les  gouvernements  britannique  et 
'francais  de  coordonner  Taction  des  armees  alliees  sur  le  front  ouest.  II 
Ventendra  a  cet  effet  avec  les  generaux  en  chef,  qui  sont  invites  a  lui 
'fournir  tous  les  renseignements  necessaires.'  On  the  3rd  of  April  General 
Foch  was  given  'la  direction  strategique  des  operations  militaires'. 


i9i8]  NIGHT  BOMBING  329 

through  Bapaume,  dropped  six  230-lb.,  ten  112-lb.,  and  26-27 
two  hundred  and  ninety-nine  25-lb.  bombs  on  the  town.  March 
The  remaining  two  Flights  of  No.  58  Squadron,  from  the 
aerodrome  at  le  Hameau,  attacked  troops  and  transport 
on  the  Bapaume-Albert  and  Peronne- Albert  roads,  and 
also  bombed  Peronne,  Albert,  and  Courcelette.  Pilots  of 
these  two  Flights  made  a  total  of  twenty-five  journeys 
during  which  they  dropped  twenty- two  112-lb.  and  two 
hundred  25-lb.  bombs  and  fired  many  rounds  from  their 
machine-guns  from  a  few  hundred  feet.  No.  58's  total  for 
the  night  of  fifty  hours  flying  was  a  record  for  this  squad- 
ron which  endured  to  the  end  of  the  war.  The  objectives 
of  No.  102  Squadron  were  the  villages  of  Mametz,  Mari- 
court,  Fricourt,  and  Suzanne,  and  roads  in  their  neigh- 
bourhood and,  between  9.  n  p.m.  and  5  a.m.  forty  trips 
were  made  by  the  squadron's  pilots  who  dropped  thirty- 
nine  112-lb.  and  two  hundred  and  forty-six  25-lb.  bombs. 
One  pilot  found  a  convoy,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  long,  near 
Courcelette  and  scored  direct  hits  on  the  column  with 
one  112-lb.  and  two  25-lb.  bombs.  Another  pilot  saw 
troops,  estimated  at  two  battalions,  in  a  field  and  on  the 
road  near  Mametz  Wood.  He  went  down  low  over  them 
and  he  and  his  observer  expended  all  their  machine-gun 
ammunition  against  the  German  infantry. 

No.  101  Squadron  (V  Brigade)  was  ordered  by  Royal 
Flying  Corps  head-quarters  to  attack  Ham  as  heavily  and 
continually  as  possible,  paying  particular  attention  to  the 
roads  through  the  town  and  the  bridges  over  the  Somme. 
But  after  the  attacks  on  Ham  had  begun,  the  squadron 
received  instructions  to  direct  all  its  further  efforts  against 
Cambrai  instead.1  'It  is  hoped',  said  the  Royal  Flying 
Corps  head-quarters  message,  'that  a  record  number  of 
'bombs  will  be  dropped.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
'to  delay  enemy  reinforcements  coming  up  at  this  crisis, 
'and  inflict  casualties  on  him.'  Bombing  by  the  squadron 
was  continuous  for  seven  hours  and  five  hundred  and  two 

1  Abnormal  train  movements  southwards  from  Lille  were  reported  from 
the  air  on  the  25th.  It  was  known  that  heavy  reinforcements  were  arriving 
at  Cambrai.  Actually  between  the  25th  and  27th  nine  new  divisions  re- 
inforced the  German  Second  Army  on  the  Cambrai  front. 


330  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

26-27  25 -lb.  bombs  were  dropped  on  Ham  and  Cambrai,  where 
March  great  activity  was  seen.  Two  hits  were  obtained  on  a 
train  in  Cambrai  station,  another  on  a  canal  bridge  in 
the  town,  five  hits  on  a  column  of  transport  moving 
into  the  town,  two  on  a  train  at  Marquion,  and 
another  on  a  dump  which  blew  up.  In  addition  to  the 
bombing,  over  4,000  rounds  of  machine-gun  ammunition 
were  fired  at  moving  lights  in  the  towns  of  Cambrai  and 
Ham.  The  operations  of  the  squadron  were  hindered  to 
some  extent  by  the  frequent  passage  over  the  aerodrome  of 
enemy  bombing  aircraft  on  their  way  to  the  British  rail- 
way lines  of  communication.  One  pilot  of  No.  101  Squad- 
ron met  an  enemy  aeroplane,  showing  navigation  lights, 
and  attacked  it  at  close  range.  One  hundred  rounds  were 
fired  by  the  observer  from  twenty-five  yards  and  the  enemy 
aeroplane  went  down  steeply  and  appeared  to  crash. 

North  of  the  battle  area,  Corps  squadrons  of  the  I  and 
II  Brigades  attacked  billets  and  rail-heads.  The  I  Brigade 
objectives  were  chiefly  the  railway  stations  at  Don, 
Annoeullin,  Provin,  and  Brebieres.  While  aeroplanes  of 
No.  16  Squadron  were  landing,  about  10  p.m.  on  the 
26th,  after  bombing  attacks,  enemy  aeroplanes  dropped 
twenty  bombs  on  their  aerodrome  at  Camblain-l'Abbe  and 
damaged  ten  aircraft.  The  II  Brigade  squadrons  attacked 
the  Roulers-Menin  railway  and  a  dump  at  Beythem. 

Two  Naval  Handley  Page  squadrons  (Nos.  7  and  14) 
also  took  part  in  the  bombing  of  German  communications. 
A  telegram  from  the  Air  Ministry  to  Major-General  J.  M. 
Salmond  on  the  26th  had  stated :  'Admiralty  have  agreed 
'to  squadrons  allotted  for  the  bombing  of  Bruges  being 
'used  for  the  present  for  any  other  purpose  you  may  con- 
sider necessary.'  On  receipt  of  this  message  the  Senior 
Naval  Air  Service  Officer  at  Dunkirk  had  been  instructed 
as  follows :  'As  many  Handley  Pages  as  possible  will  bomb 
'the  main  railway  station  at  Valenciennes  to-night.  It  is 
'of  the  very  greatest  importance  to  interrupt  the  flow  of 
'reinforcements  to  the  main  battle-front  through  Valen- 
'ciennes  and  every  endeavour  must  be  made  therefore  to 
'carry  out  as  heavy  an  attack  as  possible.'  Five  Handley 
Pages  from  each  squadron  made  their  attacks  about  mid- 


i9i8]       AMIENS  AS  GERMAN  OBJECTIVE       331 

night.  Three  pilots  failed  to  find  their  objective  and  26-27 
bombed  instead  trains  and  junctions  at  Lens,  Lille, March 
Ostricourt,  Tournai,  and  trains  on  the  St.  Quentin- 
le  Cateau  railway.  Tournai  was  seen  to  be  particularly 
congested  with  railway  traffic  and  twelve  112-lb.  bombs 
dropped  there  appeared  to  do  much  damage.  The  seven 
pilots  who  reached  Valenciennes  found  the  railway  junc- 
tion packed  with  traffic,  and  several  hits  from  their  four 
250  lb.  and  seventy-six  112-lb.  bombs  were  claimed  on 
the  station  and  among  trains  in  the  sidings. 

The  critical  front  from  now  onwards  was  south  of  the 
Somme.  'The  enemy  north  of  the  Somme',  says  General 
Ludendorff,  'formed  a  fresh  front,  which  was  sure  to  be 
'difficult  to  overcome.  In  the  direction  of  Amiens  the 
'enemy's  resistance  seemed  weaker.  The  original  idea  of 
'the  battle  had  to  be  modified,  and  the  main  weight  of  the 
'attack  rigorously  directed  on  that  point.'1 

North  of  the  Somme  on  the  27th  there  was  little  change 
in  the  situation.  During  the  night  of  the  26th/27th  the 
enemy  had  taken  Albert,  but  his  many  attempts  to  de- 
bouch from  the  town  on  the  27th  were  beaten  off  with 
heavy  loss.  Farther  north,  as  a  result  of  strong  attacks 
which  began  at  midday  the  enemy  took  possession  of 
Ablainzevelle  and  Ayette,  but  all  other  attacks  were  re- 
pulsed.2 The  fighting  on  the  Third  Army  front  was 
followed  and  reported  by  the  contact-patrol  aeroplanes  of 
the  Corps  squadrons  which  also  made  attacks  on  enemy 
infantry  formations  from  low  heights.  A  number  of  wire- 
less calls  for  artillery  fire  were  answered,  notably  east  of 
Albert  and  near  Hebuterne,  where  concentrated  artillery 
fire  was  brought  to  bear  on  German  troops  moving  to 
attack. 

Once  again,  the  main  flying  work  on  the  Third  Army 
front  was  directed  against  ground  targets.  The  whole  area 

1  My  War  Memories,  p.  599. 

2  A  Third  Army  telegram  sent  out  at  1 1. 1 3  a.m.  on  the  27th  said:  'It  is 
'to  be  distinctly  understood  that  no  retirement  from  our  present  position  is 
'permissible.  All  officers  and  other  ranks  are  to  be  made  to  understand  this. 
'Most  stringent  orders  must  be  issued  by  all  commanders  to  this  effect  and 
'officers  who  fail  to  observe  the  spirit  of  this  order  are  to  be  relieved  of  their 
'commands.' 


332  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

27  March  east  of  Albert  seems,  from  a  reading  of  the  air  reports,  to 
have  been  thick  with  troops,  and,  from  dawn,  low-flying 
attacks  in  this  neighbourhood  were  continuous.  The 
German  regimental  histories  make  many  references  to 
these  air  attacks  and  tell  of  'considerable  losses'  and  the 
difficulties  they  imposed  on  the  advance.  Many  other 
attacks  were  made  in  the  Bapaume  area.  The  two  head- 
quarters day-bombing  squadrons,  Nos.  25  and  27,  operated 
on  the  Third  Army  front.  No.  25  attacked  Bapaume  and 
Cambrai,  and  No.  27  Squadron  bombed  troops  and 
transport  in  the  Albert-Bray  area.  No.  57  day-bombing 
Squadron,  from  the  II  Brigade,  attacked  Bapaume  and 
other  squadrons  of  the  same  brigade  (Nos.  I,  19,  and  20) 
dropped  one  hundred  and  eleven  25 -lb.  bombs  on  various 
targets  on  the  Third  Army  front.  The  Corps  squadrons  and 
fighter  squadrons  of  the  I  Brigade,  on  the  left  of  the  Third 
Army  front,  once  again  did  much  of  their  flying  over  the 
Third  Army  area  in  attacks  on  ground  targets,  but  also 
operated  over  the  northern  flank  of  the  Fifth  Army  front. 
One  or  two  examples  may  be  given,  from  many  hundreds 
of  similar  ones,  to  illustrate  these  low-flying  attacks : 

No.  4  {Australian  Flying  Corp)  Squadron.1 

'Lieutenant  F.  J.  Scott  dropped  bombs  on  troops  and 
'transport  on  Albert-Bray  road,  just  outside  Bray,  from 
'1,200  feet  at  12  noon.  Direct  hits  were  observed.  Fired 
'400  rounds  at  troops  and  transport  on  road  just  west  of 
'Bray  from  800  feet. 

'Second  Lieutenant  A.  E.  Robertson  dropped  a  bomb 
'on  a  store  dump  just  north  of  Thiepval  from  1,000  feet  at 
'11.45  a.m.   Explosion  observed  in  corner  of  dump. 

'Lieutenant  G.  M.  Elwyn  dropped  bombs  on  mechanical 
'transport  parked  in  Bray  from  1,500  feet  at  8.30  a.m. 
'One  bomb  caused  a  fire.  Fired  500  rounds  on  troops 
'leading  north  from  Bray.' 

1  Statistics  available  for  this  squadron  on  the  27th  of  March  may  be 
quoted  as  an  example  of  the  work  done  by  the  fighting  squadrons.  Sixteen 
available  pilots  did  an  aggregate  of  seventy  hours' war  flying.  In  the  four  days 
25th-28th  of  March  an  average  of  fifteen  available  pilots  flew  a  total  of 
201  hours  20  minutes. 


i9i8]  LOW-FLYING  ATTACKS  333 

No.  19  Squadron.  27  March 

'Patrol  proceeded  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Albert  and 
'dropped  a  total  of  34  bombs  on  enemy  troops  in  massed 
'formation  along  the  roads  leading  into  Albert,  and  in  the 
'neighbourhood  of  Mametz.  The  German  infantry  were 
'seen  to  scatter  and  to  run  about  looking  for  cover,  while 
'in  one  case  a  large  fire  was  seen  to  break  out  east  of  Albert. 
'A  total  of  2,450  rounds  were  also  fired  into  enemy  troops 
'marching  along  the  roads  in  the  same  neighbourhood  and 
'many  casualties  were  seen. 

'Captain  J.  Leacroft,  leading  the  patrol,  dropped  four 
'bombs  on  the  Albert-Pozieres  road  where  very  large 
'numbers  of  German  infantry  were  seen  to  be  massed.  .  .  . 
'With  the  Bristol  Fighters  above,  and  in  and  out  a  circus 
'of  other  machines,  he  repeatedly  dived  at  the  German 
'troops,  firing  700  rounds  into  them  from  under  1,000  feet, 
'and  noticed  many  casualties.' 

No.  40  Squadron. 

'Captain  G.  H.  Lewis  fired  in  all  500  rounds  at  various 
'targets  on  the  Arras-Cambrai  road.  He  attacked  a  gun 
'which  was  being  dragged  across  country  by  eight  horses, 
'causing  a  stampede.  One  horse  was  seen  to  be  killed. 
'Only  small  bodies  of  troops  seen.  Enemy  trenches  by 
'Courcelles-le-Comte  seemed  very  full  and  two  ambulances 
'were  seen  going  east  from  them.  Saw  an  enemy  aircraft 
'two-seater  on  the  ground  near  Wancourt  and  fired  into  it. 
'Enemy  anti-aircraft  fire  very  active. 

'Lieutenant  Warden  was  diving  down  on  enemy  trans- 
'port  in  a  side  road  at  Achiet-le-Grand  (transport  going 
'south),  when  8  enemy  aircraft  scouts  approached  from  the 
'south.  He  attacked  enemy  aircraft  with  two  Dolphin 
'machines,  and  sent  one  down  in  flames. 

'Lieutenant  W.  L.  Harrison  fired  about  200  rounds  at 
'troops  and  transport  at  Ervillers,  scattering  troops,  and 
'transport  came  to  a  standstill.  6  Triplanes  and  6  Albatros 
'Scouts  seen.  He  attacked  and  brought  down  an  Albatros 
'Scout  out  of  control.' 

One  of  the  Corps  pilots  from  the  I  Brigade  (Second 
Lieutenant  Alan  Arnett   McLeod,  a   Canadian,  in  an 


334  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

27  March  Armstrong- Whitworth  of  No.  2  Squadron),  while  on  his 
way  to  take  part  in  the  attacks  on  German  infantry  east  of 
Albert,  gained  the  Victoria  Cross  for  the  following  exploit, 
in  which,  it  would  seem,  Baron  von  Richthofen's  forma- 
tion (Jagstaffel  11)  was  involved.1 

Whilst  flying  with  his  observer  (Lieutenant  A.  W. 
'Hammond,  M.C.),  attacking  hostile  formations  by  bombs 
'and  machine-gun  fire,  he  was  assailed  at  a  height  of  5,000 
'feet  by  eight  enemy  triplanes,  which  dived  at  him  from 
'all  directions,  firing  from  their  front  guns.  By  skilful 
'manoeuvring  he  enabled  his  observer  to  fire  bursts  at  each 
'machine  in  turn,  shooting  three  of  them  down  out  of 
'control.  By  this  time  Lieutenant  McLeod  had  received 
'five  wounds,  and  whilst  continuing  the  engagement  a 
'bullet  penetrated  his  petrol  tank  and  set  the  machine  on 
'fire.  He  then  climbed  out  on  to  the  left  bottom  plane, 
'controlling  his  machine  from  the  side  of  the  fuselage,  and 
'by  side-slipping  steeply  kept  the  flames  to  one  side,  thus 
'enabling  the  observer  to  continue  firing  until  the  ground 
'was  reached.  The  observer  had  been  wounded  six  times 
'when  the  machine  crashed  in  "No-Man's  Land",  and 
'Second  Lieutenant  McLeod,  notwithstanding  his  own 
'wounds,  dragged  him  away  from  the  burning  wreckage  at 
'great  personal  risk  from  heavy  machine-gun  fire  from  the 
'enemy's  lines.  This  very  gallant  pilot  was  again  wounded 
'by  a  bomb  whilst  engaged  in  this  act  of  rescue,  but  he  per- 
severed until  he  had  placed  Lieutenant  Hammond  in 
'comparative  safety,  before  falling  himself  from  exhaustion 
'and  loss  of  blood.'2 

South  of  the  Somme  on  the  27th  of  March  the  enemy 
began  his  attacks  about  8.30  a.m.  on  the  Fifth  Army  and 
on  the  French  to  their  right.  As  the  line  along  which  the 
Fifth  Army  stood  would  preserve  Amiens  from  serious 
bombaidment,  orders  had  been  issued  for  every  effort  to 

1  Richthofen  claimed  three  personal  victories  on  the  27th,  all  in  the 
Albert  area,  but  this  aeroplane  of  No.  2  Squadron  would  appear  to  have 
fallen  to  some  other  member  of  his  squadron. 

2  Second  Lieutenant  McLeod  died  of  his  wounds  at  Winnipeg,  Canada, 
on  the  6th  of  November  191 8.  Lieutenant  A.  W.  Hammond,  after  the 
amputation  of  a  leg,  recovered. 


i9i8]        HELP  FOR  THE  FIFTH  ARMY  335 

be  made  to  hold  the  positions.  But  the  uncovering  of  the  27  March 
left  flank  of  the  Fifth  Army  by  the  mistaken  withdrawal  of 
the  right  Corps  of  the  Third  Army  from  Bray-sur-Somme 
on  the  previous  afternoon,  had  made  the  position  of  the 
Fifth  Army  troops  near  the  river  an  impossible  one.  The 
enemy  passed  infantry  across  the  Somme  to  the  south  bank 
and  thus  took  the  left  of  the  Fifth  Army  in  the  rear.  As  a 
result,  the  troops  at  Proyart  and  to  the  north  were  com- 
pelled to  fall  back.  Thence  the  enemy  tried  to  advance 
southwards  behind  the  British  line.  There  were  no  reserves 
behind  this  front,  other  than  what  was  left  of  Carey's 
force,  and  the  general  position  was  serious.  Troops  from  the 
1st  Cavalry  Division  were  thereupon  hurried  across 
the  river,  and  determined  counter-attacks  by  battalions  of 
the  8th  Division  and  of  the  66th  Division  brought  the 
enemy  to  a  halt  west  of  Framerville.  Elsewhere,  the  Fifth 
Army  divisions  fought  all  day  and  gave  little  ground, 
but,  on  their  right,  the  French  were  forced  to  give  way 
and  the  Germans  captured  Montdidier.  In  view  of  what 
the  Fifth  Army  had  suffered  from  the  day  the  German 
offensive  opened,  the  conduct  of  the  troops  on  the  27th, 
grey  with  utter  weariness,  was  magnificent. 

In  their  resistance  they  had  considerable  help  from  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps.  Whereas  on  the  previous  day  the 
main  weight  of  the  air  offensive  against  ground  targets  had 
been  centred  on  the  Third  Army  front,  chiefly  in  the 
Bapaume  area,  it  shifted,  on  the  27th,  to  the  Somme. 
Many  flights  were  made  by  aeroplanes  of  the  I,  II,  and 
III  Brigades  over  the  river,  particularly  in  the  area  where 
the  enemy  crossed  behind  the  left  flank  of  the  Fifth  Army. 
The  fighter  squadrons  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing 
were  also  diverted  to  the  area  Albert-Proyart  and  made 
continuous  attacks  throughout  the  day  on  German  troops 
and  transport.  Much  of  the  activity  of  the  Corps  squad- 
rons with  the  Fifth  Army  was  also  taken  up  with  bombing 
German  troops.  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron,  like  the  other 
D.H.4  squadrons,  gave  up  high  bombing  on  this  day  and 
made  five  raids  on  troops  and  transport  in  the  Somme  area, 
the  attacks  being  delivered  from  between  800  feet  and 
2,000  feet. 


336  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

27-28  There  were  a  few  offensive  patrols  on  both  the  Third 
March  anc[  Fifth  Army  fronts,  but  little  fighting  resulted  as 
enemy  aircraft  had,  like  ourselves,  deserted  the  upper  air 
and  were  chiefly  active  against  the  Royal  Flying  Corps 
low-flying  aeroplanes,  particularly  between  Albert  and 
the  Somme.  The  numbers  of  rounds  fired  from  aircraft 
machine-guns  against  ground  targets  on  this  day  (313,345) 
and  of  bombs  dropped  by  night  and  day  (50  tons)  were 
the  highest  for  the  battle.1 

The  orders  to  No.  101  Squadron  for  night-bombing  on 
the  27th/28th  of  March  stated:  'The  enemy  have  been 
'attacking  all  day  between  the  river  Somme  and  Rosieres 
'and  will  without  doubt  send  up  reinforcements  in  per- 
sonnel and  material  during  the  night  through  Peronne 
'and  along  the  main  Peronne-Amiens  road.  As  it  is  most 
'important  to  hamper  this  as  much  as  possible,  you  will 
'bomb  Peronne  and  the  bridge  over  the  river  Somme  at 
'Brie  throughout  the  night.'  No.  102  Squadron,  to 
hamper  the  movements  north  of  the  river,  was  given  the 
target  of  Bray  and  the  neighbouring  roads  and  villages. 
No.  83  Squadron  and  one  Flight  of  No.  58  from  Auchel 
(Lozinghem)  had  orders  to  bomb  the  main  roads  round 
Bapaume,  while  the  two  Flights  of  No.  58  at  le  Hameau 
were  to  attack  the  same  area,  but  also  to  extend  their  attacks 
southwards  to  Bray-sur-Somme.  The  night  was  stormy, 
but  840  bombs  were  dropped  on  these  various  targets,  and 
over  18,000  rounds  of  ammunition  fired.  Pilots  of  No. 
101  Squadron  found  great  activity  in  Peronne  and  made 
many  direct  hits  on  columns  of  transport.  A  large  tent 
encampment  near  the  town,  showing  lights,  was  hit  and 
partly  set  on  fire,  and  a  dump  at  Estrees-en-Chaussee, 
east  of  Brie,  was  also  fired  by  a  direct  hit  and  blazed 
throughout  the  night. 

In  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  March,  after  a  short  in- 
tensive bombardment,  the  enemy  widened  his  front  of 
attack  and  launched  a  series  of  assaults  at  Arras,  much 

1  The  approximate  figures  are:  21st  of  March,  21,000  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion against  ground  targets  and  15-J  tons  of  bombs;  22nd,  41,000,  21  tons; 
23rd,  44,000,  23  tons;  24th,  82,000,  36^  tons;  25th,  92,000,  33  tons;  26th, 
228,000,  29  tons;  27th,  313,000,  50  tons;  28th,  242,000,  40  tons. 


i9i8]  ATTACKS  AT  ARRAS  337 

on  the  lines  of  his  initial  attacks  on  the  21st.  But  there  28  March 
was,  this  time,  no  fog  to  impede  the  defence,  and  great 
losses  were  inflicted  on  the  German  troops  who  failed 
to  penetrate  the  battle  positions.  A  second  series  of 
attacks  in  the  late  afternoon  north  of  the  Scarpe  were 
everywhere  repulsed.  In  beating  off  the  German  assaults, 
the  infantry  were  helped  by  the  air  observers  of  the 
Corps  squadrons  and  of  the  balloon  sections  of  the  First 
Army.  Many  wireless  calls  for  fire  on  massed  German 
infantry  were  answered  by  the  artillery,  and  some  of  the 
attacks  were  consequently  disorganized  before  they  reached 
the  British  lines.1 

The  Arras  attack  involved  the  extreme  right  of  the 
First  Army  as  well  as  the  left  of  the  Third  Army.  The 
fighter  squadrons  of  the  I  Brigade,  working  with  the  First 
Army,  were  therefore  concentrated  on  low-flying  attacks 
in  the  Arras  area.  The  attacks  were  kept  up  most  of  the 
day  by  the  'Camels'  of  No.  4  (Australian  Flying  Corps) 
Squadron  and  No.  3  (Naval),  the  S.E.5a's  of  Nos.  1  (II 
Brigade)  and  40  Squadrons,  and  the  D.H.4's  of  No.  18 
Squadron,  while  No.  2  (Australian  Flying  Corps)  Squad- 
ron provided  S.E.5a  escorts  for  the  low  flyers.  S.E.5a 
pilots  of  No.  40  Squadron,  who  left  at  1.30  p.m.  to  patrol 
the  area  of  Arras,  found  the  main  Arras-Cambrai  road  and 
most  of  the  side  roads  full  of  troops  and  transport,  with 
the  Douai  main  roads  similarly  congested.  These  targets 
were  attacked  from  heights  down  to  300  feet  and  panic  and 
stampedes  were  reporteol.  These  troops  were  presumably 
moving  forward  to  take  part  in  the  attack  which  developed 
north  of  the  Scarpe  in  the  late  afternoon.  Elsewhere  on 
the  Third  Army  front  low-flying  attacks  on  the  Albert- 
Bapaume  road  were  made  by  twenty  reinforcing  aeroplanes 
of  the  II  Brigade,  and  on  Bapaume  itself  by  D.H#4's  of 
No.  57  Squadron.    The  Corps  squadrons  of  the  Third 

1  The  General  Staff  War  Diary  of  the  XVII  Corps — the  centre  of 
the  three  British  Corps  engaged — records:  'From  reports  subsequently 
'received  it  appears  that  our  machine-gun  fire  caused  great  loss  to  the  enemy ; 
'our  aeroplanes  also  sent  down  many  calls  to  the  artillery  against  enemy  in 
'mass  formations,  and  the  artillery  fire  undoubtedly  caused  considerable 
'loss.' 

2504.4  -r 


338  THE  GERMAN  OFFENSIVE        [ch.  vii 

28  March  Army  kept  to  their  normal  Corps  work,  but  five  of  the  army 
squadrons  were  used  specifically  for  attacks  on  ground 
targets  in  the  area  between  Courcelles-le-Comte  and  Bray- 
sur-Somme.  The  repulse  of  the  determined  attacks 
at  Arras  marked  the  end  of  the  main  battle  north  of  the 
Somme. 

South  of  the  Somme,  however,  the  fight  for  the  posses- 
sion of  Amiens  was  intensified.  During  the  night  of  the 
27th/28th  German  troops  had  worked  southwards  across 
the  Somme  and  had  reached  the  Amiens-St.  Quentin  road. 
With  daybreak  a  general  assault  on  the  Fifth  Army  and  on 
the  French  began,  and  a  wide  withdrawal  along  the  whole 
front  followed. 

The  fighting  squadrons  of  the  head-quarters  Ninth  Wing 
were  diverted  south  of  the  Somme,  while  the  head-quarters 
day-bombing  squadrons  were  ordered  to  keep  up  a  bom- 
bardment of  Peronne  and  Chuignolles  (north-east  of 
Proyart)  and  of  the  roads  in  their  neighbourhood.  Accord- 
ingly No.  25  (D.H.4)  Squadron  dropped  twenty-eight 
112-lb.  and  one  hundred  and  sixteen  25-lb.  bombs  and 
fired  7,000  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  No.  27  (D.H.4) 
Squadron  dropped  forty  112-lb.  and  fifty-six  25-lb.  and 
fired  11,000  ro'unds  of  ammunition  against  targets  of 
troops  and  transport  at  Peronne,  Chuignolles,  and  on  the 
roads  between,  and  on  the  roads  north-westward  of 
Chuignolles  towards  Albert.  The  fighter  squadrons  of  the 
Wing  operated  against  ground  targets  mainly  southwards 
from  Cerisy-Gailly. 

The  orders  for  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  squadrons  (Nos.  35, 
52,  and  82)  were  for  at  least  one  aeroplane  to  be  on  the 
line  for  contact-patrol  work  throughout  the  day  between 
the  Somme  and  Rosieres.  After  this  duty  had  been  pro- 
vided for,  the  Corps  squadrons  were  to  put  their  maximum 
effort  into  bombing  and  machine-gun  attacks  of  enemy 
troops.  'It  was  on  this  day,'  said  a  report  of  No.  52  Squad- 
ron, 'that  an  extraordinary  number  of  enemy  troops  were 
'reported  and  our  machines  had  a  field  day  attacking 
'columns  in  fours.  Heavy  casualties  were  inflicted  on 
'several  enemy  battalions  on  roads  near  Damery,  Becquigny, 
'and  Montdidier,  and  on  deploying  enemy  infantry  near 


i9i8]  A  CONTACT  PATROL  REPORT         339 

'Warfusee-Abancourt.1    112-lb.  bombs  were  dropped  on  28  March 
'the  Somme  bridge  at  Cerisy-Gailly  and  a  party  repairing 
'it  destroyed.'    No.   82   Squadron  maintained  a  careful 
watch  along  the  Fifth  Army  front  and  on  the  left  of  the 
French  front,  and  their  reports  kept  the  army  staff  in- 
formed of  the  progress  of  the  withdrawal.    A  typical 
report  of  this  squadron,  interesting  for  the  episode  of  the 
coming  into  action  of  the  British  guns,  may  be  given.  The 
pilot  was  Captain  E.  R.  H.  Pollak  and  the  observer  Second 
Lieutenant  F.  L.  Pascoe.  'At  II.15  a.m.,'  the  report  reads, 
our  troops  seen  advancing  north  taking  up  a  position  500 
yards  north  of  Marcelcave  station  in  3  lines  and  in  large 
numbers.   Large  number  of  troops  retiring  from  Bois  de 
Pierret  in  good  order.    Limbered  wagons  still  moving 
about  west  of  Wiencourt-l'Equipee.    Many  enemy  seen 
in  open  east  of  Lamotte.  Dropped  eight  bombs  and  fired 
400  rounds  on  them.    These  troops  in  thick  formation 
south  of  road  seemed  to  be  trying  to  advance.   Dropped 
message  on  three  batteries  by  railway  south  of  Villers- 
Bretonneux  aerodrome,  and  on  two  batteries  at  Bois  de 
Hamel,  giving  information  and  position  of  enemy.  These 
batteries  had  only  one  or  two  men  per  gun  who  halted 
and  went  into  action.'    Low-flying  attacks  on  the  Fifth 
Army  front  were  made  chiefly  by  Nos.  24  and  84  (S.E.5a) 
Squadrons,  and  by  D.H.4's  of  No.  5  (Naval)  Squadron. 
Pilots  of  the  last-named  squadron  dropped  four  112-lb. 
and  two  hundred  and  sixty  25-lb.  bombs  on  troops  and 
transport  at  Proyart,  Cerisy-Gailly,  and  on  the  Amiens- 
St.  Quentin  road. 

There  was  very  little  air  fighting  on  the  28th.  Large 
enemy  formations  were  reported  from  time  to  time  over 
the  Third  Army  front,  flying  higher  than  they  had  been 
doing  for  some  days,  but  they  seemed  to  avoid  combat 

1  The  German  4th  Guards  Division  attacked,  in  the  afternoon,  in  the 
area  of  Warfusee-Abancourt  with  the  German  1st  Division,  with  the  object 
of  capturing  Hamel.  The  enemy  attacks  were  beaten  off.  'The  intention', 
says  a  history  of  the  German  4th  Guards  Division,  'to  capture  the  hostile 
'positions  before  dark,  after  a  short  artillery  preparation,  was  not  successful 
'as  the  preparatory  f